The Western Way of War: An Alternative Explanation

[Strategy]

Following on our discussion on the "Push" in the Phalanx, I thought I'd post one of the alternative theories. I had written this once already, but lost it when it failed to post. Anyway, here goes again...

Basically it follows all the same phases as described by VDH. First a Charge, then a somewhat disordered melee as the two sides sort themselves out. What comes next is where the two models differ.

Rather than stepping in to push, the hoplites would step back to lock shields. The steadiness of the file closers in this scenario would of course be particularly important, since it would be important that they not allow any backwards "ripple" through the ranks to turn into a rout.

Combat would then alternate between "stand-off" as hoplites crouch behind their shields while stabbing, hacking, swaying and shouting at their opponents in the spear in front of them. Those in back would try to encourage and help their comrade, using their spears (if possible) and by encouraging their comrades forward (much the same way as happened in Roman, Celtic, and other ancient warfare). Intermittently, there would be a localized surge of intense melee as some particularly brave (or suicidal) group of hoplites tried to exploit a perceived break or wavering in the enemy ranks, with attendant close order hacking, stabbing, and perhaps even close-in shoving and pushing to break through. This would be happening all up and down the line.

Leaders, of course, would be constantly trying to get their men to close the distance with the enemy shieldwall - the cry for "one more step" makes as much sense in this scenario as in the othismos. The use of shorter swords by the Spartans also make sense - in a stand-off situation, the most elite troops would be the ones who'd would dare go in closest on their enemy. In that context, the advice of the Spartan mother to her son in Plutarch's Moralia when queried about the short sword make perfect sense... "Add a step to the length of your sword".

The above form of combat could conceivably be carried on for hours, which would explain the many, many battles that "went on for a long time" in the sources; something that the othismos theory fails to satisfactorily explain. At the same time, it would tend to be decided on the flanks where the greater maneuvre room of the opposing hoplites would make the situation much more fluid.

I find the above theory attractive for a number of reasons:

1. It fits well with the evidence. You could take VDH's book, replace his theory with the above and use all the same "evidence" and make all the same arguements. Unlike with the othismos, however, you'd also have pictorial evidence to support the theory of combat. Similarly, there is overwhelming evidence in the sources that the Spear was the first and most important weapon of the Hoplite (e.g., Spartan hoplites on campaign were ordered to have their spears with them at all times). This emphasis is understandable in the combat model above - it makes far less sense when considered in the context of the othismos.

2. It makes the Greek hoplite basically an ordinary man, like any other, looking out first and foremost for his own life. Needless to say, standing off from each other with locked shields and jabbing at each other is not going to generate a lot of casaulties, so the Hoplite in the first ranks would be in control of his own fate - not dependent on the whim of others standing behind him - for his own fate.

3. It follows as a logical development from Homeric warfare. If we assume that pre-Hoplite warfare involved bands of warriors standing off from each other tossing spears and shouting insults at each other while individual champions advanced to do battle to one another until one side or the other charged and routed their opponents, then it is not such a big leap to the Hoplite warfare described above. Sure, everyone now was much closer to the enemy (and thus, in theory, everyone was in equal "danger"), but the function of the rear ranks would still be the same - to encourage the champions (the front ranks).

4. It also makes sense of the continued development in hoplite warfare. The evidence points toward a gradual lengthening of the length of the hoplite spear, with the famous reform of Iphikrates significantly lengthening it (double length according to Nepos, 50% extra according to Diodorus). Lengthening the spear (and making the shield smaller) makes no sense at all if the normal way of combat for a hoplite was to push at his enemy. If you normally stand at a distance from the enemy, having a longer spear is an obvious advantage.

Simmilarly, the Macedonian phalanx is just an evolution on hoplites in the above model (incidentally, it is far more likely that Philip was inspired by Iphikrates than the Thebans - Iphikrates was his "brother" through adoption, and Macedonian equipment was very similar to "Iphikratean" equipment). Pikes that could outreach spears would give an obvious advantage over hoplites in the fighting described above. Similarly, the continued lengthening of the pikes of the phalanx (until the length reached the practical limit) as happened historically, fits in well with a stand-off fight.

