Best Military Strategy of its Time

[PanzerJaeger]

PzJg, the Kampfgrupp is no more than a reorganisation of different routed units in one fighting bigger unit, combining Luftwaffe unit, different infantry units (SS, Wermarcht) and Kriegmarine and to make it as a fighting unit. It is the Corps d’Armee from Napoleon, modernised. What was really surprising is the speed the Germans succeeded to do it.

You could also say that the Blitz was a Mongol strategy modernised. The point is, the Germans were the first and best at applying combined arms in both the Blitz form and the Kampfgruppe form in a modern war situation. No modern military had that kind of doctrine until the Germans developed it.

Modern warfare really hasnt progressed much further than what the Germans took it to in a tactical sense. That says a lot.

I don’t agree with your analyse about the use of the Blitzkrieg concept by the allies. They allies didn’t plan to cut the German and surrounding them. It happened but it is another concept, it is the concept of the battles of opportunity (developed by the Red Army). Falaise could be a good example of it. You react to the situation and play on the enemy mistakes.

The allies studied and basically copied the German way of war. Look at how both the Russia and the American armies were set up at the begining of the war, and then observe how closely their setups resembled the German one towards the end of the war. Many people take for granted the concepts of direct air support, independent mechanized forces, and elastic defenses - but many of the most basic concepts of modern warfare that are studied today were completely foreign to the allies before they were introduced by the Germans.

Of course each nation used their advantages - russians being numbers and americans being air power - to put their own spin on the same basic principles.

Market Garden was a success because paratroopers can’t defeat Armoured Division. I tried to explain this many times to friends (paratroopers) but they never get the point. A tank goes faster, had bigger weapons, etc… So Market Garden is an example of how not to use paratroopers and airborne divisions, unless you provide them adequate support.

But it was the ability of the Germans to quickly throw together a functioning fighting force out of many weak ones that made that victory possible.

The planners of Market Garden never intended for the paratroopers to defeat an armored force. They made the false assumption that the attack would confound the Germans long enough for the British armor to relieve the paratroops.

The kampfgruppe doctrine, learned in Russia, allowed the German command to react to the situation much faster than the Allies anticipated.

Question: Are you sure it was Manstein in command and not Model? For what I know Manstein was dismissed in March 1944

I was refering to two different examples of that strategy employed, sorry for the confusion.

Manstein used it amazingly in Russia, especially in the retaking of Karkov, and it was also used well in the Market Garden operation.

And if you study Patton tactic, you will see he was as much flexible as his german counterparts.

It is difficult to study the tactics of the Western allies because there were very few times when they were on somewhat equal terms with the Germans. Most of the time they simply used their vastly greater numbers to overwhelm the Germans with no particular strategies. However, I believe Patton studied the German tactics, especially Rommel's campaigns, very carefully. I can see many similarities between the tactics he employed and those of the Germans.

[Brenus]

I must agree about 80% of what you said.
However, the concept itself of combining air and ground forces was developed in other nations: France with the Gal Etiennes and Liddell Hart (UK). And an Italian general, I forgot his name.
What is true is that the Germans refined the concept, and more accurately, used it.
I personally think, as you know because we debated about that before, that the Red Army made the best of their Armoured Division doctrine, adapted to the level of their conscripts and their technology… Resilient in siege warfare (Stalingrad, Leningrad), good in defensive (shield and sword tactic) in Kursk (Koniev, Zukov), and high manoeuvre ability in East Prussia (Rokosovsky), they were the first one to combine the partnership between tanks and infantry, developing the battle of opportunity concept…
The modern warfare didn’t evolved because we still use the same weapons, just better technology.
The number of Russians didn’t win the war. They were more than the Germans even at the beginning of the war (plus this “advantage” didn’t work with the Japanese in Galing Goll, or later in Manchuria).

In Market Garden, again from memory, I think the German deployed 2 Armoured Division (9th SS, and the Panzer Lehr?) against airborne divisions. They had no chance… Market Garden was a failure of Montgomery and his chief, Eisenhower who was unable to stop Patton and Montgomery to compete, thus the normally prudent English to draw a plan which was against all his principles learned from WW1.

