waterloo

[Incongruous]

What is a general without soldiers? A loon
What is a general without staff? A madman
Was Napoleon incapable of commanding without his officer? Of course he was, just like any other commander.
But to say that he left it to all his divisionals and Marshals is insane, he was a great general. Unfortunatley what had swept Europe a few years before was no longer intuative and new, it had been proven in spain that French coloumns fell before British bayonets and volleys, he was no longer the great commander he was. Yet still capable of brilliance, he could have won at Waterloo if he had sent the Guard in earlier or at leats thats what I think.

[matteus the inbred]

some of the Marshals (Lannes, Davout, Massena, arguably Suchet) were almost as talented as Napoleon, but none of these were available at Waterloo. some of the Marshals were simply not up to the job, and had gotten lucky, but then war is largely luck anyway, and Napoleon always recognised this. he might have been facing generals who knew how to fight him, but Blucher still left all his men at Ligny positioned on the forward slope, thus exposing them to French artillery and got badly beaten for his troubles. Wellington was the exception rather than the rule.

Bopa the Magyar, i suspect if Napoleon had sent the Guard up earlier they'd have got shot down earlier, but who knows! the Guard were usually a last resort, and he was also using elements of them to keep the Prussians off his right flank. had he attempted to outflank the Allied force and push it from its position, he'd have won.

[Grey_Fox]

had he attempted to outflank the Allied force and push it from its position, he'd have won.

Not necessarily. Napoleon couldn't have outflanked the British Left at Mont St. Jean because that would have put his army between the Prussians and the British. He couldn't have outflanked the British right because the only way to do so was guarded by 17,000 prime troops at Nivelles (I believe that is the name of the crossroads). Wellington (and the whole of the British army for that matter) expected something cleverer than he got on the 18th of June.

What Napoleon should have done was concentrate on beating the British army at Quatre Bras. This would have forced the British to fall back on their lines of communication to the coast. Then and only then should he have attacked the Prussians.

By attacking the Prussians first Napoleon allowed the British to fall back on their own accord, and by giving the Prussians a 12-hour head start before sending Grouchy he allowed the British and Prussians armies to meet up.

Then there is the whole farce of D'Erlon's corps during the battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras, which spent the entire day marching from Napoleon to Ney and back again without fighting in either battle.

[matteus the inbred]

bang on the money Grey Fox, i'd forgotten about the troops at Nivelles (or Hal?)

although i think it was D'Erlon's corps that got an impromptu route march instead of a battle. Davout was back in Paris running the Ministry of War...and i doubt such a competent soldier as Davout would have allowed himself to be shuttled between two critical battlefields like that!
maybe Napoleon should have kept Grouchy's force closer at hand on the right, and used it to counter the Prussian advance? still, in sending it to tail the retreating Prussians he was only following standard practice, unfortunately he sent it the wrong way. Grouchy did engage the Prussian rearguard at Wavre, and then extricated his force very skillfully, but it was too late to salvage his reputation.

[Grey_Fox]

Ah yes, it was D'Erlon, not Davout, thanks for the correction

Can't remember the name of the crossroads, it could have been Hal but I'm not too sure. Always was terrible at placenames

People can blame rain, Grouchy, or his piles (for the love of God) but the main reasons for Napoleon's loss at Waterloo were mistakes he made both before and during the battle.

[matteus the inbred]

Can't remember the name of the crossroads, it could have been Hal but I'm not too sure. Always was terrible at placenames

god knows, it's all Belgian to me! better go check the map again.

yep, as we all know, mistakes tend to lose you battles sooner or later (in my case pretty much immediately...)! Napoleon had by the end of his life blamed almost everything possible for his defeat except himself. he had a poor day tactically and allowed the strategic initiative he had won to slip away amid the mud.

it's a fascinating campaign to study though, full of what-might-have beens (aren't they all), such as; what if Gneisenau had persuaded the Blucher to withdraw?

[econ21]

Did Napoleon lose or Wellington and Blucher win it? Napoleon certainly did not fight a very smart battle - he came on in the old fashion and was driven off in the old fashion, as Wellington said. But the odds were against him on the day. Try most wargames of the battle and it should be apparent. He did not outnumber Wellington by much and Wellington was in a fairly strong defensive position. I'm not sure about InsaneApache's claim about Napoleon's army outnumbering the enemy even when it routed - if you add Blucher's troops to Wellington's, I think there was a clear advantage to the allies.

Plus Wellington fought a pretty good defensive battle. The breaking of D'Erlon's assault and the defeat of the Guard were almost as nicely done as the French cavalry assaults were badly done. The fact is that Wellington had a pretty impressive record of defeating the French. Wellington had developed a tactical system and an army that could regularly defeat the Napoleonic style of attack. At Waterloo, the French showed none of the innovation or inspiration they would have needed to overturn that record.

Blucher, of course, did his part admirably. Whipping on his army to launch an attack on Napoleon was brave, loyal and very aggressive. I am pretty sure the Iron Duke - and perhaps even Napoleon himself - would not have done as well in his position. The ordinary Allied and Prussian soldiers also fought doggedly, while the French army rather unaccountably dissolved in adversity.