Second Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945

[Turin]

Well for those of you who know only a little about this not so well know war. it was fought between the Imperial Japanese and both the Nationalist and Communist Chinese.

Before I get started I have to refute a few myths:

1. The Japanese were not better equipped than the Chinese. At the wars onset, the Nationalist forces were equipped mostly with German weaponry and equipment including armored vehicles. 3 divisions were trained entirely by German officers. On paper is was the best and biggest army in the Far East. When the British and the Americans entered the war, the Nationalists were constantly supplied with Allied weaponry and equipment.

2. The Japanese never intended to conquer all of China. They knew that such a plan was impossible to achieve and even more so to maintain. Indefinite occupation was out of the question entirely.

So why did the Chinese lose so badly? Despite all their on paper advantages: equipment, manpower, terrain, and the preoccupation of the enemy in the Pacific, the Chinese were never able to take a single city back from the Japanese on any occasion.

I mention this because such a war is uncommon to say the least.

One cannot simply brush it off by saying the Chinese are naturally bad at war because only 5 years later the Communist Chinese would drive the most advanced army in the world on the longest land retreat in American military.

[Turin]

Actually, by 1943, the situation in the air had changed. From the beginning the Chinese air force had been avoiding confrontation with the Japanese. They engaged only when the odds strongly favored them.

One example is during the air raids against Nanking where the Chinese circled above the Japanese fighters bombers while they pounded the city. Only then did they dive down to engage planes that were already low on fuel and ammunition.

By 1943, Allied airfields and the preoccupation of Japanese air power in the Pacific allowed the Chinese an open air window.

As for tactics, the Japanese infantry tactics were atrocious. Most officers were still partial to old school Prussian tactics of mass infantry charges.

As for morale, how poor can the morale of an army that is defending it's own soil be?

The situation in this case is much like that of the Russians in WWII. Yet the Russians were quick to go on the counteroffensive, while the Chinese never tried it seems.

[Del Arroyo]

My instinct would be this-- given a situation where you had two armies, equipped rougly equally, using roughly the same (human wave) tactics, the fiercer, more determined, better organized army will win. Thus, the Japanese beat the Chinese.

But when the Japanese faced the Americans they got slaughtered, not primarily because of inferior equipment, but rather due to their very very poor tactics. If the Americans had been equipped like the Chinese, the Japanese would have had some chance, but this was simply not the case. Thus the embarrassingly one-sided nature of nearly all engagements between US and Japanese forces.

DA

[nokhor]

i think the vision thing was a huge factor. except for the commanders with special access to outside supplies like the whampoa clique, most chinese divisions were underquipped peasent conscripts from former warlord forces. the KMT was still using the age old tactic of tying the consripts together in a line during a battle so they wouldn't run away. the japanese had the racial superiority ideology thing going, the communists had the universalist ideology thing going and the KMT was too fractured and was hamstrung by its own internal divisions to be capable of any effective resistance. and i don't think chiang was a bad commander, far from it; but not even sun tzu could have managed a victory with the mess that was the Nationalist forces.

[Kraxis]

The Japanese human wave tactics were actually very good in the environment they chose, the jungle and forests. There it is hard to get support weapons to work properly.
Need I say Malaya and Singapore? Or even the Phillippines.
In both cases the enemies were perhaps not superbly armed, but they were in general better equipped than their Japanese opponents.

New Guinea was also a good case where the Japanese ran out of supplies and troops really. They didn't lose because the tactics were bad per se there.

In the open of the hills of Guadalcanal and Bougainville it was costly and not a good choice. The same can be said of the flattened atolls.

[Turin]

But the Chinese had numbers and "home field" advantage right?

The reason why I ask is that recently I was reading over a book that told the war from the better documented Japanese perspective.

The Japanese never dreamed that they would have the level of success they did in China. They were pushed to go farther West only as each successive victory came more easily than they had imagined.

Even the Japanese overestimated the Chinese it would seem.

But then how was it that such a poor military could drive back the US Army, Marines and UN forces just 5 years later with even more inferior weaponry?

IMHO this is one of the most radical turn-arounds in world history. And it really gives insight to the age old question of what determines military strength. From the Chinese experiment it would seem that equipment has little to do with it.

[Mouzafphaerre]

.

But then how was it that such a poor military could drive back the US Army, Marines and UN forces just 5 years later with even more inferior weaponry?

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

СССР.

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[Samurai Waki]

Between Operation Zet and the largely inneffective Pitman Act...China had weapons and Ammunition trickling in Constantly, this furthered by the Burma Road that supplied British Weapons to Kunming by 1944 giving the Chinese further help. Actually come to think of it, Japan and Germanies confrontation with their larger, more populous, yet inferior neighbors both end quite similarly, with the exception that China never conquered anything beyond its original borders. Also, American intervention by 1942-5 drew most of Japans attention away from China.

