German Tanks in WW2 - the wrong conception

[Franconicus]

This thread may sound silly to you. German tanks were one of the best in WW2. Panther, Tiger, Tiger2 and many more outclassed their opponents. On the other side I think they were overdesigned. It took too many resources and menhours to build them. They were too susceptible against technical defects.

[IliaDN]

IMO it was just a part of the war competition.
They had to do it just because of the fact they could't breach several tanks armor with their previous armor.
Also they had to improve their tanks armor not to allow enemies breach it to easily.
Sorry if this is too messy.
P.S. E.G. Soviet IS 1 or 2 breached panther's ( if I am not mistaken) from quit a distance.

[econ21]

Yes, I think you have to look at cost-effectiveness. The Sherman, for example, is often looked down upon because tank for tank it was clearly inferior to the Panther. But technically, the Sherman was a pretty decent tank - for example, compared to the lauded T-34. And some writers have assessed it as more cost-effective than the Panther, if you factor in its lower cost of production.

As IllaDIN implies, I suspect our perception of WW2 tanks is rather influenced by the timing of development cycle in each country. Up until 1942, German tanks were not so superior in hardware. But no one noticed much, because they were used so effectively. What people focus on are the Tigers and Panthers rushed out to counter the T-34. In turn, by 1945 the Allied tanks were starting to benefit from the effort to counter the Tigers and Panthers. But it was pretty much all over by the time they (Pershing, Joseph Stalin series etc) came on in numbers.

[English assassin]

As I may have posted before, the unquestionable superiority of the Tiger over, say, the Sherman or T34 is put into some perspective when you realise that about 1400 Tigers were manufactured compared to more than 40,000 each of the Sherman and T34 (including an incredible 21231 Shermans in 1943, compare peak production of the Panther at 3777 in 1944). Even the British managed to make over 8000 of the not-very-good Valentine tank.

Another factor that can be overlooked is that to be any use you have to get a tank to a battlefield in working order. The T34, for instance, was tolerant of poor maintenance and bad conditions, important factors when it was being operated in a Russian spring thaw by troops and mechanics who may never have seen a motorised vehicle before. Both T34 and Sherman were also easier to transport than heavier tanks.

Final observation is that, possibly characteristic of a gangster regime, armoured vehicle design and production was factionalised. Guderian was most frustrated to find, when he was put in charge of overall design and production of all panzers, that this did NOT include SPGs (these being classified as artillery not as Panzers). Contrast this with the Russians efficient standardisation on two chassis only (T34 and KV, laterly used as the chassis for the JS heavy tanks) or the Americans equally efficient use of the M4.

Finally the tactical conception of the tank was different, in the American army at least. Tank-tank combat was primarily to be carried out with tank destroyers, tanks being used to make advances against enemy positions being held with infantry, AT guns and artillery. So, although this concept too was flawed, it would be a fairer comparison to compare an M10 or M36 with the Panther rather than the (clearly profoundly outclassed) Sherman.

[Kraxis]

I wouldn't say that the Germans did wrong in beginning to dabble with heavier tanks. After all the Tiger was a very old project that got up to speed due to the T-34, and the Panther was a direct counter, simply because the Germans had no counter to the T-34.
True the Pz IV was equipped with the long barreled 75mm, and it could thus do something about it, but that kind of tank wasn't available when the either project when ahead.
Also, the Germans knew they culdn't hope to outproduce the Russians when they were geared for war. Thus a slightly inferior tank was not the answer to countering hordes of enemy tanks.

One could argue that Hitler perhaps jumped the projects too much, and forced changes on both Tiger and Panther production. Initially the Panther was not meant to have been heavier than 30 tons (the same with the Tiger), and the 'T-34' version of the Panther (looks uncannily like a T-34) was in fact much lighter than the resulting Panther, but it was felt it was too obvious it was copied from the Russians.

[yesdachi]

I recently saw the show “Top Ten Tanks” on the military channel (I love TV ). The show ranked the Tiger #3 and noted that the tanks biggest weakness was that it was too complex to produce rapidly and in mass. It also noted that the Tiger was the first tank to have 2 way radios in each one. It would have been pretty tough to organize a good blitzkrieg without them.

