The Thirty Years War

[zelda12]

Well I recently read a book set in the time frame and have inadvertently found myself sucked in. The various intricasies and infighting the shifting alliances and grand battles.

What I really want is to learn more. A lot more. So I thought I know I'll start a thread where people can discuss the thirty years war. Hence the existance of this thread.

I start the ball rolling:

Was Gustav Adolphus the greatest General of the period. The king of Sweden was a born soldier. He led the assault on a fortress on the border between Denmark and Sweden Capturing it. He fought wars all across Northen Germany he defeated the polish in various engagements and his defining moment came at Breitenfeld. Where he crushed a Habsburg army. He came close to establishing a seperate, Protestant Germany free from the Habsburg control. He was however excessively brave and died soon after Breitenfeld leading a cavalry charge.

This is a sketchy history and I'll try to flesh it out but what do you think. Do you think Tilly was the best after only experiencing defeat for the first time in his old age at Breitenfeld?

Is it one of the Prince's of Orange who held the Spanish at bay for the better part of a century?

Any questions are welcome any information gladly accepted.

[Adrian II]

Was Gustav Adolphus the greatest General of the period.

It could be argued that it was Wallenstein who succesfully guarded the Habsburg front against Christian IV and became so prestigious that the territorial rulers forced the Emperor to depose him and reduce the size of the Imperial army. Wallensteins protracted campaign against Mansfeldt wasn't spectacular in the sense that it abounded in brilliant battles, but in the sense that it was a brilliant display of maneuvering skills, logistics, psychology and diplomatic skills typical of warfare in that period. German historian Golo Mann has written an exhaustive and utterly boring 1125-page biography of Wallenstein, a Bohemian eccentric who fought his own fears and preoccupations as well as his eternal - and eternally worsening - health problems as much as he fought the enemy.

[Ironside]

It's hard to know exactly on what you would put into the word greatest general. Is it the tactical skills, strategical skills, diplomatic skills or a combination of the above?

Because if you take all these together, then I would say that Gustav Adolphus was the greatest general, but if you remove the diplomatic skills part, then it isn't so certain anymore.

I'm probably biased though

Other highly skilled generals for the Swedish side was Johan Banér and Lennart Torstensson.

[zelda12]

He was certainly fearless. He recieved a neck wound by being shot. The doctors couldn't get the bullet out, so as a result he couldn't wear armour. Yet he still led many cavalry charges like the illfated charge at Lutzen.

[Watchman]

High officers, royalty included, tended to do that at the time. And, naturally, every now and then they ended up getting killed as a result despite their bodyguards' best efforts.

Though by what I've read old (well, in his late thirties...) Adolphus II didn't exactly die "leading a charge", rather more along the lines of "stumbled into a troop of enemy cuirassieurs in the smoke with a small party and duly got shot trying to det away"...

[zelda12]

Yeah, kina heard that too. Tried to ignore it though.

The Swedish did win the Battle though. Anyway he did manage, with his other generals granted, to make the Baltic an almostly entirely swedish controled area. He conquered the Russian Baltic Coast. Along with the Polish and he effectively controlled the German side after he defeated Tilly's mercenaries at Breitenfeild. The only other peopl on the Baltic were the Danes.

[cegorach]

@zelda12

I have bad feelings about the book you were reading. Isn't it 'The Age of wars' ( or similar) of a swedish author, the writer who earlier wrote 'Poltava' ?
If it is this you should know that it is completely not true when it comes to Polish-Swedish wars. Actually in Poland it is a favorite example of western ignorance regarding Polish armies. Especially its description as a semi-barbaric army !!

"Was Gustav Adolphus the greatest General of the period"

I don't think so.

I am sure he was a great reformer, commander and a very brave man.
But ask yourself whom was he fighting against ?
Old fashioned imperials, Danes and Russians in the 'Time of Troubles'
( who were fighting Poles at the same time).
He was also fighting in Poland, but in this war he didn't achieved much, actually he was defeated at least one time ( and didn't take Danzig which was his another failure). The war was a success, but costly and actually Polish army was for sure his most difficult enemy.
His famous reforms were to counter this army and no other, after all !

BTW - his first victory vs. Poles ( and first Swedish victory over Poles at all !! After SEVERAL defeats.) at Walhoff in 1625 is completely biased in swedish sources i.e. they forgot that it was the Poles who were outnumbered ( and suprised) by Swedes 2 to 1, not the opposite as they claim.
Also the losses these propose are really strange.

Who was the greatest commander at that time ?

I have no idea, but if you need a commander who was almost always victorious and crushed enemies many times larger I can say that MOST OF Polish more-than-average commanders did this usually.

If you need examples, ask.

Regards Cegorach/Hetman

[Watchman]

For some reason I'm smelling wafts of ye olde patriotism from Greg here, not that I have even checked his personal datas to see if he's Polish or anything but his tone sounds like it...

I'd like to know what *exactly* is supposed to be so wrong with Englund's description, given the man's serious lack of nationalist bias (nevermind now how the prologue of "Years of the Great War", or whatever the book's called in English, concerns a rather later conflict the man more fully discusses in "The Invincible"...) ?

Though by what I've read back when Gustavus A. II was still sorting out his dynastic disputes with the Polish king (ie. before he stuck his long nose into Germany) the Swedes had a major problem with the Polish cavalry, not in the least because they had no sufficient mounted troops of their own to counter it. This issue stimulated the developement of the (comparatively) revolutionary "Swedish brigade" which later proved to be too unwieldy and evolved into the simpler but just as efficient "sleeved" pike-and-shot formation, and the practise of "brigading" musketeers between cavalry units to provide close fire support. The latter was quite necessary to give the comparatively lightly armed and rather poorly mounted Swedish horsemen a fighting chance against heavier assault cavalry, such as the Polish hussars or Imperialist cuirassieurs.

Anyway, by every single account everywhere I've seen the Poland of the Early Modern period was a serf-abusing, stuck-up, reactionary feudal backwoods where the monarch couldn't keep the lower landed warrior-aristocracy in check and was hence unable to carry out nigh any reforms, military, social or political, that so much as looked like encroaching on the priviledges and prestige of said knightly class. (Hungary, or that region anyway as the kingdom had ceased to exist in the 1500s, seems to have been in equally lousy straits.)

And European feudal chivalry had some very serious shortcomings on the battlefield; they may be some of the best close-combat shock cavalry the world has ever seen, but their excessive quest for personal glory, hot-headed and overconfident bravery and resulting lack of professionalism, discipline and controllability was notoriously a problem already by the High Middle Ages.
Said problems were then one of the reasons they lost their military importance - professional (or drafted) troops just plain were more cost-effective and better at winning wars, and to boot didn't constantly dispute royal authority.

[Adrian II]

Anyway, by every single account everywhere I've seen the Poland of the Early Modern period was a serf-abusing, stuck-up, reactionary feudal backwoods where the monarch couldn't keep the lower landed warrior-aristocracy in check and was hence unable to carry out nigh any reforms, military, social or political, that so much as looked like encroaching on the priviledges and prestige of said knightly class.

LOL, that seems to sum up social conditions in most of Central and Eastern Europa at the time, though there were variations in backwardness and imbecility. If our friend can swallow this one whole and manage to stay on his two feet intellectually, I daresay we have no wafts of patriotism to fear. At one time or another, all our ancestors were shovelling sh*t and we better accept it if we want to develop a true sense of history.

[Ironside]

He was also fighting in Poland, but in this war he didn't achieved much, actually he was defeated at least one time ( and didn't take Danzig which was his another failure). The war was a success, but costly and actually Polish army was for sure his most difficult enemy.
His famous reforms were to counter this army and no other, after all !

BTW - his first victory vs. Poles ( and first Swedish victory over Poles at all !! After SEVERAL defeats.) at Walhoff in 1625 is completely biased in swedish sources i.e. they forgot that it was the Poles who were outnumbered ( and suprised) by Swedes 2 to 1, not the opposite as they claim.
Also the losses these propose are really strange.

I can give you that the reforms were made to counter the Polish army, but Gustav II Adolf didn't lose any battles he was commanding unless you count the ambush at Osterode with costed a few houndres Swedish horsemen thier life, or possibly the retreat at Trzciana, were the Swedish forces were able to retreat back to fortified positions after risking being overwhelmed by a superior Polish force. They did take 300 men in casualities (although the losses probably are higher in reality).
And he took Riga.

I'm curious what the numbers in Polish history are. I've seen 7000 Poles on every source with numbers. The Swedish ones are harder to get info on numbers, the only sources specifficly mentioning the forces says around 2500 men (and I assume you dispute that number, that do seem low) but it can be worth noticing that the Swedes had less than 10000 men so it's hard to outnumber the 7000 Poles with two to one.
But I admit that the Swedish losses seems to be low (0 , oddly enough not contradicted by any Swedish source). Surpriced is mentioned though, warned, but didn't got enough time to get fully prepared.

And what's up with your mentioning of the previous losses of the Swedish army? That was before Gustavs time and if anything proves that he was a good commander and exellent millitary organiser.

I am sure he was a great reformer, commander and a very brave man.
But ask yourself whom was he fighting against ?
Old fashioned imperials, Danes and Russians in the 'Time of Troubles'
( who were fighting Poles at the same time).

Yes the Danes that had been kicking Swedish ass for century, the "invincible" Imperial army and the Russians that, well uhhmm sucked at the time.

Should I be honest, the greatest general in the 30-years war by your definition is Johan Banér. He fought outnumbered against an army of simular quality and with simular troops and won. The Poles had better troops until around 1640-1650 so when they win outnumbered with better troops, it's simular with valour 9 varangian guards killing peasants (taken to a HUGE extreme) so does it matter who really commanding then? But you (the Poles) did have good commanders at the time, there's no denaying that, the question is simply who you could compare yourself with?

