Patton vs. Montgomery

[Strike For The South]

Did Montgomerys moive win best picture?

Oh, it didn't?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kh9S...eature=related

Patton was probably the last in a long line of Great Scotch-Irish military commanders we had from the south

alas

[MAJR]

Patton and Montgomery had different styles of offensives. If I had to characterise them then I would say Patton was like a heavyweight boxer always looking for the knock out punch while Monty was like a fencer riposting and parying blows until he wore his enemy down for the final blow. They worked well in different settings.

Montgomery often looked to shift the axis of his attack from flank to flank during battles. He always kept the initiative in his battles because he kept the enemy off ballance and reacting to what he was doing. In doing this he became known as the master of the "set-peice" battle while criticism emerged that he either did not understand or could not use mobile warfare but in truth it was not totally his fault. The British didn't have many talented armour commanders and, particularly in the case of El Alamein, when given the opportunity to encircle the enemy and trap them the armour simply became unruly and uncontrolable. The British Armour had evolved from the British Cavalry which had always been notorious for a lack of discipline and so it pretty much remained so Montgomery came to the conclusion that he couldn't trust his armour commanders not to do something stupid and decided it would be better to keep them on a tight leash, as such you never see him attempting ambitious maneuvers of mobile forces - save Market Garden.

Patton, on the other hand, was extremely good at exploitation, flanking and maneuver but when faced with an entrenched enemy in a set-peiece battle situation he proved to be lacking. When given wide country to drive through Patton was excellent and if you wanted someone to take you from point A to point B in the quickest possible time and damn the consequences then he was the guy you went to, and if you wanted someone to make the best of the exploitation phase of a battle almost won then Patton was your guy but he was prone to ignore orders if he wasn't the center of attention and go for targets that could get him personal glory even if it didn't help the Allied cause. To the other point, Patton proved at Brest and against the Metz fortifications in the Lorraine Campaign that when faced with a strongly entrenched enemy he simply had no clue of how to deal with them. He attacked them frontally, tried to use speed and overwhelming force to shift them but the problem was he only seem to know how to attack frontally and often peicemeal.

Of the two of them, however, only one of them scored a great battle victory over the enemy and only one of them was the principal architect of the Overlord plan and the Land Forces Commander for that operation and only one of them was an Army Group Commander and that was Montgomery. Patton, as far as the level he commanded at and the responsibilities he had to deal with, wasn't in the same league as Montgomery.

[Hooahguy]

Operation Goodwood.
'nuff said.

[PanzerJaeger]

Of the two of them, however, only one of them scored a great battle victory over the enemy and only one of them was the principal architect of the Overlord plan and the Land Forces Commander for that operation and only one of them was an Army Group Commander and that was Montgomery. Patton, as far as the level he commanded at and the responsibilities he had to deal with, wasn't in the same league as Montgomery.

Welcome to the .org MAJR!

This is a great point. Monty and Patton are often compared as equals, but by Normandy they occupied very different positions. Although, I would argue that while Husky may not have had the morale impact that El Alamein had, the latter didn't take any more military acumen to achieve and Patton's half of Husky was certainly hailed as a great battlefield victory. Further, Montgomery's Overlord revealed more weaknesses than strengths in his abilities. We will of course never know if Patton could have done better at grand strategy.

Operation Goodwood.
'nuff said.

That could be interpreted two different ways, depending on which side of the fence one sits regarding the intent of the operation.

[G. Septimus]

can I take an example?
Montgomery: :britain:
Failed to accomplish Market Garden
his most and yet famous battle, El Alamien, was fought between a few German Panzers and a heavy relief Force of Brits
did a good job for patting his Troops

Patton:usa:
did his best to hold out against an Elite SS Troop under Sepp Dietrich in Bastogne
Spearheaded Normandy
Encircled Sicily

[MAJR]

Welcome to the .org MAJR!

This is a great point. Monty and Patton are often compared as equals, but by Normandy they occupied very different positions. Although, I would argue that while Husky may not have had the morale impact that El Alamein had, the latter didn't take any more military acumen to achieve and Patton's half of Husky was certainly hailed as a great battlefield victory. Further, Montgomery's Overlord revealed more weaknesses than strengths in his abilities. We will of course never know if Patton could have done better at grand strategy.

