Operation Barbarossa - What if

[Pannonian]

Sorry, but this is not correct. Firstly the Panzer IV was not "ineffective" against the T-34, it was a good tank and performed effectively against the opposition right to the end of the war. However the T-34 was a better tank in some respects such as mobility.

Armour, gun, production...

The German Panther tank was an attempt to copy some of the good design features of the T-34, such as the increased mobility and sloped armour.

Secondly, the Tiger came before the Panther if I'm not mistaken. It was already in service in 1942, the Panther did not see action until Operation Citadel in July '43 and even then it turned out not to be ready.

Thirdly, the Panther was a considerably superior tank to the T-34 in critical respects, even after the upgrading of the T-34 with the 85mm gun. The Panther's long barrelled 75mm gun had a considerably greater effective range and more penetration than either the Russian 75mm or 85mm gun. Also, German tank guns had superior sights which made their fire much more accurate. These were critical advantages for the Panther.

Not enough to compensate for the advantages of the T-34-76/85, which were ease of manufacture and ease of maintenance. The T-34 was even better suited for mass-production than the M4 Sherman, with around 40000 of all makes produced during the war. Interchangeability of parts was also built into the design, so that parts from a broken tank could easily be cannibalised for use in another. Getting parts from one German tank to fit another of the same make was notoriously difficult. Also, just about anyone skilled in metalwork of any kind could fix a T-34, while you needed specialists to repair Panthers. Finally, the T-34 was very reliable, second only to the Sherman among MBTs.

In most other respects, the tanks were pretty much on a par, but of course the Panther also had crews with far superior training and communications which put them even further in front.

German tanks may have been better individually, but they were far too over-engineered to produce and use in sufficient numbers to win the war in the east. Soviet tanks were at least competent in their task, and were repeatedly redesigned for greater and greater simplicity.

[screwtype]

Not enough to compensate for the advantages of the T-34-76/85, which were ease of manufacture and ease of maintenance. The T-34 was even better suited for mass-production than the M4 Sherman, with around 40000 of all makes produced during the war.

Fine, but I was responding to Sarmation's comment that Panthers were "no match" for T-34's. On a tank v tank basis, the reverse if anything is true.

And while it's true that ease of manufacture was a major advantage of the T-34, it's also true that German tank production (and industrial production in general) should have been a lot better. It was quite disorganized for most of the war, for a variety of reasons. The Germans also had to cope with strategic bombing, which led to constant shortage of parts. The Soviets didn't have that problem.

So I don't think it was so much the "over-engineering" that caused the problem as it was the disorganization of the industry, which never rose to anything like the efficiency of that of the other major powers. And I don't think a better class of equipment is something to sneer at. After all, when the rule of thumb was five T-34's/Shermans to take down one Panther, one would hardly need to achieve anything like parity in production in order to still come out on top.

[Watchman]

One little detail is that AFAIK the fiascos of the early Winter War and the German demonstration of the full viablity of Blitzkrieg techniques (which the Soviets also knew under the name "Deep Combat", but hadn't implemented due to Stalin's internal scheming) prompet some serious reforms in the Red Army. A Barbarossa in -40 instead of -41 would naturally mean much less of them would have been implemented.

A rather important factor would however be if Stalin would be in similar denial in -40 as he historically was in -41. A military force's ability to oppose an invasion is obviously greatly hampered if it's told to not fire on the invaders come what may... A Soviet senior officer reputedly commented that what saved the USSR was the poor discipline of the troops, who would return fire regardless of orders.
'Course, I can't think of any particular reason why Stalin would be making his decisions any more lucidly than he did in -41.

So I don't think it was so much the "over-engineering" that caused the problem as it was the disorganization of the industry, which never rose to anything like the efficiency of that of the other major powers.

Oh, the Germans "over-engineered" their stuff all right. Not only did they have a definite flair for "bells and whistles" designs and downright odd experimentations, they had a bad habit of not designing their tanks in particular with future upgrades in mind. They pretty much just designed a wholly new vehicle every time, which was really a bit reinventing the wheel all over again. In comparision the Soviets for example could get by with a few solid base designs which they updated throughout the war, and I know the Brits built several of their late-war series fully expecting to have to for example eventually design bigger turrets to house larger guns.

It's not that the German propensity for sophistication and "high tech" didn't have its good points, rather one gets the strong impression they enageged in way more of it than their resources actually allowed for...

[Kraxis]

Actually the Panther was built with plenty of capacity for upgrading.
The Panther II which the Allies should be happy never got into production was a most impressive vehicle. A slim turret as that of the King Tiger, with the long 88 (the 75mmL100 was abandoned as being too impractical), integrated IR sights. Simplified engine and suspension and superior armour for better speed, mobility and survivability.

But the simple fact was that Germany was hard pressed, and the Panther was good enough for the job. So why divert its production for an upgrade that was unneeded, or rather would have been problematic while production was too low for current needs.

Also the Jagdpanzer IV got upgraded to the long 75. And the StuG III (and IV) could have carried the long 75mm, but the Germans took the chance to create purposedesigned vehicles rather then upgrading vehicles that were already being too slow/weakly armoured. The reason why they never got the long guns in any case, can likely be attested to the same problem of the Panther. They were just needed that much to allow the assembly lines to change too much.

[Pannonian]

Actually the Panther was built with plenty of capacity for upgrading.
The Panther II which the Allies should be happy never got into production was a most impressive vehicle. A slim turret as that of the King Tiger, with the long 88 (the 75mmL100 was abandoned as being too impractical), integrated IR sights. Simplified engine and suspension and superior armour for better speed, mobility and survivability.