That pikemen definitely did not expect to go in close and push at their opponents close-up is also suggested by the almost complete lack of mention of swords in connection with ancient pikemen (besides the frequent mention of the fact that it was the pikes that gave pikemen their advantage over other troop types).

Anyway, that's it for today. Comments? Thoughts? Questions? Any obvious points I may have overlooked? Objections?

The ideas above basically build on Goldsworthy and in particular Sabin; any obvious idiocies are my own though.

Regards,

Michael A.

[L'Impresario]

The phases of hoplite warfare are well documented and very often repeated, so is that why you named this thread "An Alternative Explanation"?

Might this turn into a "push or not" thread no2? Wouldn't want throw myself into such an argument again
Maybe a broader analysis of "The Western Way of War" would help... bring some Keegan in as well, I want to bash him sooo bad

Basically it follows all the same phases as described by VDH. First a Charge, then a somewhat disordered melee as the two sides sort themselves out. What comes next is where the two models differ.

Rather than stepping in to push, the hoplites would step back to lock shields. The steadiness of the file closers in this scenario would of course be particularly important, since it would be important that they not allow any backwards "ripple" through the ranks to turn into a rout.

Receiving a spartan charge (altho they didn't run like other hoplites) could send you back a good 20-30 feet, this could offer the momentum to produce a "countercharge", or pushing ,as there wouldn't be enough room to term this as a "charge".

In that context, the advice of the Spartan mother to her son in Plutarch's Moralia when queried about the short sword make perfect sense... "Add a step to the length of your sword".

Heh, let's not try to be so literal..imagine a spartan man who's been training during the entirety of his life, getting some nice "battle tips" from good ol' mum
I would comment like this some (not all) passages from Xenophon (among others) you provided in the other thread regarding morale, but I'll just say that these weren't written as a way to portrait the way hoplites fought, more rather as a bit of glorification of the ideals a warrior should cherish. By extension , holding the line and not wavering infront of your enemy, was promoted by the belief that your brethren would do the same; a study on "democracy" and "isopoliteia" and their reflections in ancient greek warfare is begging to commence

1. It fits well with the evidence. You could take VDH's book, replace his theory with the above and use all the same "evidence" and make all the same arguements. Unlike with the othismos, however, you'd also have pictorial evidence to support the theory of combat. Similarly, there is overwhelming evidence in the sources that the Spear was the first and most important weapon of the Hoplite (e.g., Spartan hoplites on campaign were ordered to have their spears with them at all times). This emphasis is understandable in the combat model above - it makes far less sense when considered in the context of the othismos.

Spears break often in battle...what happens next ,apart from sword fighting, is ... well, I'll not push this forward

2. It makes the Greek hoplite basically an ordinary man, like any other, looking out first and foremost for his own life. Needless to say, standing off from each other with locked shields and jabbing at each other is not going to generate a lot of casaulties, so the Hoplite in the first ranks would be in control of his own fate - not dependent on the whim of others standing behind him - for his own fate.

I don't find this consistent with the idea the ancient Greeks developed for themselves, that is the "group above the individual" and the notions in literature texts, that one placed his life on the hands of his fellowmen, while they invested upon him their own fates.

3. It follows as a logical development from Homeric warfare. If we assume that pre-Hoplite warfare involved bands of warriors standing off from each other tossing spears and shouting insults at each other while individual champions advanced to do battle to one another until one side or the other charged and routed their opponents, then it is not such a big leap to the Hoplite warfare described above. Sure, everyone now was much closer to the enemy (and thus, in theory, everyone was in equal "danger"), but the function of the rear ranks would still be the same - to encourage the champions (the front ranks).

