Could the Mongols have conquered Europe?

[Orda Khan]

It sounds to me like you're saying the Mongols weren't able to properly integrate the subjugated nomad peoples into their military system.

Not quite. Throughout this thread and other threads before it that have covered the same question, I have continually tried to paint a picture of the Mongol empire so that people can discount the factors, like Ain Jalut and take them for what they were which was not a defeat of THE Mongols.
The Mongol incursions into eastern Europe after those of Batu can not be regarded in the same way as his invasion. Up until 1241, regardless of some unrest, the Mongols were at least united, this was not the case after the death of Ogodei and it became less and less so. As you know, the 'Golden Horde' was more Turkic than Mongol and even during Batu's invasion the Mongol tumens probably contained more Turks than Mongols. They were still successful but let us not forget, they had been defeated by Mongol tumens before they were conscripted. When Ogedei died the vast majority, with the exception of Batu's personal army, of these Mongol tumens returned east. After this point and with time, the Golden Horde obviously became less Mongol and this can be seen with Mongol being replaced by Turkic on coins and the spoken language and eventually culture and names.
Hulegu suffered in a similar way, only this time a Civil War broke out between Qubilai and Ariq Bukha, he also had to consider hostilities from both the Golden Horde and Qaidu, so his position was probably worse than that which Batu had experienced.
Wizard and myself have been trying to make people forget the facts after 1241 and only consider what might have happened had Ogodei's death not changed things because after that event, Mongol minds were preoccupied with 'turf wars' and the empire was no longer a whole, but quite segmented. Even attempts by Bayan of the White Horde, to bring about a coalition and so end disputes failed.
Had Ogodei not died I have no doubt that within Subedei's projected 18 years, Europe would have fallen

........Orda

[Reenk Roink]

Orda, my point here is that the Mongols could be defeated, when similar tactics were deployed against them. Very well, you wish to discount Ain Jalut, claiming that the very nature of the soldier had changed (I would argue that the larger factor was that there was no military genius like Genghis or Subotai present).

But my point that the Mongols could be (and were) defeated when similar tactics were used against them stands. Recall Parwan in 1220, where Jalaladin of the already teetering Khwarizm Empire defeated a Mongolian army with the tumen warriors, renowned for their discipline, morale, and prowess, under the leadership of Genghis himself on the steppes of Central Asia.

Of course, this battle was swept away into the pages of insignificance when Genghis reattacked and won, sealing the end of the Khwarizm Empire, but the question remains? What if Jalaladin, in 1221, in that fateful second battle, was able to lure the Mongols into the hills and crush them like he had an year earlier, using that good ol' feigned retreat? He would have stopped them at the Indus, and certainly, at the least bought some time. Would Genghis attack again? Perhaps, the Mongols were persistent. But this would add a steely resolve to their foes, as well as disheartening them.

As for the conquest of Europe, it seemed almost inevitable at that stage, I will post more on it tommorow.

[Orda Khan]

Orda, my point here is that the Mongols could be defeated, when similar tactics were deployed against them. Very well, you wish to discount Ain Jalut, claiming that the very nature of the soldier had changed (I would argue that the larger factor was that there was no military genius like Genghis or Subotai present).

I discounted Ain Jalut for more than one reason. It was an army versus a rearguard. The rearguard comprised many Georgian and Armenian auxiliaries so was hardly 'Mongol'. On the contrary, Ked Buqha was an established, competant and experienced commander of standing, which is why the battle was a considerable struggle for Kutuz. He had crushed the Seljuks at Kose Dagh and was a favourite of Hulegu.

But my point that the Mongols could be (and were) defeated when similar tactics were used against them stands. Recall Parwan in 1220, where Jalaladin of the already teetering Khwarizm Empire defeated a Mongolian army with the tumen warriors, renowned for their discipline, morale, and prowess, under the leadership of Genghis himself on the steppes of Central Asia.