To study and copy the enemy (and upgrade) is a common thing in war. It was exactly what happened to Napoleon, and to the English against the Boers, when they also tasted the Maxim effect.
Difficult to study the allies’ tactics because they had several, by the simple fact they were different. The Naval assault was more an US and UK tactic than Russian (except for Crimea, but it is an exception) and the vast development of tanks can be hardly achieved in Western Europe…

[Kraxis]

About tactics and strategy.

Well, tactics are broadly (liberal use of the word here) within the range of the weapons. Meaning about 15 km at most. Strategy is how you pursue the goal of the tactical battle. The tactical battle is a foregone conclusion in strategy, thus Blitzkrieg is in fact a strategy. It is strategy when you reform the troops to take the last major crossing of a river behind the enemy, or when you head your advance towards the main industrial area. Blitzkrig could be applied on both scales, the concentration of forces in essence (which was contradictory to the three points of Barbarossa).

And while the Kampfgruppe was brought out as an ad-hoc unit it eventually became an institution. Commanders were taught how to communicate with the infantry, guns and so on. It was an accepted tactic (the Kampfgruppe was never a strategy as it always reacted to tactical problems, for instance it couldn't be used to effect in operation Bagration).

But the Germans perfected another tactic that was almost perfect. Elastic Defence. Performed on strategic scale by Manstein and on a tactical scale by many, a good example is the Battle of the Selöw Hights (ultimately a loss though).

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Modern Era:

Optimum Strategy = Blitzkrieg

Goal: deep penetration of the enemy's front in order to break communications, impede logistics, and induce "shock," thus degrading the fighitng ability of far more troops than are actually engaged.

Subordinate tactics: kampfgruppen/task force, combined arms assault, infiltration, indirect attack, close support. Virtually all of these tactics were used by the Imperial German army in 1918, the Wermacht of 1939+ simply combined them together in pursuit of a strategic goal.

Brenus: The Italian author on airpower, by the way, is Guilio Douhet.

Modern Variations: The Soviets improved on the German doctrine with their strategy of ruthlessly reinforcing success during blitzkreig operations. If your regiment met light resistance and mine got bogged down, YOU got the division reserve and artillery and I got told "good luck." The modern USA version of blitzkrieg follows this approach, but the relatively lavish resources US forces usually field allow for a kinder/gentler version.


Gunpowder Era = "Frequent Small Engagements"

Goal: The favored strategy of Maurice de Saxe, the purpose was to nibble away at enemy forces, resources, and capabilities. This strategy relied on taking and keeping the initiative so as to keep an enemy off balance. It also avoided the risk of "all or nothing" battle.

Subordinate tactics: The entire gunpowder era was dominated by the importance of close order drill in terms of discipline and firepower. The tactics used in battle -- flank them if you can, concentrate forces on a key point -- are hardly novel.

Note: The amazing speed of french revolutionary infantry allowed them a strategic mobility that often bested their foes -- creating almost a blitzkeig-like shock. The slowing of the Imperial army under Napoleon also took some of their "edge."


Medieval Era = "Mongol Horde"

Goal: Catch the enemy off-guard and under-prepared through strategic mobility. The Mongols consistently covered distances that stunned their opponents.

Subordinate tactics: feigned retreat (an oldie but goodie), harrassment/raiding between "campaigns."


Ancient Era = Fabian Strategy (Often mis-labeled tactics).

Goal: Avoid pitched battle, retreat in such a manner that you draw your foe into devastated/despoiled terrain leaving them without supplies and frustrated.

Subordinate tactics: scorched earth, strong/impregnable defensive positions, guerilla harassment.




Note: I disagree with the inclusion of Guerrilla warfare as an ideal strategy. Guerrilla warfare has always been the tactic employed by an severely outnumbered or outpowered defensive force. With the rare exceptions of winning through frustration (opponent just up and leaves, U.S. in Vietnam) or the collapse of the opponent via corruption (Kuomintang), guerrilla warfare only works by setting the stage for a different kind of strategy later. The minutemen sniping at the Brits in Concord/Lexington frustrated the British efforts, but it wasn't until straight-up wins at Saratoga and Yorktown that victory could be achieved. Guerrilla warfare is a strategy to prolong the fight and to prolong the powerful faction's pain level.



