Could "Sea Lion" have succeeded?

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Requested breakout of a sub-theme in WWII Generals thread. Moderators, feel free to slice and attach to this one.

Short answer: Almost no blinking chance in Hades.

[Kagemusha]

I like to think nothing is ultimately impossible. If the Germany had concentrated on attacking Airfields and the British airfields and not turned foolishly their attention to British Cities i think that ultimately with long time Air superiority it would have been possible.
It would have taken long to create enough transports to ferry the troops over the channel put with combined arms attack and Air superiority i think it would have been possible.Also the majority of the British Land troops were not in Britain.So once the Wermacht would have got a foothold i think they would have been superior to British troops in land war.

[Pannonian]

I like to think nothing is ultimately impossible. If the Germany had concentrated on attacking Airfields and the British airfields and not turned foolishly their attention to British Cities i think that ultimately with long time Air superiority it would have been possible.
It would have taken long to create enough transports to ferry the troops over the channel put with combined arms attack and Air superiority i think it would have been possible.Also the majority of the British Land troops were not in Britain.So once the Wermacht would have got a foothold i think they would have been superior to British troops in land war.

Dowding's plan was to withdraw 11 Group into the midlands to refit if it all got too much. That leaves at least 10 and 12 Group in the vicinity to deal with any deeper ranging German attacks. Once 11 Group withdrew to the north, further German bombing of airfields would have been useless, as they were no longer strategically useful targets. However, if any invasion took place everything would have been thrown into the mix, land, air, sea. And you'll still have to answer the question of how you're going to supply the troops that got across.

1. Your transports are crap and not seaworthy. 2. You have more barges than you have crew. 3. The enemy has a fleet hugely more powerful than yours. 4. Your air superiority, hardwon over 11 Group, disappears as it returns to action stronger than ever with 10 and 12 Groups joining in as well. 5. You are attacking the most heavily defended area in the world, with very strong defences in extreme depth. 6. Your heavy weapons can't get across the Channel to help overcome these defences.

So you're attacking with only light troops, without air superiority, with a chronically threatened supply line that cannot be repaired or defended if the enemy attack it, or if the weather turns bad. Good luck with your invasion.

http://www.flin.demon.co.uk/althist/seal1.htm
http://gateway.alternatehistory.com/essays/Sealion.html

[Csargo]

How course it could have worked there are just some factors you have to look at.

1 The Germans would have too win the Battle of Britain which is possible like Kagemusha said the Germans would have to concentrate on Airfields and Industry not terror bombing London. Which would take out the ability to produce airplanes, tanks, and machinery.

2.You need to find a way to transport enough troops across the Channel to take out the British forces on the island which will be a problem.

3.I dont know what you should do about the RN I have no idea.

4. Or like Kenshin said to dam up the whole English Channel and just drive across.

[Pannonian]

How course it could have worked there are just some factors you have to look at.

1 The Germans would have too win the Battle of Britain which is possible like Kagemusha said the Germans would have to concentrate on Airfields and Industry not terror bombing London. Which would take out the ability to produce airplanes, tanks, and machinery.

Most of British industry is up north. Southern England is farmland.

[Csargo]

A major campaign of the early part of World War II, the Battle of Britain is the name commonly given to the attempt by the German Luftwaffe to gain air superiority over the Royal Air Force (RAF), before a planned sea and airborne invasion of Britain (Operation Sealion). Neither Hitler nor the German Wehrmacht believed it possible to carry out a successful amphibious assault on the British Isles until the RAF had been neutralised. Secondary objectives were to destroy aircraft production and ground infrastructure, as well as terrorising the British people with the intent of intimidating them into seeking an armistice or surrender.

That was the whole plan of Battle of Britain to destroy the RAF and the aircraft production and ground infra. But Hitler changed it all to terror bombing and that is the main reason why the RAF survived and destroyed most of the Lufftwaffe. If Hitler would have kept to destroying infra. and airplane prod. the Battle of Britain would have been won by the Germans.

[rotorgun]

How course it could have worked there are just some factors you have to look at.

1 The Germans would have too win the Battle of Britain which is possible like Kagemusha said the Germans would have to concentrate on Airfields and Industry not terror bombing London. Which would take out the ability to produce airplanes, tanks, and machinery.

