waterloo

[English assassin]

'The latest and most highly developed attempt to put wargames on TV was Channel 4's series 'Game of War', which was broadcast in August 1997

That was it. Was it really 9 years ago, that's very scary I thought it was about a year ago.

[Templar Knight]

Nusbacher was good in TC, throwing blocks around

[matteus the inbred]

That was it. Was it really 9 years ago, that's very scary I thought it was about a year ago.

doesn't time fly when you have Total War!

Nusbacher was good in TC, throwing blocks around

yeah, always reminded me of the operations room in Battle of Britain...!

[Grey_Fox]

...or, as General Cambronne probably didn't say at the end of the battle of Waterloo upon being asked to surrender, 'merde'.

Actually, the legend has it that Cambronne said 'The Old Guard dies, but never surrenders'. What he really said was 'merde'. Either way, he still surrendered.

[King Kurt]

really? brilliant!

Yes - sadly it wasn't ancient warfare. In fact it was present day warfare. My combined artillery/ airpower tactics just blew him away. The spooky thing was the tactics were the same as the Americans used to invade Kuwait in the first Gulf War - a conflict that Mark covered for the BBC. It was really strange watching him on the TV talking about the very tactics I had used to beat him years before.

[Spino]

This topic has been covered quite extensively here in the Monastery over the last few years but if I had to pick one single factor that contributed to the French loss at Waterloo it would have to be Napoleon's appointment of Marshal Ney as the commander of the Left Wing of L'Armee du Nord. Napoleon may have not brought his 'A' game to Waterloo but the massive bungling of one of his two main subordinates put the French in such a hole that only a miracle could have granted them a victory that day.

To Ney's credit he was fearless, aggressive, tenacious and an inspirational leader. To his discredit he was tactically unimaginative, barely competent in strategic matters and was seemingly incapable of effectively commanding a force greater than 10,000 men (a point I believe Napoleon made in his memoirs). Ney's lackluster performance during the campaigns of 1813/1814, especially his awful performance when granted independent command of the Army of Berlin in 1813, should have been all the proof Napoleon needed to severely limit his role and put him on a tight leash during the Waterloo campaign.

Beyond the battle of Waterloo the biggest 'what if?' of the 100 Days campaign is what would have happened had Napoleon taken the main body of L'Armee du Nord and chased Blucher instead of Wellington after the Prussian defeat at Ligny. For all his strengths Wellington was not nearly as aggressive as Blucher and possessed none of the hatred of the French his Prussian ally was so famous for. Furthermore the disposition of the British Army during the Waterloo campaign, from Wellington's prosecution of the battle of Quatre Bras to his apparent lack of support for the Prussian position afterwards, seems to imply a great deal of emphasis on self preservation instead of teamwork. I firmly believe that had Blucher and Wellington's roles been reversed at Waterloo the latter would have made only a half hearted attempt to assist his ally and at the slightest hint of a Prussian defeat would have beat a strategic withdrawal to the Belgium coast. I simply cannot envision Wellington moving heaven and earth to get at Napoleon's jugular as Blucher did at Waterloo.

[Franconicus]

The whole campaign of Napoleon was quiet desperate. He had collected his old burned out veterans and inexperienced youngsters. His army was not well trained. His staff has past its top and N himself was not at a very good condition.

N had to start a fight. He had to win before the joined forces of Russia, Austria and Prussia would appear. Even then he had little chance to win.

The Allied forces were not much better. Wellington had some elite phalanx (or musketeers ) but most of his soldiers were low quality.

Wellington's army was good in defense and so was their commander. Blücher's army was good in offensive and so was Blücher, too.

Both leaders promised to help each other in case Napoleon attacks.

N's plan was simple and good: Attack Blücher before he can join Wellington! At the battle of Ligny he could beat the Prussians. Wellington did not come in time. If N had attacked Wellington instead, Blücher had been faster to help Wellington probably.

So the Prussians had to run and N could turn to Wellington. Now something happened that was not according to the plan. Blücher did not retreat to his base in the east. He turned and tried to reach W. Weather helped him.

The battle of Waterloo (or Belle Alliance) was not Napoleon’s masterpiece. But it is funny: if you read the comments you see that Napoleon and his generals made one mistake after the other while Wellington choose a brilliant defensive position. However if you look at the numbers losses at both sides were equal. It is always good to write comments after the battle.

In the afternoon Wellington’s troops were exhausted and Napoleon was about to win. The attack of the Prussians changed the battle.

So there are many factors for the defeat: Napoleon’s weakness, the rain, Wellington’s stableness …. But the most important factor was Blücher’s maneuver and his will to beat Napoleon after the defeat at Ligny.

But this interpretation may be a bit German.

[econ21]

I remember the TV wargame of the Waterloo and was profoundly unconvinced by the victorious French grand tactics. The French team, led by a prominent British extremely senior ex-general, basically threw everything - including the Guard - against the ground between Hougomont and La Haye Sainte. Maybe that would have won on the principle of overwhelming force, but if you have wargamed Waterloo that ground is arguably the strongest part of the British line (it is also the ground the Imperial Guard broke against in the real battle). Hougomont and La Haye Sainte provide obstacles from which the allies could have enfiladed the French assault from both sides. The section of the line was held by the British Guard amongst others and they were backed by virtually all Wellington's reserves (he expected Napoleon to turn his right). The TV program had a very simplistic combat resolution system. In a boardgame such as SPI's Wellington's Victory, such grand tactics would not necessarily have led to victory. I confess I have an English scepticism of the ability of French Napoleonic infantry to break redcoats in a simple frontal assault. I think they would have had to do something pretty clever with combined arms to prevail and they seldom - never? - pulled such a thing off in Spain.

Also, the Allied team messed up. IIRC, they got Wellington trapped in a square, out of touch with his reserves and unable to influence the battle. By contrast, in the real battle, the accounts I have read (admittedly perhaps biased by Wellington's own writings), put him at the critical spot most times of the day - directing the artillery that shelled Bauduin's assault on Hougomont, directing the charge of the heavy cavalry, at the defeat of the Guard etc. One account I read said the only time in the battle Wellington was wrongfooted was at the fall of La Haye Saint (of course, he was wrongfooted several times in the campaign that led up to the battle).

[English assassin]

Well remembered SA. My memory was hazier, but I did recall thinking that the French had the advantage of knowing the battle had to be won quickly as Blucher would arrive around 4 pm, which Napoleon himself did not know.

Its the point made above I suppose, that you either have to have rules forcing you to make more or less the mistakes that were made historically, or you have to accept you aren't really "refighting" the battle because both sides apply the wisdom of hindsight.

[Grey_Fox]

[QUOTE=Simon Appleton]I confess I have an English scepticism of the ability of French Napoleonic infantry to break redcoats in a simple frontal assault. I think they would have had to do something pretty clever with combined arms to prevail and they seldom - never? - pulled such a thing off in Spain.[quote]

At the Battle of Salamanca Clousel's counterattack broke through the Third Division before being repulsed by the Sixth Division. That, however, is the only instance I know of a French column beating the British line.

in the real battle, the accounts I have read (admittedly perhaps biased by Wellington's own writings), put him at the critical spot most times of the day - directing the artillery that shelled Bauduin's assault on Hougomont, directing the charge of the heavy cavalry, at the defeat of the Guard etc.

All the accounts I have read say the same thing.