Military Organization in the Middle Age

[Sethik]

I always wondered how troops were sorted out before warfare reached its most formal stage (Musket-era warfare.) When all you had were swordsmen, pikemen, archers, and cavalry how were the forces divided? Were there regiments or battalions? Platoons? When did all of these terms come about?

[Adrian II]

I always wondered how troops were sorted out before warfare reached its most formal stage (Musket-era warfare.) When all you had were swordsmen, pikemen, archers, and cavalry how were the forces divided? Were there regiments or battalions? Platoons? When did all of these terms come about?

The first thing you need to do is forget about the TW games and their convenient but hopelessly unrealistic battle formations and scripts. Secondly, the way troops were constituted, entered the battlefield and played their separate roles changed continuously. Thirdly, the whole subject of war and battle was deeply influenced by religious and social attitudes, much more than most of us can imagine.

If you want to get some idea of warfare in the age when feudality was at its peak, I suggest you read (a translation of) Georges Duby's Le dimanche de Bouvines (Gallimard, 1973). It's much more than a battle account, it's an analysis of the main primary sources for the battle based on the author's profound historical and anthropological knowledge of the period. It's a captivating read, I guarantee you won't put it down before you're through. I know what I'm talking about because I walked into a lamppost when I was reading it on my way back from work years ago.

One thing you learn from the book is that battles such as these were not a part of war or werra as the seasonal low-intensity conflicts of barons, baronets and local potentates was known in the latinised language of the High Medieval Franks. They were considered outside the realm of warfare altogether because they were regarded by the participants and contemporaries as an ordeal in the original sense, a fight in which men engaged to see whose side God was on, and to know whom the Lord deemed most fit to lead, protect and preserve Christendom.

It also tells you a lot about the way social circumstances and beliefs dictated the make-up of armies and their behaviour on the battlefield. Knights were completely covered in expensive harnesses in those days, more or less the equivalent of modern-day tanks, and the author gives a good description of how this influenced their mentality. Foot soldiers were seen at scum, their arrows, pole axes, long knives and other 'modern' weaponry as base, unmanly and cowardly.

Few knights actually died during battles, many more died during tournaments where the going was often a lot tougher. France was the paradise for the tourneying knight in those days, and young English, German and Spanish nobles came to France to gather experience, make a splash or, indeed, die young. French knights who didn't tourney were considered sissies, and the tourneys were a natural selection process of the best and the smartest among them. Tourneys were never individual affairs like we see in movies (or read about in children's books), but always group versus group fights. That's how knights learned to act like cavalry and work together closely, so close that 'there was no light between their lances' as a chronicler states. This training gave the French knights a decisive advantage over their opponents at Bouvines. Even though they were fighting on two fronts and in the minority on both, Philippe Auguste and his son Louis carried the day because they had the best knights, armour and weaponry.

The analysis of the battle itself, the hostage-taking, and the aftermath all reflect Duby's terrific background knowledge. The French foot soldiers were gathered in 'communes', local or urban battalions led by local dignitaries (often priests), and they acted separately from the knights. They gathered behind the banner of Saint-Denis, the famous Oriflamme, hoisted on a pedestal on some peasant cart. Some French knights had their own foot soldiers, who took up a circular formation with lowered pikes and only one small opening through which their Lord, between two engagements, could enter to catch his breath, feed on some wine and bread, and recover before he galloped back into the fray.

The German foot soldiers were mainly mercenaries from Brabant, paid for by money from Richard Lionheart's undeserving son, Jean sans Terre, who couldn't make it to Bouvines because he was too busy running away from Crown Prince Louis in the South of France. These Brabançons were very well trained and maneuvered in phalanx-like formation with pikes levelled to all sides.

It's funny to read how both sides despised each other's tactics. The French had nothing but contempt for the Germans who allowed themselves to be protected by lowly, blood-thirsty and unmanly Brabançons paid by a foreign King. The Germans and Flemish were disgusted when the French right wing opened the battle by sending ahead three hundred feudal knights. They weren't noblemen! So the Flemish knights didn't budge and took them on only when they couldn't avoid their onslaught. Meanwhile, the Brabançons came so close to Philippe that they managed to pull him off his horse and he had to be saved by his personal guard of elite knights.

After the German emperor fled (or withdrew) the Brabançons were the only ones left to put up a fight, and they did. The French King however, who was very magnanimous when it came to treating captured enemy knights, gave the order to slaughter them to the last man and wipe them off the face of the earth for what they represented: the valour of the common man and a threat to the social order ordained by God.

Above all, the book is sober and free from all chauvinism. Duby analyses how (and how quickly) the events were turned into mythology by chroniclers to reflect High Medieval notions about hereditary kingship, God's truce, etcetera.

I particularly love the way he turns the spotlight on telling details. Before this post turns into a booklet by itself, let me finish by telling you there was a French bishop-elect who couldn't refrain from taking part in the battle in order to revenge something or other, but since he was holy man and not allowed to spill blood with his own hands, he came armed, not with the Frankish long-sword, but with a mace... and bashed in countless heads.

[Sethik]

So common foot troops were massed together with no thought? Just put a bunch of guys with anything pointy or sharp over there with Knights on their flanks and charge away?

There has to have been some organization, no? I'm interested in things like the Hastii, Princeps, and Triarii system of Ancient Rome. Did Medieval society have anything along those lines?

[Adrian II]

So common foot troops were massed together with no thought? Just put a bunch of guys with anything pointy or sharp over there with Knights on their flanks and charge away?

That's not what I wrote, is it? In this battle some foot troops were accompanying a particular knight, others were following local notables (and took orders from the higher commanders of course) in battalions called 'communes', and still others, such as the mercenaries from Brabant, knew quite well how to operate on their own even when their paymaster fled.

Anyway, I merely tried to give you an idea of what really went down at one stage. A hundred years later, on other battlefields, things were very different. If you look into the links in the Sticky for Online Historical Resources, you will see several good links on Medieval warfare that give you details on all sorts of stuff. Enjoy!


EDIT

To give you an idea, here's a copy of a diagram of 'Bouvines' taken from one of the sites in the sticky. Like I said, in order to understand what went on you have to get rid of a lot of modern assumptions. It's hard to develop a proper notion without turning to the sources, digging up details and looking for authors who answer the real questions. As you can see in the diagram, the armies were divided into three parts -- a left wing, a right wing and a center. Believe it or not, but that was done to reflect the Holy Trinity.

On the Xenophon/Oriflamme site you can follow how, after weathering the devastating German pole arm attack in the center, the French made two flanking movements. That wasn't so much a matter of tactics. The right flanking movement was made possible mainly by the capture of the Earl of Flanders, whose own foot soldiers fled immediately after they lost their leader. The whole concept was very immobile compared to modern views. On the left, it took the French a lot longer because Renaud took shelter behind his Brabantine pikemen until they were worn down and he could be captured.