I'd like to know what *exactly* is supposed to be so wrong with Englund's description, given the man's serious lack of nationalist bias (nevermind now how the prologue of "Years of the Great War", or whatever the book's called in English, concerns a rather later conflict the man more fully discusses in "The Invincible"...) ?

I'm also curious of this.

[Watchman]

Far as I know for most intents and purposes concerning the TYW the poles might as well not have existed, save for their role as the cause for the wildly succesful Swedish military innovations (which nigh everyone promptly copied, especially if they got their asses kicked by them; the fundamental problem of the unruly feudal power structure compared to the centralized absolutist state is perhaps best illustrated in how the East Europeans specifically could not copy it nor adapt to it all that well...). Gustavus wasn't stupid, and made sure he was well done with his Polish adventures before getting stuck in Germany; and while that conflict was turning Germany into a blasted wasteland the Poles only ever got involved in the few odd cases when an army of one side or another tried an outflanking move by detouring through Polish border provinces, much to the impotent fury of the resident noblemen.

That aside, I understand Ottavio Piccolomini from the Imperial side tends to get rated fairly high as far as TYW commanders go - or at least he was able to hold off first Baner and then Torstensson with by that point a far inferior army, albeit the half-year "hunger wars" this resulted in were undoubtly something none of the commanders actually wanted to see happening.

But then, Baner hadn't exactly planned to raze Bohemia either, and yet ended up doing so.

[cegorach]

I am a lawyer so from time to time I just love a good quarrel ;))

Answers.

@Watchman
"For some reason I'm smelling wafts of ye olde patriotism from Greg here"

1. What Greg ?
2. Accusing me of being nationalistic doesn't help in countering my statements. I am fully aware of my country's achievements and mistakes, and I am proud of the achievements, but it doesn't mean that I am wrong.

"I'd like to know what *exactly* is supposed to be so wrong with Englund's description, given the man's serious lack of nationalist bias (nevermind now how the prologue of "Years of the Great War"

Mostly the fact that in the prologue ( battle at Warsaw 1656) polish army is described almost as 'a rabble', an old fashioned, anachronic army or rather a tribe.
Especially Winged Hussars which for some reason are 'the last knights of Europe', fearsome but rather more similar to nomad warrior elite than modern cavalry. This image is completely untrue.
Even you seem to believe in this, unfortunatelly.
Second, as far as I remember he repeats an old mistake of swedish propaganda that Charles X parried a Hussar's lance with his sword.
This idea was countered, even at that time by a polish writer who spoke
"Yeah, he could also claim that he can parry a thunderbolt with his hat"
There are many more things, especially too much was said about Tatar allies ( 2000 from 54 000) so that the Polish army looks even more primitive and also there is some strange idea that Polish army was very slow to move thanks to the number of supply wagons it was usually using.
This is especially funny, cause Polish forces were known of their high marching speed. I can give a LOT of examples to support this statement.

"because they had no sufficient mounted troops of their own to counter it"

And what was the sufficient number, cause more than usually Swedes used
the same or even higher number of cavalry than the Poles - and not every horsemen in the army of the Commonwealth was a Winged Hussar.

"chance against heavier assault cavalry, such as the Polish hussars or Imperialist cuirassieurs."

Polish Hussars were not really heavy m8.

"And European feudal chivalry had some very serious shortcomings on the battlefield; they may be some of the best close-combat shock cavalry the world has ever seen, but their excessive quest for personal glory, hot-headed and overconfident bravery and resulting lack of professionalism, discipline and controllability was notoriously a problem already by the High Middle Ages.
Said problems were then one of the reasons they lost their military importance - professional (or drafted) troops just plain were more cost-effective and better at winning wars, and to boot didn't constantly dispute royal authority. "

And what that is supposed to have in common with Polish cavalry ?
Do you really think so that an overconfident, hot-headed cavalry could counter such diverse and agile enemies as the Poles did ?
Actually noble levy cavalry was almost never used, except when their own region was in danger, and actually from 1456 it was almost in real combat except the Cossack wars ( 1648-1672) and the Swedish invasion in 1655, and actually in some years' time it was a fairly efficient unit type.

"Anyway, by every single account everywhere I've seen the Poland of the Early Modern period was a serf-abusing, stuck-up, reactionary feudal backwoods where the monarch couldn't keep the lower landed warrior-aristocracy in check and was hence unable to carry out nigh any reforms, military, social or political, that so much as looked like encroaching on the priviledges and prestige of said knightly class. (Hungary, or that region anyway as the kingdom had ceased to exist in the 1500s, seems to have been in equally lousy straits.)"

Yes, so I believe you think you are well informed in this matter ?
Sorry, but this description is based on only most serious disadvantages from the later part of of the Commonwealth.
However I am not suprised.
Maybe I can counter this in some way. The problem is that in this 'serf-abusing' ( BTW Weren't Imperial, French or Swedish rulers 'serf, citizen and noble abusers' with their endless demands for cannon-fodder ?), 'stuck-up' and 'reactionary' nobility, especially middle-nobility was the power behind most of MANY reforms in Poland-Lithuania - exactly like the middle class today.
These 'serf-abusers' had something called a voting right - for men or women alike, they were AT LEAST 10 % of the society and it wasn't all actually, also bigger towns and some nationalities
( e.g. Jews) were able to propose their ideas in the Polish Parliament.
I want also to add that one of the greatest achievement of this 'primitive' was extremely tolerant policy from the beginning of the Polish-Lithuanian union - one of many reasons why PROTESTANT Danzig, PROTESTANT Royal Prussia, PROTESTANT Riga, ORTHODOX Belorussia and Ukraine, as well as many JEWISH AND OTHER communities were so eager to stay in Poland as well as many REFUGEES from INTOLERANT countries such as France, England, Scotland, Spain, German states and many others fled to Poland.
It seems that in many minds THE SOLE useful idea for that time is Absolutism or something similar, AND NOTHING ELSE. Isn't it ?
In Poland the power of the king was limited such like US President's power nowadays. Many our historians believe that the problem was that it was THE KING who should be given less power, NOT the nobility i.e. THE VOTERS.
Many problems were created by monarchs who tried to implement some kind of absoluric/despotic system, but were stopped. Actually MOST OF reforms were prepared by THIS 'serf-abusing' nobles
( many had NO SERFS to abuse !) cooperating WITH A KING ( in early, middle and late XVIth century, in early XVIIth and in late XVIIth as well as in mid-late XVIIIth).
Also in many ways Poland was similar to USA, especially southern states.

"which nigh everyone promptly copied, especially if they got their asses kicked by them; the fundamental problem of the unruly feudal power structure compared to the centralized absolutist state is perhaps best illustrated in how the East Europeans specifically could not copy it nor adapt to it all that well..."

"Could not copy" - superstition. Well... Maybe I will add something more.

Gunpowder weapons were used in Poland only several years later than in Western Europe ( just after Tannenberg in 1410 for example), modern muskets exactly 3 years later, modern artillery 1 or 2 years later, handgranades even earlier. This useless caracole was never used, but does it mean it was Poland which was primitive ?
Also Polish infantry was used mainly to provide firepower, actually there weren't many pikemen used. It was used for firepower, almost JUST LIKE G.Adolph's infantry !
If you mean that the high number of cavalry and a small one of infantry is a sign of backwardness
notice what was the Polish army for - for countering Tatar raids most of times.

Also notice how quickly Poles were able to reform their army if required - in 1633 its already reformed army defeated both Russians at Smolensk and the Ottomans at Kamieniec Podolski, which was one of the reasons why the Swedes were so eager to retreat from Prussians ports according to 1635 treaty.

"the Poles only ever got involved in the few odd cases when an army of one side or another tried an outflanking move by detouring through Polish border provinces, much to the impotent fury of the resident noblemen."

And what about Humienne in 1619, have you noticed this battle ?

"impotent fury..." Hmmm ..May I just remid you that it was the XVIIth century - not the XVIIIth.


@AdrianII

"LOL, that seems to sum up social conditions in most of Central and Eastern Europa at the time, though there were variations in backwardness and imbecility"

Thank you for this summary, it really is brilliant.
Or maybe.., it proves how much ignorance there is in your sources.

"If our friend can swallow this one whole and manage to stay on his two feet intellectually"

I can read this and understand 'cause this kind of 'knowledge' is ( too-) common, but it doesn't mean that you are right or it is true.

" At one time or another, all our ancestors were shovelling sh*t"

I am fully aware of this and can give you some examples as well, but IT WASN'T at that time.

@Ironside

Glad to have you here as well m8! I am former Hetman BTW.

"but Gustav II Adolf didn't lose any battles he was commanding unless you count the ambush at Osterode with costed a few houndres Swedish horsemen thier life, or possibly the retreat at Trzciana, were the Swedish forces were able to retreat back to fortified positions after risking being overwhelmed by a superior Polish force. They did take 300 men in casualities (although the losses probably are higher in reality).
And he took Riga."

I mean Trzciana in 1629, when well led ( at least ! 'Cause Sigismund was a bad commander)
Polish army ( with some, not really important support from Imperial army) crushed his cavalry.

Polish-Austrian army ( 8000), the Swedes ( 9000 ?). The forces were equal, however Gusav Adolph was fully aware of the impact of charging Winged Hussars against unprepared and unfortified Swedish infantry so he ordered a retreat to save his infantry sucrificing his cavalry.
So it was a cavalry battle - about equal forces, however soon Imparial cuirassiers were left behind and Poles had to fight alone. According to my sources Swedes lost 1000 dead, 500 captured and some cannons ( and 'commanded' musketeers), Poles 150 dead. About Imperials I don't know much. Gustav Adolph himself was almost captured, once or twice in this battle.

Yes he took Riga, but as I am sure you know at the very same time Polish army was used to stop a 200 000 strong Ottoman army ( which was defeated) so only a small number of soldiers could be used in Livonia.