Jalal ad Din did not defeat an army under the leadership of Chingis Khan.
Shah Muhammad inherited the Khwarazm empire and with it a huge army. The army were Turkish descendants of the mercenary army of Khutbeddin who had declared independence from the Seljuks, plus Qangli Qipchaqs that made up his bodyguard. He annexed Khurasan and refused to pay further tribute to Qara Khitai. Osman of Transoxiana switched allegiance to Khwarazm. When Qara Khitai fell to the Mongols, Muhammad marched almost unopposed into Transoxiana and became the richest ruler in Islam.
By the time of his treachery towards Chingis his army was truly massive, reportedly 400,000 in Transoxiana alone, twice the size of any army the Mongols had ever managed. The Khwarazmian army was deployed along the Syr Darya in a 500 mile front. Jalal ad Din saw the folly of this and wanted an immediate strike against the Mongols. When news arrived that a Mongol army was approaching Ferghana, he took 50,000 men to meet them. The Mongol army, led by Jebe and Jochi had crossed the Tien Shan range with the task of creating a diversion. They suffered horrendous conditions losing men, horses and supplies in the freezing mountain passes. Jalal ad Din met around 30,000 wretched, starving Mongols in the Ferghana valley, as he advanced so they withdrew. They turned to face him in the foothills and after massive losses to both sides they retired. Jalal ad Din's men were not capable of pursuit but he could at least claim a victory.
Only about half the Mongol army returned to Kashgar but their objective had been achieved, the Mongol army was now assembled and ready to go on the offensive. Chingis Khan realised the difficulties ahead and had requested help from his Tangut subjects, all he received was a contemptuous refusal. Regardless of this the Mongols went on to destroy the armies of Khwarazm in an incredible campaign.
As usual, religious tolerance was exercised by the Mongols but was questioned by the Moslems who resented the fact that others shared the same rights, they began to revolt. Chingis turned to his youngest son Tolui to set about suppressing these revolts. A very ruthless commander, Tolui embarked on a path of extermination. News arrived that Jalal ad Din had defeated a Mongol detachment at Ghazni. Shigiqutuqu was sent to deal with him but his force was insufficient and Jalal ad Din was not fooled by dummies on Mongol mounts. The Mongols were forced into retreat. Chingis decided to march on this irritable foe and as he approached over the hills, Jalal ad Din was forced to withdraw. Cornered, with his back to the Indus, he made a resilient stand but with another example of tactical skill, Chingis sent a small force which hit and routed the seemingly safe Khwarazmian right flank. After a second desperate charge, Jalal ad Din turned and fled, swimming across the river.

Of course, this battle was swept away into the pages of insignificance when Genghis reattacked and won, sealing the end of the Khwarizm Empire, but the question remains? What if Jalaladin, in 1221, in that fateful second battle, was able to lure the Mongols into the hills and crush them like he had an year earlier, using that good ol' feigned retreat? He would have stopped them at the Indus, and certainly, at the least bought some time. Would Genghis attack again? Perhaps, the Mongols were persistent. But this would add a steely resolve to their foes, as well as disheartening them.

It has been mentioned in Persian sources that the armies of Mongolia and Khwarazm had met in the past. In 1209 while pursuing Naiman fugitives, Jebe and Subedei ventured into Transoxiana (at that time vying between Qara Khitai and Khwarazm). After defeating the last of these Naimans, they were attacked by a Khwarazmian army from Samarkand. There was no real outcome however the Mongols withdrew in the night. There is also a possibility that Khwarazmian forces were encountered again by Jochi during his march west but these are inconclusive and possibly a confusion with the earlier meeting.
So you see, this notion of invincibility is something that was perpetuated in the west, however losing a battle does not necessarily affect the outcome of a campaign. The Mongols suffered many set backs in Korea which is more or less on their doorstep but Korea too became part of their empire.
In 1236, Batu's younger brother Suntai had been forced to halt his advance on the Bulgars when reinforcements from Smolensk and Kiev arrived. A year later would see the Bulgars defeated and from there, Russia, Poland and Hungary would crumple before the Mongol advance. Poland was left defenseless by a simple diversionary force that defeated all that she could field. Hungary was left so weak that parts of it were annexed to Austria.
Anyway, the question is about Europe and having studied Mongol history and researching information about their various campaigns and their opponents, I still have yet to find a reason to believe that European armies would pose any realistic threat to the Mongol advance

........Orda

As for the conquest of Europe, it seemed almost inevitable at that stage, I will post more on it tommorow.[/QUOTE]

[Reenk Roink]

