What made Napolean different?

[Sethik]

Everyone knows that Napolean was the pint-sized badass that almost conquered all of Europe. Many regard him as one of the greatest generals ever.

But why was he so successful on the field? I am not at all familier with musket warfare (march towards each other and shoot until one side breaks, add cannon and cavalry, lather, rinse, repeat.)

I remember hearing somewhere that he started placing his best troops in the center instead of the fringes, which was apparantly the opposite of what was done in that day. But besides that I have nothing.

So what made Napolean different militarily speaking? And don't tell me it was the hat.

[Duke of Gloucester]

While you're waiting for someone more knowledgeable, I'll add my very small contribution. He was originally an artillery officer and he used his cannon very effectively. Before him, the loss of guns was seen as shameful, so people were cautious about placing them too close to the enemy. He turned this on its head with horse artillery that could approach the enemey, set up just outside musket range and pummel them, retiring quickly if challenged.

[caesar44]

The bullets of his enemy could not reach him , when he bend over he was 76.5 cm and with his hat .

[caesar44]

For the record, Napoleon was taller than the average frenchman of the day. Then again, he wasn't french. He was Corsican.

IIRC, one of the reasons he was so effective was Divisional Tactics which, unless I'm mistaken, he was on of the first to use.

For the record , he was smaller than any European ruler in his time

[Meneldil]

For the record, Napoleon was taller than the average frenchman of the day. Then again, he wasn't french. He was Corsican.

Yeah, and Hitler wasn't German but from Austria.

Napoleon was certainly not the best general ever (although he won a fair amount of battles). He's rather remembered for being one of the smartest politician and ruler of the 19th.
That's how I see things at least.

As for his military skills, I don't know really. I guess one of the factors was the moral of his soldiers.
I don't mean to imply that French troops were better than British, Prussian or Russian ones, but the French were fighting an ideological war : they had to protect their country and the ideals of the 'Revolution' against the Monarchies of Europe. Add to that the fact that Napoleon was faithfully respected by his army.

About is height :

Contrary to popular belief (perpetuated by the above-mentioned caricatures), Napoleon was not especially short. After his death in 1821, the French emperor's height was recorded as 5 feet 2 inches in French feet. This corresponds to 5 feet 6.5 inches in English feet, or 1.686 meters, making him slightly taller than an average Frenchman of the 19th century. In addition to this miscalculation, his nickname le petit caporal adds to the confusion, as non-francophones mistakenly take petit as meaning "small"; in fact, it is an affectionate term reflecting on his camaraderie with ordinary soldiers.

[nokhor]

one of the things napoleon could do better than most of his opponents was get the right number of troops to the battlefield in the nick of time. the mega armies of that time marched dispersed [for logistical reasons] and concentrated for the set piece battles. time after time, an enemy general would march on napoleon hoping to catch him by surprise, but during the course of the battle french detachments would continue to arrive in the nick of time, to support the main battle line, and turn the enemy's flank.

napoleon also had a knack for getting on the flank or behind his enemy on the strategic level and then forcing his enemy to attack him tactically while he stood on the defensive. it was obviously a huge psychological and morale blow for the anti-napoleonic armies and generals.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

The Keys to Napoleon's Success:

-- Unsurprisingly, Clausewitz is a great resource on this -- worth a read.

1. Strategic Speed
2. Tactical Speed
3. Massed Artillery
4. Excellent Skirmishing
5. Genius Timing with Reserves


1. The French revolutionary army was poor and consequently unencumbered by a lot of baggage wagons and the like. Moreover, a goodly percentage of its officer corps had been NCO's and were well aware of what their soldiers could do (would not put up with slackers cause they knew all the tricks). Since provisioning & logistics were spotty, they had an army that was strategically unencumbered and had some incentive to move forward for food and supplies taken from the enemy. Napoleon was simply the first Revolution era general to take this to its logical extreme. His army practically ran across Northern Italy and were almost always able to punch the Austrians where they weren't quite ready for it. This advantage faded somewhat as the revolution gave way to the empire, but Napoleon always preferred speed.

2. Tactically, the French often fought in column rather than in line, as had been the tradition. They would, in some cases, punch their columns through the enemy's line while the enemy were still deploying from column to line. Columns give away a lot in firepower, but have a greater speed and shock. Since many actions were decided by the moral shock of an approaching bayonet charge, this gave the French an edge. Very few European opponents had the discipline to stay in line and fire rapidly enough and effectively enough to allow the line's firepower to overmatch the column's mass and impetus. The English are a prime example here, and both Moore and Wellington used this to its fullest.

3. Massed artillery. Napoleon was the first to consistently use "grand batteries" to focus heavy firepower on selected points of the enemy position. Prior to this, the tendency was to spread out the artillery in small batteries supporting each regiment or brigade, save in sieges. Interestingly, in history, most "firepower" weapons have started out as weapons spread out among the infantry as a means of support. Then some person came along, bunched them together, and used this as a means to change warfare and dominate their opponents (massed chariots, persian archers, napoleonic cannon, tanks). Napoleon could often create a weak spot in the enemy line with his heavy batteries of cannon -- and then exploit them.