I think warfare departed a lot from it's Homeric form,esp. in the Classical Ages, particularly as personal combat wasn't seen as way to gain glory, but as a foolish action, if this was placed before the common good, the action of an "idiot"
No more did nobles have the spotlight turned on them, they were just another part of the army, a vital one but still...Ofcourse I can't forget to mention that you needed quite some money to have hoplite equipment, but democracy (this isn't limited to the athenian form of it, but has more to do with "isopoliteia" and the mindset of the citizen,as I said before) helped the middle classes get a bigger share of the pie.

4. It also makes sense of the continued development in hoplite warfare. The evidence points toward a gradual lengthening of the length of the hoplite spear, with the famous reform of Iphikrates significantly lengthening it (double length according to Nepos, 50% extra according to Diodorus). Lengthening the spear (and making the shield smaller) makes no sense at all if the normal way of combat for a hoplite was to push at his enemy. If you normally stand at a distance from the enemy, having a longer spear is an obvious advantage.

This is an attempt to disclaim the "othismos" eh? For me this argument isn't convincing, as it could be used by any side. If you lenghten the spear, you just have an overall advantage,something that in general can be described as "strike before getting hit". This applies even today (mostly today ) and it s natural that people will want to have the range advantage. Even the pilum throwing has a similar role in battle, bridging the melee range disadvantage the Romans had due to the gladius being most of the times shorter than enemy arms (sidenote: this wasn't tho very effective at all vs the late macedonian phalanxes).

Simmilarly, the Macedonian phalanx is just an evolution on hoplites in the above model (incidentally, it is far more likely that Philip was inspired by Iphikrates than the Thebans - Iphikrates was his "brother" through adoption, and Macedonian equipment was very similar to "Iphikratean" equipment). Pikes that could outreach spears would give an obvious advantage over hoplites in the fighting described above. Similarly, the continued lengthening of the pikes of the phalanx (until the length reached the practical limit) as happened historically, fits in well with a stand-off fight.

Let's assume that your average hoplite isn't able to provide a distinct advantage over his enemy in a normal phalanx fight. Versus some of your enemies- namely Spartans- , you can't match their discipline and physical strength (if we assume that these were the natural prerequisites for pushing in a line). I think that you 'll start thinking lateral and try to avoid a very close encounter, thus we get the pike, consider it a counterweight to othismos.

[Rosacrux redux]

L'impressario, I am... impressed

There is one point though that begs for a clarification:

The Iphikratian reform was:
a) not one that involved the bulk of the Athenian hoplites, just a small, more professional kind of "standing army".
b) not aiming at changing the hoplite phalanx warfare, but introducing a more mobile and more agile type of troops, to serve mostly as marines in the many small fleets employed by the Athenian at that time to harass the Peloponesian and literaly "bring the war at their homes".
c) a reform that produced a sort of peltast (that's how most ancient writers call them,not "hoplites") which could fight in a phalanx if need arose.

Other than that, I am pretty much covered by L'Impressario, who has such an extensive knowldedge of ancient Greek affairs, to even use the word "idiot" in it's original context.

[Strategy]

Receiving a spartan charge (altho they didn't run like other hoplites) could send you back a good 20-30 feet,

I thought you were the one who said not to be too literal? That aside, I do wonder where this fact comes from - sounds like speculation turned into fact to me.

Heh, let's not try to be so literal..imagine a spartan man who's been training during the entirety of his life, getting some nice "battle tips" from good ol' mum

I don't see what's so strange about a boy receiving advice from his mom. Besides, it is well-established that Spartan swords were extremely short, and there are other similar comments; e.g., that of Agesilaos when the length of the Spartan swords is mocked by an Athenian (he says they are so short a juggler could swalllow them) Agesilaos replies "Because we fight close to the enemy".

I would comment like this some (not all) passages from Xenophon (among others) you provided in the other thread regarding morale, but I'll just say that these weren't written as a way to portrait the way hoplites fought, more rather as a bit of glorification of the ideals a warrior should cherish.

Hmmm... so explicit statements should be viewed as idealistic glorification, but a widely used metaphor should be considered as good evidence?

