Zitadelle

[Franconicus]

We learned a lot about operation Zitadelle and with Kraxis' help we were even able to win for the German side.

The more I learn about the historical battle the more i wonder why the Germans started it.

It was clear that the Russians were prepared. They had collected everything they could. And the whole area was a big fortress.

So attacking Kusk was not only silly it was completely against the German military doctrine: Never use your tank formations against strong defense. Attack soft points and the rush behind the enemies defense.

So why did the German attack here. They had the innitiative and several options:
- Not attacking at all (Guderians option)
- attacking somewhere else (maybe crossing the Donez at Charkow)

How risky the plan was becomes clear when you look at the armies which where not involved in Zitadelle.2nd TankArmy had only two Tank Divisions (kind of reserve for the army group) with 200 tanks. 2nd army had only 200 assault tanks.... .

So it was obvious that the whole front would collapse if Zitadelle failed.

So how could excellent generals like Manstein, Model, Kluge execute such a failed strategy. Why didn't they explain Hitler that he could attack everywhere else?

[MoROmeTe]

Because of Hitler's "genius" that wanted to keep the initiative in the East and also gain a significant tactical victory by taking out a large number of Russian armies, presumably through an encirclement...

[Pericles]

Hitler (the corporal) figured he knew better than anyone else (ie ALL his generals).

He then suffered from a brain fart...

The rest is history...

[Kagemusha]

Yep.It was Hitlers grand idea.Like the brave fight to a last man in Stalingrad,while his Field Marshalls urged him that the troops should break out.
This is what you get when Corporals start to lead Armies.

[Kraxis]

Manstein was somewhat of a fish in this case. First he urged the battle to go ahead prior to May, but afterwards he protected the offensive and was oddly silent when Guderian and others objected to it's continual postponement (he didn't like Guderian much so that might be a factor).

It seems pride got the better of him here, he actually believed he could pull it off, which is clear when he complained when the offensive was called off.

Manstein was not a perfect man, his pride cost Germany dear a few times, and his lack of willingness to oppose Hitler was also bad. He never gave Paulus the order to break out, eventhough he could have done so, forcing him to do it (taking the responseability from Paulus, freeing his hands). And in this case he never pressed hard enough to get going early...
He wasn't afraid of Hitler, but it seems he had too much Prussian pride (an officer does not question his superior).

Model was too low ranking at the time, his thoughts didn't carry weight, besides he never really thought about strategic concerns, only the tactical ones (which is why the true strategy of elastic defense was never fully implemented, only on tactical levels).

Kluge was afraid of Hitler if I'm not mistaken, and preferred to stay as far away from him as possible, that means the front. When he was there he did at time talk back but in general kept a low profile.

So, the one that did talk back to Hitler most didn't care and was too low key, the one that would talk back and had the strength to do it didn't out of honour and the one that didn't suffer from honour didn't dare talk back.

Hitler and Zeitzler had a free reign here.

[Rodion Romanovich]

I think that the fact that Germany was losing on all other fronts made them want to try a desperate breakthrough operation.

Manstein probably first suggested it an offensive on the Kursk area at the time of Soviet operations Uranus and Saturnus, in a combination with a quick withdrawal of Kleist from the Caucasus. Then Kleist could hold the southern Volga area, while Manstein could send many troops north and achieve much by a quick counter-attack against the - probably - weakest part of the USSR front - far south of the Moscow area offensive and just north of the Stalingrad area offensive. But Kleist's slow withdrawal meant Manstein almost lacked the basic strength needed for holding the line and slowing down the Soviet offensive towards Caucasus, and much time and German resources were wasted while awaiting Kleist, whose defeat in the Caucasus was inevitable at the time. Manstein had big problems even restoring the front.

I think that when he saw how the slow withdrawal of Kleist's group, and the German losses it had led to, he realized the Germans lacked the needed strength for any decisive counter-offensive and abandoned the idea. Actually the decision to not withdraw Kleist quickly from the Caucasus was just as much as Stalingrad an important part of the turning-point on the eastern front. It's possible that a quick withdrawal from the Caucasus and a counter-offensive in the Kursk area could have successfully given back the Germans the initiative, but that was, realistically speaking, the last chance they ever had of turning the war. Manstein eventually recieved reinforcements from the south and did a quite good job of reestablishing the German frontline in a clash near Kharkov, but as mentioned it was too late for a shock offensive on Kursk. But even though Manstein's plan was by that time no longer useful, there was no better plan to choose instead. The Germans were already at a strong strategical disadvantage on the eastern front, and were steadily losing on all other fronts. Their last chance, if they had any at all, lied in through brilliant manouvres winning a great victory on the eastern front. Eventually just the dogmatic belief of a last chance there probably got the better of them. So, Franconius, I disagree to that the Germans would have had the initiative and good alternatives. They were barely holding the frontline anywhere along the eastern front when it came, but the Soviets knew it would come and therefore halted their advance and prepared defenses, while using the time only for minor offensives even though they could have pushed forward continuosly. This way, they could get a decisive clash that destroyed enough German troops and equipment to make continued advance much safer and easier.

On a side note, it's actually quite ironical that the operation was called Zitadelle, citadel, as it was like a Medieval storming a citadel, with huge casualties for the attackers, and very little chance of breaking through, as if they had known what the outcome would be.

