Could "Sea Lion" have succeeded?

[Kagemusha]

Ok. sorry guys if i came out as hostile in my latest reply it was pretty late at the time over here.

[Rodion Romanovich]

@Seamus Fermanagh: you're reading my post so incorrectly, that I won't even respond to that. If you read your history books the same way you read my post then you'll have a good chance of a career in politics or writing fantasy novels.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

@Seamus Fermanagh: you're reading my post so incorrectly, that I won't even respond to that. If you read your history books the same way you read my post then you'll have a good chance of a career in politics or writing fantasy novels.

Actually, I thought your post was more or less on target. I was expanding on the impracticability issues to which you had alluded. My post, which followed yours in sequence, was not conceived of -- at least by me -- as a direct response to yours (if it were I'd have quoted you or bolded your name -- only fair thing to do). I was addressing the general trend of many in this thread to address the tactical issues without putting the strategic perspective on it -- a perspective which your post did address.

So, if I have accidentally offended you, sorry, but it was neither my intent nor -- I had thought -- my result.

By-the-way, I have not yet slipped so low as to seek office -- a person must preserve some shred of dignity.

[screwtype]

Well after reading several websites on the "whole plan for Sealion" along with it's attempts for a diversion in Ireland and then the failures of the one German exercise I change my mind and now believe that Sea Lion would have been impossible.

I still stand by the idea that the Luftwaffe could have gotten air superiority over southern england and this at least would have helped there war effort but not driven the British out of the war.

See! Sometime people do change there minds in internet debates.

I don't know, it seems to me that if the Luftwaffe had established air supremacy, then control of the seas would have naturally followed. WWII proved how vulnerable capital ships are from the air, and the Luftwaffe had Stukas and Ju-88's which could perform the anti-shipping role very well. In any case air supremacy itself would probably have forced Britain to capitulate. It's hard to see the public putting up with a prolonged campaign of uncontested bombing.

The problem was gaining that air supremacy and the key, I think, would have been aiming at the greatest possible attrition of British pilots, which was the weakest link. However, the Germans probably didn't know that so they'd have been unlikely to put such a plan into action.

I guess the bottom line is that the Luftwaffe just didn't have the power to break the RAF in 1940, so any discussion of a possible conventional invasion is moot.

Which again brings us back to the Rommel plan. A large scale night drop of paratroops, combined with a night landing of the largest possible force with all available sea assets, immediately after Dunkirk, might just have pulled off a coup, and while obviously a long shot it would perhaps have been the only chance the Germans had of a successful invasion IMO.

But then, that too wasn't apparent at the time, it would only have become so after the Germans discovered in the subsequent battle that the RAF wasn't the inferior force they had anticipated.

[Pannonian]

I don't know, it seems to me that if the Luftwaffe had established air supremacy, then control of the seas would have naturally followed. WWII proved how vulnerable capital ships are from the air, and the Luftwaffe had Stukas and Ju-88's which could perform the anti-shipping role very well.

The Luftwaffe had shown itself to be incompetent in an anti-shipping role in the Norway campaign. It wasn't until the loss of the Prince of Wales that air attack alone was seen to be effective against warships at sea. In any case, 12 and 13 Group could have provided air cover as far south as the Thames and probably Kent. Even if the Luftwaffe had made the airfields of southern England untenable, the Home Fleet could simply have hugged the coast on its way south. Can you imagine Stukas and Ju-88s ranging far from their bases against Hurricanes and Spitfires close to theirs?

In any case air supremacy itself would probably have forced Britain to capitulate. It's hard to see the public putting up with a prolonged campaign of uncontested bombing.

Most accounts say that morale actually went up as a result of the bombings. In any case, Bomber Command could reply in kind.

The problem was gaining that air supremacy and the key, I think, would have been aiming at the greatest possible attrition of British pilots, which was the weakest link. However, the Germans probably didn't know that so they'd have been unlikely to put such a plan into action.

Attrition was always going to favour the British, as any British pilots surviving being shot down would soon return to action, while any German pilots suffering the same fate would be captured.

I guess the bottom line is that the Luftwaffe just didn't have the power to break the RAF in 1940, so any discussion of a possible conventional invasion is moot.

Which again brings us back to the Rommel plan. A large scale night drop of paratroops, combined with a night landing of the largest possible force with all available sea assets, immediately after Dunkirk, might just have pulled off a coup, and while obviously a long shot it would perhaps have been the only chance the Germans had of a successful invasion IMO.