Also in Polish sources there are many complains that it was he who avoided battles...

"I'm curious what the numbers in Polish history are. I've seen 7000 Poles on every source with numbers."

The problem is that the WHOLE Lithuanian army was around 7000 at that time. At Walhoff only 1500 soldiers could be used, and these were suprised by superior ( 4000 according to Polish sources)
Swedish army. Poles lost 700 men ( dead, wounded, captured) many simply trampled to death by panicking horses.
It seems that both our sources are wrong, but it is a usual thing. The reason for such high number of Poles according to Swedish sources is probably that noone from your historians noticed that the army send there ( around 4000-5000) was devided before the battle - Sapieha wasn't expecting this to happen. He was suprised, fortunatelly for the last time, as far as I know.
I know how low Swedish losses are supposed to be, but possibly these were very small, but I am sure it wasn't 3 wounded only.
BTW - maybe I will prepare this battle for MTW P&M TW mod - I have finished 5 historical battles for now.
I was also suprised when I have read of the battle at Kircholm in swedish ( web) sources. Especially polish losses which were supposed to be around... 1000. I think they counted also lightly wounded men and killed and wounded horses as well LOL.

"and what's up with your mentioning of the previous losses of the Swedish army? That was before Gustavs time and if anything proves that he was a good commander and exellent millitary organiser. "

I won't deny this, but I doubt he was the greatest - or do we really have to count 'off-battle' achievements as well.
Or maybe are we really discussing what commander was the greatest in THIS PARTICULAR WAR. If yes I agree that he was the greatest.

"the "invincible" Imperial army"

However you see the difference, how different these armies were ( Swedes and Imperials) - especially this idiotic caracoling cavalry.


TO YOU ALL

During discussions in NTW forum ( Library) I have learnt about a very good book about Eastern-Northern European military ( and not only) "The Northern Wars (Modern Wars in Perspective) by Robert I. Frost.
It seems that you Watchman should REALLY read this, especially.
Also other books - Osprey's Polish Army ( 2 volumes) and even Norman Davies "Europe - a history"
, "God's Playground" or "Question of honour" by Lynne Olson and Stanley Cloud can give you more information about Polish military and political system at that time and not only. You could not like this, but at least I hope you will not repeat again some of the false statements written here, in this thread.

Or just see some topics in the Library at the NTW forum for the same purpose.

I enjoy a good discussion, so I am waiting ( impatiently) for you answers.

regards Cegorach/Hetman

[Watchman]

Well, I thus happily daresay you recall the prologue quite wrong - nowhere does Englund claim Carolus X parried any lance, rather he observes that in the fairly brief but bloody melee that (naturally) followed the Hussars' first charge (ie. the one that was actually able to press home, at least against the Swedish-Saxon cavalry who couldn't shoot them to bits thoroughly enough to turn them away like the infantry and had no pikes for extra deterrent) one Hussar - I think he even mentions a name - caught a sight of the Swedish king and grabbed the opportunity. The only thing that kept his lance from skewering the monarch there and then was the king's breastplate, of which the lance glanced off (naturally the Hussar had little time or room to accelerate to full tilt velocity, but even if he had had it might've well gotten deflected anyway - plate armor is annoying that way), after which a Swedish cavalryman (possibly a bodyguard) promptly shot the Hussar in question at point-blank range.

It seems to have been a fairly common practice for pistol-armed horsemen (which all "modern" cavalry of the period were) to quite literally press the barrel against an armored opponent before discharge; for example at Lützen one of G. A. II's attendants is recorded to have done this to the Imperial cuirassieur who shot the King.

As for the rest, there's a lot of honest-to-God apologism literally dripping from many of your arguments. Many of them seem to be based on misreading of others' arguments and/or blatant ignorance of the subjects in question - if this is honest mistake or lack of knowledge, or national-romanticist tendentiousness, I will not bother guessing at for the end result is quite the same though I strongly suspect the latter.

Long experience with the more patriotic interpretations of my own country's history, being what it is and that other countries' I've seen being rather similiar, has taught me that kind of thing only tends to have a very tedious link to reality indeed... Something to do with interpreting things as one would like them to be rather than as they most likely and by most accounts were (which as a rule tends to be far less flattering), I gather.

1. What Greg ?

A little mistake from my part. For some reason I read your username as "gregorach" and abbreaviated it accordingly, but I promise I'll make a point of calling you "Ceg" in the future instead...

The rest will follow once I have more time to spend typing.

[Watchman]

The Hussar in question is named as one Jakub Kowalski, if that says anything to anyone (odds are it doesn't). And for some reason I keep thinking of the Swedes' allies as Saxons instead of Brandenburgians. Oh, well...

Mostly the fact that in the prologue ( battle at Warsaw 1656) polish army is described almost as 'a rabble', an old fashioned, anachronic army or rather a tribe.

...and pray tell what else it was, or could be ? East Europe on the whole was pretty backwards at the time, both economically, militarily and socially, all of which fed each other. What Englund describes in the prologue could with very little cosmetic modifications be the description of most any Medieval feudal army, bar the by West European standards exceedingly large proportion of cavalry (he gives 4,000 as the rough head count of combat-effective infantry (most of them German and Hungarian mercenaries, the rest unevenly armed peasant levies and militia) out of a total combat force of about 40,000), but then Poland and Hungary didn't earn their reputation as "horse nations" for nothing.

The enemies the Poles had mainly fought as of late were, unluckily, at least as militarily retarded - Russia and the Ottomans, the latter well on their downward slide by that point. The territorial dispute with the Swedes apparently had taught no lessons, or at least any that had practical consequences; one suspects the political power of the feudal warrior nobility was at least partly to fault here, much as the Janissaries prevented any military reforms the Ottomans tried to get done. The "old way" of doing battle had served them quite well, but the problem was that at Warsaw, 1656, they did not face a foe who fought with similarly traditional methods or one against which those methods any longer worked.

Rather, they faced just about the most cutting-edge, professional, all-around most effective modern military in whole contemporary Europe.

Especially Winged Hussars which for some reason are 'the last knights of Europe', fearsome but rather more similar to nomad warrior elite than modern cavalry. This image is completely untrue.

And where exactly had they learned to be anything else than premodern, medieval cavalry ? "Modern cavalry" at the time meant professional soldiers operating as entire units (as much as possible), with iron-hard discipline, comparatively light armor to keep costs and encumberance down, and wheellock pistols as their primary weapons. By ethos and method these were soldiers, not warriors. I fail to comprehend where the Polish noble-born heavy cavalry would or could have picked up such qualifications as to not count as chivalric anachronisms in comparision. Lighter commoner-background soldiers (who have always tended to be more adaptive and team-playing than the aristocracy) might have, but even those had yet to encounter the pressures which led Western armies to become the murderous, fire-spewing machine they at the time were.

And the powerful central governement which could effect such reforms and developements that produced and enabled such armies.

There are many more things, especially too much was said about Tatar allies ( 2000 from 54 000) so that the Polish army looks even more primitive and also there is some strange idea that Polish army was very slow to move thanks to the number of supply wagons it was usually using.

Englund gives the number of Tatar cavalry as 3,000. Chew on that. Anyway, all armies of the time recruited (and attracted) irregular light cavalry, who were quite useful for scouting, screening and harassing but usually not much good in straight combat (most sources I've encountered seem to consider it an unusual occasion worth mentioning when TYW Imperialist "croats" stood and fought for any meaningful time), and the Tatars were likely of considerably higher quality than the mounted bandits most armies had to make do with.

Beats me where you've picked up the part about the Polish army and the supply wagons (which for the record were an utter pain for any and every army all the way until railways, motor vehicles etc. could take up their role - vital, indispensable, vulnerable, slow as hell, prone to causing traffic jams and generally inconvenient), as the main mobility problem of the Poles there was the simple fact they had the Wisla river to cross one way or another. When the Hussars set out on their ill-fated charge a good portion of Polish combat troops were still queuing up on the other bank...

I've read analyses on 1500s Ottoman field armies on the march, and both the numbers and the feats of logistics and coordination involved especially in getting troops over major rivers boggle the mind. And the Ottomans were downright famous for being able to pull it off with fairly little trouble - AFAIK the Poles weren't.

And what was the sufficient number, cause more than usually Swedes used
the same or even higher number of cavalry than the Poles - and not every horsemen in the army of the Commonwealth was a Winged Hussar.

...and I'm sure the German mercenary cavalry the Swedes had to mainly rely on during their pre-TYW-involvement squabbling with Poland, used to the caracole, overall fairly fond of their skins intact, and comparatively lightly armed, could be relied to hold and fight against a shock charge of even a comparatively small force of Hussars, not that the rest of the Polish cavalry was noted for its unwillingness to charge home against an enemy either...
Not to forget that in 1656 the Hussars were actually able to throw over and rout the first columns of the cavalry units they smashed into (though the second and third squadrons then routed them in melee; in a way it's a pity), and Swedish cavalry at that point was something *far* different from what it was in around 1620s.

Not a chance. Which is exactly why the Swedes made the military innovations they did, and more to the point copied (or rather relearned) what one Osprey book called "the wild Eastern way of fighting" and a Finnish military history book termed "the Polish practice of going on a ferocious attack against the enemy, which greatly shocked cavalrymen used to caracoling in a civilized manner" (sarcasm evident in the later quote), which served them so well in Germany until everyone elses' cavalry caught up and started acting pretty agressively too.

Polish Hussars were not really heavy m8.

...
...
...excuse me ? Let's see now; shock charge with couched lance is the primary battlefield function; armored; at least partially barded horses; known for their ability to shatter entire segments of enemy army with a thunderous mounted assault into close combat.

...I don't know what criteria you are using, but by all the criteria *I* have ever seen that's damn near a textbook description of "heavy cavalry", if not also of chivalry ("there is a difference between cavalry and chivalry", as Jean Flori's highly interesting study La Chevalerie puts it).