Seamus

[Papewaio]

You could also say that the Blitz was a Mongol strategy modernised. The point is, the Germans were the first and best at applying combined arms in both the Blitz form and the Kampfgruppe form in a modern war situation. No modern military had that kind of doctrine until the Germans developed it.

Germans weren't the first to use this combined arms approach with a modern army:

the true role of infantry was not to expend itself upon heroic physical effort, not to wither away under merciless machine-gun fire, not to impale itself on hostile bayonets, but on the contrary, to advance under the maximum possible protection of the maximum possible array of mechanical resources, in the form of guns, machine-guns, tanks, mortars and aeroplanes; to advance with as little impediment as possible; to be relieved as far as possible of the obligation to fight their way forward.

[PanzerJaeger]

Ok, who used combined arms first in modern warfare?

[Papewaio]

The Aussies.

[PanzerJaeger]

I do believe you enjoy talking about the Australian military almost as much as I enjoy talking about the German military... almost.

[Papewaio]

I do believe the prototype for the German method existed in WWI. Germans continued the way to greater heights with greater tech.

But you might enjoy reading this:

John Monash

[Redleg]

Ok, who used combined arms first in modern warfare?

Well since the first war to be considered modern warfare happened to be the American Civil War - I would have to say we did.

[Papewaio]

True... just missing tanks and airplanes...

[Kraxis]

Well since the first war to be considered modern warfare happened to be the American Civil War - I would have to say we did.

Hardly right. The modern aspects of the ACW was the industry and totality of eth war, and of course the development of the respective armies.
But in terms of combined arms I would say it wasn't so much the case.
Almost all battles were sluggingmatches between infantry, supported by artillery. That artillery was independant quite often, which was a good thing in the ACW as it could easier find a new spot to fire from.
The cavalry didn't have an integral infantry force with them for obvious reasons. The North did find a way around this by makign their cavalry more like infantry, but still they were not combined with infantry.

And far too often the caavlry had to deal with its objectives alone, and the infantry likewise. It is in fact the opposite of combined arms. It is devided arms.

[Rosacrux redux]

The first combined arms use ever (not in the modern sence though... aircrafts were not invented back then...) is by Alexander the Great. Strategically (since the word strategy was used primarily in this thread, allthough in a wrong content) Alexander was extremely effective too and his use of the terrain, way of cutting off the main supply centers for the Persians, taking Egypt and the Middle East before delivering the decisive blow, dismantling his fleet etc. etc. are all prime examples of strategical choices that allowed the small Greek army to triumph in Asia.

When it comes down to tactics, Alex's thing was quite simple to conceive but hard to achieve... he was very keen on the concept "hitting the strong point of the enemy with the best thing you've got and deliver the decisive blow, while the rest of the enemy forces were pinned by your less mobile forces" but it's realization was extremely complicated and involved the use of many different elements of his army (missile, light and heavy infantry, light and heavy cavalry) in the most affordable possible way.

When talking about tactics, one shouldn't forget the double encirclement of the great Hannibal of Karthago at Cannae, the skewed phalanx of the Theban Pelopidas (copied by, among others, Napoleon, Frederick the Great, Karl Gustav and others). I might think of more ancient uber-tactics later...

[Redleg]

The first combined arms use ever (not in the modern sence though... aircrafts were not invented back then...) is by Alexander the Great. ...

Yes and no - Alexander the Great did use many concepts that were similiar to combined arms warfare. Several older battles were also fought using the combined arms that were availiable during the time period.

And then the question was

Ok, who used combined arms first in modern warfare?

Alexander the Great hardly qualifies when using the term modern warfare.

[Redleg]

Hardly right. The modern aspects of the ACW was the industry and totality of eth war, and of course the development of the respective armies.
But in terms of combined arms I would say it wasn't so much the case.
Almost all battles were sluggingmatches between infantry, supported by artillery. That artillery was independant quite often, which was a good thing in the ACW as it could easier find a new spot to fire from.
The cavalry didn't have an integral infantry force with them for obvious reasons. The North did find a way around this by makign their cavalry more like infantry, but still they were not combined with infantry.