2.You need to find a way to transport enough troops across the Channel to take out the British forces on the island which will be a problem.

3.I dont know what you should do about the RN I have no idea.

4. Or like Kenshin said to dam up the whole English Channel and just drive across.

A few ideas have been rummaging around my head for a number of years in regard to these factors. I will enumerate on each point below:

1. I agree with most historians that attacking airfields, and aircraft maunufacturing plants was the Geremans best chance for victory. I also feel that something must have been done to draw the RAF into dogfights over the Channel where recovery of downed pilots was more problematic. As all would probably agree, it was the loss of trained pilots which Britain could least afford.

2. The German high command felt that enough transport could be provided by September to transport at least two Panzer and eight Infantry Divisions across the Channel in two waves. Logistics where planned to be delivered by air to the airfields captured in south England by the invasion forces. August was the deadline for the decision to proceed.

3. I believe that a sortie by the Italian Navy in the Med, perhaps threatening Gibraltar, coupled with a faint invasion fleet aimed for Scotland would have drawn a good portion of the Home Fleet to sea. There they could have been dealt with by a combined air/submarine campain and crippled. This would have left an attenuated force with which to guard the Channel.

4. In a sense, a "dam" of sorts could have been created by the German surface elements guarding an invasion corridor sreened by as many U Boats as were available. The job of such a force would be to draw out any remaining RN forces to destroy them with the aid of the Luftwaffe, assuming that the RAF was Neutraliized by the earlier attacks. With a combined arms approach, I believe that the RN could have been driven off or defeated. It would have been costly to the German Kriegsmarine no doubt, but such a sacrifice would have been justified for Sea Lion to suceed. As soon as the RN was stopped, let the Blitzkrieg begin!

[Pannonian]

2. The German high command felt that enough transport could be provided by September to transport at least two Panzer and eight Infantry Divisions across the Channel in two waves. Logistics where planned to be delivered by air to the airfields captured in south England by the invasion forces. August was the deadline for the decision to proceed.

It's not possible to transport tanks across the Channel by river barges. It's not possible to transport men across the Channel by barges, unless the sea was utterly calm and the crossing was utterly uncontested. Neither the Channel nor the Royal Navy and Air Force were known for these behaviours.

3. I believe that a sortie by the Italian Navy in the Med, perhaps threatening Gibraltar,

There was already a fleet in the Med ready to deal with the Italians. There may have been a problem should the French fleet join the Germans, but the British took care of that at Mers el Kebir and Oran.

coupled with a faint invasion fleet aimed for Scotland would have drawn a good portion of the Home Fleet to sea. There they could have been dealt with by a combined air/submarine campain and crippled. This would have left an attenuated force with which to guard the Channel.

The Home Fleet sailing south from Scapa Flow would first be under the cover of 13 Group, untouched by the Battle of Britain, until they reached Tyneside or slightly futher south. Then they would be under the cover of 12 Group, which was barely touched by the Battle. Note that this route takes them close to the British coast and far from German bases. Only when they reach the mouth of the Thames do they start coming within reasonable range of German aircraft.

If the situation had been serious enough for the Home Fleet to be sent south, the bulk of 13 Group and the whole of 12 Group would have been used to keep them safe on the journey. A heavily armed convoy from Britain suffered 60% losses on its way to Malta, on a lengthy journey that was mostly within range of enemy coasts. The passage of the Home Fleet would have been a hugely more heavily armed convoy consisting entirely of warships expert at dealing with u-boats and accompanied by massive air support.

4. In a sense, a "dam" of sorts could have been created by the German surface elements guarding an invasion corridor sreened by as many U Boats as were available. The job of such a force would be to draw out any remaining RN forces to destroy them with the aid of the Luftwaffe, assuming that the RAF was Neutraliized by the earlier attacks. With a combined arms approach, I believe that the RN could have been driven off or defeated. It would have been costly to the German Kriegsmarine no doubt, but such a sacrifice would have been justified for Sea Lion to suceed. As soon as the RN was stopped, let the Blitzkrieg begin!