Jalal ad Din did not defeat an army under the leadership of Chingis Khan. Shah Muhammad inherited the Khwarazm empire and with it a huge army. The army were Turkish descendants of the mercenary army of Khutbeddin who had declared independence from the Seljuks, plus Qangli Qipchaqs that made up his bodyguard. He annexed Khurasan and refused to pay further tribute to Qara Khitai. Osman of Transoxiana switched allegiance to Khwarazm. When Qara Khitai fell to the Mongols, Muhammad marched almost unopposed into Transoxiana and became the richest ruler in Islam.
By the time of his treachery towards Chingis his army was truly massive, reportedly 400,000 in Transoxiana alone, twice the size of any army the Mongols had ever managed. The Khwarazmian army was deployed along the Syr Darya in a 500 mile front. Jalal ad Din saw the folly of this and wanted an immediate strike against the Mongols. When news arrived that a Mongol army was approaching Ferghana, he took 50,000 men to meet them. The Mongol army, led by Jebe and Jochi had crossed the Tien Shan range with the task of creating a diversion. They suffered horrendous conditions losing men, horses and supplies in the freezing mountain passes. Jalal ad Din met around 30,000 wretched, starving Mongols in the Ferghana valley, as he advanced so they withdrew. They turned to face him in the foothills and after massive losses to both sides they retired. Jalal ad Din's men were not capable of pursuit but he could at least claim a victory.

And yet the army of the Sultan faced equally difficult conditions themselves. They were also an exhausted bunch and also not very well equipped. Not only that, but the army of Khwarizm was hated by the populous and had questionable loyalty. And yet Jalaladin was able to repel the Mongols after a one day battle. My point is, had he been able to do it again at the Indus, where Genghis was brilliantly able to seperate the army from the refugees and slaughter both, this would greatly affected future expeditions by the Mongols. Would there be more? Most probably, but then again, Jalaladin could also make preparations.

Only about half the Mongol army returned to Kashgar but their objective had been achieved, the Mongol army was now assembled and ready to go on the offensive. Chingis Khan realised the difficulties ahead and had requested help from his Tangut subjects, all he received was a contemptuous refusal. Regardless of this the Mongols went on to destroy the armies of Khwarazm in an incredible campaign.
As usual, religious tolerance was exercised by the Mongols but was questioned by the Moslems who resented the fact that others shared the same rights, they began to revolt. Chingis turned to his youngest son Tolui to set about suppressing these revolts. A very ruthless commander, Tolui embarked on a path of extermination. News arrived that Jalal ad Din had defeated a Mongol detachment at Ghazni. Shigiqutuqu was sent to deal with him but his force was insufficient and Jalal ad Din was not fooled by dummies on Mongol mounts. The Mongols were forced into retreat. Chingis decided to march on this irritable foe and as he approached over the hills, Jalal ad Din was forced to withdraw. Cornered, with his back to the Indus, he made a resilient stand but with another example of tactical skill, Chingis sent a small force which hit and routed the seemingly safe Khwarazmian right flank. After a second desperate charge, Jalal ad Din turned and fled, swimming across the river.

I find it odd how you try to downplay Jalaladin as an "irritable foe" when Genghis himself had such respect for the man that he prohibited his archers from shooting him while he fled.

So you see, this notion of invincibility is something that was perpetuated in the west, however losing a battle does not necessarily affect the outcome of a campaign. The Mongols suffered many set backs in Korea which is more or less on their doorstep but Korea too became part of their empire.

My point exactly. The Mongols were always able to follow up their defeats with victories (until Ain Jalut), due to their brilliant leadership, unmatched organization, and their unquestionable battle prowess.

In 1236, Batu's younger brother Suntai had been forced to halt his advance on the Bulgars when reinforcements from Smolensk and Kiev arrived. A year later would see the Bulgars defeated and from there, Russia, Poland and Hungary would crumple before the Mongol advance. Poland was left defenseless by a simple diversionary force that defeated all that she could field. Hungary was left so weak that parts of it were annexed to Austria.
Anyway, the question is about Europe and having studied Mongol history and researching information about their various campaigns and their opponents, I still have yet to find a reason to believe that European armies would pose any realistic threat to the Mongol advance

It was the internal difficulties withing the Mongol Empire itself that prevented an full scale invasion of Europe. Germany would have been easy, as the emperor was not on the Pope's good side then, and I don't believe that France or the low countries would have been able to put up much resistance. However, I do think that the Mongols would have been frustrated by the numerous fortifications around the continent, which were much more frequent than the Assassin strongholds...
The biggest problem, however, was that the Mongol borders were too overextended, and such an ambitious campaign as to conquer Europe would require many men, resources, and time. Subotai predicted that it would take 18 years to complete. In short, it was simply too difficult for the Mongols to invade and control Europe without jeapordizing their previous holdings.