And far too often the caavlry had to deal with its objectives alone, and the infantry likewise. It is in fact the opposite of combined arms. It is devided arms.

I was joking did you not notice the

But I was also partly serious - The civil war in the United States is considered the first modern war by many historians. Several battle - were fought with all three branches being used together.

Take for instance the Battle of Gettysburg. From the Union standpoint alone. A cavarly screen stumbled onto a shoe gathering party. An essential part of modern movement to contacts is the unit as a screen in front to find and fix the enemy force.

Using Wikipedia as a source - because its convient

When Pettigrew's troops approached Gettysburg on June 30, they noticed Federal cavalry under Brig. Gen. John Buford west of town, and Pettigrew returned to Cashtown without engaging them. When Pettigrew told Hill and Henry Heth about what he had seen, neither general believed that there was a substantial Federal force in or near the town, suspecting that it had been only Pennsylvania militia. Despite General Lee's order to avoid a general engagement until his entire army was concentrated, Hill decided to mount a significant reconnaissance in force the following morning to determine the size and strength of the enemy force in his front. Around 5 a.m. on Wednesday, July 1, Heth's division advanced to Gettysburg.

Then here showing that part of the Battle of Gettysburg followed some of the doctrines of what is now considered combined arms warfare.

Around 1:00 p.m., 170 Confederate cannons began an artillery bombardment was probably the largest of the war. In order to save valuable ammunition for the infantry attack that they knew must follow, the Army of the Potomac's artillery at first did not return the enemy's fire. After waiting about 15 minutes, 80 or so Federal cannon added to the din. The Army of Northern Virginia was critically low on artillery ammunition, and the cannonade did not significantly affect the Union position. Around 3:00 p.m, the cannon fire subsided, and 12,500 Southern soldiers stepped from the ridgeline and advanced the three-quarters of a mile (1200 m) to Cemetery Ridge in what is known to history as "Pickett's Charge". Due to fierce flanking artillery fire from Union positions on Cemetery Hill and north of Little Round Top, and musket and canister fire from the II Corps as the Confederates approached, nearly one half of the attackers would not return to their own lines. Although the Federal line wavered and broke temporarily at a jog in a low stone fence called the "Angle", just north of a patch of vegetation called the Copse of Trees, reinforcements rushed into the breach and the Confederate attack was repulsed.

There were two significant cavalry engagements on July 3. Stuart was sent to guard the Confederate left flank and was to be prepared to exploit any success the infantry might achieve on Cemetery Hill by flanking the Federal right and hitting their trains and lines of communications. Three miles (5 km) east of Gettysburg, in what is now called "East Cavalry Field" (not shown on the accompanying map, but between the York and Hanover Roads), Stuart's forces collided with Federal cavalry: Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg's division and George A. Custer's brigade. A lengthy mounted battle, including hand-to-hand sabre combat, ensued. Custer's charge, leading the 1st Michigan Cavalry, blunted the attack by Wade Hampton's brigade, blocking Stuart from achieving his objectives in the Federal rear. After Pickett's Charge, Meade ordered Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick to launch a cavalry attack against the infantry positions of Longstreet's Corps southwest of Big Round Top. Brig. Gen. Elon J. Farnsworth protested against the futility of such a move, but obeyed orders; Farnsworth was killed in the attack and his brigade suffered significant losses.

Then there are the lesser know battles fought in the west - again from Wikipedia for convience.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Pea_Ridge

On the morning of 8 March Curtis massed his artillery near the Tavern and launched a counterattack in an attempt to recover his supply lines. Leading the attack was Curtis' second-in-command Franz Sigel. The massed artillery combined with cavalry and infantry attacks began to crumple the Confederate lines. By noon Van Dorn realized that he was low on ammunition and that his supply trains were miles away with no hope of arriving in time to resupply his men. Despite outnumbering his opponent, Van Dorn had no choice but to withdraw down the Huntsville Road.

There are other battles fought in the civil war that have all the aspects of modern combined arms warfare - just like there are also battles that were nothing but infantry slug fests like the ones in WW1.

The American Civil War is often considered the first modern war for many reasons - the primary being that the whole nation was involved in the war effort. But also because many of the fundmental tactics of combined arms warfare was also being experimented with and used.