Yes, so I believe you think you are well informed in this matter ?
*snip*
Also in many ways Poland was similar to USA, especially southern states.

What, they had black slaves too ? I never knew...

I'm frankly not going to touvh the rest of that thing; it has the rank stench of national-romatic apologism all over it. I'd just point out that as far as I know Eastern Europe including Poland and Austria-Hungary (and of course Russia) are quite infamous for having kept serfdom long after pretty much the rest of Europe had dropped it (which happened sometime around late 17th and early 18th centuries, if I recall even close to correctly) - whose legacy some historians argue to be more or less the cause for the region's dismal recent history - and that religious tolerance has exceedingly little connection to social developement. The Ottomans were about as religiously tolerant as you could ever want a medieval nation to be right until the 1800s, and they were a byword for utter stagnation in most any respect from around 1600s onwards.

Feudalism in any more extensive form virtually quarantees an eventual introduction of at least partial (and usually more or less total) serfdom; the prime reason Scandinavia (with the possible exception of Denmark) never had serfdom is that for assorted reasons feudal cavalry was never very important in the region, and hence the associated power structures largely failed to emerge.

Gunpowder weapons were used in Poland only several years later than in Western Europe...
*snip*
It was used for firepower, almost JUST LIKE G.Adolph's infantry !

Irrelevant, and to be quite frank suggests you do not fully comprehend the evolution of firearms, infantry and their battlefield role. In the old "Spanish school" tercios (you know, the gigantic rectangles of musketeers and pikemen) the musketeers weakened the enemy formation so their pikeman buddies could gain an edge in the "push of pikes". In the "Swedish brigade" and the later pike-and-shot triangle the pikemen were almost more of support troops who fended off cavalry and enemy pikemen while the musketeers did most of the killing, although pike assaults were still commonly done and were a thing to be feared.

For some reason I rather suspect the native Polish infantry wasn't exactly using the sort of firearms drill (say, contramarches) which was de rigueur already for 1500s landsknecht arquebusieurs, or at least not too well. Something to do with the emphasis on cavalry.

If you mean that the high number of cavalry and a small one of infantry is a sign of backwardness notice what was the Polish army for - for countering Tatar raids most of times.

Well, it was also a sign of backwardness - like it or not, but feudal cavalry had already become obsolete in the West during the 1500s to a large part because it quite simply didn't work too well against disciplined professional infantry.

As for the part about Tatar raids and countering them, well, that's the core of the poodle really. Feudalism more or less developed from the need to defend large territories for comparatively small groups of fast-moving raiders (Vikings, Moors, Avars, Hungarian-Magyars... you get the idea), which necessitated a network of fortifications across the countryside and quickly mobilizable units of heavy cavalry who could chase off or defeat the raiders. Hence the developement to feudal fiefdoms and semi-independent landlords' private armies of heavy cavalry.

The need for this arrangement had disappeared in the West already by the end of 12th century, after which (rather perversely) the feudal armies were needed as a counter to the neighbors' feudal armies and it took a while before the effigy collapsed. In Eastern Europe that need remained pressing at least until the 1600s (or at least until the Russians mopped up the rest of the Golden Horde's splinter khanates and the Ottomans weakened enough), and this military threat resulted in the institutionalization of the feudal arrangement that wouldn't really be dismantled before the 19th century or so - by which time its various side effects had severely stagnated and otherwise disadvantaged the region.

Lesson of the story ? It sucks to live next to the steppe. On a quick skim none of the nations in that unenviable position managed without some very serious problems, even after the nomads finally quieted down for good.

And what about Humienne in 1619, have you noticed this battle ?

No, was it of any particular importance ? Repeat after me:
Before
Swedes
Got
Involved
In
1630
so it's for most purposes irrelevant, as it was largely the Swedish intervention that turned a religious civil war about to die out (as the Emperor was running out of foes still standing) into the European "world war" of apocalyptic proportions we know and love from our history books. Poland seems to have spent most of the conflict sitting on its butt, which was probably a Very Good Thing for the country given the stellar expenses that war caused to all participants.

"impotent fury..." Hmmm ..May I just remid you that it was the XVIIth century - not the XVIIIth.

So why could the about 4,000 men under von Krockow then cheerfully detour through Poland on their way from Prague to Swedish-held Pommern in 1643, then ? Given that they had to skirt around the entire Brandenburg county that wasn't too short a trip...


Look, as far as I know Polish history after the end of the Middle Ages is a tale of woe and slowly accelerating decay and stagnation, which seems to have gathered a fair bit of velocity after around the time the Polish branch of the Vasa dynasty died out (the Swedish branch left the picture when Queen Christina abdicated in around 1655 or so), the poor country evetually getting partitioned between neighbors in the 1700s. And there's preciously little you can say to counter the implications of this developement, including the way the Polish army tended to get shredded by any up-to-date colleague it went up against.

[Gregoshi]

cegorach1 and Watchman, can we please refrain from making snide remarks and lacing our posts with a condescending tone? Challenging someone's intelligence or insulting their learning is not the way to persuade them that your point of view is right. You have an opportunity to broaden your knowledge and/or that of the other. Don't lose that opportunity through needless sniping. Thank you.

[Watchman]

...I'll be good.

[Ironside]

I mean Trzciana in 1629, when well led ( at least ! 'Cause Sigismund was a bad commander)
Polish army ( with some, not really important support from Imperial army) crushed his cavalry.

Polish-Austrian army ( 8000), the Swedes ( 9000 ?). The forces were equal, however Gusav Adolph was fully aware of the impact of charging Winged Hussars against unprepared and unfortified Swedish infantry so he ordered a retreat to save his infantry sucrificing his cavalry.
So it was a cavalry battle - about equal forces, however soon Imparial cuirassiers were left behind and Poles had to fight alone. According to my sources Swedes lost 1000 dead, 500 captured and some cannons ( and 'commanded' musketeers), Poles 150 dead. About Imperials I don't know much. Gustav Adolph himself was almost captured, once or twice in this battle.

Did find a good source on this, Gustav II Adolf was appearently good on explaining away this as an irrelivant skirmish. While the Poles have been exagerated the losses.
The losses was 600 men in dead or captured, although around 700 more men were unfit for duty right after the battle (wounded lost horses etc.). The cav part was 5500 Swedish cav vs. 4500 Polish-Imperial cav. And the Imperial did change the battle to Polish advantage in the end, when it was down to a melee.

Konieckpolski is held high though

Also in Polish sources there are many complains that it was he who avoided battles...

I'm guessing thier not complaining when it comes to Czarniecki.

BTW according to Englund, the reason for the quick speed of the cav (ok he says specifficly Czarniecki's forces, but I'm guessing the same reason can be used for several other cav forces) was because they didn't have supply wagons but was relying on looting to get food.
So it's up to you to give examples on quick supply wagon movements by the Poles.

[Watchman]

...was because they didn't have supply wagons but was relying on looting to get food.

Not much of anyone's speciality then - in the proper terrain cavalry has been capable of doing that since time immemorial (or at least since humans figured out horses were good for something else than the stew). Infantry too, they just aren't as mobile and can't ...forage (ie. loot and pillage) at equally long distances.

Only really doable with comparatively small units, however. Larger armies will need to split up if they want to do this (as most wanted and did) which has its own problems.

[cegorach]

@Gregoshi

Yes my mistake. It won't happen again.

@Watchman

"Well, I thus happily daresay you recall the prologue quite wrong - nowhere does Englund claim Carolus X parried any lance"

Ok, I remembered this in a wrong way, you are right.

"but I promise I'll make a point of calling you "Ceg" in the future instead... "

I prefer my full nickname. There is nothing to shorten, it means something, actually.

"What Englund describes in the prologue could with very little cosmetic modifications be the description of most any Medieval feudal army"

Polish army wasn't medieval I will prove this later.

"The territorial dispute with the Swedes apparently had taught no lessons, or at least any that had practical consequences;"

Polish army was reformed around 1630, however the army which was fighting the Swedes in 1655+ was
what was left after several suprisingly serious defeats against Russian and Cossack armies ( e.g. most of veterans were killed at Batoh in 1652, a blow which can seriously affect ANY army of any time). Training a fairly good infantry required more time than 1 year ( Russia invaded in 1654).
In Poland it was always easier to recreate light cavalry and light/medium cavalry than infantry or medium cavalry like the Hussars.
Also it was more useful when most of the army was demolished to harass the enemy stopping their offensive.

"Rather, they faced just about the most cutting-edge, professional, all-around most effective modern military in whole contemporary Europe."

Yes and this was the real problem.

"And where exactly had they learned to be anything else than premodern, medieval cavalry ?"

I shall explain then.

