Could "Sea Lion" have succeeded?

[spmetla]

Well after reading several websites on the "whole plan for Sealion" along with it's attempts for a diversion in Ireland and then the failures of the one German exercise I change my mind and now believe that Sea Lion would have been impossible.

I still stand by the idea that the Luftwaffe could have gotten air superiority over southern england and this at least would have helped there war effort but not driven the British out of the war.

See! Sometime people do change there minds in internet debates.

[Kagemusha]

Ok. sorry guys if i came out as hostile in my latest reply it was pretty late at the time over here.

[screwtype]

Well after reading several websites on the "whole plan for Sealion" along with it's attempts for a diversion in Ireland and then the failures of the one German exercise I change my mind and now believe that Sea Lion would have been impossible.

I still stand by the idea that the Luftwaffe could have gotten air superiority over southern england and this at least would have helped there war effort but not driven the British out of the war.

See! Sometime people do change there minds in internet debates.

I don't know, it seems to me that if the Luftwaffe had established air supremacy, then control of the seas would have naturally followed. WWII proved how vulnerable capital ships are from the air, and the Luftwaffe had Stukas and Ju-88's which could perform the anti-shipping role very well. In any case air supremacy itself would probably have forced Britain to capitulate. It's hard to see the public putting up with a prolonged campaign of uncontested bombing.

The problem was gaining that air supremacy and the key, I think, would have been aiming at the greatest possible attrition of British pilots, which was the weakest link. However, the Germans probably didn't know that so they'd have been unlikely to put such a plan into action.

I guess the bottom line is that the Luftwaffe just didn't have the power to break the RAF in 1940, so any discussion of a possible conventional invasion is moot.

Which again brings us back to the Rommel plan. A large scale night drop of paratroops, combined with a night landing of the largest possible force with all available sea assets, immediately after Dunkirk, might just have pulled off a coup, and while obviously a long shot it would perhaps have been the only chance the Germans had of a successful invasion IMO.

But then, that too wasn't apparent at the time, it would only have become so after the Germans discovered in the subsequent battle that the RAF wasn't the inferior force they had anticipated.

[Pannonian]

I don't know, it seems to me that if the Luftwaffe had established air supremacy, then control of the seas would have naturally followed. WWII proved how vulnerable capital ships are from the air, and the Luftwaffe had Stukas and Ju-88's which could perform the anti-shipping role very well.

The Luftwaffe had shown itself to be incompetent in an anti-shipping role in the Norway campaign. It wasn't until the loss of the Prince of Wales that air attack alone was seen to be effective against warships at sea. In any case, 12 and 13 Group could have provided air cover as far south as the Thames and probably Kent. Even if the Luftwaffe had made the airfields of southern England untenable, the Home Fleet could simply have hugged the coast on its way south. Can you imagine Stukas and Ju-88s ranging far from their bases against Hurricanes and Spitfires close to theirs?

In any case air supremacy itself would probably have forced Britain to capitulate. It's hard to see the public putting up with a prolonged campaign of uncontested bombing.

Most accounts say that morale actually went up as a result of the bombings. In any case, Bomber Command could reply in kind.

The problem was gaining that air supremacy and the key, I think, would have been aiming at the greatest possible attrition of British pilots, which was the weakest link. However, the Germans probably didn't know that so they'd have been unlikely to put such a plan into action.

Attrition was always going to favour the British, as any British pilots surviving being shot down would soon return to action, while any German pilots suffering the same fate would be captured.

I guess the bottom line is that the Luftwaffe just didn't have the power to break the RAF in 1940, so any discussion of a possible conventional invasion is moot.

Which again brings us back to the Rommel plan. A large scale night drop of paratroops, combined with a night landing of the largest possible force with all available sea assets, immediately after Dunkirk, might just have pulled off a coup, and while obviously a long shot it would perhaps have been the only chance the Germans had of a successful invasion IMO.

