During the cold war, nuclear strategic doctrine was riven by a fundamental contradiction. Governments thought it sensible to threaten nuclear war--the better to "deter" a foe from doing something unwanted--yet it obviously made no sense actually to wage nuclear war, for this led to the famous "mutual assured destruction." But if carrying out the threats was senseless, then how could it be frightening? What use were they? Wouldn't the foe, supposing that no country would be demented enough to "assure" its own destruction, disbelieve the threats and do what it pleased in spite of them?
The high strategists of nuclear defense scratched their heads and came up with answers. One was to take technical and other steps that deliberately put your nation on what the strategist Thomas Schelling called a "slippery slope." That is, if you visibly arranged to make yourself a little bit out of control, the foe would no longer be able to imagine that you might desist from nuclear war in a last-minute fit of sanity. They'd think that you might plunge into the abyss in spite of yourself. And so they would fear you, as hoped.
Bookmarks