"Modern cavalry" at the time meant professional soldiers operating as entire units (as much as possible), with iron-hard discipline"

Yes they were proffesional soldiers operating as entire units and with iron hard discipline.
Actually note how far polish cavalry was able to raid into enemy territory scouting, pillaging and generally causing trouble to occupy valuable enemy reserves.
It was because ( too lazy not to quote):
"Ok, we all have learned about equipment of Winged Hussars their tactics and deeds. But who did Poles managed to train and maintain such force. Approach that Poland used to create this fearsome force is also interesting.
Although Poland had king, he was very much restricted by Commonwealth parliament (Sejm) which had very strong influence on the king’s decisions, in Poland king had less power then he had in Lithuania. Sejm consisted of nobles and selected burgers that had right to participate in Sejm. King was responsible for maintaining army which he commanded, but income that he was generating from leased land, trade taxes and towns were not enough to support significant force therefore some of this burden was laid on Polish magnates and Sejm was voting on taxes that used to maintain regular army which size depended on economic situation and military threat. If required regional ruling council could also raised from noble levy and peasants. Polish king was appointing captains (rotmistrz) from nobles that were responsible for recruiting their companies. Rotmistrz was recruiting officers (towarzysze) from polish magnates each towarzysze was responsible to providing and maintaining 2-6 retinues, so one company of Hussari included very significant number of officers this gave very good control over troops during military operation even when company cooperated in small groups and allowed Hussari to make raids as far as 200 kilometers in small independent groups searching for supplies or devastating enemy lands like they did in war against Moskovy. Towarzysze was requiring their retinue from poor nobles and was responsible for their training. As opposite to Western Europe captain Polish captains were not requiring whole force but group of officers who brought their very trusted people with them. All towarzysze within company were equal and formed ‘cycle’ where all towarzysze was discussing decisions as equals but under rotmistrz command. Serving in Hussari and being towarzysze was part of being noble it was mater of personal prestige to serve in Army and to provide your retinue with best equipment and training. Polish magnates could afford having their own small armies which they very well equipped, this way all of that tiger and jaguar skins and quite expensive equipment of Hussari comes from. The way how towarzysze hussari looked and equipped displayed the wealth and nobility of their commander. Probably towarzysze and his retinue spend plenty of time together training, hunting and fighting the small wars between nobles for various reasons.
Cegorach correct me if did understood something wrong."

"comparatively light armor to keep costs and encumberance down, "

Their armour was pretty light ( only 4 kilos more than of light/medium Pancerni or Kozacy cavalry)
and didn't slow them down ( were faster than western cuirassiers or Swedish cavalry).
About the price - Winged Hussars were only about 3 times more expensive than good quality infantry .

" and wheellock pistols as their primary weapons"

They were armed with whellock pistols as well, but their task was different than of the Swedish cavalry for example. However they were using the pistols in combat when the lances were broken/unused and they didn't use their lance-like longswords or heavy hussar's sabres
( secondary weapons).

I have no idea why modern cavalry had to use whellock pistols as primary weapons to count as modern ?


"I fail to comprehend where the Polish noble-born heavy cavalry would or could have picked up such qualifications as to not count as chivalric anachronisms in comparision"

They were nobles ( not always) and believed they are very good, because they were in reality.
However it doesn't mean that they were not disciplined, proffessional and so on.
Please tell me how many cavalry units were able to turn on spot, loose they formation DURING a charge just to tighten it again just before the impact, how many non-proffessionals were able to
charge, turn on spot, retreat and charge again few minutes later in a formation not just like a mob.
They were one of few cavalry units able to reform their formation so quickly, but they were trained for this, they were professional soldiers and often veterans as well.

"Lighter commoner-background soldiers (who have always tended to be more adaptive and team-playing than the aristocracy"

They were, they were not knights.

"specially in getting troops over major rivers boggle the mind. And the Ottomans were downright famous for being able to pull it off with fairly little trouble - AFAIK the Poles weren't."

Ok, marching speed - Chodkiewicz before Kircholm - 45 kilometers per day. Sobieski to Vienna 30 kilometers per day or more. Of course without the wagons it was even faster - Czarniecki in February 1657 almost 100 ( !) kilometers a day, Sobieski in 1672 ( muddy ground, crossing autumn rivers and figting a battle EVERY day or every second day) 50 kilometers per day !

"excuse me ? Let's see now; shock charge with couched lance is the primary battlefield function; armored; at least partially barded horses; known for their ability to shatter entire segments of enemy army with a thunderous mounted assault into close combat."

Yes armoured, but not heavily, their armour protected only most exposed, vulnerable body parts.
Their horses were not barded.
Yes they were known to shatter enemy formations, but thanks to the impetus of their charge
( faster than gallop) and weapon they were using ( could beat enemy pikemen quite easily) but not thanks to how heavy they were, because were not.
Their lances were hollow BTW.

"and that religious tolerance has exceedingly little connection to social developement."

And intolerance has ? The problem is that the tolerance in Poland was achieved through discussion mostly and not without this, this was because the education level was quite high and the country was very diverse. Warsaw Confederacy 1572 ( a treaty of religious tolerance) is in UNESCO world's heritage list from this year BTW.

"For some reason I rather suspect the native Polish infantry wasn't exactly using the sort of firearms dril"

They were, but usually were shooting in 2-3 rank salvos. Also I don't really know what do you mean by this term 'native polish' - in Polish/Lithuanian/Belorussian/Ukrainian/German/Jewish/Russian/Scottish/Tatar/Dutch etc. country it is hard to say what was 'native polish'.

"Well, it was also a sign of backwardness - like it or not, but feudal cavalry had already become obsolete in the West during the 1500s to a large part because it quite simply didn't work too well against disciplined professional infantry."

There was no feudal cavalry in Poland, but if you call noble militia - feudal cavalry that is your decision. Note how rarely they were used, mostly like some sort of territorial defence forces.
I am sure you don't think that cavalry at all is a sign of backwardness, but only feudal cavalry which was no more there after 1456.


"Feudalism more or less developed from the need to defend large territories for comparatively small groups of fast-moving raiders"

But polish army was proffessional - stayed in these, exposed areas.

"he need for this arrangement had disappeared in the West already by the end of 12th century"

In Poland it at later, but not much.

"No, was it of any particular importance ?"

If you consider Gabriel Bethlen's forces a threat to Vienna, then yes it was.

"Poland seems to have spent most of the conflict sitting on its butt"

I believe it was rather a good decision, but there was enough wars to feel occupied.
Of course with a better king than this idiot Sigismund III Vasa Poland could gain much using this opportunity e.g. to reclaim Livonia, take Eastern Prussia or a part of Silesia ( the last was achieved, but only as a personal domain of Vasa dynasty.

"Look, as far as I know Polish history after the end of the Middle Ages is a tale of woe and slowly accelerating decay and stagnation, which seems to have gathered a fair bit of velocity after around the time the Polish branch of the Vasa dynasty died out"

If you believe that a country can decay from the very beginning, that's fine.
But it doesn't mean that it is true.
The problem is that it is not right to see history of any country from the point of view how did it end ( if we assume that the polish history ended in the late XVIIIth century, which isn't correct). This way it is quite easy ( for a well informed historian) to prove that EVERY or almost every country's history was "a tale of woe and slowly accelerating decay and stagnation". This way I could add that, lets say, Prussia was doomed from te beginning ( XVIIth century) because it was annihilated in 1945. Also this way of 'discussing history' ( couldn't find a better term, my English is bad unfortunatelly) is very similar to the way it was taught in soviet schoolbooks ( still remember them) where almost every event was 'proving' that the ultimate victory of the Communism is inevitable - from Spartakus slave revolts and peasant rebellions to the 'revolution' in 1917.
There are many examples of similar approach. Fortuanatelly the way that historians see the history of Poland is changing, it is after more than 200 years of offending it, but it is better than nothing.
BTW - When did the Middle Ages ended in Poland, it seems it had to be no earlier than in late XVIth-early XVIIth, because it is hard to say that "a tale of woe and slowly accelerating decay and stagnation" is all what can be told about a period known as the Golden Age of Poland.
At this moment there is really no reason why it wouldn't be Poland which could dominate Eastern Europe for another 3 centuries or more.

"The poor country evetually getting partitioned between neighbors in the 1700s. And there's preciously little you can say to counter the implications of this developement"

I can, I said it few lines earlier.

Wasn't it very different from the fall of Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Venice etc. ?
The problem is that there was no place to hide behind and all our neighbours were getting stronger at that time. Of course it doesn't matter that Poles didn't try to survive or reform the state MORE than its neigbours ( world's second constitution was created in Poland - it is called 3rd May Constitution BTW). Note that Poland was/is getting stronger when Germany and Russia were/are weaker or less agressive. It is a normal thing to me. The destruction of Poland in the later XVIIIth wasn't something stranger than its re-apperance in the XXth century.

"including the way the Polish army tended to get shredded by any up-to-date colleague it went up against."

Shredded you say.
Ok, let's proceed:

1792 - Constitution war vs. Russia. Yes a failure, but the army was just recreated and it was fighting Russian veterans ( 1st time and almost the last time when Russian forces were of better quality than Polish).

1794 - Kosciusko Uprising vs. Prussia, Russia & Austria - hardly possible, but the only way to survive. Russian greatest commanders ( Suvorov) & veterans + 3 countries vs. 1 = that is why this was a defeat. 'Invincible' Prussian army was humilated BTW.

1809 - Duchy of Warsaw vs. Austrian VIIth corps - a VICTORY, even though Polish army was outnumbered and made of conscripts mostly. Or it DOESN'T count ?

1812 - invasion of Russia ( or Polish second war) - a defeat, but should I count Napoleon as POLISH ?

1830-31 - November Uprising - fairly equal forces of a part of Poland and Russian empire.
Yes, a defeat, but Russia was the country which defeated Napoleon, or not ?

1863-64 - January Uprising - Poles vs. Russia. A guerilla war. No chance to win possibly, but this revolt was hard to avoid. It was like the Irish uprising in 1916.

1918-21- 8, yes EIGHT wars vs. Germany ( 4 uprisings), Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, western Ukraine and the Bolsheviks - these were mostly WON. Or aren't these worth mentioning ?

1939 - Poland vs. Germany and the Soviet Union. Well... Two greatest military powers of the world
vs. one country which recently re-appeared. Yes it really was a humilation not to win this as well.

Presently however there is no Third Reich nor Soviet Union, and Poland is in the UE and NATO isn't it a victory ?

As you can see it was very ironic, but I don't think it is offending.
If you see this way, I am sorry.

I am really good at 'converting' other people's mind when it comes to the history of Poland for example. Just give me some time m8.

Regards Cegorach/Hetman

[cegorach]

I'm guessing thier not complaining when it comes to Czarniecki.


But Gustav Adolph wasn't fighting a guerilla war, was he ?