But then, that too wasn't apparent at the time, it would only have become so after the Germans discovered in the subsequent battle that the RAF wasn't the inferior force they had anticipated.

Have you read the links I provided?

[Franconicus]

The Luftwaffe had shown itself to be incompetent in an anti-shipping role in the Norway campaign. It wasn't until the loss of the Prince of Wales that air attack alone was seen to be effective against warships at sea. In any case, 12 and 13 Group could have provided air cover as far south as the Thames and probably Kent. Even if the Luftwaffe had made the airfields of southern England untenable, the Home Fleet could simply have hugged the coast on its way south. Can you imagine Stukas and Ju-88s ranging far from their bases against Hurricanes and Spitfires close to theirs?

Pannonian,
The Norway campaign is maybe not the right example. Weren't most of the naval fights out of range?
The British attacked the Italian fleet in the med and showed that it worked. I think that made the Japs think about it too. The German planes, esp. the divers, were very effective in fighting ships. They gave the RN a hard time in the med.

Last night I had a look in Churchills war memories. He said that it would have been stupid to send the big ships into an area where the sky is controlled by German bombers. However, he said, that there were thousands of small ships (destroyers, subs, torpedo boats ...) that could attack the German troop carriers. Due to their number they could be hardly stopped by the Germans. I haven't seen it this way, but maybe he is right.

[screwtype]

edit......

[Franconicus]

I thought about it once more and I think that there was a chance to win it; which does not mean that there was no high risk; there was.

The only way to invade the British Islands sucessfully would have been:

1) After the evacuation of the British Expetition Forces from France (Dunkirk)the Germans had to slow their advance in France. This sounds silly but it would have put the British government under pressure to send more forces to the mainland. They did not have many intact divisons, though, so most likely they would have been forced to send some squads of the RAF, esp. fighters. This would not have changed the end in France but weakened the defense of Britain.
2) At the same time the German should have started the preparations of the landing: collecting ships and equipments, lay mines, attack traffic in the channel, train the paras, refill the army units
3) After the fall of France the invasion of should have taken at once and as surprising as possible. The British army was very weak then, but it was becoming stronger and stronger. The air attacks were silly. They were unsuitable to reach any of the strategic targets. They could not defeat the RAF, because the RAF could easily retreat north were the German fighters could not attack; they could not destroy the British industry nor end the supply lines at sea. So the whole campaign was just a waste of time and resources.
The Germans should have attacked immediatelly. Air raids against the RN, mine fields at the edges of the channel, then a massive landing of airborne and seaborne troops. The air borne troops should have been able to get two air fields (there were many there). Sure the Germans would not be able to supply them enough to use them as air bases, but at least they would have been able to use them to ship more troops and to refuel the fighters. So the range of the German fighters would have been much longer and the German airforce would have been able to attack most of the Islands territory (the range of the German bombers was sufficient).
Then a landing of some 200,000 German soldiers. It would have been a bloody fight and both sides would have lost a lot. The outcome would have been uncertain.


There were three reasons why the Germans failed:
1) Hitler thought that Churchill would give in, at least when the first bombs would fall.
2) Hitler did not have the intention to defeat Britain and to ruin the British empire. This would have happaned if the invasion had been successful
3) Hitler new that there was a high risk of loosing many divisions and even loosing the campaign and the good reputation he had gained after the fall of France. He thought that it was not necessary to attack Britain, that he would win anyway.
4) He was focused on the USSR.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

I thought about it once more and I think that there was a chance to win it; which does not mean that there was no high risk; there was.