But the simple fact was that Germany was hard pressed, and the Panther was good enough for the job. So why divert its production for an upgrade that was unneeded, or rather would have been problematic while production was too low for current needs.

Also the Jagdpanzer IV got upgraded to the long 75. And the StuG III (and IV) could have carried the long 75mm, but the Germans took the chance to create purposedesigned vehicles rather then upgrading vehicles that were already being too slow/weakly armoured. The reason why they never got the long guns in any case, can likely be attested to the same problem of the Panther. They were just needed that much to allow the assembly lines to change too much.

They should have done what the troops on the ground told them to do in 1941, reverse engineered a captured T-34 and given them large numbers of a good, reliable tank and let superior German doctrine do the rest. Up until the end of the war captured T-34s were a favoured prize for panzer crews, powerful, reliable, fast, easy to use. The Soviets reputedly had crews drive the finished tanks from factories straight into battle, so simple were they to understand. This simplicity meant it was never difficult to find replacement crews in the roles the Soviets meant for their tank armies, exploitation of breakthroughs. Of course, the relatively inexperienced Soviet crews meant that the average T-34 was mincemeat for defending Tigers and Panthers, but that wasn't their primary purpose. By the time Panthers were available in numbers, Soviet SUs (nicknamed animal killers for their effect on Tigers, Panthers and Elefants) were also available for specialist anti-tank work, armed with 152mm guns (!!!).

[Watchman]

The "from the factory into combat" story is AFAIK true, but happened in Stalingrad where the Sovs ditched everything for expediency for obvious reasons. The "Tank Factory" was one of the more contested locales, wasn't it ? I've read the tanks often weren't even fitted with even the simple sights they normally had, and the gunners had to aim through the holes...

The Germans tended to enjoy rather better communications and sighting aids (not to mention training), which resulted in the Soviets trying to compensate by turning tank fights into close-range melees whenever possible. This was naturally a bit of a challenge in itself every now and then on the steppes...

[Pannonian]

The "from the factory into combat" story is AFAIK true, but happened in Stalingrad where the Sovs ditched everything for expediency for obvious reasons. The "Tank Factory" was one of the more contested locales, wasn't it ? I've read the tanks often weren't even fitted with even the simple sights they normally had, and the gunners had to aim through the holes...

It certainly wasn't ideal, but it just shows how simple they were to man (in many cases woman). That kind of tank crew wouldn't stand a chance against another tank, but tank armies were supposed to break into the rear, not fight other tanks. A classic instance of Deep Operations in action occurred when T-34s broke into Tatsinskaya airfield, far, far beyond the front line. They shot up any planes that didn't manage to escape, and made the airfield unusable for the Luftwaffe from then on. No tank to tank combat, just lots of mobility and independence taking them far into the enemy's rear, where they severely disrupted the enemy's communications. No need for experience or finesse when the enemy can't harm you.

Experienced crews would naturally be given the best equipment and would be on a level par with enemy tanks. Less experienced crews would either learn from their experience or die and be replaced.

The Germans tended to enjoy rather better communications and sighting aids (not to mention training), which resulted in the Soviets trying to compensate by turning tank fights into close-range melees whenever possible. This was naturally a bit of a challenge in itself every now and then on the steppes...

The usual tactic was to open up with Katyushas and artillery before probing with infantry, followed by a combined infantry-armour attack (with additional artillery) if needed. Those were the Shock Armies, designed to punch a hole in the enemy lines. The bulk of the armour and mobile infantry would be concentrated in Tank Armies, ready to go through that hole and deep into the enemy's rear. The destruction of the enemy's communications would lead to the crumbling of the enemy front, which were mopped up by following, more conventionally organised formations. That was Deep Operations as envisaged by Mikhail Tukhachevsky before he was purged by Stalin and his ideas with him.

The KV was upgraded to the SU-152 after Stalingrad showed the need for bunker destroyers. It was first used in numbers at Kursk, where it proved itself against the heaviest armour the Germans had (able to destroy Tigers from over 1km). Kursk also saw the introduction of the Panther. So the Soviets always had specialist Panther and Tiger killers whenever they suspected large formations of them were about. As Tigers and Panthers were specifically designed to counter the T-34, so the King Tiger was later designed to counter the ISU (formerly SU) tanks.

[Kraxis]

They should have done what the troops on the ground told them to do in 1941, reverse engineered a captured T-34 and given them large numbers of a good, reliable tank and let superior German doctrine do the rest. Up until the end of the war captured T-34s were a favoured prize for panzer crews, powerful, reliable, fast, easy to use.

Well, that is all good and well, but the T-34 had what in German eyes were glaring mistakes. I won't number them, but they are truly horrible. And Germans don't like to repeat mistakes, they like to make their own mistakes.
The T-34s captured were always retrofitted with German sights and had a lot of the glaring faults field-fixed. Some even had the gun replaced with German 75mmL48 gun... But all this was done in the field.

Anyway, they could never copy the engine of the T-34 properly. It just went wrong whenever they tried. And that just shows the true impressive nature of the T-34, it couldn't be copied, even by tech-savvy Germans.
The copycat tank that came out of it, looked a great deal like the T-34, but it was dropped in favour of the Panther (well it would have been named Panther too). The reasons for this was the unbalanced design (turret far ahead) and the increadible overhang of the gun, making it more succeptable to obstructions.