[Watchman]

Guerilla warfare tends to throw many "normal" military maxims out of the window, which is of course the whole point. I've yet to read up on the Invincible, but a brief summary I've been give of the basic developement goes roughly "Carolus X went into Poland, beat up all armies sent against him, more or less conquered the place and installed a suitable puppet monarch, managed to alienate the natives who eventually rose in a guerilla war which did not go very well for the Swedes, and the whole foray generally went onto the rocks."

But then winning the war is notoriously often easier than winning the peace that follows...

Actually note how far polish cavalry was able to raid into enemy territory scouting, pillaging and generally causing trouble to occupy valuable enemy reserves.
...

...and...? The Poles may have been better at it than most of their contemporaries, but this is not a particularly impressive feat by itself; rather it is something of a vital part of any cavalry's job description. During their heyday the Central Asian nomad hordes (in many ways better and more capable soldiers than anything the settled nations could muster until somehting like 20th century, albeit they were overall on the decline already by the late 1500s) were the masters of this strategy, and the main reason long-range cavalry raids weren't too popular in Medieval Europe was the simple fact the feudal defense network was specifically designed against such incursions.

Little in the way of discipline, professionalism or any other positive military quality is honestly needed for long-range devastation raids - the Hussars in the universal European sense (the Polish Hussars were a very different animal; beats me where they picked the name from) for example developed out of the irregular light frontier cavalry, little more than glorified bandits and border raiders, both the Hungarians and the Turks used to ravage each others' territories and scout on each others' armies already during the later Middle Ages.

'Course, if the long-range cavalry forces are also supposed to be able to fight effectively when needed they'd better be of a little higher quality - nomad horse-archers or the comparatively good-quality horsemen the Polish according to you employed for the job, for example. (On the other hand the irregular raiders are a cheap, if not free, easily replaced and quite disposable resource - really just the usual marauders that follow war made halfway useful.)

Just so you know, but if you took away the local flavor and a few minor details from the quote about the recruitement of Winged Hussars what you'd end with would be virtually the basic, universal schematic of the feudal cavalry system.
"Noble levy" ? Check, the whole basis of feudal landholding is military service when needed.

...captains --- from nobles that were responsible for recruiting their companies" ? Check. With some variations similar setups were common across the whole Europe after the Early Middle Ages.
"Rotmistrz was recruiting officers (towarzysze) --- each towarzysze was responsible to providing and maintaining 2-6 retinues, so one company of Hussari included very significant number of officers ---
-
Towarzysze was requiring their retinue from poor nobles and was responsible for their training. As opposite to Western Europe captain Polish captains were not requiring whole force but group of officers who brought their very trusted people with them.
-
Serving in Hussari and being towarzysze was part of being noble it was mater of personal prestige to serve in Army and to provide your retinue with best equipment and training. Polish magnates could afford having their own small armies which they very well equipped, this way all of that tiger and jaguar skins and quite expensive equipment of Hussari comes from. The way how towarzysze hussari looked and equipped displayed the wealth and nobility of their commander. Probably towarzysze and his retinue spend plenty of time together training, hunting and fighting the small wars between nobles for various reasons.

Aside from local variations of the basic theme, the whole of this applies, almost without any modifications, to the basic universal structure of the feudal heavy cavalry of the Middle Ages. All of it. Quotas of certain numbers of troops, certain minimum levels of equipement, personal loyalites, loyal retainers equipped by their patron, pride and social prestige, noblesse oblige, training and practice in small-unit teamwork (for several reasons always vital to cavalry), displays of wealth and power in the richness of the retinue's appereance...
It's all theere. There is very little on that whole list that was not, in some very close variation, the institution of the Medieval mounted warrior class of landholding noblemen (officially knighted or not) and their sworn retainers (who usually were neither noble nor knights).

I hate to tell you, but that's a pretty lousy argument to mkae for "modernity"...

were faster than western cuirassiers or Swedish cavalry

On march or on the battlefield ? If on the latter, that doesn't take much - most Early Modern European cavalry would move at a pace faster than trot only in emergencies or during charges, in order to preserve the horses and maintain unit cohesion. By the same token loose-order light infantry has always been faster than close-order "line" infantry. To boot the Swedish had the brigades of musketeers between the cavalry squadrons for fire support, and these accompanying footmen naturally slowed the Swedish horse down to the speed of infantry (the extra punch they gave seems to have been considered worth the lost mobility).

I have no idea why modern cavalry had to use whellock pistols as primary weapons to count as modern ?

Lances are heavy and unwieldy things, even in combat; on march they're going to be a royal pain in the butt to transport (on reason the heavy 3/4 cuirassieur armor dropped out of general use was the transportation issue - the breastplate-and-helmet combination could conversely be worn by the trooper even on the march). More to the point, I suggest you take a look at the way lance-armed cavalry fought and compare it to the way pistol-armed cavalry did - and ask yourself why the latter usually mopped the floor with the former once they learned not to try the caracole in the wrong context. (Light lancers were used in most armies until mid-1800s, true, but that's a different topic - and by ethos and method those were soldiers in the modern sense.)

They were nobles ( not always) and believed they are very good, because they were in reality.
*snip*
They were one of few cavalry units able to reform their formation so quickly, but they were trained for this, they were professional soldiers and often veterans as well.

*shrug* That just proves their fighting method had not degenerated the way it had in the West after the 1200s (which is when "knight" had become synonymous with "nobleman", though the bulk of the cavalry was still made up of non-noble retainers) - but then given the rather more diverse nature of opponents they faced this is perhaps nothing to wonder about. For example back at the time the feudal heavy cavalry of the Crusader Kingdoms was decidedly far more controlled and better at tactical maneuvering than their colleagues back in Europe - facing the Turks and the Arabs, they had had to learn or die (conversely Crusaders fresh from Europe were prone to committing just the kinds of tactical blunders the Franks of the Outremer had learned out of).

The Early Modern Hussars' up-to-date cavalry contemporaries, however, were all about maintaining formation and unit cohesion. A cycle of charging, withdrawing to redress the ranks (and reloading) and attacking again was how they wore out each others resolve and cohesion; even the cavalry, flightly as it always was compared to footmen, of the Early Modern period could be incredibly resilient to shock and casualty and the cavalry wings of opposing armies might well spend a whole battle colliding with each other without any meaningful results (besides a lot of corpses).
The fact is, premodern cavalry could not do that. They just didn't have the formation depth and the discipline to soldier on despite the often obscene combat attrition rate, which is among the main reasons the Hussars and their ilk were in such trouble with them.

Yes armoured, but not heavily, their armour protected only most exposed, vulnerable body parts.
Their horses were not barded.
Yes they were known to shatter enemy formations, but thanks to the impetus of their charge ( faster than gallop) and weapon they were using ( could beat enemy pikemen quite easily) but not thanks to how heavy they were, because were not.

Cavalry "weight" is usually rated more by its battlefield function than its specific equipement, though the criteria vary confusingly. However, armored shock cavalry who attack in close order with lances are definitely "heavy". For the record, Early Medieval knights often had no heavier armor than a simple mail shirt plus helmet, but are nonetheless always considered "heavy".

More later, perhaps, for I have other things to do now.

[cegorach]

I've yet to read up on the Invincible, but a brief summary I've been give of the basic developement goes roughly "Carolus X went into Poland, beat up all armies sent against him, more or less conquered the place and installed a suitable puppet monarch, managed to alienate the natives who eventually rose in a guerilla war which did not go very well for the Swedes, and the whole foray generally went onto the rocks."

But then winning the war is notoriously often easier than winning the peace that follows...


There was no peace to win, because Charles X wasn't able to conquer the country. There was no puppet monarch, you simply mistaket ntis war with the Great Northern War 50 years later.

About the rest I will answer later.

I have Ukrainian election to analise today.

Regards Cegorach/Hetman

[Lazul]

I know nothing about the polish cavalry so I wont get in to that discussion.

But latley I have been studying the Swedish conflicts around that era and I find it very intresting.
I havent read the "invincible" and Im wondering if someone could tell me more about some things.

Ive heard that the Swedish Cavalry under Gustaf II Adolf introduced a new tacitc against the imperial forces; instead of riding towards the enemy firing their pistols and then running away to return a few minutes later with a reloaded gun the Swedish Cavarly charged towards the enemy in classic way, but instead of the skirmish-way they never used the pistol and just charged like medieval knights suprising the imperials that wasnt used to the tactic. Now im talking about the Sweden vs Imperial troops and not against polish cavarly.
Also I read somewhere that the Swedes won several times against the imperial forces couse they didnt form Huge square formations but instead divided the Pikes from the Rifles and used the shock fire tactic, moving towards the huge formations, all firing at the same time (cant miss that big formation to) and then running back and reload while another group shockfires.

Also when readin about the major Sweden vs Imperial battles they call the different more elite brigades; Blue and Yellow brigades and names like that. Did theese brigades only consist of swedish troops or was it mostly mercs?

And I might add that the most intresting thing about Sweden at this time is that we had 4 Kings in a row that all where superb generals, from Gustaf II Adols to Karl XII.

If anyone could give me more information about theese things, maybe correcting me, I might be wrong, ill be most thankfull.

[cegorach]

""Carolus X went into Poland, beat up all armies sent against him, more or less conquered the place and installed a suitable puppet monarch, managed to alienate the natives who eventually rose in a guerilla war which did not go very well for the Swedes, and the whole foray generally went onto the rocks."

But then winning the war is notoriously often easier than winning the peace that follows..."


Soon he found out that 'it is possible to beat Poland, but not to conquer it ( alone)'. In 1657 in Radnarot he designed the treaty to cut Poland in pieces - one for Swedes, one for Brandenburg, one for Cossacks, one for Transylvania and one for the traitorous Radziwill.
In the same year, however all what was left of this was devastated Transylvania and destroyed its army, Brandenburgia changing side, defeated Radziwill and convinced and divided Cossacks.