On El Alamein.

The Panzer Armee Afrika had entrenched in the strongest defensive position yet seen in the war. Its flanks were secured by the Mediterranean to the north and the Qatarra Depression to the South and at its front had been laid the largest minefield of the war, further Rommel had organized his defensive line so that his strongest mobile armoured units were free and available to be deployed against any breakthrough attempt. The only way to get to the Panzer Army Afrika was to make avenues through the minefield - using bayonets to find the mines and hands to remove them - and advance through them. There is quite a strong arguement to be had that had Rommel not been in Germany on sick leave and had Stumme not died on the first day of the battle that the 8th Army's advance could have been stopped dead in the minefield.

The numerical advantage of the 8th was crucial to victory but the victory was not a foregone conclusion and people looking to lessen the worth of Montgomery had embelished the advantage he had - I have seen some people claim he had a 10 to 1 advantage. Montgomery did not have the 3 to 1 advantage accepted in military theory to insure victory. The actual numbers of the two forces were:

8th Army - 195,000 men, 1,029 tanks, 435 armoured cars, 530 servicable aircraft, 892 to 908 artillery pieces and 1,451 anti-tank guns

Panzer Army Afrika - 116,000 men, 547 tanks, 192 armoured cars, 480 servicable aircraft, 552 artillery pieces and 496 anti-tank guns.

Also the claims that the numerical superiorty was all that it took to win this battle conveniantly ignores the fact that the British had enjoyed similar superiority in numbers over the Panzer Army Afrika at Gazala and had been soundly beaten.

On Overlord.

The original plan for the Normandy landings had been created by Freddie Morgan and the staff of COSSAC. Eisenhower was assigned to be SHAEF and asked for a Land Forces Commander for the operation - he wanted Alexander but got Montgomery. Without any consultation with Eisenhower, Montgomery arrived in the UK and was presented the COSSAC plan. He criticised it for being too restrictive and said it needed to be enlarged. Walter Bedel Smith was present and he backed Montgomery up.

The COSSAC plan called for a three beach landing - Gold, Sword and Juno if I remember correctly - then a lightning drive to Caen to secure that, a defensive force would be left behind in Caen while the main body swung west to take Cherbourg and clear the port for use before turning back to drive the Germans beyond the Seine.

The Overlord plan called for a five beach landing followed by a holding action in the east designed to draw in and hold down the German reinforcements coming into Normandy, in the west the Allies would aim to clear the Cherbourg Peninsula, take Cherbourg and open the port for use before breaking out and driving the Germans beyond the Seine.

Montgomery laid this plan out in detail to the Allied Top Brass in his St Paul's lectures in April and May. Montgomery stated his goal as being to cross the Seine by Day+90 but that the first 40 days of the operation would be solely aimed as securing their lodgement area on the European Mainland and linking up the beaches.

He then made the mistake of saying that he could take Caen on Day+1 and no one has let him live it down since. It doesn't matter that the Canadians were the only Allied force to achieve their D-Day objective, nor does it matter that those objectives were ambitious but not vital and the failure to take them did not effect the master plan, all that mattered was that Montgomery said he could do something but didn't manage it and thus it was enlarged to the proportions of a epic failure even though it was only a minor set back.

In truth Montgomery had wanted to take Caen early and use it as an anchor to his positions on the Allies left while the majority of the fighting would happen beyond it around the Faliase region but even though Caen wasn't taken early the Germans reacted in the way Montgomery's expected by putting their reinforcements against the British/Commonwealth forces, the only change was that the majority of the fighting happened around Caen rather than beyond it.

Even if the Overlord plan itself had more flaws than strengths as far as Montgomery's planning went, even if things didn't go totally to plan the basic master plan was still followed and the Allies not only accomplised the main aim of the operation but also crossed the Seine well ahead of schedule so Overlord as an operation can viewed as nothing but a success and Montgomery must recieve credit for planning it and commanding it, so whatever way you look at it Overlord is a plus point in Monty's carear.