Spears break often in battle...what happens next ,apart from sword fighting, is ... well, I'll not push this forward

Most likely, the Hoplite would reverse the spear and use its buttspike, as is described in the sources. Several other possibilities spring to mind (and none of them require pushing) as well: fighting on with the broken spear, using just his sword, grabbing hold of the enemy's spears (all of the above supported by the sources), getting a spear from one of the men behind him, or even exchanging places with the man behind (the last two being just speculation).

The fact that one of the men in the front ranks may lose their spears is not very much of an issue here; the presumption here is that under normal circumstances the hoplite (like most normal people) is more interested in surviving than in killing.

Worth noting, btw, that iconographic evidence indicates that early hoplites carried two spears. Actually, the archeological evidence suggests that one of them may have been a throwing spear.

I don't find this consistent with the idea the ancient Greeks developed for themselves, that is the "group above the individual" and the notions in literature texts, that one placed his life on the hands of his fellowmen, while they invested upon him their own fates.

While there is much to admire about the Ancient Greeks, what makes you think the Greeks were any less narcissistic than people are today? Certainly it can't be the behavior described in their literature and letters.

I think warfare departed a lot from it's Homeric form,esp. in the Classical Ages, particularly as personal combat wasn't seen as way to gain glory, but as a foolish action,...

I'd say both yes and no. Personal combat was discouraged, but clearly heroic courage was still esteemed (see e.g., the story of the naked hoplite in the surprise attack on Sparta). The big change was that where before courage was primarily associated with offensive action (i.e., the single combat), courage in the hoplite era also got associated with a defensive action (protecting one's neighbour with one's shield). I don't think that weakens the arguement; quite the contrary.

Of course, just going in with the spear line was a big step up from the "old-fashioned" way of fighting - everyone showing (or trying to show) courage, rather than just a few. It is no surprise that armor became progressively more massive as hoplite fighting developed. In fact, it seems fairly clear that to the Greeks, the men standing in the first line, have taken over the "role" of the heroic warriors. As Tyrtaios says:
"Those who dare, standing by one another, to join in the hand to hand fighting in the front line lose fewer men and protect the people behind; when they flinch, the courage of all is perished."

And it is worth remembering that the "Homeric ethos" didn't dissappear - it survived for quite a few centuries among the "barbarians" (such as the Romans ).

This is an attempt to disclaim the "othismos" eh? For me this argument isn't convincing, as it could be used by any side. If you lenghten the spear, you just have an overall advantage,something that in general can be described as "strike before getting hit". This applies even today (mostly today ) and it s natural that people will want to have the range advantage.

Is it natural to increase the range if your object is to get in close and personal? I have to say I disagree... troops that wanted and needed to get in close adopted shorter weapons, not the other way round. Short weapons (as also commented above) force you to go in close, whether you want it or not.

Even the pilum throwing has a similar role in battle, bridging the melee range disadvantage the Romans had due to the gladius being most of the times shorter than enemy arms

I would have to disagree again (I tend to do that, don't I ), but the pilum still placed the Roman at a range disadvantage; the javelins carried by most of their opponents would have had further range.

I think that you 'll start thinking lateral and try to avoid a very close encounter, thus we get the pike, consider it a counterweight to othismos.

This is pretty hard to do, since at least half (and probably more than that) of the arguement for the othismos is based on anecdotes and interpretation about the pike phalanx.

Regards,

Michael A.

[Strategy]

The Iphikratian reform was:
a) not one that involved the bulk of the Athenian hoplites, just a small, more professional kind of "standing army".
b) not aiming at changing the hoplite phalanx warfare, but introducing a more mobile and more agile type of troops, to serve mostly as marines in the many small fleets employed by the Athenian at that time to harass the Peloponesian and literaly "bring the war at their homes".

On this topic, I'll refer simply to the first part of Luke Ueda-Sarson's excellent article:
Evolution of Hellenistic Infantry, part 1.
He argues the case on the Iphikrateans much better than I can.

c) a reform that produced a sort of peltast (that's how most ancient writers call them,not "hoplites") which could fight in a phalanx if need arose.

