Roman phalanx?

[Chelifer]

Just a silly thought
Why didn't the Romans give the legionares long spears? Combined with their large shields and body armor it could add up to a virtually indestructible defensive formation, immune to arrows (in testudo/phalanx), cavalry and infantry. The spears can be dropped once they don't need them, so it does not really affect the mobility in offense either.

[Quillan]

Historically, the Romans abandoned the phalanx for a couple of reasons. First, they found that maneuverability beat the phalanx. Secondly, they had a lot of pressure from barbarians coming across the Alps, and they needed a more flexible fighting method against them, and they found that in the pilum. In later years, as their foes became mostly mounted troops instead of foot troops, they switched from the pilum to the spliculum, which was a throwing spear, but without the iron shank. It could still be thrown, but was better when retained in the hand to fend off horsemen.

[Red Harvest]

Rome lost a number of hoplite armies vs. invading barbarians and in their own attempts to subjugate neighbors like the Samnites. They were handled roughly by the Samnites at times. The fighting vs. Samnites was often on rugged terrain unsuited for phalanx warfare. The Romans apparently began to copy shields, sword, and missile attack from some of their opponents.

The main weakness of a phalanx system is that it is somewhat one dimensional in its purest form--a single extended line. It is also very vulnerable to anything disrupting it. The lack of depth is a substantial weakness. Most phalanx defeats resulted from some factor causing serious disruption of some portion of the phalanx. So if a portion of a phalanx is disrupted, it will likely be defeated, and the whole army might be routed with proper exploitation. Alexander and Hannibal used combined arms rather than relying on the phalanx alone. Cavalry dealt the decisive blows. By comparison, Rome did not field substantial cavalry.

Rome also relied on heavy deep infantry assault to break enemy lines. This fits with the aggressive nature of Roman warfare. The phalanx has a more defensive posture about it. And it is more difficult for hoplites to chase down defeated enemies. Pyrrhus could not complete the destruction of the Romans in either of his first two battles/victories against them. His phalangites could not conduct an effective pursuit.

[Nelson]

In addition to the fine rationales given by Quillan and RH, I would add that a shield so large as the scutum was incompatible with very long pikes. Phalangites could only manage a buckler on their left forearms as the sarissa needed two hands.

[Uesugi Kenshin]

Yeah, the giant tower shield would not have been very practical for pike combat. Although I bet it proved very handy when the legions went up against phalanxes. Mobility has become more and more the best trait to have. It does not matter how strong a unit is if it cannot get into battle with the enemy. Thus cavalry and non-spear infantry became more popular. Being able to hunt down and kill fleeing enemies would be a great bonus as well.

[Shadar]

The Romans favoured a more flexible and effective approach with their armies. Pretty much, the heavy infantry Roman legionary had an enormous advantage over the hoplites. As Alexander found, and other hoplite commanders before, a phalanx is severely disrupted by uneven ground. Italy is fairly mountainous, and most likely the Romans would have had to fight several battles in uneven terrain against their enemies on their rise to power. As a result of being completely surrounded by enemies, the Romans had to rely greatly on a disciplined and well-trained army to fight off their enemies.

The Roman soldier's equipment helps discover their main purpose - they were designed to destroy phalanxes and barbarians. The short sword of the Roman soldier (can't remember the name..) can be used to PARRY (i.e. deflect the weapons of enemies). The Tower shield of the Romans offered them great protection from the front, and carried above their heads allowed them protection from missile fire - leading to the testudo. By forming the soldiers close range with shields beside another, the Romans could stab BETWEEN the shields using their sword - thus enabling them to deal damage in relative safety - and other weapons would have had difficulty in penetrating this shield wall.

Their pila - heavy javelins - enabled them to exploit the ultimate weakness of shielded infantry - their slowness. By carrying up to 2 pila per soldier, they could deal damage as they were charging the enemy formation. Later innovations made the pila cleverly engineered to make movement for anything hit by a pila unwieldly (meaning that shields would have to be cast aside, or ripped out of a soldier for him to continue fighting).

In other words, they were ultimately created to counter the predominance in hoplite/phalanx warfare that was so predominant in the height of Greek influence in the European world.

Also, their 4 rank system, using the Velites, Hastati, Principes and Triarii enabled them to also exploit the weakness of a phalanx, the inability of the front ranks of the phalanx to retreat and rest without breaking up the formation and thus making them easy kills. The hoplites needed to kill at a distance, but the Roman soldier was both equipped to attack from longer range (the pila) and to attack from short range (with his short sword).

