This is an understable point and I found it troublesome at first as well. That stated, let me present an understanding I have achieved regarding the concept. In ancient warfare, the coordination of vast armies against enemies was not guarnateed. There were numerous impediments to successful coordination where the implications were strategic and tactical.Originally Posted by Aetius the Last Roman
Allow me to provide you with an example of this. In the Pelopenisian war following the expulsion of Persia prior to Phillip pand Alexander dominance of Greece, two city-states represented contrasting hegemonys that were bound for conflict: Athens and Sparta. In the ensuing war that lasted decades upon decades, Sparta and Athens led varying types of campaigns against each other, both ground and naval. During this time, alliances with lesser states and the balance of power repeatedly shifted back and forth between Sparta and Athens. (here is where I get to the point) One battle where reinforcement coordination made all the difference is as follows:
Agis, a young King of Sparta, eager to overcome a reputation of perceived cowardice (it was actually prudence. Agis sought peace.) found his opportunity in the region of Arcadia. He was to face the Argives, allies of Athens who were expecting reinforcements for the very same battle. Agis was also expecting reinforcements for the same battle, but Agis found himself in an akward position. The Argives had placed themseles on a steep hillside while awaiting their reinforcements. As it was at that exact time, Agis of Sparta had superior numbers while the Argives held superior ground. If both war parties were to receive their reinforcements at the same time, the Argives would hold superior numbers AND superior ground. Agis made an impetous decision to lead his army in phalanx against the enemy army's superior position. Just as the armies were about to engage, Agis called them off and the army went back down the hill. History tells us that Agis's retinue declared it suicide (which it was, despite superior numbers) and prevented the assault.
Agis found a way to bring the army down from the hill ( I won't go into detail, but it involves flooding the Argive's allies city) and fight the battle below. Agis won. The point is this, had Argive's reinforcements arrived when expeted, the battle would have been fought differently and it is entirely possible the outcome would have been different.
So you see, delayed reinforcements is an aspect of the game adding to its strategic complexity, depth, and realism. If you cannot rely on brute force and attrition warfare, you must then turn to tactics and manuever warfare.
Regarding prisoners, classical armies commonly routed. And the aggressor commonly pursued and destroyed the routers. Typically, once the leader of personality fell (for example, the king of Persia to Alexander) or fled, the army broke apart and routed piece by piece. It mattered not who was actually winning the day. In fact, Armies sometimes routed so ferociously that they trampled many of their fellow soldiers to death while in flight. The concept of rational thought escapes the man who is filled with terror and panic. And panic breeds panic. It is known to be contagious on the battlefield in real life as it is in TW.Originally Posted by Aetius the Last Roman
And if you are refering to the "my huge army versus your tiny army" aspect of the game... They usually flee first. When you face them a second time, they have no more options to flee. In this case surrender is death. I'd rather fight.
Regards.
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