[Orda Khan]

And yet the army of the Sultan faced equally difficult conditions themselves. They were also an exhausted bunch and also not very well equipped. Not only that, but the army of Khwarizm was hated by the populous and had questionable loyalty. And yet Jalaladin was able to repel the Mongols after a one day battle. My point is, had he been able to do it again at the Indus, where Genghis was brilliantly able to seperate the army from the refugees and slaughter both, this would greatly affected future expeditions by the Mongols. Would there be more? Most probably, but then again, Jalaladin could also make preparations.

Please explain how conditions were equally bad for an army that marches to a valley from its homeland, while the other army has just crossed mountain passes of 13,000ft and almost frozen and starved to death.

I find it odd how you try to downplay Jalaladin as an "irritable foe" when Genghis himself had such respect for the man that he prohibited his archers from shooting him while he fled.

Downplay? An irritable foe he was indeed and a capable commander also. Why did you not use my quote that depicts this?

Jalal ad Din saw the folly of this and wanted an immediate strike against the Mongols

My point exactly. The Mongols were always able to follow up their defeats with victories (until Ain Jalut), due to their brilliant leadership, unmatched organization, and their unquestionable battle prowess.

They did not win a victory after Ain Jalut? I think you will find that they actually managed to take Syria after Ain Jalut.

It was the internal difficulties withing the Mongol Empire itself that prevented an full scale invasion of Europe.

No. Initially it was the news of Ogodei's death.

The biggest problem, however, was that the Mongol borders were too overextended, and such an ambitious campaign as to conquer Europe would require many men, resources, and time. Subotai predicted that it would take 18 years to complete. In short, it was simply too difficult for the Mongols to invade and control Europe without jeapordizing their previous holdings.

They were not over extended at that time and at that time the empire was a united one.

.......Orda

[Watchman]

No. Initially it was the news of Ogodei's death.

Even if the leader needs to go away for a while (and I've read he never bothered going past his Russian power base - no doubt full well aware that he was altogether too far away to be able to have any effect on the outcome), that doesn't explain the complete pull-out from Hungary (where, I've read, the Mongols had already started minting their own coinage by that point) and total abandonement of further major invasions into the subcontinent.

Frankly, something doesn't add up here. We're talking about a world-empire which had pretty much gotten started by taking over China (albeit one in yet another period of internal strife) and rolled over the whole damn Great Eurasian Steppe Belt, and by what I've read of it had in place a pretty serious case of imperial expansionist ideology ("manifest destiny" to take over the world, as it were). And when they hit the edges of that great stretch of plains and grasslands, their procession suddenly came to a screeching halt. Not only was there a marked absence of any meaningful further expansion where it was seriously attempted - the Ilkhanids being stymied in Syria, the Yuan failing their overseas adventures - the different segments of the great empire under different and to a large degree competing potentates were already coming to loggerheads in mid-1200s, and by what I've read pretty much in open hostilities by the end of 1260s (which looks suspiciously like them turning inwards to savage each other in absence of real opportunities to expand outwards).

All this smacks of them hitting their "point of maximum expansion", an ephemereal thing all empires possess; sooner or later they simply run out of the resources and/or opportunities to expand further, and in practice have to settle down to rule and defend what they have aquired thus far (although further developements may allow succesful conquest to be taken up again later on; this is what happened to the Europeans). Every single empire in history, particularly the premodern ones, hit this point sooner or later; and there is nothing so special about the Mongols as to make them immune to this conspiracy of ecology, logistics and politics.

And against this mountain of evidence of their blunt loss of momentum - blatant inability to enact further conquests of any note and falling to internal squabbling - we are to believe that they could have completed a project as time-consuming as actually conquering and consolidating the vaporous fortress-field of Europe "with ease", or that their patent inability to overpower the Mamluks resulted from lack of "proper Mongol" troops ?

No offense but bollocks, in my humble opinion. That, or what I tend to unkindly term fanboy apologism - the phenomenom where the ultimate failure of a well-liked actor, in this case the Mongol Empire, is attempted to cover up and/or explain away by such cheap excuses due to a basic unwillingness to admit they, as all men and things, were and are not perfect or infallible or unbeatable or whatever.
I occasionally find myself falling guilty of the same fault, if that helps.

Nonetheless, besides the Romans, Spartans (particularly the bunch at Thermopylae), the Samurai and the English longbowmen (and umpteen national-romanticist fantasies I prefer to not touch with an eleven-foot pole), the Mongols seem to firmly sit in the Fanboy Top Ten as far as the premodern period goes. And I daresay I'm finding altogether too many clues of this principle here.