As far as Japanese Tactics, the Banzai Charge was actually considered quite fearsome and effective. Japanese small arm tactics weren't in any way inferior to their American and British counterparts, however their handling of the "bigger picture" of the war was atrocious, as they had constant trouble maintaing their supplie lines. By 1944 all of their supply lines had come to an almost complete halt due to Allied Warships destroying 95% of their supply line capacity.

As for those of you who think that every engagement the US fought against the Japanese was a cake walk, talk to a Marine that fought at Guadal Canal, Iwo Jima, Saipan, Tarawa, Okinawa or any other Major Engagement against the Japanese in WW2, and they will tell you that the Japanese were very efficient and cohersive fighting force...and on more than one occassion sent American troops(including Marines) to flee for their lives.

[Derfasciti]

I believed they lost due to China's natural division. Although I could be wrong. I don't know much about the war.

[Kraxis]

The Chinese soldiers didn't have much in sense of a national feeling. Imagine being sent from the borders of Vietnam to near Nanking, and being an uneducated peasant with a rifle. Would you feel that much as home? You couldn't talk to the locals, and you couldn't write with them either. It would be totally foreign to you.

The Banzai charge was good at times, but most often it was just scary, and something that hastened the fall of the given island, in more actual battles it was at it's best, and at Tarawa it nearly broke through. But as a tactic it was costly and not good for an isolated garrison.

The Japanese tried to adapt, by for instance only guarding a section of an island (failed miserably) or creating operational reserves (failed due to US aircover). The only tactic they developed that seemed to have an impact on the American drive (with superior weapons and numbers) was the infiltration. If the Americans took a like of bunkers or manholes, the Japanese would infiltrate and reoccupy those positions. Staying silent for days perhaps until finally opening fire on unsuspecting patrols or convoys.

It was a pain to continually go back and refight battles, and obviously a drain on morale as the soldiers would think the generals had let the enemy retake the positons without a fight (a la Hamburger Hill in Vietnam).

[Del Arroyo]

As for those of you who think that every engagement the US fought against the Japanese was a cake walk, talk to a Marine that fought at Guadal Canal, Iwo Jima, Saipan, Tarawa, Okinawa or any other Major Engagement against the Japanese in WW2, and they will tell you that the Japanese were very efficient and cohersive fighting force...and on more than one occassion sent American troops(including Marines) to flee for their lives.

Guadalcanal? What about the battle of [such-and-such] creek? 800 Marines vs. 900 Japanese, 30 dead Marines vs. 500 dead Japanese. Or the two battles of Bloody Ridge? Both of them were 500-800 Marines vs. 3000-4000 Japanese, and both ended the same way-- less than 100 dead marines, and over 2000 dead Japanese.

I'm not saying that fighting the Japanese was easy or fun, but they did tend to lose, HARD, in situations where you HAVE to think they could have done better.

DA

P.S.: Even on Iwojima, which was very bloody and very difficult for US troops, the Japanese lost four times as many men.

[nokhor]

i believe that the chinese success in pushing back the american forces had more to do with american logistical weakness than chinese tactical success. historically it has been much easier to supply a large army from china moving southwards through korea, than to supply a large army from japan moving northward through korea. there is a great operational similarity between the japanese invasions of korea under hideyoshi, and the american war in korea under mcarthur. so i don't think it's a case of the chinese turning things around rapidly from wwii to korea, but rather a case of the logisitical difficulties of moving northward through korean and then meeting a massive chinese counterattack at the end of your logistical rope.

and in fact for the chinese communists, the korean war was a win-win situation. the reason for the massive desertions and lackluster performance by the rank and file chinese infantry man in korea, was because a lot of those guys had only a couple of years before been fighting for the nationalist side in the civil war. so the communists were using their recent internal enemies to fight their external enemies.

[Turin]

Going to the hypothetical now:

Let's say that we keep this entirely conventional, no NBC (nuclear biological chemical).

If Japan had 10 years to rearm itself and China continued on the same course of military development that it is on now (that is with massive foreign purchases and little domestic development), could the Japanese, at the end of this 10 year period achieve the same level of success against China that they did in 1937?

What if they had 20 years to prepare?

[Del Arroyo]

Yet even then, the Japs could afford such losses. The policy was to wear down the U.S. morale and come to a negotiated peace.

Yet the fact is that really, they couldn't. By the end of the war all their good soldiers were dead.

[Kraxis]

Guadalcanal? What about the battle of [such-and-such] creek? 800 Marines vs. 900 Japanese, 30 dead Marines vs. 500 dead Japanese. Or the two battles of Bloody Ridge? Both of them were 500-800 Marines vs. 3000-4000 Japanese, and both ended the same way-- less than 100 dead marines, and over 2000 dead Japanese.

I'm not saying that fighting the Japanese was easy or fun, but they did tend to lose, HARD, in situations where you HAVE to think they could have done better.

