Quote Originally Posted by Kraxis
Antietam was quite interesting.

The battleplan was to attack the CSA forces in succession. Each corps mounting an attack to draw in the neighbouring the units, then the next corps would come in against a weaker line and so on. It was done in mainly open terrain with some hills and cropfields. But there was a major bungle up in getting off too late, the individual corps attacked too late comparatively to each other, so instead of the CSA getting depleted, it was themselves that got defeated in detail.
The major problem was that the only true regular force in the Union army, 5th Corps I believe, made up entirely of regulars was not used at all.

While European forces had about 1/3 in reserve that was to counter any enemy surprises, to stiffen attacks and throw back counterattacks. Basically a firebrigade. Had the 5th corps been used as such, it would without a doubt have been a Union victory, ending the war right there.
Yes, McClellan was far too timid. Great organizer and trainer, charismatic, but a poor battlefield commander because he lacked boldness. However, his basic concept for Antietam was flawed in my opinion. Trying to coordinate successive attacks across a wide front invites timing errors from the outset. His men had to march to position and develop the enemy positions...one can see how trying to time series assaults would have little hope of proper coordination under the circumstances. And series attack vs. arced defensive formations also allows defenders to support one another via interior lines. This is the recipe for defeat in detail because the defender's flanks are protected, while the attacker's flanks are necessarily exposed by each advance. Much better to call for a general advance so that fighting will still be ongoing in each sector and therefore mutually supporting and denying the enemy the ability to shift units from sector to sector. Whichever enemy sector is nearest collapse is the one to hurl the reserves at.

And you can't hold it against Sigel that he made an error like that. His enemy didn't have that problem with him. It happene all the time in the early war, and mostly with Union troops firing on Union troops. With that in mind I find it likely that Lyon had made it specific to his subordinates that he didn't want any FF at all, he simply couldn't afford it. So the CSA troops marching on Sigel realized that he didn't know they were his enemies marched as close as possible before firing. The fact that they did that would have confirmed for Sigel that they were friendly (they haven't fired yet... good... an enemy would have done that long ago). Especially considering the abilities and experince of the troops that early in the war. Such daring and nerve would have been almost unthinkable.
I can hold this one against Sigel. There is a lot more to the story. He pressed Lyon heavily to have his german regiments detached to do this flank attack. Lyon was actually opposed to splitting the force as were the other commanders, but after a private discussion consented and provided Sigel with some dragoons to guide him.

Sigel misread the lull after the first confederate counterattack on Lyon as a general withdrawal by the confederates. He ceased fire from his battery and did *nothing* as he assumed the rebels were in full retreat while they were actually regrouping for another assault. Sigel then utterly failed to properly secure his position and did not send an officer forward to determine the nature of the approaching troops until they were quite close. The officer, a Capt. Tod, realized too late and was shot as he attempted to raise his weapon, just before the rebels attacked. A bit earlier Sigel did have his regiments wave their banners to signal they were union since they were also not wearing regulation blue. That prompted fire from a rebel battery along a wooded hill to his right which he had failed to identify. Sigel's brigade was also flanked a few seconds later by two other regiments of which he was apparently unaware. He made too many mistakes at once for me to dismiss this one. He was on some of the more open terrain (a small plateau) and yet saw nothing before it was too late. Incidentally, two of the same CSA regiments that defeated him had just repelled a small federal task force's attempt to silence a battery enfilading Lyon's line from across Wilson's Creek. These CSA units had done quite a bit of marching to reach Sigel. Had Lyon had the Sigel's extra men with him, he could have used a larger force to successfully deal with the battery that enfiladed his own position on Bloody Hill. Being short a brigade was critical.

Sigel had a "history" of poor judgement. A few weeks before he had rashly charged out to Carthage, Missouri (without authorization if memory serves) with the same two german regiments, intent on kicking the secessionist Missouri State Guard out of the state. That edge of the state is mostly prairie and gently rolling hills--ideal terrain for MSG cavalry to gobble up his infantry only force...particulary since he was outnumbered 4:1. Luckily for him, his Germans were well drilled and did good work. (German militia groups in St. Louis had been drilling continuously before the war.) At Carthage Sigel realized after aligning for battle and after an artillery duel that he was going to be enveloped by the cavalry proceeding along his flanks. He was able to retreat in good order using successive creeks as barriers. Fortunately for him MSG cavalry were largely worthless at the time (other than Shelby's tiny command) and the MSG cav commander Rains was one of the most inept cavarly commanders of the ACW (perhaps only matched by Stahel, Sigel's close friend and cavalry commander at New Market.) A battalion of Sigel's Missouri infantry performed a bayonet charge on some cavalry that blocked their escape route, scattering the riders. One thing Sigel was competent at was retreat. He wasn't really a bad person and he was a decent organizer, but he had poor strategic judgement and he fumbled badly in key situations, resulting in disaster for his commands at Wilson's Creek, MO later at New Market, VA and finally at the supply depot Martinsburg where he abandoned all the stores and retreated his command without a shot. The fiasco at Martinsburg got him relieved of all command.