CBR,

I think the problem is that trying to apply Napoleonic tactics just wasn't going to work in the ACW theaters, even if the units were well drilled. The terrain and logistics wouldn't make them practical here. Simply put you could field a more versatile force for much lower cost. If the US had to fight a large war at that time in Europe, no doubt the tactics would not have been the same as the ACW. A war lasting this long with as many men engaged tends to find its own efficiencies based on the whole environment.

The first time cuirasseurs attempt a charge against a position that doesn't break, you've lost them as an effective force. (Reminds me of the Japanese losing their elite pilots at Midway...their pilot pipeline was too long to replenish.) Even worse in the ACW, you are not going to find many times where that shock cavalry will be more effective than a rifleman. Shock cavalry couldn't find enough open ground in which to operate in most ACW battles--not in the numbers you favor. (Not that a commander could even *see* far enough on most fields to make this possible. Visibility was a big factor in armies groping their way towards one another.) The U.S. had become reasonably adept at replacing 10,000 rifle men after each major battle. Replacing horses was more problematic...

Cavalry pursuits were often attempted against beaten armies in the ACW. Unfortunately, usually even a broken army could find some piece of terrain that acted as a bottleneck to the cavalry (or pursuing infantry.) Burn a bridge. Set up a battery in a road and wait for them with double canister. Fell trees as you withdraw... Take a battalion and ambush the pursuers alongside the road. Nightfall usually settled the matter as units would have reformed overnight. Too much virgin forest perhaps? That certainly played a part in the lack of suitable forage--and therefore the number of horses that could be supported in a theater.

Classifying veteran ACW regiments as militia is erroneous. There were militia as well, and they were considered unreliable. Conscripts and true militia are weak. The volunteers still drilled and they "did drills by the numbers." They were not like militia who wouldn't leave their home state/region. It took time for them to become reliable veterans, but they eventually reached the proficiency level that was needed.

Yes, most of the cannons were 12#'ers but they had switched to rifling. Projectiles and fuses had improved greatly. Twelve pounder smoothbores were on the way out by the middle of the war although present in great numbers. In 1863 at Gettysburg they were 39% of the total. 6#'ers were almost completely gone by midwar (a single one at Gettysburg). The smoothbores were deadlier at close range than rifled weapons, but less effective at extended range. The CSA had trouble producing quality fuses and the like, somewhat limiting the value of rifled pieces for them since they couldn't properly regulate explosive shells. The Federal ammunition had tight quality control and better raw materials, plus, the Federal artillery arm was excellent. A mix of rifled guns with 12# smoothbores was often considered ideal for a battery.

And I disagree with the assertions about accuracy/range not being all that much different. I think you are comparing apples to oranges. What happens when accuracy and range improve? Combat occurs at longer ranges...at least across open ground. Why advance to 100 yards when I can do the work at 200 yards? The loss rate doesn't change in these circumstances because the loss rate is *what the men will tolerate.* You could throw in comparisons of rounds fired per casualty in WWII as well. In the ACW the officers and men did whatever they could to take advantage of fences, cover, or even lying prone to fight. He who held the better piece of cover or got off the first devastating volleys would usually win a firefight unless flanked, out of ammo, etc. Officers and color bearers fell like leaves when on open ground exchanging volleys...that's no accident, they were targeted. In the ACW, it was not uncommon for a regiment to lose all officers above captain in a single tough fight, sometimes leaving only two or three captains.

Not sure where you are going with the trenches bit. Defenders tended to dig in, because they could hold a given piece of ground with fewer men (or fewer casualties.) Why would I stand out in the open to get shot at when I could use a nice trench with a headlog and perhaps a ditch out in front? Let me pare his regiment by 10, 15 or 20% before it can even start to reach my line. Earthworks worked just fine in the ACW...and in the War of 1812. A scratch force of "militia" cut the British to shreds at the battle of New Orleans. And I can find no fault with courage or discipline of those Brits. In the ACW, men got pretty good at building earthworks in just a few hours. Headlogs/rails would be used so that they were essentially using firing slits. With such works attackers often couldn't see them or how many they faced until they took an initial volley...or two...or three...or until they actually reached the works. Defensive works hide one's strength, and that is often critical. Longer range weapons also provide better coverage to the flanks for an entrenched defender. A given gun could cover a lot more area...and enfilade fire was increased, not just frontal fire.

Yes, if you want to take a position via melee, then you should hold fire while advancing. That was used on quite a few occasions in the ACW. Much of this is morale. If an assault force has good morale and is bold, the defenders will often not put up much of a fight when the attacker closes. However when morale was good for the defenders, even massing versus thinly held positions had problems--there was some good use of assault columns by Upton (think it was him) at Spotsylvania. His timing, tactics, and choice of location was good so the massed assault columns were not slaughtered by cannon. And the rebels threw everything they had at his men to succussfully repel them from the rupture. Weak defensive lines typically work because they are reinforced as the attack unfolds. If Upton had been properly reinforced, the breakthrough might have grown to a full rupture. However, his columns did not face galling fire when they attacked either. This was another fight in the woods... And the density of his columns exceeded the defender's by many times.