Musket Warfare (Napolean style)

[TinCow]

The failures of WWI are more obvious than in the Civil War. In WWI, the means were readily available to circumvent trench warfare, but they were heavily resisted by the old guard. Most military leaders still thought of warfare in the sense of two armies pulling up face to face and slogging it out until one broke. They intentionally ignored and inhibited the development of technology and tactics that would have resolved the situation. The development of the tank was heavily resisted and only came to fruition after the horrendous slaughters began to have a huge impact on the home front. Even after the development of the tank, it was used rarely and improperly. Even AFTER WWI, where its usefulness had been proven decisively, most armed forces resisted the development of tank corps or the use of tanks in anything other than a support role.

Most of the major breakthroughs in WWI were done by (relatively) small units operating on local tactical level using stealth, speed and/or surprise. What is most remarkable is not that the "over the top" charges occurred at all, it is that they persisted throughout the war. Military leaders refused to accept the idea that it was a futile tactic that achieved nothing more than slaughter of both sides. This eventually evolved into an Allied strategy to simply fight trench warfare until the Germans ran out of men. That is not tactics, that is simply slaughter.

[English assassin]

It was not easy to assault an enemy formation even though the rate of fire was low. The effect of a point blank salvo was devastating. Firepower by Major-General BP Hughes has some examples of it.

At Blenheim in 1704 where 5 English battalions lost about a third of its strength in just one salvo from the French defenders, fired at about a distance of 30 paces. He estimates it to about 20% of all muskets fired found a target.

At Fontenoy 1745 the English attackers did get the first salvo, also at 30 paces, with about 25% of the muskets hit. Its described how some of the French battalions lost their whole front rank in just one salvo.

Losses like that is enough to disrupt an enemy unit so any further advance would most likely cause a quick rout before any actual melee started.

Yes, I can see that, although it must be a moot point whether one volley at 30 yards was any worse than four at 100 yards. And the charging infantry would of course have their own volley, as the Fontenoy case showed.

There's another thing, which is that if you are getting 25% hits at 30 yards, 75% of your infantry are not contributing killing power to the battle. (I realise that is too simplistic because of course you need the 100% firing to get the 25% hits, muskets being what they were. Say that you cause casualties of 25% of your number then). Whereas bayonet to bayonet, even in three lines, 33% of the infantry are directly engaged in killing the enemy (and vice versa of course). And whats more I think a bayonet duel would last less time that the 30 seconds needed to get off a musket ball (I have never fenced with a bayonet, but I have with a foil, and if you are both going for the point you rarely have to wait even ten seconds for a hit) So if we said the average bayonet duel would produce a casualty in, say, 20 seconds (which is surely very conservative indeed), and you have third of your infantry causing casualties rather than a quarter, you are causing (and taking) casualties at, err, roughly double the rate, if my maths is right.

Ultimately I think the reasons for prefering volleys to closing to hand to hand must be psychological?

[CBR]

Ultimately I think the reasons for prefering volleys to closing to hand to hand must be psychological?

Warfare is done by humans and not machines so psychology is basically everything. The point blank salvoes produced devastating losses that would completely disrupt and collapse a unit. If a countercharge is done right after such a salvo not many units would be able to hold with such losses and the confusion and panic that was caused by them. And the salvo would most likely be enough to rout the unit.

You will find many attacks that stopped before they got to the point blank range as the men would rather stay at a "safe" distance and shoot back than doing something that feels suicidal. Having battalions fire by platoons meant the enemy never could feel safe for 20+ seconds as they faced continous shooting.

An attacker who outnumbered the defender wanted to close in as the melee would be fast and a defender would rout quickly but the guns simply prevented most attacks for reaching their target.

IIRC there is an incident where the soldiers in an English batallion all turned around to get their backpacks off. That made the French unit facing it to suddenly charge. But there were time enough to turn around and fire a salvo and then they charged to scatter the surprised French. That is all about psychology as the French thought it was safe to advance.

Whereas bayonet to bayonet, even in three lines, 33% of the infantry are directly engaged in killing the enemy (and vice versa of course).

Hm If I use same logic I would say that with muskets you have all 3 lines (100%) engaged in killing the enemy IIRC in most cases one side routed very quickly and not many men were actually killed by bayonets. Even in the melee oriented ancient/medieval battlefield not that many men were killed in actual fighting but in the pursuit after a unit had routed.

The ability of an outnumbering attacker to win quickly in a melee is not in doubt, its the ability to close in that is. Psychological factors are important in both situations.