The Kriegsmarine tended to let loose their ships individually, so the British couldn't so easily catch them, and quickly, keeping their exposure in open waters to a day or two at the most until they reached the Atlantic. If they were afraid of sailing in convoys or dallying in the Channel for a few days at a time, what makes you think they would dare to set up a permanent stand there?

Also, the passage of Gibraltar was regarded as tantamount to suicide by u-boat crews. Wouldn't you think that with Britain threatened with invasion, the Channel would be even more heavily guarded?

[rotorgun]

Dowding's plan was to withdraw 11 Group into the midlands to refit if it all got too much. That leaves at least 10 and 12 Group in the vicinity to deal with any deeper ranging German attacks. Once 11 Group withdrew to the north, further German bombing of airfields would have been useless, as they were no longer strategically useful targets. However, if any invasion took place everything would have been thrown into the mix, land, air, sea. And you'll still have to answer the question of how you're going to supply the troops that got across.

1. Your transports are crap and not seaworthy. 2. You have more barges than you have crew. 3. The enemy has a fleet hugely more powerful than yours. 4. Your air superiority, hardwon over 11 Group, disappears as it returns to action stronger than ever with 10 and 12 Groups joining in as well. 5. You are attacking the most heavily defended area in the world, with very strong defences in extreme depth. 6. Your heavy weapons can't get across the Channel to help overcome these defences.

So you're attacking with only light troops, without air superiority, with a chronically threatened supply line that cannot be repaired or defended if the enemy attack it, or if the weather turns bad. Good luck with your invasion.

http://www.flin.demon.co.uk/althist/seal1.htm
http://gateway.alternatehistory.com/essays/Sealion.html

All very good points indeed. I also enjoyed your counterpoints to my previous post. I would be grateful for you to share the history books you've read about the Battle of Britain. I also was impressed with Csar's intelligent responses to my arguements. (Not to mention the very astute Seamus Fermagh) Correct me if I'm wrong, but wasn't 10th group rather woefully equipped in comparison to 11 and 12 group? I realize that the Luftwaffe was dreadfully mauled by the battles in the south prior to switching over to night attacks in late August. Wasn't that because they had switched tactics due to Hitler's orders to bomb the cities? I guess my point was that attrition began to favor the RAF only after such a move. It was only when London was thrteatened with large-scale raids that 12 group was brought into the battle with the "Big wing" approach.

If the Germans were able to gain a foothold in the south, admittedly at very high odds against such an outcome, with what land forces was England supposed to defend so heavily? The survivors of Dunkirk where also only "lightly" armed due to their heavy weapons being abandoned in France. I still maintain that if the channel could be controlled by the Germans for a week, enough troops, tanks, artillery, and supplies could have been landed for the Germans to establish superiority on land. With that comes enough airfields to establish the Luftwaffe as a serious threat to the rest of the RAF. No longer restricted to 15 minutes loiter time over the targets, they could have finished off the RAF in the north. Of course such sucess would come at a very high price to all arms of Germany. I would imagine that Hitler would have seriously depleted his forces to such an extent that he would have never contemplated the invasion of Russia for many years, if ever.

Post Edit: I just noticed the links you provided and will take the time to read them this week sometime. Thanks for such a great discussion!

[Pannonian]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but wasn't 10th group rather woefully equipped in comparison to 11 and 12 group?

11 Group, the one mainly involved in the Battle, was the best equipped of the lot, but the others were there if needed. In any case, 12 Group wasn't far off the quality of 11, and it was mostly untouched. The northernmost airfield to see regular action was Hornchurch I think, and that's part of London nowadays, so that tells you something about the Luftwaffe's lack of range.

I realize that the Luftwaffe was dreadfully mauled by the battles in the south prior to switching over to night attacks in late August. Wasn't that because they had switched tactics due to Hitler's orders to bomb the cities? I guess my point was that attrition began to favor the RAF only after such a move.

Goering was successively withdrawing various models from bombers from action because they were too vulnerable to Hurricanes and Spitfires. Kesselring was also worried about his planes, and wanted to switch to anything that could preserve his force. The appearance of the Big Wings showed that, despite massive losses on both sides, Fighter Command could still field intimidatingly large formations of modern fighters. It was the Tet Offensive of the Battle of Britain if you like, with a better attrition rate for the British. The British raid on Berlin was the excuse the Luftwaffe needed to switch to bombing civilian London instead of the heavily defended airfields.