"It's all theere. There is very little on that whole list that was not, in some very close variation, the institution of the Medieval mounted warrior class of landholding noblemen (officially knighted or not) and their sworn retainers (who usually were neither noble nor knights)."

There are notable differences though, which I will describe here:
Husaria was recruited in a way which was very similar to all Polish cavalry units.
Firstly when the army was beeing mobilized all Colonels ( Pulkownik) were granted with 'list przepowiedni', which gave them the right to recruit soldiers for the incoming war. They were usually asking known Rotmistrz ( Rotamasters) to prepare 'their' units.
'Their' because these were NOT their retainers, vassals or so ( there were NO SUCH generally, nobles were EQUAL in rights), but rather friends and similar. They were generally recruiting soldiers from disbanded units and other volunteers. Then they get the money to pay their soldiers, so often they had to spent some money before this to equip some of their soldiers properly. Units were armed in the same way ( had to be), but because it was them who were buying most of this equipment they were eager to do it as well as possible - this is the reason why the quality of their weaponry and steeds was exceptionaly high.
BTW Selling warhorses outside of Poland was prohibited to the later XVIIIth century.
Anyway, only a small part of the equipment was provided by the authorities ( lances !) and this was the reason why for the STATE i.e. society Husaria was pretty cheap to recruit.
Of course this meant that when the country became poorer it was harder to create large numbers of Husaria cavalry, but for a long time ( 250 years, at least) it was a very easy and cheap way to create very good quality ( because recruited from professionals and volunteers) units of cavalry and infantry.
Generally this system had several advantages ( cheap and efficient + virtually no corruption) and some disadvantages ( slower than 'ordinary' way of recruitment and more related to the wealth of the society and public opinion).
It can be described as 'a decentralised and voluntary recruitment', but it is hard to call it 'feudal'.
If you think that it was too dependant on looting the defeated enemy and their country note that other armies were also e.g. Swedes weren't called 'Tatars of the north' without a good reason.
This way the army was also more related to the society ( it was the Parliament - Sejm - and local 'parliaments' - sejmiki which were providing the money) than to the king in times of war, which was important to stop his ambitions most of times. He had to rely on public opinion to get enough money to fight a war, so had to convince the society that the war is right and justified e.g wars with Russia in 1579-82 and other.
This way army was much more difficult to use as a political tool by any king unless he was supported by a really large percent of the voters.
Note also that there is no mention about mercenary Husaria in history, fighting outside of Poland even though the army wasn't recruited for monarch's cash.
For the battlefield purposes it was also quite good - the soldiers knew each other so usually trusted their colleagues and were able to perform more difficult tasks in much smaller groups than in 'ordinary' armies, the number of deserters was much smaller and there really were no problems with officers spending soldiers' wages in, let's call it, 'unorthodox way'.


"Quote:
were faster than western cuirassiers or Swedish cavalry

On march or on the battlefield"

Both. Actually many people forget that they were usually transporting the lances in wagons, so even Czarnecki , most likely, had to use at least a small number of these when he was speeding along northern Poland almost 100 km per day.


"I have no idea why modern cavalry had to use whellock pistols as primary weapons to count as modern ?

Lances are heavy and unwieldy things, even in combat; on march they're going to be a royal pain in the butt to transport (on reason the heavy 3/4 cuirassieur armor dropped out of general use was the transportation issue - the breastplate-and-helmet combination could conversely be worn by the trooper even on the march). More to the point, I suggest you take a look at the way lance-armed cavalry fought and compare it to the way pistol-armed cavalry did - and ask yourself why the latter usually mopped the floor with the former once they learned not to try the caracole in the wrong context."

You forget that the Winged Hussars ( Husaria) were using TWO primary weapons and TWO secondary weapons. Lance wasn't used when it was not dangerous enough to the enemy e.g. vs. Tatars, however I can't even think of one single example when Husaria's lances were the reason why this cavalry lost a battle or a melee, against ANY enemy.
There is also another question - the lance was HOLLOW which is often forgotten by various historians. It was virtually one use weapon. Hussars were using a lance-like sword ( 'koncerz'), heavy sabres and wheellock pistols after the initial impact. But actually rarely enemy cavalry was able to survive this impact ( also pikemen were in big troubles because of this weapon and special Husaria tactics to fight them).
Actually when a Winged Hussar was in a situation when the lance wouldn't be useful he could always use another type of weapon he had - a 'koncerz' during a charge or a sabre/pistol.
Hussars didn't use their lances for more than 150 years without a very good reason and noone was going to replace it with something else.
BTW - only first 2 ranks of Husaria were using this weapon.

Regards Cegorach/Hetman

[Watchman]

As I said, the whole Polish foray generally bombed for Carolus X. Heck, I've been told he lost his nickname "the Invincible" in that mess.

Anyway, you have yet to present anything to make the Polish army (or at least the cavalry) appear any less fundamentally feudal in nature - the very fact that its linchpin are landed noblemen and similar potentates is alone enough to mark it as such. That, according to your description, the cavalrymen were at least partially mercenary is nothing new in such setups - how do you imagine the many "wandering knights" (often younger sons of noblemen who didn't inherit the estate) of medieval Europe made their living ?

The part about the "equal rights" of the nobility would appear to hint at something many sources I've seen speak of - the enormous military importance and therefore political influence (the coëfficent between the two being a typically feudal trait) of lower landed aristocracy, whom at least one source referred to by the term szlachta or thereabouts and added "famed for their courage".

The whole system costing the central governement, such as it was, very little is yet another typically feudal trait although such arrangements of military obligation have been very common also at other times and places - one need merely think of the citizen-soldier hoplites or Republican Roman legions, or the tribal warbands of their barbarian neighbors. All the better that way - states that rely on such systems quite often did so out of sheer inability to sustain an economy that allowed for alternatives (which, in other words, require a comparaticely sophisticated economy and a central governing organ capable of gathering taxes and pooling them for whatever use required, such as a standing army).

There yet remains a very strong air of feudalism over the whole affair. That it was a feudalism slightly different from, say, what you found in 14th century France is wholly beside the point - feudalism is a catchall term for a certain kind of landholding-cum-military system, not any specific national variety thereof. Its contemporaries seem to have been barely aware of its existence as any singular institution - for them it was merely the fact of life - and a formal theory of it (which can be summed up roughly as "no land without master") only developed during the 1600s or so, after it had become largely defunct and the nobility sort of felt themselves left hanging in the wind.

Not in the least because the newly emerging autocrat states were keen of restricting the privileges of the landholding class, especially taxation-related.

That aside, compared to the ultramodern Swedish army of the mid-1600s the Polish one was little more than a curious if still dangerous medieval relic. Englund, who seems fascinated by the collision of old and new military paradigms (he is clearly aware of the often tragic nature of the friction, and his tone is often almost wistful - gallant old individualism vs. faceless modern efficiency seems like a recurring theme in his books), may be excused if he bluntly calls it such especially in the context.

If you think that it was too dependant on looting the defeated enemy and their country note that other armies were also e.g. Swedes weren't called 'Tatars of the north' without a good reason.

Off with the finger-pointing, thank you. I don't think anyone who knows anything about the TYW has any illusions of the obscene devastation the various armies, including the Imperial ones, wrought in Germany or the horrors they visited upon the civilian populace. The conflict enjoys a reputation as the first truly "modern" war, that is to say, one where the civilians were the ones to suffer the worst and intentionally targeted by the warring powers...

Anyone who's read up on the Swedish role in the conflict, preferably without any nationalist mental filters (there are fairs held here in Finland celebrating the Hackapells, a at least here famous cavalry contignent in the Swedish army mostly recruited from the country's Finnish provinces... I like to call that sort of thing "my grampa was a worse murdering rapist than yours"- grandstanding), is going to have a difficult time finding nice things to say of the state army's conduct in Germany. The scorching of Bohemia, which earned Baner the nickname "Old Arsonist" in the Catholic camp and the eternal hatred of Bohemian peasantry, is probably the most extreme example but it ought to tell something that until early 1900s or so in many parts of Germany children were scared into submission by telling them "Swede" or Axel Oxenstierna (the Swedish Chancellor of State during the time) would take them if they didn't behave...

The Swedish participation in the conflict was only economically possible through massive debts to anyone and everyone who was willing to loan money, the generous French subsidies (Richelieu in a sense hired the entire Swedish army to cause trouble for the Habsburgs) and a very thorough looting and pillaging of the unfortunate German locals. But, then, the Emperor had it even worse - he lacked the French monetary support and to boot the fighting and ravaging went on in his lands...


As for the Hussars' weaponry, nobody said they fought with just the one-shot lance, just like the medieval knight carried a score of backup weapons and the 1600s cuirassieur and musketeer alike had a sword (in principle at least). That doesn't mean the lance was any less a pain in the arse on campaign - see your own mention of them usually being transported in wagons. The lance was always quite possibly the most disposable part of the feudal cavalryman's outfit in any case - its sheer lenght and the one-handed technique of wielding it made it cumbersome in the melee that often followed the initial shock charge. If nothing else there could well be someone's corpse skewered on it, or it might be stuck in some poor horse's bowels, so it was often unceremoniously discarded. Pages, squires and other serving-folk were tasked with bringing the knights fresh lances if and when required.

The one-shot hollow lances of the Poles were really just the logical next step.

[cegorach]

"As I said, the whole Polish foray generally"

And I just said that you have mistaken one war with another and corrected this mistake. That is all.

"you have yet to present anything to make the Polish army (or at least the cavalry) appear any less fundamentally feudal in nature - the very fact that its linchpin are landed noblemen and similar potentates is alone enough to mark it as such. That, according to your description, the cavalrymen were at least partially mercenary is nothing new in such setups"

No they didn't have to be landed noblemen. It didn't matter, they had to be:
1. well known,
2. experienced,
3. wealthy ( sometimes not necessary),
That is all.