Actually, the peltast dissappears completely from historical records after the Iphikratean reforms; when "peltasts" reappear again, the words is primarily used to describe the elite foot guard of the Hellenistic Kings. As Luke also points out in his article, the presumed replacement (the "Thureophoroi") was first and foremost a hoplite-replacement.

[Rosacrux redux]

I think that if you read carefully that Luke, you'll figure out that he describes excactly what I wrote in conjunction with the Iphikratian reforms - only in more length and detail.

So, Luke and Rosacrux agree:
- Iphikrates did not reform the Athenian hoplites, just the marines
- The product of his reform was indeed called "peltast", since they were armed with a light pelte-type shield, not hoplite
- It was a small, professional army that was armed in the way Iphikrates suggested. The Athenian forces that faced Philipos were armed in the traditional hoplite way.

[sharrukin]

I think that if you read carefully that Luke, you'll figure out that he describes excactly what I wrote in conjunction with the Iphikratian reforms - only in more length and detail.

So, Luke and Rosacrux agree:
- Iphikrates did not reform the Athenian hoplites, just the marines
- The product of his reform was indeed called "peltast", since they were armed with a light pelte-type shield, not hoplite
- It was a small, professional army that was armed in the way Iphikrates suggested. The Athenian forces that faced Philipos were armed in the traditional hoplite way.

I have read this article and the product of the reforms WERE hoplites able to function in the peltast role as well. The reforms were not adopted in greece proper until later c.250 BC. Iphikrates reformed the marines and peltasts who were equipped in a hoplite role as well as poorer hoplites. This is clearly stated in the article.

[Rosacrux redux]

I have read this article and the product of the reforms WERE hoplites able to function in the peltast role as well. The reforms were not adopted in greece proper until later c.250 BC. Iphikrates reformed the marines and peltasts who were equipped in a hoplite role as well as poorer hoplites. This is clearly stated in the article.

From the article itself

One reason people have continually referred to Iphikrates' troops as 'peltasts' like Diodoros does is that there is plenty of evidence that hoplites continued to be equipped in the traditional manner, both during Iphikrates' lifetime and long after, right until the demise of the Greek polities as independent states. Accordingly, it is normally assumed that Diodoros and Nepos are both mistaken in stating it was hoplites that were reequipped, despite their accounts seeming to derive from two different original sources (the difference in details such as the length of the weapons would indicate that their accounts do not derive from a common intermediate source, but are independent).

Point one: Not the hoplites were reequiped.

Who was then?

who were these 'hoplites' that Iphikrates reformed? I believe the answer lies in Xenophon. Upon his return from Persia, he records that Iphikrates was appointed general by the Athenians to replace the lackadaisical Timotheos (Hellenica, 6.2.13-14). Xenophon records that as "soon as he was made general, Iphikrates went to work vigorously on manning the ships and saw to it that the captains did this work too".6 In other words, Iphikrates was reforming the naval arm. Athens, like other Greek states, made use of hoplites as marines, and indeed, such marines were the only hoplites Athens had at the time that saw regular service, since the bulk of the city's hoplites were a militia force called up only when needed, whereas the Athenian navy was constantly patrolling the seas that linked Athens' scattered territorial possesions.7

meaning...

I would contend that the hoplites Nepos and Diodoros refer to are the Athenian marines

Now that we have cleared up this point, let's proceed...

general who did not want to burden himself with citizen levies, yet wanted to be able to fight field battles required another source of hoplites, and Iphikrates solved this problem by rearming his peltasts once his experiment with his marines had proved a success.

If the vast majority of Iphikratean 'peltasts' as recorded by Diodoros were actually originally peltasts, this might provide an alternative explanation of why Diodoros calls them peltasts despite using equipment that would normally be described as a hoplite's. Perhaps Diodoros had one source (the one that Nepos also used?) that said hoplites were (initially) converted, and another that (later) they were peltasts. It would be only natural for him to assume that his hoplites would then be called peltasts because they each had a pelta.17 However, it may be that originally they really were called hoplites, and that their name was changed sometime afterwards. Certainly Xenophon refers to Iphikrates' men after he manned his expedition to Korkyr as both hoplites and peltasts

Peltasts and hoplites, then. Be it.