There was a small part in the Tiger segment were they talk about the Tigers armor and actually show a Tiger that took IIRC 270+ hits from Shermans and wasn’t destroyed. They were definitely over-designed but what great crew survivability (at least against the shermans ).

Link to #3 of the top 10
http://military.discovery.com/conver...deshow_08.html

[Derfasciti]

This thread may sound silly to you. German tanks were one of the best in WW2. Panther, Tiger, Tiger2 and many more outclassed their opponents. On the other side I think they were overdesigned. It took too many resources and menhours to build them. They were too susceptible against technical defects.

You are at least partially right. They did indeed have absolute geniuses working for them. That gave them great tanks. But from what I've heard from discussions on History International channel, the Soviets had much better tanks but were poorly upkept and it's crew poorly trained. How they got those tanks? Search me!

[econ21]

...the Soviets had much better tanks but were poorly upkept and it's crew poorly trained. How they got those tanks? Search me!

Good question. The Russian tanks were not much better with the exception of the T-34[1], based on an American design that the US military rejected. But some Russian general must have had a good eye to pick up the design - clearly Stalin did not kill all the talent in the Red Army in the 1930s purges. Or is there a tragic story to this too?

[1]The KV-1 was also an amazingly powerful tank for the early war period - there's a story about the Germans spending a whole day trying to knock one out when they first encountered it. But it was not produced in the quantities to have the kind of war-affecting impact of the T-34.

[Kraxis]

Good question. The Russian tanks were not much better with the exception of the T-34[1], based on an American design that the US military rejected.

Suspension... The suspension was the part they kept of the Christie tank. The rest they came up with themselves. So it wasn't based on the Christie.

Personally I would say that the Russian designs were better. They were not individually as good as the German ones, but had the Russians had the same doctrine to tank warfare and had the same training and experience I believe we would have seen comparable losses.

[Del Arroyo]

The best thing to fight tanks is tanks. AT artillery doesn't cut it.

I definitely disagree with these statements. AT artillery in WW2 was most certainly an effective counter-measure to tanks and had an important role in the tactical methods of all armies fighting at the time.

The idea of AT artillery is not that one gun or perhaps even two will defeat a high-quality tank, but that if you get enough pieces into a defensive line in concealed positions, and the enemy armor attacks them, they'll at least take out enough enemy tanks to allow friendly armor to finish the job later on.

What's more, AT artillery on many occasions in WW2 was enough to stop tanks cold, decimating their ranks and forcing them to call in support. This was especially true with German AT artillery vs Allied tanks, though even as a German panzer commander I would be very nervous using armor against a prepared, unsoftened defensive line.

Tanks in their proper use are for exploiting enemy weak points and operating in enemy flank and rear areas-- it is the infantry's job to take down strong defensive positions. This is best illustrated by the US Army's tactics during the First Gulf War-- Combat Engineers, supported by Helicopters, took on the Iraqi defensive wall; the tanks drove around and struck at the soft underbelly.

..

The reason that tank-vs.-tank effectiveness is so important is NOT because tanks are the best solution to kill tanks-- they most certainly are not. But if an enemy armored division breaks through your line, or comes around the rear, what else can you hope to counter it with?

And if you use your armor to break through your enemy's line, or come around their flank, what are your tanks most likely to face next?

Hence armor vs. armor.

DA

[Seamus Fermanagh]

I definitely disagree with these statements. AT artillery in WW2 was most certainly an effective counter-measure to tanks and had an important role in the tactical methods of all armies fighting at the time.

The idea of AT artillery is not that one gun or perhaps even two will defeat a high-quality tank, but that if you get enough pieces into a defensive line in concealed positions, and the enemy armor attacks them, they'll at least take out enough enemy tanks to allow friendly armor to finish the job later on.

What's more, AT artillery on many occasions in WW2 was enough to stop tanks cold, decimating their ranks and forcing them to call in support. This was especially true with German AT artillery vs Allied tanks, though even as a German panzer commander I would be very nervous using armor against a prepared, unsoftened defensive line....

The reason that tank-vs.-tank effectiveness is so important is NOT because tanks are the best solution to kill tanks-- they most certainly are not...DA

Del:

To both agree and disagree....