4. French light troops roamed in front of their columns and harrassed the length of an enemy's line. The goal was to annoy, panic, or fluster whoever they could and thereby slow up effective enemy response to whatever Napoleon was trying. The French were so effective in this effort that the British felt compelled to develop rifle regiments in order to neutralize this annoyance. Such skirmishing would often slow units from a response to Napoleon's attack at the "point of decision."

5. Napoleon's genius was in guestimating exactly when and where the opponent had reached a breaking point. He would, through skirmishing, bombardment, and cavalry recon-in-force encourage the opponent to commit most of his re serves. Then -- with most of their forces commited or delayed by skirmishing -- wherever a fold of ground, a lucky skirmishing effort, or his grand batteries had generated a weakness, he would fling his reserve columns in to crack or turn the enemy line. Even when outnumbered, this approach often brought on a temporary superiority of numbers. Once the line was broken, cavalry and infantry would progressively flank other units and widen and deepen the breach. At this point, most opponents crumble.


Seamus

[Csargo]

I always thought that it was because of his great use of artillery on the field of battle and thats all I can tell you.

[dgfred]

Very good post S F ! . Artillery = 'King' of Battle

[King Henry V]

He was excellent in manoeuvring troops both on and off the battle field. The campaign which led to the Capitulation of Ulm in 1805 was waged with hardly a battle fought.

[Mount Suribachi]

The Revolutionary era French army was also a meritocratic army, in an era where promotions were quite literally bought, or achieved through being related to the King/General. So good young officers weren't left wallowing as Lieutenants whilst richer and/or better connected officers leap-frogged over them.

[Duke Malcolm]

That was like the British Army until 1870, or thereabouts. An officer purchased his cadetship, then purchased promotions right up to general.

[dgfred]

He was excellent in manoeuvring troops both on and off the battle field. The campaign which led to the Capitulation of Ulm in 1805 was waged with hardly a battle fought.

This thread has got me thinking , oh no! What do you guys think
about Napolean having the best scouting/recon/map-reading&making/
engineer types since he always seemed to get 'there' in fine fashion, along
with having the best artillery set up and ready to go in most cases? Always amazing to me the amount of men involved and the
number of artillery/cavalry that were on the battlefield and how they got
'there' .

[Kraxis]

Seamus has clearly pointed out the most important aspects of Napoleon's genius. But one remains. His ability to read the land, tactically.
He knew when and where his troops should do this and that, often centered around important, yet often overlooked aspects of the battlefield.
For instance at Austerlitz he had a single battalion of genadiers hold back an entire division for a serious while in a village, while Napoleon attacks the hills. That battalion could never have performed that achievement in a normal village or in the open. But obviously Napoleon had seen the strength of the position, and thus knew he could draw in the enemy while getting more troops to attack the hills.
Even the late battles after his Russian adventure had him using the ground perfectly, defeatingthe Prussian and Austrian armies, but the lack of cavalry lost him the strategic advantage.

And this wasn't the first time, nor the last.
Whenever he did overlook this or was unavailable for the judgement it became a bloody mess. Just look at Borodino or Waterloo. But in general he was superior to his enemies in this department.

[Grey_Fox]

All the points made by Seamus and Kraxis are good, but he had three major weaknesses. In the first is that he never held a regimental command, and often demanded more off them then they were capable of giving.

His other weakness was that he chronically ignored logistics, especially during the Russian campaign.

The third weakness was that he could delude himself into thinking that things were going better than they really were.

[Marshal Murat]

Napoleon is known for
1.Being able to amass his men at 1 place quickly to face a threat.
2.He is able to blast troops away with artillery, then thrust troops in with cavalry and horse artillery support.

The failure of Napoleon was
The need for local supplies (forage) depended upon a rich country. Soon as you meet someone who is smart enough to burn the crops, your stuck.
Hannibal is a prime example.

He couldn't control the Austrians, Prussians, and numerous others.

[Brenus]

What made Napoleon different?
Personal courage: He took risks to achieve his goals (Arcola, Toulon for example)
Opportunism; Friend of Robespierre brother, he will play on the revolution for promotion, and then will become Emperor. He won’t hesitate to abandon his troops in Egypt when he will judge the situation hopeless.
Luck: In Marengo, he was saved by Desaix (who died during the battle), the only general who could have compete with him, in politic and militarily.
Genius: See Austerlitz
Tactician: he invented the corps d’armee concept.
Administrator: Code Napoleon for the civilian aspect…
Charisma: His troops followed him every where.

Plus, dictator, ruthless, ambitious,.

[Alexanderofmacedon]

Most ambitious man I know (Tied with Alexander the Great )

[Grey_Fox]

What made Napoleon different?
Personal courage: He took risks to achieve his goals (Arcola, Toulon for example)

No different from other generals of his age. Moore was killed in battle, at Talavera 1/4 of Wellington's staff officers became casualties, at Waterloo an artillery ball actually took the leg off his second command when they were having a conversation, Blucher made a cavalry charge at Ligny (and he was in his seventies). At Waterloo, Borodino and Wagram he was nowhere near the fighting.