It was only when London was thrteatened with large-scale raids that 12 group was brought into the battle with the "Big wing" approach.

Bader was itching for action and so were the rest of 12 Group, having sat out the Battle. Leigh-Mallory was eager to allow his protege free rein and show his superiority over Park. They would have found an excuse to enter action sooner or later.

If the Germans were able to gain a foothold in the south, admittedly at very high odds against such an outcome, with what land forces was England supposed to defend so heavily?

The existing land forces weren't great, but the British could afford to throw Home Guard and other motley stuff at the invaders while they reorganised their regular army. Once they did that, they'll have the advantage of home ground and easy supply versus a German forces whose communications were threatened daily. Remember the Normandy force had difficulties in 1944 when they had absolute control of sea and air, neither of which the Germans could have attained in 1940.

The survivors of Dunkirk where also only "lightly" armed due to their heavy weapons being abandoned in France. I still maintain that if the channel could be controlled by the Germans for a week, enough troops, tanks, artillery, and supplies could have been landed for the Germans to establish superiority on land.

During the war, the Kriegsmarine never dared let their ships loiter in the Channel for more than a couple of days at a time. To establish such a bridgehead, you'll have to achieve domination enough to allow merchant ships and barges relatively uncontested passage for a week. As in the Battle of Britain where pure formations of fighters were left alone, the RN doesn't need to sink the Kriegsmarine, all they need to do is sink the transports and there is no successful invasion.

[Franconicus]

Tough question. Let's see.

The German army was definatly stronger. British home defense after Dunquerk was weak.
German Luftwaffe was stronger than the RAF, however the RAF had some tactical advantages. They could withdraw from combat whenever they wanted to. So in the Battle of England it was undefeatable.
The Germans had nothing comparable to the RN.

The German strategy was foolish. The army tried to push responability to the Navy by saying that they have to guarantee a save crossing. Navy did the same and pushed resp. to the airforce. However, the air force was not able to beat the RAF in a air battle.

The right strategy would have been:
1) Preparation: Short attacks against the airfields and harbors in Southern England
2) Air borne operations against the airfields and then landing of the army.
The German paratroops would have been strong enough to take the airfields, I guess. The RAF would not havve been able to stop them. Standard proceedure would have been: heavy bombing at three o'clock, then at four or five landing of the paras. RAF had no effective night fighters and with a lot of German planes in the night sky they would not have had a chance to stop the German paras.
The question is would there have been a chance to reenforce the paras? The German fighter could have used the Brits airfields and screened the sky. Both sides would have had awfull casualties. Then the Germans had to cross the channel. The RN would have had to attack the flanks. There would be only little support from the RAF while the Ju88, Ju87 and He111 would have attacked the British fleet. A very interseting and decisive battle.
I do not know what would have been the end. Hitler was not willing to take the risk (although he always played risky!). However, this moght have been his last chance to win this war.

[spmetla]

I think Sea Lion *could* have succeded but not on the timetable that was being planned by the German High Command.

The Battle of Britain was the key point and this should have continued concentrating on military targets, early warning and airdefense, infrastructure (roads, railways, oil depots, powerplants).

The Luftwaffe's bomber arm shouldn't have begun doing "deep" strikes until some sort of air superiorty was won. If the fighters had been concentrated on at least denying the channel and immediate ground of southern England to the RAF they could then have used their advantages of higher fighting position, superior numbers, and more experienced pilots to draw out and kill the RAFs fighter arm while minimizing the huge downside of the Bf 109s extremely short range. The bombers would in the mean time concentrate on eliminating any RN presence in the English Channel, southern North Sea, and the southern approaches to the Irish Sea. This should have continued for several months. Just having done this would at least allow the Kriegsmarine to operate closer to English waters and would have allowed at the minimum commando raids on coastal targets, especially radar.

Using this time the Germans should have designed and built or at least copied true landing craft and tried to build them in quantity. Barges made for canals are simply not suffiecient for the English channel and too easily destroyed to be considered for an Invasion force.

If the above objectives were at least partilly achieved and sustained then at least the uboot arm would have not needed to fear air attacks from the RAF while operating near France and Southern England.