So, assuming we are reading the same article, where excactly does it contradict with my statement? Where does it concede with strategy's statement that Ifikrates changed the hoplite warfare generally and not only his own band of mercenaries?

[sharrukin]

So, assuming we are reading the same article, where excactly does it contradict with my statement? Where does it concede with strategy's statement that Ifikrates changed the hoplite warfare generally and not only his own band of mercenaries?

I did NOT argue for Strategy's point of view. In fact I agree with yours more than his. My point was that the product of Iphikrates reforms were hoplites. I also stated that the reforms did NOT take hold in greece until well into the hellenic period. Are you saying that you do not believe that they ever took place in Greece proper?

BTW: This is what I disagree with.

c) a reform that produced a sort of peltast (that's how most ancient writers call them,not "hoplites") which could fight in a phalanx if need arose.

They were referred to as peltasts, but they were hoplites (close order infantry).

from the article
Part one;
Diodoros 15.44 records the following:

"After a trial of the new shield its easy manipulation secured its adoption, and the infantry who had formerly been called "hoplites" (hoplitai) because of their heavy shield (aspidon), then had their name changed to "peltasts" (peltastai) from the light pelta they carried."

"In fact Nepos and Diodoros make it clear that the troops given the new equipment were hoplites, not peltasts,"

[Strategy]

The point that I disagreed with (which you suggested) is that the reform was "not aiming at changing the hoplite phalanx warfare" (which I agree with, but not - I think - in the way you mean it) and a "a reform that produced a sort of peltast".

All the evidence is that the Iphikratean reform was a hoplite reform (i.e., intended to improve the effectiveness of hoplites). The reform was carried out on hoplites (marines are hoplites). Note that although Luke speculates the reform was extended to Iphikrates mercenary peltasts (and I'd agree with him), this is only speculation. There is no hard evidence for this at all.

Already during the Peloponesian wars, however, we see a tendency to less and less armor being carried by the Hoplite, so the only real difference between the "Iphikrateans" and a regular hoplite at this time, would very often just have been the size of the shield and the length of the spear.

Looks like a spade, is used like a spade, is a...

Luke's point, of course, is that "Iphikratean" hoplites did not dissappear, but became the standard mercenary soldier of the following era.
Basically:
- Mercenaries adopted the Iphikratean gear (speculation).
- Peltasts dissappear.
- Philip adopted Iphikratean gear and replaced the very long spear with a pike. Pikemen, of course, are main battle line troops.
- Philip, like many of his opponents in this period, often go on campaign only with mercenaries; clearly, these forces could be expected to stand up to the citizen hoplites they could expect to encounter.
- Mercenaries are used as main battle line troops by the Successors.
- Cities switch over to thureophoroi (except for Sparta, who stay with the old style hoplites until they change directly to pikemen). Interestingly, Thureophoroi are often still referred to as hoplites.
- Mercenaries eventually adopted the thureos in place of the small pelte (Thureophoroi) and develop into Thureophoroi.

Again, the evidence points to the result of the reform (if it was adopted as Luke speculates) being not "some sort of peltast" but a battle-line soldier first and foremost: a Hoplite. Some - the well-trained elite - would have been capable of operating in a peltast capacity, but Luke's point is precisely that the primary role of the majority of the "Iphikrateans"/Thureophoroi was the same as that of their ancestors = as hoplites.

Which makes sense, doesn't it?

Rather than having the evolution of Greek warfare being that of a change from Hoplite dominated warfare, to mercenary-peltast dominated warfare (as is the current theories), to pike dominated warfare, to thureophoroi/pikes ...

The idea that mercenaries were just "souped up" (Iphikratean style) hoplites and phalangites/pikemen just "souped up" Iphikrateans is evolutionary rather revolutionary, and pleasingly simple.