The parrying ability of the short sword would also render the Hoplites literally useless - since spears were unwieldly to quickly maneuvre, and once an enemy is within the "blind spot" directly in front of you, you would stand no chance unless you dropped your spear and took out a secondary weapon, thus weakening the phalanx's wall of spears as a whole.

[conon394]

Shadar

I assume you are meant to compare just the Legion to the Macedonian Phalanx.
At Zama facing a Phalanx that looks a lot more like a hoplite one, none of these supposed advantages seem to have helped the legions of Scipio.

The more traditional Greek style phalanx did not Have the blind spot you describe, since a Hoplite, could either use his sword (not the tiny weapon of the Macedonian phalanx) or reverse his broken spear add have short 4ft or so thrusting weapon (rather useful in a tight fight).

[Red Harvest]

Shadar,

Elements of that are certainly true, but the hoplites/phalangites were anything but helpless. They put the mojo on the Roman legions several times when faced frontally. As conon394 said, even at Zama, a decisive victory for Rome, the African phalanx was not getting the worst of it---until the Roman allied Numidian cav returned to strike the phalanx from the rear. This was a well prepared and veteran Roman army under a military genius, not some hurriedly assembled force under a lackluster commander. Also, the Romans took quite a few casualties facing Pyrrhus and lost the first two major encounters. Even at Cynoscephalae the formed phalanx was *winning* vs. the Romans, pushing them back and killing a respectable number. It was the other flank that was unable to reach the ridge and form up that cost the battle. It sounds reasonable to say that the front ranker with the gladius could easily parry a spear thrust...until you realize how many spear points the man had to contend with.

[Shadar]

My idea was simply that Romans gradually developed their military to fight against the predominant military style of the day - the spearmen phalanx. The strength of the Romans was their discipline and their training, BUT the Romans almost never made the same military mistake twice, the punic wars is a very good example (although sometimes history repeats itself... Crassus and Marcus Antonius' invasion of Parthia for one thing).

I'm mainly drawing from the archaeological evidence i have on hand - and making an inference. I don't think its that bad actually, considering my military history is fairly limited (actual campaigns is a different matter. battlefield fighting? don't know much). I do realise it doesn't apply to everything, but i was somewhat generalising...

[Mikeus Caesar]

The short sword of the Roman soldier (can't remember the name..)

I think it was called the Gladius.

[Kraxis]

I think it was called the Gladius.

Yes Gladius = sword. Simple as that, so any sword was named Gladius.
But I take it that Shadar is looking for the famous Gladius Hispanicus with its broard straight edges with the nasty strong tapering. But even it wasn't really that common until relatively late. This sword is called the Gladius Hispanicus Pompeii

The more common earlier Gladius Hispanicus (Mainz) was of equal length but had a much longer tapering that never had an obvious point where it went over itno straight sides, making it shaped like a artillery shell actually. That was the sword Scipio Africanus gave to his troops, and they were the swords the legionaries used until about late in Augustus' reign.

Oh and Red you forget Pydna where the pikemen pushed the entire Roman army back, but sadly for them they were unsupported and their advance made them break up a bit and that gave the Romans their openings. Individual centurions and legionaries attacked into the openings and the phalanx slowly broke down as the pikemen had to drop their pikes.

Also, the sarissa is mentioned to have been able of penetrating the scutum, making it a nasty weapon to face if you are in the frontlines. You can't even depend on your large shield to protect you.

[Aetius the Last Roman]

This argument rests in two camps, Romans = good, Romans = Bad.

In fact, it is not soo simple, the major events that are listed as evidence are all actually defeat.

Yes the phalanx was capable of handling the Romans from the front, in fact I think this is because as a formation is so hard to penetrate. However, given that the phalanx rests on primarily one-dimensional warfare (warfare that only offers simple and clear lines) that Legions added a new dimension of mobility to the infantry arm that was simply too mobile for the phalanx to anticipate.

Take Pydna, unlike Kraxis's statement, the reason the Macedonian phalanx was winning at the start was because Paulus's Legions were only partially formed. However, one they were lured off level ground and onto broken ground, the legions charged the gaps and slaughtered the unwieldy, closely packed phalanx. The result, was 31,000 Macedonians dead too 100-500 Romans. The Romans had 25,000 troops to the Macedonians at the start. As we see, the flexibility of the maniple organisation outweighs is the offensive answer to the defensive nature of the phalanx.

[Aetius the Last Roman]

Romans had 25,000 troops to 40,000 Macedonians at the start, sorry a few sp's in there, in a rush.