Yes AT guns were effective components of almost all of the defensive efforts in European and African combat in WW2. They produced a significant percentage of all tank kills recorded. So why were they phased out?

Answer = mobility & survivability. Towed AT guns, however powerful, were vulnerable to infantry and standard artillery response. As the war progressed, both the Soviets and the Germans, and to some extent the US/UK shifted to Assault guns because of their mobility and survivability. Towed AT weaponry even ended up being thrown away, as with the Sovs at Kursk, simply to slow an attack down a bit -- no transport provided, just shoot until overrun.

Assault guns, tanks, and tank destroyers were subsequently found to be funtionally interchangeable in practice, so why bother to build several types of AFV, just concentrate on a better battle tank.

AT guns weren't bad as guns, just superceded (though never entirely replaced, I'l admit) in practice.


As to the other artillery fans out there, I have yet to see any compelling sources provided for artillery used in an effective anti-tank role during WW2 unless firing over open sights at fairly close range. HE concussion and light-weight shrapnel do not seem likely to damage any but the lightest of AFV's.

Seamus

[Redleg]

Some have covered it - the use of artillery against tanks.

Some basic information about artillery against tanks.

What many are forgetting is where is the fuel tanks for most armored vechicles? What are the most vulnerable areas of the Tank to artillery fire? What munitions have the most effect on these weakness? Is a mobility kill prior to the battle more important then the physical destruction of the Tank.

For instance - The primary weakness of the T-34 through T-72 was the location of the fuel tanks. An Artillery Plan of attack on these tanks prior to DPICM munitions included a heavy artillery barrage of HE/PD and HE/VT or HE/TI, followed by WP to burn any fuel that should have been caused to leak by the HE. (This actually works more then you might think)

Now for the munitions used during WW2 the mix of shells against armor would of been primarily the HE/PD (High Explosive/point denonating) and HE/TI (HE/Time fuze). What this does is strip any radio anteneas, can cause moblity kills by causing the track to come off of the tank, destroy road wheels which keep the track, damage engines, kill crew, and cause the tanks to shut hatches - which in turn slows them down.

The lucky stray shot for the artillery could destroy the tank if the round was heavy enough to penerate through the top armor and had the angle of fall necessary to insure that peneration. Being that most tanks during that time had less armor protection on the top.

Engine compartments were the most vulernable since they were also normally acessed through the top of tank.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Good question. The Russian tanks were not much better with the exception of the T-34[1], based on an American design that the US military rejected. But some Russian general must have had a good eye to pick up the design - clearly Stalin did not kill all the talent in the Red Army in the 1930s purges. Or is there a tragic story to this too?

But of course there is tragedy, you are speaking of Stalinist Russia! The Soviets were, briefly the leaders in combined arms thinking -- Germany even sent folks there to train and observe -- including Guderian (Stolpi, "Hitler's Panzers East"). The key Ruski was a chap named Tukhachevskiy, who advocated the use of massed armored formations to achieve breakthrough followed by rapid exploitation. He assiduously backed the development and use of the Christie Suspension tanks (BT & T-34 series). His reward?

n Soviet Russia, Thomas G. Mahnken describes the military's attitude towards tanks as "largely unencumbered by tradition". In fact while British commanders originally felt the need to separate tanks from infantry to preserve roles, Russian commanders viewed the tank within a combined arms context. As Mahnken describes, "a future battle would unfold in two phases. The first would consist of a massed, echeloned attack along a narrow front by mechanized divisions operating in conjunction with infantry, artillery, and aviation. Once through the front lines, this force would attempt to convert the tactical breakthrough into an operation success by penetrating into the enemy's rear areas, disrupting his command and control, and destroying his reserves." This description should seem hauntingly familiar, having heard the German concept of blitzkrieg. Unfortunately for the Soviets, Stalin was a major proponent of the cavalry and sought to protect that ancient tradition from encroachment. On June 12, 1937, Stalin executed Mikhail N. Tukhachevskiy and several other commanders who were at the forefront of combined arms advocacy.

Soviet Russia disbanded its large armored formations in 38 and 39, only going back to them in late 40 and early 41 when German success indicated that Tukhachevskiy had been right all along. Had he not gotten whacked, the Germans may not have been the ones launching an assault in 1941.

Seamus