The Soviet government was evacuated to Kuybyshev (Samara) in October 1941, well before the Germans could ever have hoped to have captured it. Stalin remained there only as a symbol, the entire Soviet government operated from Kuybyshev until 1943. As such, there most certainly would not have been a loss of political infrastructure.Originally Posted by Del Arroyo
It wasn't so much the Soviet population that gave them the advantage as it was the lack of willingness on the part of Germany to fight in a similar manner. Germany relied entirely on superior training and equipment to deal with the larger Soviet manpower. Yet the Soviet T-34 was far superior 1 on 1 to any German tank up until the Panther. Even against the Panther and Tiger, it was a superior vehicle because it could be produced in vastly larger numbers. The Soviets produced, in 1942 alone, almost DOUBLE the production of Panthers, Jagdpanthers, Tiger Is, Tiger IIs, and Jagdtigers combined for the entire war.And I can say with certainty that Soviet numbers advantage was NOT a guarantee of victory-- it obviously wasn't in 1941, and still wasn't in 1942. Considering that in the end it was a 20 to 1 numbers advantage and few critical cracks that finally got the Germans running, and that the Russians STILL lost two or three men for every hopelessly outnumbered German they killed all the way back to Berlin, and in the siege of Berlin lost FIVE to one...
It wasn't so much the manpower superiority as the vast equipment superiority. By 1942-43, the Germans were not only heavily outnumbered, but often had poorer equipment. Their superior training and leadership (in general) certainly had a great impact, but the idea that they were technologically superior by that time was largely a myth.
As for the casualty ratio... the number of casualties inflicted has nothing to do with victory. The key is the number of casualties each side is capable of sustaining. Despite the horrendous losses the Soviets suffered during WW2, they could have taken double that number and still kept fighting. The Soviets simply had a willingness to sacrifice soldiers that the Germans did not have.
The Soviet Army at the start of Barbarossa in 1941 was not the same force that the Germans faced by the end of 1942. There was a VAST restructuring of both the Army and the Air Force, resulting in an incredibly improved command and control structure. The Soviet Armies learned from their mistakes very, very well and this is what enabled the turnaround in 1942.You have to remember-- the Germans had no problem defeating Russian armies that were only, say, 5 times as large as theirs, and it was (according to many historians) largely the incredible strategic overreach and needless diffusion of offensive energy which cost the Germans the war. If they'd stayed out of Kursk, if they'd kept their forces together, if they'd concentrated their offensives and kept ample reserves for defense, they could have kept the Russians tied up for years and possibly have held them off all together.
Remember that the Germans were STILL advancing, on MULTIPLE fronts until the end of 1942.
Even if Moscow had been captured, none of these things would have changed. The Soviet production superiority would still have existed. The Soviet restructuring of the armed forces would still have occurred. The highly skilled Eastern divisions would still have arrived to reinforce the front. As for morale... not really an issue. By late 1941 the Soviets understood it was a fight for their very survival. Morale doesn't play much of a factor when you have no choice but fight or die (by German or Soviet guns).
Bookmarks