Phalanx warfare stayed the same throughout, the only evolution being that troops dropped the heavy armor (which had already started happening in the "hoplite" era) and that combat became less and less close.

[Rosacrux redux]

I think you got epochs and trends mixed up strategy. The thireoforos did not appear in the ear you are talking about. The hoplite did not dissapear at that time. The Greek city hoplite began vanishing only after Chaeronea, and that was a quite slow process and some cities (Sparta?) didn't adopt to the new situation.

And when they switched, they didn't turn Thireophoroi (which was a soldier type used mostly in the 3rd century BC, although it appeared at the end of the 4th and has never been the mainstay of the Greek armies, but on the contrary usually we are talking about mercenaries) but phalangites or peltasts. The Aetolian league, for instance, could deploy a large number of Peltasts at the height of their power, and a smaller number of hoplites. That is what the ancient sources tell us. Most large city states switched to the Macedonian phalanx model, but employed great numbers of peltasts, as the citizen-army ideal was beggining to wade.

Also, the Iphikratean reforms might aid Philipos in his idea for the Macedonian Phalanx, but the city states at Cheronea deployed standard Hoplites, with aspis and spear, not "Iphikratian hoplites/peltasts" or Thireoforoi.

You argued that after Iphikrates everybody turned into the hybrid hoplite/peltast. And I am telling you, this is not the case. Luke agrees with me.

I kinda find your idea pretty interesting, as a theoretical model of the evolution of Greek warfare. A nice continuation theory. But it's only a theoretical model and as such it's practical application to the 4th-3rd century Greek warfare is problematic.

[Strategy]

The thireoforos did not appear in the ear you are talking about.

The Thureophoros does indeed appear in the Hellenistic era, right after the Galatian invasion of Greece/Macedonia in 279.

The hoplite did not dissapear at that time. The Greek city hoplite began vanishing only after Chaeronea, and that was a quite slow process and some cities (Sparta?) didn't adopt to the new situation.

The citizen hoplite in fact began to dissappear in the aftermath of the Theban hegemony (which is the time most often assumed for Iphikrates reform), and the defining mark of the conflicts that defined the era prior to Second Chaeronea - the Third Sacred War and the Rise of Macedon - was the extensive use of mercenaries (even by states such as Athens) to face citizen hoplites (primarily the Thebans) and the Macedonians. And of course Philip and Alexander themselves used mercenaries extensively.

And when they switched, they didn't turn Thireophoroi but phalangites or peltasts.

On the contrary, inscriptional evidence (tombstones, troops lists, etc) from Boeotia make it very clear that Thureophoroi first appear among citizen infantry very shortly after the Galatian invasion.

The Aetolian league, for instance, could deploy a large number of Peltasts at the height of their power, and a smaller number of hoplites.

The Aetolian league fielded 7000 "hoplites" for the Thermopylae expedition in 279; considering that the largest force ever fielded by the league was only 12000, I'm not sure I'd agree with the above statement. In light of the evidence, it seems likely that the Aitolians had adopted Thureophoroi equipment (and the former hoplites would probably have been lightly armed - like "Iphikrateans" - due to the ), which would fit with Polybius contempt for them (Thureophoroi would obviously not stand against the Achaean pikemen with whom Polybius was familiar) and would fit well with their mercenary traditions.

That is what the ancient sources tell us. Most large city states switched to the Macedonian phalanx model, but employed great numbers of peltasts, as the citizen-army ideal was beggining to wade.

Firstly, very few city states switched. Certainly there is no evidence to suggest that Athens, Corinth, and other city states changed. Secondly, the city states employed mercenaries - not peltasts. As Luke also points out, after Chaeronea we do not hear about peltasts (save one stray reference) until suddenly they reappear as the elite troops in the phalanx.