Then of course if true airsuperiority over southern England was achieved an invasion force would have been able to cross with out interferrance of the RN and with the state the British Army was in at the time once the intial resistance was crushed (which with air superiority would have been achieved in my opinion) the Wehrmacht would steadily push north once their armor was landed and suffiecent supplies for inland operations were stockpiled. If the Wehrmacht had gotten a good foothold on English soil with a secure naval supplyline (made secure from the air) then England would probably have fallen fairly easily.

The biggest failures of the real Battle of Britain/Sea Lion was that Georing and Hitler had "victory disease" from the Battle of France and thought that air superiorty would be quickly achieved quickly and that the RAF would be beaten within 3 months. They let bombers operate beyond the range of their fighters and underestimated the effiency of British radar (which without the real BoB might not have been won). The later switch from military targets to terror bombings shows the lack of patience and overconfidence that the German High Command had. Then of course once Barbarrosa was launched any invasion of Britain in the near future was impossible and with the addition of the Americans in 42 they had to switch to defense.

With a protracted timetable with realistic goals (not commiting to deep operations too early) and expectations the Germans could have won. I'm confident that with the British needing supplies from overseas and the loss of fighters and more importantly pilots that Germany could have one.

[Rodion Romanovich]

A few things:
1. without an Operation Barbarossa air superiority of 1940 and early 1941 would have remained over the channel. However that would still not have been enough.
2. if the Vichy fleet ships could have been taken (and a few crews trained quickly), there would have been enough of a fleet to support the channel crossings. Although Vichy fleet plus Kriegsmarine would probably be weaker than Royal navy, the advantage in the air added to the advantage on the ground would have been enough. If only one third or half of the 40 divisions from the original Seelöwe plan would have been successfully inserted, the rest would have gone so quick that supply problems wouldn't have mattered that much. But I suppose the Vichy fleet would have scuttled earlier if any attempts to take the ships had been made...

So not impossible theoretically, but certainly impossible with the way of thinking among the German High Command at the time. Or perhaps they did know it was possible, but thought it wasn't worth what it would probably cost - several divisions eliminated in the very attempt to cross the channel.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

There's an old saw that suggests that amateur soldiers study tactics while the professionals study logistics.

Could the Luftwaffe have defeated the RAF with an alteration in tactics? Yes, at least to the extent of developing air superiority over the Channel narrows and the SE corner of England. But to what purpose?

Germany had -- at best -- three or four divisions which may have been airlifted to secure an airhead in SE England. These were crack troops, but lightly armed as were all air-mobile infantry of the era. They would have been subject to viscious counter-attacks by more numerous (albeit shoddily trained) home guard forces along with hastily re-equipped regular formations -- and probably every gaffer who could hold a Purdey. Moreover, Germany NEVER had the airlift capacity to put all of these forces into play at once (remember, even Market-Garden came in waves). Their ability to survive and create tolerably safe airheads would have been dubious at best.

If they could have created such air-heads, it would have been almost impossible for them to create working airfields for the needed Luftwaffe covering force to create a true bridgehead. Yes, the 109s and 87d's could have put down in any reasonably clear field -- with which SE England abounded at the time -- but fuel, bombs, mechanics, ammo etc. are very difficult to move forward via air supply alone (witness the chronic supply concerns of the air groups stationed in China along witht the difficulties the Germans had supplying troups by air drop in the CCCP). True operations from recently captured airfields are, at best difficult.

But suppose that the Fallschirmjaegers work miracles and capture half a dozen coordinated fields near a small port and that the Luftwaffe, by using its bomber force along with its trimotors can lift in enough supplies to keep the airhead open, to maintain some degree of air operations, and to allow the engineers to begin clearing the needed port. To work, an invasion would require the services of, at the least, a small port and the ability to sea-lift the necessary ground forces and supplies across. Did the Germans have enough "barges" to do so? Possibly, but the difficulty in crewing them and the limited conditions under which such semi-seaworthy vessels might be employed make an unescorted or "quickly slipping across in the dark" attempt almost impossible.