[Kraxis]

Aetius you forget that te large number of dead Macedonins had to do with the Macedonian cavalry never engaging the Roman cavalry, neither in support in the attack and not in support of the routers. With no protection against the cavalry the phalangites had no chance whatsoever. And it is a confirmed fact that most kills happens in the chase. The battles themselves were often fairly unbloody, like in this case.
Just becasue Pydna was a defeat doen't show any destinct advantage of the legion, but rather that the Macedonians had a really bad management for the battle. Perseus was a damn bad commander unlike his Roman adversary.
He had thrown a great victory out the window earlier when he could have trapped the consular army of Q. Marcius Philippus. But he failed to send reinforcements to the passes surrounding the Romans.

The battle itself included far more than 25,000 Roman troops. There was in fact 38,000, of which 33,400 were infantry. The Macedonains had 44,000 troops, including the 21,000 phalangites. Both sides had about 4000 cavalry (so the extreme caution by Perseus was not warrented and he had better cavalry).
There is no indication that the Romans were surprised by the Macedonians and the battle took place late in the afternoon. There was ample time to deploy.

The fact is that Perseus squandered his advantages. He never helped his anvil (the phalangites) with his hammer (the cavalry). There was even routing among allied infantry in the Roman army, yet here was no exploitation of it. Perseus simply let the infantry march to their doom. When the openings did happen where were the light infantry that was supposed to close the gaps, as they had done for centuries?

When you use Pydna as proof that the Roman army was better you make a devastating fault. By this reasoning I could argue that the Carthagenian army was much better than the Roman because they defeated tehm again and again and again...

[hoom]

I have been finding this tradeoff between the Phalanx and the Maniple quite fascinating since I got Rome.

The two types are kind of extremes.
The Maniple style Roman is all about flexibility (ranged/anti cav with the pilum, close with the gladius hispanicus & scutum in the face, defensive with good armour & big shield, able to fight reasonably well on any terrain and able to maneuvre in small sub units)

The Phalanx has superior outright frontal power but is stiff and brittle.
It will fail quite easily if not setup & cared for perfectly or if it is outmanouvred either tactically or strategically.

Surprisingly, R:TW actually seems to do a fairly good job of simulating this difference.

[Uesugi Kenshin]

More proof that in the end the overall skill of the general is more important than whose soldiers are better equipped or trained for the battle. If you have a horrible general he will not be able to take advantage of his soldier's fighting style's strengths or his enemie's weaknesses. A good general can do both and in that way gain the upper hand over a better army.

[Red Harvest]

Aetius,

This isn't Romans good or Roman bad. This is weighing the relative merits of formation types. The Roman system was more practical and utilitarian. More versatile military tools often are at a disadvantage when fighting a more specialized weapon on its own terms.

I'm not sure what you were trying to say with "the major events that are listed as evidence are all actually defeat". Asculum and Heraclea were victories for the phalanx, Zama and Cynoscephalae were defeats. Pydna was also a defeat. We could add to the victory list, the Battle of Tunis from the 1st Punic War, and Hannibal's victories at Trebbia and Cannae as well. We could of course also add to the Roman victory list with "3rd Time's the Charm" Beneventum and others.

[Kraxis]

Just noticed a small misinformation. The Macedonian losses were more like 25,000 than 31,000. 6000 is a lot. But that is just a small issue really.

Red, there is actually some serious beliefs that Beneventum wasn't really a victory, but rather a bloody draw. You can say a Pyrrhic Draw.
Pyrrhus had suffered many losses (or so we are led to believe) at Asculum and Heraclea, and again in the crossing from Sicily and in the fighting down there. Yet he managed to retain a quite sizeable part of his forces after Beneventum, 8000 out of the 25000 he had brought to the peninsula. Added to this the losses suffered to nature itself it doesn't seem as if Beneventum was very decisive.
The Roman forces apparently didn't take advantage of their victory like they have normally done, and the political scene was also not too fast in changing after the apparent victory.

This brings to mind the quote of Pyrrhus after Heraclea: "Another victory like this will be the end of me." Suddenly it doesn't sound all that bad that after Beneventum he said "screw you guys, I'm going home." And this because he had suffered yet another battle that wasn't all that great for him. In fact the quote of Pyrrhus could be an indicator of it, something that had survived (not factual mind you but rather as some kind of myth that fitted the situation) until Levy thought of writing it down. But Rome couldn't have an undefeated opponent slip away from invading roman soil, so the draw became a defeat.