And note again - the switch to the pike by all city states that we know of, except for Sparta - comes after their switch to the Thureophoroi. A bit strange, isn't it, that they would quickly adopt the Thureos (took only a few years in Thebes), but would take 100 years before adopting the pike? Incidentally, citizens continued armed as Thureophoroi even after the adoption of pikes (again cf. Boeotian tombstones and inscriptions).

Also, the Iphikratean reforms might aid Philipos in his idea for the Macedonian Phalanx, but the city states at Cheronea deployed standard Hoplites, with aspis and spear, not "Iphikratian hoplites/peltasts" or Thireoforoi.

Question - not that I particularly disagree - but what proof is there that all of the citizen hoplites were armed with aspis?

The point I make about the "reform" is that it wouldn't have changed things much - troops with a longer shield and a smaller shield would still be considered hoplites (at least if citizens).

But it's only a theoretical model and as such it's practical application to the 4th-3rd century Greek warfare is problematic.

By definition, historical models of this period have to be theoretical, considering the lack of evidence we have for the period.

Let me try to restate what I tried to write earlier:
- Iphikrates did carry out a reform of Hoplites (Cornelius Nepos, Diorodors).
- Philip would have known of Iphikrates reforms (Family relationship).
- Mercenaries are no longer referred to as peltasts after Chaeronea (cf. all the sources).
- Mercenaries are frequently used as main battle line troops after Iphikrates (cf. the battles of the Third Sacred War, Rise of Macedon and the Wars of the Diadochoi).
- The thureos is adopted by at least one major Greek city state very shortly after Thermophylai in 279 (archeological evidence).
- The thureos was adopted by mercenaries to the extent that Thureophoroi became synonymous with mercenaries (cf. all the sources).
- Thureophoroi were main battle line troops (cf. Polybius + archeology).
- Pikes were only adopted by non-Macedonians after the thureos was (cf. archeological evidence + Polybius).

You quibble with my assumption that Iphikrateans became more commen, but the above statements are facts, IMO, as much as anything historical ever can be considered a fact.

You argued that after Iphikrates everybody turned into the hybrid hoplite/peltast.

No, you misread my arguement.

I argue that after Iphikrates the distinction in combat between mercenaries (previously synonymous with skirmishing peltasts) and hoplites was largely erased. That eventually, mercenaries and some hoplites adopted the thureos instead of aspis/pelte. And that all of them: hoplites, post-Iphikratean mercenaries, thureophoroi, and pikemen essentially fought identically (except that elite pikemen and well-drilled mercenary/citizen thureophoroi maintained the ability to skirmish if needed).

Hope that cleared up some of the misunderstanding.

Regards,

Michael A.

[L'Impresario]

http://www.hoplites.co.uk/pdf/spartan_reflections.pdf

This an article(you might have read it already) by Cartledge which deals shortly with the transition from the homeric model to the classical greek hoplite and then with Sparta's social and political circumstances that allowed her to remain a military-focused state, long after the trend was gone;)

[Strategy]

Thanks for the reference. Found the article a bit rambling, though.

He does mention Hans van Wees, who I hear has a very interesting theory on Greek warfare; namely that "real" hoplite warfare as we imagine didn't really develop until the 5th century. He apparently builds this on the pictorial evidence combined with the evidence that "hoplite" armies may have had high proportions of non-hoplite infantry. For instance, each Spartan at Plataea had a retinue of 7 helots - do we assume all of those were servants, or might they in fact have been supporting light javelinmen intended to fight at the rear of the line?

Alexander Zhmodikov apparently looks at the same pictorial evidence, and reaches the opposite conclusion in his look at phalanx evolution (you should like this article, L'Impressario - it's greek):Phalanx Evolution

Anyways, will certainly be getting hold of Hans van Wees "Greek warfare : myths and realities" after XMas; if nothing else it should prove an entertaining evening's read.

[L'Impresario]

Actually I don't hold any particular love for greek texts or for any other text based on its language ;)

I think Cyril and Methodius would have hadan easier time than me trying to read the link hehe ...maybe you confused the links?
I can make the first word of the text, must be problem or problems , soemthign similar nonetheless:)