[Mouzafphaerre]

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Model?



Mödl?
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[Brenus]

Operation Zitadelle, or Citadel was launch for several reasons. New researches, with access to the Russian Archives give one which seems a good one.
Political reason: Hitler and Stalin had started talks for a separated peace, but Stalin demands were too big (withdrawal to the borders of 1939 (including Poland). Hitler wanted a victory to show the Russians than the German Army was still able to win battles.
Tactical: Hitler and his general wanted to regain the initiative after a series of defeats and withdrawals…
Strategy: The Red Army was becoming stronger on daily basis. Hitler thought he could defeat them (like he did with the French) before the full capacity and new weapons could be deployed)

However, the German plan was too obvious (good old blitzkrieg again) and the fact that the Russian had a spy within Hitler’s HQ help them.
But, the German hadn’t the air superiority like before; the Russian troops were training, well equipped and ready. They won several battles before and knew what to expect…
It was a gamble to take back the initiative. But it failed.

[discovery1]

Any reason backhand blow wasn't implimented, aside from Hitler's odd need to hold captured ground(fool). What were his arguements for doing so, btw?

[Kraxis]

He wasn't too sure that Manstein had in fact tought the entire Kharkov event up himself but had been lucky. He wouldn't like to risk another collapse. Also giving up ground on a major scale could turn his allies against him, certainly not needed. Or at least this was what he thought.

The truth is that the backhand blow would likely have been the best chance of victory. It would have been a battle of maneuver which the Germans were still much better at than the Russians (individual soldier's training more important here) and there was a lot of land to be used. It would basically use the expanses of Russia against her. Trade land for losses, it could have worn the Russians down. But such victories would never be enough to force a settlement, Germany would have been on the defensive and percieved as the weaker. An offensive battle would be needed for any such case.

[Rodion Romanovich]

For a not native English, what does the term "backhand blow" mean?

[Kraxis]

For a not native English, what does the term "backhand blow" mean?

When you slap a person on the cheek with you hand it is a forehand blow, the backhand blow is when you use the back of your hand in a similar fashion. It is usually regarded as an insult and it is also somewhat harder due to the knuckles, often breaking the skin of the target.

[Rodion Romanovich]

When you slap a person on the cheek with you hand it is a forehand blow, the backhand blow is when you use the back of your hand in a similar fashion. It is usually regarded as an insult and it is also somewhat harder due to the knuckles, often breaking the skin of the target.

Ok... but what is backhand blow in a war?

[Franconicus]

It is pretty much what the Russians did. Let the enemy attack, wait until his forces are exhausted and his supply is tight, then attack him.

It would have had some big advantages. First of all the German would ahve been able to choose when and where the decisive battle would take place. Then, it would have been a battle on open ground, so the Soviets would not have been able to use their ATGs and heavy artillery that effective. In an open battle the German tanks would have been superior to the Russians. Look how many German tanks were destroit by mines or artillery at Kursk!

[Kraxis]

No the Russians did a Parry and then a Forehand Blow.

A Backhand Blow is to let the enemy attack, then cut him off or at least maul his attacking forces when they are far from their reserves and supplies, like Manstein did in his counteroffensive.

[Rodion Romanovich]

Aha, then I must agree. Definitely the best way to go in 1943. I never read the entire "Manstein's woes", I saw the thread too late to be part of it and so only skimmed it now afterwards (pity, it would have been interesting to take part in - maybe I'll try the next Interactive history ), but I assume the backhand blow is how you did it?

Edit: 1943, not 1942...

[Kraxis]

I gave the option, but the choice was for the Forehand, like the one in real history, but this one was advanced about two and half months.

[Geoffrey S]

Hindsight, eh?

[Rodion Romanovich]

I gave the option, but the choice was for the Forehand, like the one in real history, but this one was advanced about two and half months.

Ok. Btw, my first association when hearing "backhand" was tennis, and now there's "forehand" too

[Kraxis]

Ok. Btw, my first association when hearing "backhand" was tennis, and now there's "forehand" too

Well, just apply that to the human hand and you have got a backhand.
I doubt there is a true 'backhand' strategy, it was just nicknamed the 'Backhand Blow'. But perhaps it is truly fitting enough, I mean a double encirclement is still called a 'Cannae'.

And Geoffrey, the Backhand was indeed favoured by a minority (they even tried applying it later, several times ), but to be honest the Russians were not strong enough for an offensive in the middle of April, they were still recovering from Manstein's counteroffensive. So an early Forehand was the correct choice in that regard, at least if victory was to come soon, beside it would be more complete than the Backhand in destroying and capturing many more troops.

[Brenus]

“they were still recovering from Manstein's counteroffensive”. True, but this was after a series of Russian victories from November 1942. Manstein succeeded to stop the Russian offensive. However, the Germans and allies lost the 6th and a great part of the 2nd German Army, the 8th Italian Army, the 2nd Hungarian army and the 3rd and 4th Rumanian Armies., total of 185 000 Italians, 140 000 Hungarians, 250 000 Rumanians. The figures for the German Army is from a report from the 1st of March 1943; it shows that the Werchmacht had a deficit on the Eastern front around 470 000 men.
The Russians were able to recover their losses. Not the Germans