That aside, it's linky time. I've been seeing some pretty curious claims from time to time, which curiously don't seem to quite add up with somewhat more thorough and deeper-going accounts of the same things I've read. Here are some highly interesting and quite varied articles on the topic - De Re Militaris is a pretty good site from what I can tell, and tends to turn up nice and well-researched stuff most of the time. Of particular interest to the topic at hand would be Mamluks and Mongols: an overview, which IMHO puts forth some pretty sensible theories as to why the Ilkhans failed in Syria but nonetheless kept trying for half a century.

[Spartakus]

Nonetheless, besides the Romans, Spartans (particularly the bunch at Thermopylae), the Samurai and the English longbowmen (and umpteen national-romanticist fantasies I prefer to not touch with an eleven-foot pole), the Mongols seem to firmly sit in the Fanboy Top Ten as far as the premodern period goes.

It is true, yes, I'm convinced most history buffs will second that statement. However, no matter how many fanboys the Mongols might have, this doesn't mean the conclusions reached about their superiority through empirical reasoning is any less correct. And Orda Khan knows his stuff, I would say he is more educated on this subject than anyone else on the forum, before arguing with him I'd first do some serious research.

[Reenk Roink]

Please explain how conditions were equally bad for an army that marches to a valley from its homeland, while the other army has just crossed mountain passes of 13,000ft and almost frozen and starved to death.

Jalaladin had many disadvantages going into Parwan, especially concerning his forces. Remember, the soldiers of the Khwarizm Empire were recruited Turks who were unloyal and hated by the populous. Contrast that with the soldiers of the Great Khan. Also, By the time of the battle, they were an exhausted bunch, on top of not being well equipped.

Downplay? An irritable foe he was indeed and a capable commander also. Why did you not use my quote that depicts this?

"Irritable foe" stands out as the only direct characterization of Jalaladin you make. If I read you wrong, forgive me; it happens constantly in message boards where there is no voice tone/body language to aid the communication.

They did not win a victory after Ain Jalut? I think you will find that they actually managed to take Syria after Ain Jalut.

I was not stating that they did not win a victory after Ain Jalut. I was stating that Ain Jalut was the first time they were not able to follow up a defeat with a decisive victory. If you believe the successful invasion in 1299 (after which they were repelled again shortly) was a decisive victory, consider the fact that the Il-Khanate invaded again in 1300. The Il-Khanate invasions Syria were also repelled in 1281, 1303, and 1312...

No. Initially it was the news of Ogodei's death.

Hence the beginning of internal difficulties...

[Watchman]

Someone remind me, who became the Head Honcho after Ogedei and how did the selection process work out de facto ?

[Spartakus]

I discounted Ain Jalut for more than one reason. It was an army versus a rearguard. The rearguard comprised many Georgian and Armenian auxiliaries so was hardly 'Mongol'.

I'll give you another reason; even though this rearguard was outnumbered, tricked into an ambush and completely surrounded by the Mamluk forces, the Mongols still held fast when they were charged on all flanks and battle ensued. Their defence was so vigorous that the enemy ranks at one point actually wavered, despite fighting an outnumbered and surrounded foe. The Mamluk commander, Qutuz, had to enter the fray himself and rally the men to further efforts before they were finally able to grind the Mongols down. Such prowess is outstanding in the military history of the period.

As for the whole debate on whether or not they could've conquered Europe, speculative and pointless though it may be, I must admit that as much as I dislike the thought of Europe being trampled by the Mongols, I can't really see any reason why this would've proved too much of a challenge to them. When I read all these contra-arguments I see nothing but hoping against hope, refering to exceptional losses that happened under exceptional circumstances, or close-run battles that the Mongols might have lost.

The truth is no European potentate could field more men than the Mongols, none of them had a comparable apparatus for logistics and intelligence gathering, and the tight discipline and organization of the Mongol army had no counterpart in Europe, in fact, this is something the European armies were notoriously bad at, with the exception of a few City-State infantry forces. Not a single fortification existed in Europe that was beyond the capabilties of the Mongol siege machinery to deal with, Orda has already mentioned how they were able penetrate many of the Middle-East's greatest fortresses and walled cities in record time. And forests? Now that's a desperate hope.