My point about Patton not having a great battle victory to his name over the enemy was more about what he personally can claim as a solo effort. He never had his own El Alamein or Alam Halfa, his supporters never point out one great battle he commanded that proves his worth as a battlefield commander but always point to his mobility and speed. While it is true, however, that his turning movement at the Battle of the Bulge was a masterpiece the attack that followed it was weak and understrenght and did nothing to stop the German offensive, only once Patton was reinforced by forces from 6th Army Group, the skies cleared to allow the Aircraft to engage and the German's ran out of steam did Patton make any headway, and his attack into a snowstorm following the relief of Bastogne caused him to suffer more casualties through adverse weather conditions than inflicted by the enemy.

So my point about Patton remains unchanged. He was not the kind of general you wanted to command the main body of troops in a battle but you could ask for no one better at exploitation and persuit.

[MAJR]

can I take an example?
Montgomery: :britain:
Failed to accomplish Market Garden
his most and yet famous battle, El Alamien, was fought between a few German Panzers and a heavy relief Force of Brits
did a good job for patting his Troops

Patton:usa:
did his best to hold out against an Elite SS Troop under Sepp Dietrich in Bastogne
Spearheaded Normandy
Encircled Sicily

Patton relieved Bastonge, he didn't defend it. That was Anthony McAuliffe and the 101st Airboune division. He didn't spearhead Normandy he was kept in reserve until the operation was almost finished and his 3rd Army wasn't activated until after Bradley's 1st Army had achieved the break out, he was used to decoy the Germans with the fictional 1st US Army Group while the crossing happened and the majority of the fighting took place. Patton didn't encircle Sicily, he took Palermo against negligable opposition and drove to Messina where he proved no more effective against the German rearguard than the 8th, his race to Messina was onesided as Montgomery had not only given up the prise but had suggested Patton take it.

Market Garden was not a typical Montgomery operation, not least of which because he took a a back seat and allowed Browning and Brereton to plan it and them and Dempsey to execute it with minimal interferance from him, even so it was very nearly successful, still a failure but very narrowly so. For El Alamein see my last post.

[PanzerJaeger]

On El Alamein.

The Panzer Armee Afrika had entrenched in the strongest defensive position yet seen in the war. Its flanks were secured by the Mediterranean to the north and the Qatarra Depression to the South and at its front had been laid the largest minefield of the war, further Rommel had organized his defensive line so that his strongest mobile armoured units were free and available to be deployed against any breakthrough attempt. The only way to get to the Panzer Army Afrika was to make avenues through the minefield - using bayonets to find the mines and hands to remove them - and advance through them. There is quite a strong arguement to be had that had Rommel not been in Germany on sick leave and had Stumme not died on the first day of the battle that the 8th Army's advance could have been stopped dead in the minefield.

Indeed, Rommel's absence and Stumme's death during the beginning phase of the battle proved disastrous. The Axis also faced critical supply shortages, especially in fuel. That lack of fuel alone eliminated his ability to make the kind of sweeping maneuvers that had allowed him to defeat larger armored forces in the past. He was forced to fight a battle of attrition, which usually favors the numerically superior force.

The numerical advantage of the 8th was crucial to victory but the victory was not a foregone conclusion and people looking to lessen the worth of Montgomery had embelished the advantage he had - I have seen some people claim he had a 10 to 1 advantage. Montgomery did not have the 3 to 1 advantage accepted in military theory to insure victory. The actual numbers of the two forces were:

8th Army - 195,000 men, 1,029 tanks, 435 armoured cars, 530 servicable aircraft, 892 to 908 artillery pieces and 1,451 anti-tank guns

Panzer Army Afrika - 116,000 men, 547 tanks, 192 armoured cars, 480 servicable aircraft, 552 artillery pieces and 496 anti-tank guns.

Also the claims that the numerical superiorty was all that it took to win this battle conveniantly ignores the fact that the British had enjoyed similar superiority in numbers over the Panzer Army Afrika at Gazala and had been soundly beaten.

10-1 huh? That sounds like Rommel fanboy speak. However, the raw numbers alone don't tell the whole story either.

Of Panzer Army Africa, German forces made up less than half of the total size.