And they were COMPLETELY 'MERCENARY', but I don't think calling them mercenaries is really correct - they were rarely fighting outside the country actually. There were no Husaria mercenaries for example.

"The part about the "equal rights" of the nobility would appear to hint at something many sources I've seen speak of - the enormous military importance and therefore political influence (the coëfficent between the two being a typically feudal trait) of lower landed aristocracy, whom at least one source referred to by the term szlachta or thereabouts and added "famed for their courage"."

One thing to correct.
In Poland there was no higher or lower aristocracy. According to the polish law all these titles ( baron, count, prince, duke etc.) didn't matter. Actually NOONE was allowed to use this kind of ranks nor grant them.
Exceptions:
1.former Lithuanian/Russian 'kniaz' ( princes) were allowed to use these titles;
2. ranks granted by the HRE Emperor, Pope could be used.
However all this didn't matter in courts or enewhere else.
So in theory a landless noble from a small village in Masovia was equal to a Ukrainian noble with 5000 strong private army.
Of course in theory, but today it isn't very different in a way.

'Szlachta' is the term used to describe all the nobility of the country/region - more than 10 % of the population ( in some regions even 33 %).

The most important part of this class was middle 'szlachta' which prepared most of many reforms, but also very wealthy nobles achieved a lot of good.
In many ways In Poland middle nobility was replacing citizens preparing similar reforms.

"All the better that way - states that rely on such systems quite often did so out of sheer inability to sustain an economy that allowed for alternatives (which, in other words, require a comparaticely sophisticated economy and a central governing organ capable of gathering taxes and pooling them for whatever use required, such as a standing army)."

In Poland there was another reason. It was to prevent the king from becoming a tyrant, because the army was often his tool for keeping his
'beloved' country in check.
It was also because this way unwanted wars were rather hard to start by a monarch - these guys should really be controlled.
I think it was a good solution.

"That aside, compared to the ultramodern Swedish army of the mid-1600s the Polish one was little more than a curious if still dangerous medieval relic. Englund, who seems fascinated by the collision of old and new military paradigms (he is clearly aware of the often tragic nature of the friction, and his tone is often almost wistful - gallant old individualism vs. faceless modern efficiency seems like a recurring theme in his books), may be excused if he bluntly calls it such especially in the context."

Was it ?

I can't see no 'old individualism' in Polish army. Sorry it can be only found in the way how it was possible to achieve much of 'wealth and glory' in the Republic. You can call it 'the american dream' of that time.
It was a republic, so much more was possible than in countries ruled with 'an iron fist' even when covered in a gentle glove.
Certainly it is rather hard to see much individualism in the way how the army fought on the battlefield - no 'knights errant' but units moving, charging and fighting in a formation, which very important in Polish military art.

"Off with the finger-pointing, thank you."

Sorry, but it was just an example, if you are from Sweden I am sorry if it offends you.
I just wanted to point out that many armies of that period were dependant on loot. Sweden is a very good example, because here 'the war had to pay for itself', so in many ways loot was more important than in other countries, or not ?

"The lance was always quite possibly the most disposable part of the feudal cavalryman's outfit in any case - its sheer lenght and the one-handed technique of wielding it made it cumbersome in the melee that often followed the initial shock charge."

But it was worth using it, especially against enemy pikemen. When it wasn't really useful ( rarely) it wasn't IN USE, that is all.
In addition the lances were always provided by the country in the same way it was done in the XVIIIth, XIXth and XXth centuries.
Was the cavalry still feudal at that time as well ?
BTW - even in the XXth century some units were created by local landowners/other wealth men in Poland, maybe it was because Poland was/is feudal at that time ?
Or maybe the reason was different...

regards Cegorach/Hetman

[cegorach]

I have recently read an interviev with Englund in a Polish newspaper.
It was related to his 'Invincible' book which is going to be published now in Poland.

I think that I seriously underestimated this historian, but most of my knowledge comes from this stunning prologue in the 'Years of war'(or whatever it is titled) and from my discussion with Watchman, so it can be understood, I think.

Anyway I would like to read 'the Invincible' and share my comments with you sooner or later.

Still there were quite interesting statements in this interviev, which should be noted, I believe.

1. At the beginning of the XVIIth century Sweden was the poorest country in Europe.
2. The Age of Reason never really affected this country, certainly not so much as southern states e.g. German states or Poland.
3. Protestant faith was wide-spread very quickly especially amongst poorer citizens, minor nobility etc.
4. Number of nobles in Sweden was very small.

My thoughts:

1.This explains why its citizens were so eager to follow their monarchs in endless wars they fought ( weak opposition + protestant, actually Lutheran religion) without any real opposition.

2. The very fact that there was a strong army demanded so many wars to provide cash to maintain it.
This way it was an army with a country not a country with an army in a very similar way it was in Prussia.

3. It explains why Charles X invaded Poland not Russia in 1655. Russia was certainly more dangerous at that time, because of its early victories vs. Poland in 1654, but only invading Poland could provide enough funds to maintain the army - its society was very wealthy at that time, especially in western Poland where the last war was fought in the late XIVth century i.e. about 300 years earlier.

This proved to be a strategical mistake, because weakened Poland wasn't able to defeat Russia this time and this way the Russian Empire was born - it resulted in Poltava many years later.

This way the balance of power in eastern Europe was changed for next 300 years i.e. till 1991 and present events such like ukrainian election.

regards Cegorach/Hetman

[Ironside]

2. The very fact that there was a strong army demanded so many wars to provide cash to maintain it.
This way it was an army with a country not a country with an army in a very similar way it was in Prussia.

Not really, the Swedes didn't have a standing army that constantly drained money. But when the rised an army they needed to attack. Peace was still expensive though, but that had more to do with bad finances in the first place.

3. It explains why Charles X invaded Poland not Russia in 1655. Russia was certainly more dangerous at that time, because of its early victories vs. Poland in 1654, but only invading Poland could provide enough funds to maintain the army - its society was very wealthy at that time, especially in western Poland where the last war was fought in the late XIVth century i.e. about 300 years earlier.

Actually the original goal was to conquer the cities at the rivers close to the coasts to get "mares Balticum", but after the extreme initial success, Charles X:s plans grew (that's the problem with a king with megalomania), thus in the end resulting in a failure. A focus on the coast together with the army marching towards Warsaw and Krakow 1655 would probably give the Swedes an exellent peace treaty.

This proved to be a strategical mistake, because weakened Poland wasn't able to defeat Russia this time and this way the Russian Empire was born - it resulted in Poltava many years later.

Indirectly true, but a good victory at Poltava would on the other hand be devastating for the Russians, but that campaign wasn't well made before Poltava either.

1.This explains why its citizens were so eager to follow their monarchs in endless wars they fought ( weak opposition + protestant, actually Lutheran religion) without any real opposition.

Probably, but the peasants had a very strong position in Sweden compared to the rest of Europe, so I suspect they saw this drafting as something you'll need to live with to get away from the "evil" nobility and live under the "good" king instead. Besides much of the soldiers at this period were mercs.

[Watchman]

During the TYW the "national-Swedish" ("national Swedish" as in "anyone from within the Swedish realm") drafted troops were primarily employed as garrisons, being considered both more economical and more reliable than mercenaries for the job. The bulk of Swedish field armies was, like everyone elses', made up of mercenaries who were considered better for field duty.

After TYW mercenaries apparently fell out of favor and were replaced by national regulars. The Swedish rulers came up with many different schemes for supporting the troops during peacetime, including granting them small plots of land to cultiate for sustenance, but satisfactory ones were few and far between. No surprise there - the Swedish superpower stood on legs of hollow clay, as it quite simply had neither the demographics nor the economy to sustain the continued warfare. The kingdom's stint as a Great Power was no longer than under a century and five monarchs, and by its end - after Poltava and Carolus XII - its "core" regions, Sweden proper and the area of present-day Finland, were bled dry, impoverished and severely underpopulated.

Ironically, the country did quite well for itself overall after it by necessity dropped its grandiose imperial pretensions. It'd eventually be reduced into its "original" land area of Sweden proper (the Russians took Finland bit by bit, until Alexander I grabbed the whole thing in the Napoleonic wars) but could concentrate on domestic developement and enjoying the hard-fought, bloodstained plunder of its past wars.

Incidentally, with the possible exception of Denmark Scandinavian peasantry on the whole remained very "free" through its recorded hostory. The nature of the geography and the limited population and agricultural productivity kept feudal chivalry from ever attaining the military importance it did to the south, and hence staved off serfdom; and later on, quite possibly without breaks, at least the Swedish peasantry kept their representation in the Estates of the governement diet. The Finnish ones got to keep it under Russians overlordship too, save for the last two panslavist czars who tended to crack down on regional autonomy. But then, those jokers (and particularly the dimwit last one) were also the ones who lost the empire their forefathers had built over half a millenia...

However, when the Reformation rolled around Gustaf Vasa was quick to see an opportunity and started the trend of converting the local branch of the Protestant faith into a tool of the State, a process essentially completed during the early years of Gustavus II Adolphus' reign a century later. In a sense this created a sort of proto-police state - the rulers could in a very real sense get into the very thoughts of their subjects and mold their very way of thinking. Many other lords tried something similar, with varying degrees of success. This is one undeniably bad thing about the Reformation - whatever the old Catholic Church had been, it had in its own way been quite laissez-faire and content to leave people's private lives alone. Post Luther, at least many Protestant states and quite possibly many Catholic ones too (Counter-Reform, you know) made confession mandatory...

"The State and Church joined forces to control people even in their bedrooms", as the social historians here often put it.

Englund cites this de facto brainwashing as a major reason behind the fervor, nothing short of religious, the kings of the later Great Power period (ie. Caroluses XI and XII) could inspire in civilians and soldiers alike. The basic fatalism of the creed was also well suited to the realities of contemporary warfare, where stoic indifference to death and pain was of value.