So now we have the Kreigsmarine facing the Home Fleet in the waters of the Channel and North Sea. The Germans can field -- best case -- 120 submarines, 20 Destroyers, 6 Cruisers, 2 Pre-dreadnoughts, and 5 capital ships (Bismarck, Scharnhorst, Gneisnau, and 2 pocket battleships). Please note, I'm already rounding up on Bis and the pre-dreads). The RN had available 20 subs, 90+ destroyers, 30+ cruisers, 2 carriers, and 8 capital ships. Even with half of these sunk/crippled by an abnormally effective series of luftwaffe attacks, the odds are still against the German navy.

Let us suppose even further that the Vichy Atlantic Fleet joins with the Germans (no Mers-el attack and French ally with the boches who just stomped them) and sorties successfully to the Channel . Coupled with 50% British and zero German/French casualties on the way in, the Axis now field 40+ destroyers, 9 cruisers, 2 Pre-dreads, and 7 capital ships. This force could theoretically defeat -- albeit with heavy casualties -- a British "sortie-en-masse" that had been halved by air-power.

Even so, this crippled Axis defensive force could keep the Channel open to barge traffic for only a few weeks to a month, whereupon the Mediterranean Fleet would replace it and end the cross channel traffic. A breakout of Axis forces through Gibraltar to counter them would have been virtually impossible. Would one month of perfect barge weather have given them enough panzers and supplies to break England?

If you truly believe Sea Lion could have been made to work with what was available, then I suggest a career in creative fiction (or politics, assuming there is a distinction between the two).

[lars573]

Actually there was 1 full equipped regular army division in the UK in 1940, the Canadian 1st division. My ancestors had arrived to late to be part of the BEF in France. So after Dunkirk ours was the only division at full strength with all their gear in the whole island.

[Rodion Romanovich]

@Seamus Fermanagh: you're reading my post so incorrectly, that I won't even respond to that. If you read your history books the same way you read my post then you'll have a good chance of a career in politics or writing fantasy novels.

[Franconicus]

Look at this:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sealion

Quote:
In wargames conducted at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1974, which assumed the Luftwaffe has not yet won air supremacy, the Germans were able to establish a beachhead in England by using a minefield screen in the English Channel to protect the initial assualt. However, the German ground forces were delayed at the "Stop Lines" (e.g. the GHQ Line), a layered series of defensive positions that had been built, each a combination of British Home Guard troops and physical barriers. At the same time the regular troops of the British Army were forming up. After only a few days, the Royal Navy was able to reach the Channel from Scapa Flow where they cut off supplies to German troops in England and prevented further reinforcement. Isolated and facing regular troops with armour and artillery the invasion force was forced to surrender.

A mass invasion by sea however, may not have been necessary. In British wartime cabinet documents released in 1998, it was revealed that after the failure of the British Expeditionary Force in France and its evacuation at Dunkirk, Winston Churchill had lost support in the cabinet and in Parliament. Had the Royal Air Force been defeated by the Luftwaffe, Churchill may have been replaced as Prime Minister by Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, who was believed to be in favour of peace negotiations with Germany rather than face a civilian bloodbath on British soil.

[spmetla]

That test though is only if air superiority hand't been won yet. The whole keypoint and the major part of the German strategy for Seelowe was that air superiority had been achieved over the Channel and the immediate shoreline of Southern England. The misappropiation of the Luftwaffe by Georing, Hitler, and the rest of the German High Command along with the gross underestimation of the RAF's ability to operate (remeber that the battle of France made the Luftwaffe think little of the RAF due to it's lack lustre performance throughout the whole campaign) and the effectiveness of British radar stations. If these factors had been taken into account and a more realistic timetable been established I'm confident that Sealion would have been succeseful but without winning the air campaign a succesful amphious invasion is nearly impossible.

[Pannonian]

A mass invasion by sea however, may not have been necessary. In British wartime cabinet documents released in 1998, it was revealed that after the failure of the British Expeditionary Force in France and its evacuation at Dunkirk, Winston Churchill had lost support in the cabinet and in Parliament. Had the Royal Air Force been defeated by the Luftwaffe, Churchill may have been replaced as Prime Minister by Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, who was believed to be in favour of peace negotiations with Germany rather than face a civilian bloodbath on British soil.