DAK consisted of less than 50,000 men, 249 tanks, 150 serviceable aircraft, ~200 artillery pieces, and ~350 anti-tank guns. Further, only 118 (88 PzIII L and 30 PzIV L) of those German tanks were capable of engaging the 522 Allied medium tanks committed to the battle on anything close to equal terms. That weakness became especially acute as the British broke out into the vast expanses of Western Egypt. The 252 Shermans were virtually unstoppable once they breached the AT belts.

While the Italians were induced into greater levels of competence and tenacity under German leadership than under their own, they were still of far less quality than their British counterparts, particularly in weaponry and equipment.

On Overlord.

I generally agree. Most people, especially Americans, who decry Montgomery's abilities in comparison to Patton neglect to mention that he was the principle architect of Overlord - the greatest Western Allied victory of the war - while Patton was only given a command after the battle had essentially been won.

Of course, Monty was again dealing with a far inferior enemy in terms of manpower and material, this time enjoying an even greater disparity than at El Alamein. Further, Hitler had the senior German leadership in a state of complete paralysis throughout the battle. Essentially, Monty did not have to deal with aggressive and sustained large scale counteroffensives, and could act at a leisurely pace not enjoyed on the Eastern Front. Still, the Allies were kept bottled up for two and a half months by the beleaguered German forces, even after their disastrous response to the initial landings. I'm interested in your source as to Monty's claim of a 90 day campaign, as every time I've seen it written it has been sourced to his own memoirs, in which he does quite a bit of retroactive justification of his actions.

In any event, as I said before, I think he was a far better strategist than tactician. The multiple attritional offensives against Caen are evidence of this. Most German and Russian commanders would have recognized the city as a hardpoint to be bypassed far sooner. IIRC, Monty later claimed that Cobra was planned on the 13th of June and that they were all part of the plan, but a careful examination of the operations, their objectives, and their outcomes undercuts that conclusion. If they were merely diversionary in nature, they certainly could have been done with far fewer casualties.

So my point about Patton remains unchanged. He was not the kind of general you wanted to command the main body of troops in a battle but you could ask for no one better at exploitation and persuit.

I completely agree, and I would even discount Patton's abilities in exploitation. Running out of fuel at the Moselle River demonstrated a remarkable level of arrogance, hubris, and/or lack of tactical awareness. Had the Germans been able to mount a major surprise counteroffensive, as they did some months later, Patton would helpless on his own front or unable to support another.

[ReluctantSamurai]

Of course, Monty was again dealing with a far inferior enemy in terms of manpower and material, this time enjoying an even greater disparity than at El Alamein. Further, Hitler had the senior German leadership in a state of complete paralysis throughout the battle. Essentially, Monty did not have to deal with aggressive and sustained large scale counteroffensives, and could act at a leisurely pace not enjoyed on the Eastern Front.

Monty never had to fight a battle or campaign where there was a good chance of losing. While the success of Overlord was no 'gimmee' by any means, 21st AG was never in any great peril even from D+1. Part of this can certainly be attributed to Monty's preparedness, and partly to luck. One can only wonder how 21st Army would've reacted had 5th Panzer been thrown at them instead of Patton's 3rd Army, later on after the breakout.

I'm currently reading a book entitled "Colossal Cracks" written by Stephen A. Hart, a senior lecturer at The Dept. of War Studies, Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. While not an immediate Monty fanboy, he has some interesting points to make about the part played by 21st Army, and Monty's tactics. One point he raises, and one which I was never much aware of, was the morale problems of 21st Army due in part to war weariness at home, and from unexpected heavy casualties from the fighting around Caen. Monty pretty much HAD to apply overwhelming firepower (as nearly all Allied commanders both British, American, and Soviets did) to keep casualties as small as possible in face of the manpower shortage being faced by Britain.

I'm about halfway through....I'm sure I'll have more comments when I finish it.

Most German and Russian commanders would have recognized the city as a hardpoint to be bypassed far sooner.

Given that the majority of supplies were still coming in 'over the beach' even into July, I don't think such a maneuver was possible. The beaches needed to be protected, and leaving such a large concentration of German armor in ones rear was not to be recommended, IMHO.

[Hooahguy]

Welcome to the .org MAJR!

That could be interpreted two different ways, depending on which side of the fence one sits regarding the intent of the operation.