CBR

[TinCow]

Does anyone have any idea of the frequency of hand to hand combat in the Napoleonic Wars? I know that despite common perceptions, the charge to melee was relatively rare as far back as the US Civil War. Does this apply even farther back as well?

[CBR]

They intentionally ignored and inhibited the development of technology and tactics that would have resolved the situation.

And that is actually a bit harsh. Tank technology was still new and a lot of them had mechanical breakdowns. It takes time to figure out what to do and then the find the best way of implementing them.

When they faced the horrors of trench warfare they did try new things trying to break through it. One way was to produce huge numbers of heavy artillery in a way to smash the enemy bunkers and machinegun positions before the big attack. At Somme 1916 the English were confident that the week long barrage (more than a million grenades fired IIRC) had done the job.

When the war started all armies had mainly medium artillery meant for the fast maneuver warfare that everyone expected it to be. It took time to produce the newer heavy types.

Germans used gas already in 1915 hoping that would be the thing.

Later on the Germans started using modern day infantry tactics but even that was no miracle as it still wasnt easy to get supplies forward after the first advance as railways were still the best way to do that.

The fact is that the tanks and trucks that was needed simply wasnt there and it took time to develop them as well as getting them in sufficient numbers and be reliable enough.

Sure you can always find some stupid general/poltician but overall they did try to new ways to win the war.


CBR

[econ21]

TinCow - I think I have seen some statistics that the number of bayonets wounds in Napoleonic Wars was less than 1% or so of all wounds through combat. I am not sure if that included melee causalties due to cavalry (sabre and lance), but that probably does not alter the conclusion much.

Shock combat was more common in the Napoleonic period than in the ACW but even then I suspect it was more a psychological contest over ground - a test of wills - rather than a means of killing. I suspect there is something like a "fight or flight" issue going on, and that when one determined side starts to get close enough to fight at hand to hand, the other side falls back or breaks. This is my reading of occaisions when French assaults broke the enemy and of other occaisions when they French assaults were repulsed by British counter-charges.

[Axeknight]

What I don't understand about Napoleonic warfare is why entrenchments were not more common on the battlefield.

Well, the Peninsular (in particular) was a war of movement. Wellesley knew his teeny British army hadn't a chance in hell of beating the massive French ones - although a large proportion of the French in Spain and Portugal were tied up guarding supply lines, messengers etc (note of interest: reports from the time suggest that a single mesenger required 40 dragoons escort) against the guerilleros. Wellesley had to maneuvre himself into positions where he could take advantage of his strengths (the British infantryman fired 4 rounds per minute, to the French 3, allowing them to deploy in 2 ranks to the French 3, and so have more firepower than the French, but the same rate of fire).

A great example of this is Busaco. Wellesley used his 'passive agression' tactic (advance, grab the high ground, and make the French counterrattack him over easily defensible terrain) to perfection here. His 50,000 British and Portuguese were then able to beat the 65,000 French under Marshal Massena very convincingly. Wellington then continued his retreat towards Lisbon, having done the French some serious harm.

Because Wellesley was constantly shifting his army around, and the sucession of Marshalls had to chase him, there simply wasn't much time for fortifying positions. The notable exception, of course, is the lines of Torres Vedras.

[English assassin]

In close range the accuracy increased and they changed ammonition to shotgun type (I'm not sure of the name in English).

In English, case, or caseshot. Often but inaccurately called grapeshot , which was a naval load only.

[Ironside]

What I don't understand about Napoleonic warfare is why entrenchments were not more common on the battlefield.

I can think of some few things. First, you need time to dig yourself down, like a day. Second you're quite stuck in that position, so the enemy can simply move around you. Third, this I don't know but at the Napoleonic age perhaps a disrespect for trench warfare was in place?
And the Forth point, the biggest one. Are you going to attack an entrenched enemy? Atleast during the 30-years war, a good way to avoid a battle was to dig yourself down.

That's why there was so few trenches in the big battles, when the enemy was digged down, you didn't attack him, but tried to flank him or tried to cut of his supplies.

Ultimately I think the reasons for prefering volleys to closing to hand to hand must be psychological?

Mostly yes, but that volley is going to take the edge of the attack due to problems passing the bodies. Still, the Caroliners (Karl XII troops) was trained for attack and to be completly silent to get extra morale decrease for the enemy. Taking a charge was always morale decreasing.

Wait I almost forgot one important thing. Cannons. In close range the accuracy increased and they changed ammonition to shotgun type (I'm not sure of the name in English). This is probably a big reason not to go into melee.