About the issue that it was the general that made the army.
Well that is true enough, but I tend to believe that the Roman system was more forgiving than most others. Roman commanders were often inexperienced and/or downright bad generals. Yet under these bad generals the Romans still scored victories. That says to me that the Roman system was very solid and very flexible at the same time.
The Roman system didn't need cavalry to the extent like those of Hannibal and the Macedonains styles. The lack of proper cavalryaction in those cases often spelled doom for their armies.

[Darius]

Actually I do remember one instance in which the Roman Legions actually used a phalanx. It was during the Imperial Era of the Roman Empire and it was during the civil war between Otho and Vitellius I believe. When the Vitellian cavalry charged Otho's conscripts (former sailors pressed into service) the Vitellian cavalry attempted to withdraw after taking some casualties, to prevent them from fleeing, Vittelius had formed a phalanx in the cavalry's path, and so forced them back into the fight which ended with the cavalry being victorious. Other than this I have seen little to no references to any other times where this was used other than during the very early Republican Era of the Empire. Of course the fact that the Vitellian spearmen never actually used the formation against an ENEMY was probably what made it less memorable.

[The Stranger]

I hate the Roman System in the game, maybe it is because you get easily surrounded and finished of, but i like their infantry, Pilum infantry are one of the most effective units in the game, capable of routing the first infantry wave without a actual combat, atleast if formed in the good way like this /----\

[Uesugi Kenshin]

I also think the Roman system was more forgiving, but the skill of a general is in many ways more important than his soldiers if the face off is between skilled and unskilled. The unskilled general may have the better army, but even if the skilled general blunders h may not be able to take advantage of it and if the unskilled general blunders the skilled general will be able to use the opening to its fullest extent.

[AntiochusIII]

Yeah, if Perseus had the knack of Demetrius and the first two Antigonus(es) the fall of Macedon would be a bit later and a bit more glorious, in worst scenarios.

I have a question: how does a Roman army fight after the reforms? Do they still use the 3-line formations? and...what is a late Roman army under Diocletian and Constantine?

[Red Harvest]

Kraxis,

I can't say that I disagree about Beneventum. It really doesn't fit the mould too well anyway, as it started as a night attack. As such it doesn't really lend itself to easy quantification or classification in the context of other battles. The Romans weren't able to follow it up, which suggests that they were badly bloodied rather than stunningly victorious. The Pyrrhic victories were similar in that regard, he couldn't follow up.

[cunctator]

The greek historician polybios has compared the Phalanx and the roman system. Probably it helps.

http://perseus.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/...out=;loc=18.29

[amagi]

"And now Pompey's cavalry rode up on the flank in a proud array and deployed their squadrons in order to encircle Caesar's right wing. Before they could charge, the cohorts which Caesar had posted behind him ran forward and, instead of hurling their javelins, as they usually did, or even thrusting at the thighs and legs of the enemy, aimed at their eyes and stabbed upward at their faces."

[Kraxis]

Kraxis,

I can't say that I disagree about Beneventum. It really doesn't fit the mould too well anyway, as it started as a night attack. As such it doesn't really lend itself to easy quantification or classification in the context of other battles. The Romans weren't able to follow it up, which suggests that they were badly bloodied rather than stunningly victorious. The Pyrrhic victories were similar in that regard, he couldn't follow up.

Yes, it could even have been a Roman loss, though I'm pretty certain it wasn't. But still the quote of Pyrrhus certainly fits such a case.

What I think happened at Beneventum was that the Romans defeated the Tarentines and the other itallo-greeks while Pyrrhus central core and cavalry (the bane of the Romans) dealt out a devastating beating. When Pyrrhus saw the allied forces on the run he understood that a victory might be at hand but at what cost? 'Screw them!' would be a fitting quote at that junction.

AntiochusIII, the Roman army kept the three lines. Even though the troops were now the same they were still called Hastati, Principes and Triarii for a long time yet. Initially it seems the lines were the H, P and T like before, but in time it changed into a more more fitting system of using the cohorts themselves. That meant the first line had 4 cohorts (including the enlarged 1. cohort) and the second and third line consisted of three cohorts. That made the system tactically more flexible as it is easier to command a single (or any number you want) cohort rather than a line of infantry across all the cohorts.

[KRALLODHRIB]

"Why didn't the Romans give the legionares long spears? Combined with their large shields and body armor it could add up to a virtually indestructible defensive formation, immune to arrows (in testudo/phalanx), cavalry and infantry. The spears can be dropped once they don't need them, so it does not really affect the mobility in offense either."