I wasnt aware that the British aimed to get ravaged by the Germans in that battle.

[ReluctantSamurai]

Montgomery came to the conclusion that he couldn't trust his armour commanders not to do something stupid and decided it would be better to keep them on a tight leash, as such you never see him attempting ambitious maneuvers of mobile forces

I would like to see some sources that address this statement. Monty kept all of his commanders on a tight leash, "grip" as he liked to call it, throughout the entire campaign in Europe. There were certainly competent commanders in both the British and Canadian armies. I just think Monty's style of command led him to be more interfering even to the point of bypassing Crerar and Dempsey to deal directly with corps commanders.

and if you wanted someone to make the best of the exploitation phase of a battle almost won then Patton was your guy but he was prone to ignore orders if he wasn't the center of attention and go for targets that could get him personal glory even if it didn't help the Allied cause.

Another statement I'd like to see some evidence for. I can think of only one instance where Patton might have let personal feelings get in the way of judgement...that of the Hammelburg mission.

Without any consultation with Eisenhower, Montgomery arrived in the UK and was presented the COSSAC plan.

This statement runs counter to the sources I have which state that Ike and "Beetle" Smith had looked at the COSSAC plan and didn't like it, and gave it to Monty to rewrite (and the COSSAC planners did everything they could to prevent Monty from even seeing the plan without consulting them first).

While it is true, however, that his turning movement at the Battle of the Bulge was a masterpiece the attack that followed it was weak and understrenght and did nothing to stop the German offensive, only once Patton was reinforced by forces from 6th Army Group, the skies cleared to allow the Aircraft to engage and the German's ran out of steam did Patton make any headway, and his attack into a snowstorm following the relief of Bastogne caused him to suffer more casualties through adverse weather conditions than inflicted by the enemy.

Patton was one of two Allied commanders who favored cutting off German forces in the Bulge at the base of their penetration, something he had recommended even at the Dec 19 SHAEF meeting in Verdun. At a subsequent meeting on the 28th, four proposals were put forth: contain the penetration and continue with already planned offensives, push the Germans back starting at the nose of the salient, cut off German forces at the Bastogne salient, or cut off all German forces by striking along the base of the entire salient.

Needless to say, noone favored the first option; and the option with the least risk...the second, was favored, not surprisingly, by Monty. Ike, Bradley, and Hodges favored the limited version of cutting the Bulge at Bastogne, and Patton and Collins were the only commanders who favored cutting the Bulge at Diekirch in the south and Elsenborn in the north, thereby trapping the entire 5th & 6th Panzer Armies...the option with the most risk. As Patton put it: "If you got a monkey in a jungle, hanging by his tail, it is easier to get him by cutting off his tail than kicking him in the face."

He goes on further to say (in his personal diary): "I want to attack north from Diekirch but Bradley is all for putting new divisions in the Bastogne fight. In my opinion, this is putting good money after bad. In this weather, on the defensive, the Germans can hold us well enough so that we can never trap them there, whereas if we attack close to the base, they will have to pull out and we will regain the ground and probably catch just as many Germans as the other way."

Command styles were never more prevelant than the decision to take a less risky course of action to resume the initiative in the Ardennes Campaign. Monty opting for the least risk, Ike and Bradley for a midling course, and the US Army's two most aggressive commanders, Patton and Collins opting for the most risky course.

[PanzerJaeger]

I will be interested in MAJR's response to your points, RS.

I wasnt aware that the British aimed to get ravaged by the Germans in that battle.

Well yes. I was referring to the controversy over whether the battle was intended all along as a diversion for Cobra or as a full scale offensive in its own right. Regardless, it did not go "well" by any stretch of the imagination.

[Jaguara]

I have always found these Mongomery/Patton discussions amusing, moreso since I am not really a fanboy of either of them. I must say though, that I am impressed that this discussion has stayed so civil, maintaining a high level of academic discussion as well (as opposed to rhetoric).

Personally, I think both Montgomery & Patton have their faults, and though they have their merits as well, in an overall historical view, I am not particularly impressed with either. Do either deserve to be quoted in the ranks of Napoleon and Alexander? No. Not even close.