The only way to invade the British Islands sucessfully would have been:

1) After the evacuation of the British Expetition Forces from France (Dunkirk)the Germans had to slow their advance in France. This sounds silly but it would have put the British government under pressure to send more forces to the mainland. They did not have many intact divisons, though, so most likely they would have been forced to send some squads of the RAF, esp. fighters. This would not have changed the end in France but weakened the defense of Britain.
2) At the same time the German should have started the preparations of the landing: collecting ships and equipments, lay mines, attack traffic in the channel, train the paras, refill the army units
3) After the fall of France the invasion of should have taken at once and as surprising as possible. The British army was very weak then, but it was becoming stronger and stronger. The air attacks were silly. They were unsuitable to reach any of the strategic targets. They could not defeat the RAF, because the RAF could easily retreat north were the German fighters could not attack; they could not destroy the British industry nor end the supply lines at sea. So the whole campaign was just a waste of time and resources.
The Germans should have attacked immediatelly. Air raids against the RN, mine fields at the edges of the channel, then a massive landing of airborne and seaborne troops. The air borne troops should have been able to get two air fields (there were many there). Sure the Germans would not be able to supply them enough to use them as air bases, but at least they would have been able to use them to ship more troops and to refuel the fighters. So the range of the German fighters would have been much longer and the German airforce would have been able to attack most of the Islands territory (the range of the German bombers was sufficient).
Then a landing of some 200,000 German soldiers. It would have been a bloody fight and both sides would have lost a lot. The outcome would have been uncertain.


There were three reasons why the Germans failed:
1) Hitler thought that Churchill would give in, at least when the first bombs would fall.
2) Hitler did not have the intention to defeat Britain and to ruin the British empire. This would have happaned if the invasion had been successful
3) Hitler new that there was a high risk of loosing many divisions and even loosing the campaign and the good reputation he had gained after the fall of France. He thought that it was not necessary to attack Britain, that he would win anyway.
4) He was focused on the USSR.

You're right as to the timing. A landing immediately after Dunkirk -- or even better during that evac -- would have maximized the panic factor and given Germanys forces a huge leverage factor. On the other hand, they had to finish with France in order to take advantage of that same "sense of defeat" shock that they had inflicted. They didn't want France to develop a "second wind."

I've read nobody who could come up with a plausible way to create the sealift capacity required to put that kind of force into the UK with anything resembling heavy supplies. Airlift in the time was hugely limited and while staging fighters through the captured airfields might have been an improvement for the Germans, they really wouldn't have been able to base anything there -- an important limitation. Also, while not impossible, I haven't seen anything that, IMO could truly have prevent the RN from mucking up the whole thing -- killing lots of RN people and units, yes, but actually screening away or destroying it, no.

[Pannonian]

You're right as to the timing. A landing immediately after Dunkirk -- or even better during that evac -- would have maximized the panic factor and given Germanys forces a huge leverage factor. On the other hand, they had to finish with France in order to take advantage of that same "sense of defeat" shock that they had inflicted. They didn't want France to develop a "second wind."

I've read nobody who could come up with a plausible way to create the sealift capacity required to put that kind of force into the UK with anything resembling heavy supplies. Airlift in the time was hugely limited and while staging fighters through the captured airfields might have been an improvement for the Germans, they really wouldn't have been able to base anything there -- an important limitation. Also, while not impossible, I haven't seen anything that, IMO could truly have prevent the RN from mucking up the whole thing -- killing lots of RN people and units, yes, but actually screening away or destroying it, no.

A point little considered in this discussion is that Fighter Command was mostly untouched at this time, while the Luftwaffe would have been at least tired from the campaign in France. If the Home Fleet decided to come south to muck up the crossings, it could do so under air cover provided by 12 and 13 Group, with 11 Group covering the last dash from the Thames mouth to the south coast. Fighters couldn't damage warships, level bombers were useless for attacking warships, and dive bombers were horribly vulnerable to the Hurricanes and Spitfires Fighter Command had in abundance. Trying to cross without having first achieved air superiority of better still, air supremacy, would mean losing the transport fleet, or worse, landing your invasion force then having the transport fleet destroyed behind them.

The air battle was a necessary precursor to the invasion of Britain, but there was no way of achieving the victory conditions of the air battle.