Roman warfare was not, though it may seem so, dependent upon superior generalship. It is the queen of the arms of war, the incomparable infantry, that primarily defined Roman victories in combat, and that relied on the single warrior: his will, ability, trianing, experience and discipline. After the humiliation of the Caudine Forks, Romans would never look upon possible defeat as an option nor war as something to be pursued in a half-assed manner. They did indeed mint and own the concept of TOTAL WAR.

Roman warfare relied upon the discipline of the individual legionary and his superior will to live over his enemy on the opposing line. It was disclipline and the fear of showing it that enabled Rome to easily mow down all other significant powers in the Mediterranean. Romans did not fear hand-to-hand combat; they anticipated, revelled and gloried in it! Their arms and organizational structure accomodated and facilitated it.

Early Roman society taught her young that disobedience or disgrace upon the family or towards the father was punishable by death. Draconian decimation was similarly used to deter cowardice in battle. So, while weapon systems (Mainz or Pompeii- their gladius was wieldy, short, strong, sharp and deadly), generalship, tactical manipulation all have a part to play, for the Romans success was measured by each man and his discipline.

My own suspicion was that it was easier for the Romans to conquer the Meditteranean world than it was for Alexander to conquer Asia. Greek hoplites are tanks compared with the lightish and skittish infantry found in Asia (though it was Alexander's cavalry that really BROKE the enemies while his infantry "held" the opposing infantry to engage and employ them), but, alternately, Hellenic hoplites were much too static and soft compared to the legionnaries that skewered, eviscerated and dismembered them in Greece.

[Watchman]

The Roman army, once it got out of the old part-timer hastati-princepes-triarii and into full-time professional legionaires, was nothing if not extremely professional. Assuming the clueless senators, governors and whatever that every now and then ended up commanding them didn't make truly hideous misjudgements or bungle on a truly impressive scale, the career officers of the legions would normally ensure the army performed at least passably even under a totally clueless moron.

Well, even the old three-tiered manipular system proved itself capable of knocking the stuffing out of Macedonian and Greek phalanx alike... The key was apparently the fact that the phalanx was essentially purely linear; it was specialised and only any good for frontal combat, and was in dire trouble indeed if its formation was distrupted or it got flanked. The Roman maniples and later legions weren't nearly as good in straight linear mincemeat power, but they were by far better at maneuvre, actual up-close-and-personal killing and operating in less-than-perfectly accommodating terrain.

As a side note, it apparently wasn't a particularly remarkable occurrence for a spear or javelin to punch through a shield on a square hit. Rather, it seems to have been more or less expected. Any combatant worth his salt would've tried to deflect an incoming blow or at the very least receive it at an angle, not just block it straight on. That sort of thing just gets your parrying tool (shield, weapon, arm...) broken, the respective arm numbed by the impact, and in general is a less than optimal way of going about actively defending yourself.

Here is a somewhat more concise and less cluttered version of Polybius' discussion, courtesy of the generally interesting De Re Militari.

[hoom]

What I don't get is that I've never heard of a real phalanx formation being set up with the flanks turned back in a /------\ formation.
Doing that makes a phalanx army much stronger in RTW & makes much sense to me in reality & yet it doesn't appear to have been done.

[Oaty]

What I don't get is that I've never heard of a real phalanx formation being set up with the flanks turned back in a /------\ formation.
Doing that makes a phalanx army much stronger in RTW & makes much sense to me in reality & yet it doesn't appear to have been done.

Think of 20,000 hoplites. Now take your game on huge settings and select 20 units of pikeman @ 240 each That's 4800 men for your army so take 3 more allies and give them the same thing. That should give you a perspective of it's length................ although remenber it's just a GAME

Now to think of it's flanks, more than likely the better cavalry and possibly higher numbers of cavalry are going to be on the right flank. So a cavalry wing may contain 2000 cavalry. On huge settings you can have 2160 cavalry.

So in game terms of representation your a wing commander not a general.

And this quote from Kraxis

. Perseus simply let the infantry march to their doom. When the openings did happen where were the light infantry that was supposed to close the gaps, as they had done for centuries?

Phalanxes had to keep moving forward, to help reduce chances of being outflanked. At the battle of Marathon the flanks were "blocked" up but not so much for protection but for offensive power and the Persians did breach the center of the line but these blocked up flanks worked in on the Persian army wich caused there center to pulback/route. Phalanxes worked best with support and to redeploy them could actually mean suicide and that is why in reality your angled flanks would not work. And in reality any phalanx army that just stood there would not even see a frontal fight more than likely, the flanks would be overrun and the phalnxes worked in.