Wartime Britain traditionally demands a coalition government, and the Labour party and a large part of the Conservatives wouldn't have stomached Halifax or any other defeatist Tory forming a government. Halifax would have faced and lost a vote of No Confidence as soon as he took office.

[spmetla]

Well after reading several websites on the "whole plan for Sealion" along with it's attempts for a diversion in Ireland and then the failures of the one German exercise I change my mind and now believe that Sea Lion would have been impossible.

I still stand by the idea that the Luftwaffe could have gotten air superiority over southern england and this at least would have helped there war effort but not driven the British out of the war.

See! Sometime people do change there minds in internet debates.

[Kagemusha]

Ok. sorry guys if i came out as hostile in my latest reply it was pretty late at the time over here.

[screwtype]

Well after reading several websites on the "whole plan for Sealion" along with it's attempts for a diversion in Ireland and then the failures of the one German exercise I change my mind and now believe that Sea Lion would have been impossible.

I still stand by the idea that the Luftwaffe could have gotten air superiority over southern england and this at least would have helped there war effort but not driven the British out of the war.

See! Sometime people do change there minds in internet debates.

I don't know, it seems to me that if the Luftwaffe had established air supremacy, then control of the seas would have naturally followed. WWII proved how vulnerable capital ships are from the air, and the Luftwaffe had Stukas and Ju-88's which could perform the anti-shipping role very well. In any case air supremacy itself would probably have forced Britain to capitulate. It's hard to see the public putting up with a prolonged campaign of uncontested bombing.

The problem was gaining that air supremacy and the key, I think, would have been aiming at the greatest possible attrition of British pilots, which was the weakest link. However, the Germans probably didn't know that so they'd have been unlikely to put such a plan into action.

I guess the bottom line is that the Luftwaffe just didn't have the power to break the RAF in 1940, so any discussion of a possible conventional invasion is moot.

Which again brings us back to the Rommel plan. A large scale night drop of paratroops, combined with a night landing of the largest possible force with all available sea assets, immediately after Dunkirk, might just have pulled off a coup, and while obviously a long shot it would perhaps have been the only chance the Germans had of a successful invasion IMO.

But then, that too wasn't apparent at the time, it would only have become so after the Germans discovered in the subsequent battle that the RAF wasn't the inferior force they had anticipated.

[Pannonian]

I don't know, it seems to me that if the Luftwaffe had established air supremacy, then control of the seas would have naturally followed. WWII proved how vulnerable capital ships are from the air, and the Luftwaffe had Stukas and Ju-88's which could perform the anti-shipping role very well.

The Luftwaffe had shown itself to be incompetent in an anti-shipping role in the Norway campaign. It wasn't until the loss of the Prince of Wales that air attack alone was seen to be effective against warships at sea. In any case, 12 and 13 Group could have provided air cover as far south as the Thames and probably Kent. Even if the Luftwaffe had made the airfields of southern England untenable, the Home Fleet could simply have hugged the coast on its way south. Can you imagine Stukas and Ju-88s ranging far from their bases against Hurricanes and Spitfires close to theirs?

In any case air supremacy itself would probably have forced Britain to capitulate. It's hard to see the public putting up with a prolonged campaign of uncontested bombing.

Most accounts say that morale actually went up as a result of the bombings. In any case, Bomber Command could reply in kind.

The problem was gaining that air supremacy and the key, I think, would have been aiming at the greatest possible attrition of British pilots, which was the weakest link. However, the Germans probably didn't know that so they'd have been unlikely to put such a plan into action.

Attrition was always going to favour the British, as any British pilots surviving being shot down would soon return to action, while any German pilots suffering the same fate would be captured.

I guess the bottom line is that the Luftwaffe just didn't have the power to break the RAF in 1940, so any discussion of a possible conventional invasion is moot.

Which again brings us back to the Rommel plan. A large scale night drop of paratroops, combined with a night landing of the largest possible force with all available sea assets, immediately after Dunkirk, might just have pulled off a coup, and while obviously a long shot it would perhaps have been the only chance the Germans had of a successful invasion IMO.

But then, that too wasn't apparent at the time, it would only have become so after the Germans discovered in the subsequent battle that the RAF wasn't the inferior force they had anticipated.

Have you read the links I provided?