DA

P.S.: Even on Iwojima, which was very bloody and very difficult for US troops, the Japanese lost four times as many men.

You forget the power of artillery. It and it alone caused the majority of losses in WWII. Japan was notorious for its lack of reliance on the big guns (unless they were mounted on ships), but rather relied on getting up close and personal, a very effective tactic in dense forests such as jungles or in fog/night/whatever. When they were caught in the open, they suffered appropriate losses to that. The attacks on Henderson Field (early in the campaign) ended up with disaster because the attacks were broken up by artillery sent down on them in predared open terrain. That had more to do with their officers not understanding a difference in surroundings. The Japanese soldiers themselves were perfectly capable of seeking cover and advancing correctly in open terrain, but the officers didn't utilize this and relied on speed and ferocity, something that is not good in open terrain.

Besides, total losses, killed and serious wounded, were in favour of the Japanese on Tarawa, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. The Japanese didn't have much 'choice' really, do or die. In those events it turned out to be die, while American forces could 'just' be fed into it and have their wounded shipped out. But had it been more open with a chance to withdraw the Japanese wouldn't have suffered the same catastrophic losses.
One should never forget that overwhelming airpower, seapower and artillery can do a lot. The guy without this can't move freely and thus can't respond properly on in time to serious attacks (very serious in small islands). Local forces have to make do. Thus not only were American forces superior in numbers, but could also be very superior in local attacks.

Remember that the human wave attacks worked wonders in the early war against western forces that were perhaps not superbly armed but still heavier than the Japanese. Allied losses were significantly higher (not counting captured).

[Turin]

Japanese strategy and tactics remind me of those used by the typical RTS player: aggressive, aggressive, overly aggressive. Looking through Japanese history one can see that they have always favored the offensive to the defensive.

In Chinese history the opposite is true as evidenced by the Chinese habit of building walls,walls and even more walls.

Perhaps this had something to do with it. I read accounts that as early as 1938 the Chinese were offered golden opportunities to counterattack as the Japanese advance on Hankow was slowed by a stiff and wide Chinese defensive line. But Chiang refused to even consider such a move and refused to reinforce the line. In less than a month, Hankow had fallen. Even the Japanese feared defeat as they knew the march on Hankow would be difficult. The initial resistance they encountered was far greater than their estimates. Had Chiang followed the advice of his German and American consultants, he could have turned the tide right there and then.

Perhaps it is strategically where one must be aggressive, but tactically cautious?

[Papewaio]

Chinese historians place the start of the war at 1931 at the Manchurian incident.

The main reason the Japanese did so well was they had a better technology base, better troops and they were attacking a fractured enemy.

Wiki is not the best but it has a nice summary

Compared to Japan, China was unprepared for war and had little military industrial strength, few mechanized divisions, and virtually no armor support. Up until the mid 1930s China had hoped that the League of Nations would provide countermeasures to Japan's aggression. In addition, the Kuomintang government was mired in an internal war against the Communists. All these disadvantages forced China to adopt a strategy whose first goal was to preserve its army strength, whereas a full frontal assault on the enemy would often prove to be suicidal. Also, pockets of resistance were to be continued in occupied areas to pester the enemy and make their administration over the vast lands of China difficult.

...

At the commencement of the Chinese-Japanese War the Japanese Army comprised 17 divisions, each composed of approximately 22,000 men, 5,800 horses, 9,500 rifles and sub machine guns, 600 heavy machine guns of assorted types, 108 artillery pieces, and 24 tanks. Special forces were also available. The Japanese Navy displaced a total of 1,900,000 tonnes, ranking third in the world, and possessed 2,700 aircraft at the time. Each Japanese division was the equivalent in fighting strength of three Chinese regular divisions.

The Chinese forces possessed 80 Army infantry divisions, nine independent brigades, nine cavalry divisions, two artillery brigades, 16 artillery regiments and one or two armored divisions. The Chinese Navy displaced only 59,000 tonnes and the Chinese Air Force comprised only 600 aircraft. In spite of significant deficiences in technology and industrial capacity, especially in air and naval power, China had a size advantage: its territory was 31 times larger than Japan and it had a population five times that of Japan.

Although Japan possessed significant mobile operational capacity it did not possess capability for maintaining a long sustained war. As a result, Japan adopted a strategy of rapid warfare and conquest. In the first three months the Japanese were successful at making rapid gains in what was dubbed the "China Incident". At this point the Chinese adopted a defensive strategy aimed at weakening Japanese warmaking capabilities. The Chinese goal was to degrade Japanese military strength before resuming an offensive.

Nowadays China has a population now ten times that of Japan. Also while Japans population is ageing, so China has the ability to field a lot more bodies on the ground. Also the technology difference is not as extreme.

Nor would one expect that the Japanese could expect over half their invading army to be supplied by Chinese. In the second Sino-Japanese war there was 2 million Japanese plus 2.1 million allied Chinese.