Look no further than how the attack on Europe was carried out; two large co-ordinated forces attacking from two corners. What European force could work that way? We're talking warfare on a whole new level, this isn't your typical raid, counterraid with impetous individuals seeking personal glory in battle. Europe's only chance of gaining an advantage, if we accept the accounts of how the Mongols seemed to be severly hampered by outnumbered knights in heavy armour at Sajo and Legnica, would be to lock the Mongols in melee with the heavy cavalry as often as possible, and maybe with some luck wear them down this way. Still, that'd be a miracle, as I can't see any force in Europe with the necessary resources, administration and authority to implement a grand strategy for Christendom. The German princes had just recently been left to their own devices by the Emperor Frederick II, who focused all his energies on Italy, a concerted attack by France and England seems unlikely, remembering their recent conflict, while nearby Denmark is completely flat and ideal for Mongol horsemanship. And still, if we just suppose that a grand strategy could be put into action, there remains the problem of numbers. The French Royal army at the time has been estimated to about 15000 men, the English a bit less, meaning that even if these and more had united, the Mongols would still be more than able to outnumber them if they desired to do so.

Forgive me if I just repeated a lot of which has already been said, as I haven't read all the replies in this thread yet. In any case my conclusion is that only an effort outstanding in the military history of medieval Europe would be good enough to repel the Mongols, and it would be against all odds. But if we stick with logic instead of hope, I must concur with Orda Khan and admit that conquest seemed inevitable.

[Watchman]

Betcha that back in the day it also seemed inevitable the Ottomans, who had even better logistics and adminstration nevermind the best damn siege train in the world at the time, would've overrun at the very least Central Europe and prolly quite a bit more too.

They didn't though. The logistical leash simply ran out. It's a pain and a half to enact lasting conquests once you get past certain distance from your actual power centers, nevermind now over rather uncooperative geography. That's what ultimately stumped all empires until the Europeans went and changed the paradigm half by accident in the Early Modern period, and even then they only got really going (with the exception of America) in the 1800s. Think of the way the Romans never made permanent inroads into Germania proper and had trouble holding even parts of Central Europe, or how the ancient Mesopotamian empires could never rid themselves of the pesky barbarians of the highlands to the north. Pretty much the same issues, far as I can tell.

I've no doubt the Mongols could have sent serious attack wedges all the way to the Atlantic if they really wanted, but I also suspect that's have gotten dreadfully expensive in men and materials (chiefly horses) for relatively little gain, a real pain in the ass to do given the fortress-field nature if the subcontinent, and unlikely to accomplish much else than to cause some major mayhem and spread some appropriate fear of their betters around on a liberal basis.

But taking, holding and consolidating territory, especially in conditions as were the norm in medieval Europe, with an army ultimately revolving around steppe-based nomad troops, is a whole different beast entirely from laying waste to the land with large-scale chevauchees. Put this way: assuming they conquered everything in Poland and Germany and Hungary, what'd they use to replace the inevitable campaign-attrition and siege-assault casualties nevermind the steady inevitable trickle of dead men from even victorious battles ? And garrison their conquests with ? Subjugated Europeans perhaps ? Or where'd they get enough remounts to maintain their military backbone, or for that matter even keep all those horses they needed fed outside the grazing-grounds of the steppe ? Or push further with ? I'm pretty sure a steppe army simply could not be maintained in fighting shape in Europe proper for an extended period due to sheer ecology (at its most basic, not enough pasture for all the horses - there's good reasons why cavalry were so few in number in the local armies after all), so they'd have to be largely withdrawn to the steppe proper during the necessary consolidation phases. Even if they tried to take care of the whole thing in one swoop (probably impossible if only given the amount of siege warfare involved), they'd still run into the very real problem the nomadic army would be operating far beyond the limits of its logistical leash, with seriously stretched lines of communications to their "home bases" and reinforcement recruiting grounds on the distant plains.

All of which would only be getting worse the further westwards they went. In essence if they really wanted to "take and hold" the subcontinent they'd sooner or later have had to convert to more sedentary forms of warfare out of the sheer ecological impossibility in keeping a steppe army operational there over the long term - and they'd also have to deal with nearly every damn baron and other lordling who now happened to have some forts and armed men to his name more or less separately, which gets sort of frustrating right quick.

Throw the Khanate's little domestic troubles into the mix (and such considerations as the no doubt rather dubious loyalty of for example the various Russian vassal states), and I can actually quite well see why they decided they didn't actually want even Hungary. Not Worth The Trouble, and quite possibly deemed borderline impossible.