But then, that too wasn't apparent at the time, it would only have become so after the Germans discovered in the subsequent battle that the RAF wasn't the inferior force they had anticipated.

Have you read the links I provided?

[Franconicus]

The Luftwaffe had shown itself to be incompetent in an anti-shipping role in the Norway campaign. It wasn't until the loss of the Prince of Wales that air attack alone was seen to be effective against warships at sea. In any case, 12 and 13 Group could have provided air cover as far south as the Thames and probably Kent. Even if the Luftwaffe had made the airfields of southern England untenable, the Home Fleet could simply have hugged the coast on its way south. Can you imagine Stukas and Ju-88s ranging far from their bases against Hurricanes and Spitfires close to theirs?

Pannonian,
The Norway campaign is maybe not the right example. Weren't most of the naval fights out of range?
The British attacked the Italian fleet in the med and showed that it worked. I think that made the Japs think about it too. The German planes, esp. the divers, were very effective in fighting ships. They gave the RN a hard time in the med.

Last night I had a look in Churchills war memories. He said that it would have been stupid to send the big ships into an area where the sky is controlled by German bombers. However, he said, that there were thousands of small ships (destroyers, subs, torpedo boats ...) that could attack the German troop carriers. Due to their number they could be hardly stopped by the Germans. I haven't seen it this way, but maybe he is right.

[Rodion Romanovich]

@Seamus: ok

[edyzmedieval]

I think Sea Lion would have succeeded if they attacked the strategic bases of the English Air Force.
Instead, they attacked the cities, but it proved useless, because the great Spitfires and Hurricanes could still get off the ground.

[screwtype]

edit......

[Franconicus]

I thought about it once more and I think that there was a chance to win it; which does not mean that there was no high risk; there was.

The only way to invade the British Islands sucessfully would have been:

1) After the evacuation of the British Expetition Forces from France (Dunkirk)the Germans had to slow their advance in France. This sounds silly but it would have put the British government under pressure to send more forces to the mainland. They did not have many intact divisons, though, so most likely they would have been forced to send some squads of the RAF, esp. fighters. This would not have changed the end in France but weakened the defense of Britain.
2) At the same time the German should have started the preparations of the landing: collecting ships and equipments, lay mines, attack traffic in the channel, train the paras, refill the army units
3) After the fall of France the invasion of should have taken at once and as surprising as possible. The British army was very weak then, but it was becoming stronger and stronger. The air attacks were silly. They were unsuitable to reach any of the strategic targets. They could not defeat the RAF, because the RAF could easily retreat north were the German fighters could not attack; they could not destroy the British industry nor end the supply lines at sea. So the whole campaign was just a waste of time and resources.
The Germans should have attacked immediatelly. Air raids against the RN, mine fields at the edges of the channel, then a massive landing of airborne and seaborne troops. The air borne troops should have been able to get two air fields (there were many there). Sure the Germans would not be able to supply them enough to use them as air bases, but at least they would have been able to use them to ship more troops and to refuel the fighters. So the range of the German fighters would have been much longer and the German airforce would have been able to attack most of the Islands territory (the range of the German bombers was sufficient).
Then a landing of some 200,000 German soldiers. It would have been a bloody fight and both sides would have lost a lot. The outcome would have been uncertain.


There were three reasons why the Germans failed:
1) Hitler thought that Churchill would give in, at least when the first bombs would fall.
2) Hitler did not have the intention to defeat Britain and to ruin the British empire. This would have happaned if the invasion had been successful
3) Hitler new that there was a high risk of loosing many divisions and even loosing the campaign and the good reputation he had gained after the fall of France. He thought that it was not necessary to attack Britain, that he would win anyway.
4) He was focused on the USSR.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

I thought about it once more and I think that there was a chance to win it; which does not mean that there was no high risk; there was.

The only way to invade the British Islands sucessfully would have been:

1) After the evacuation of the British Expetition Forces from France (Dunkirk)the Germans had to slow their advance in France. This sounds silly but it would have put the British government under pressure to send more forces to the mainland. They did not have many intact divisons, though, so most likely they would have been forced to send some squads of the RAF, esp. fighters. This would not have changed the end in France but weakened the defense of Britain.
2) At the same time the German should have started the preparations of the landing: collecting ships and equipments, lay mines, attack traffic in the channel, train the paras, refill the army units
3) After the fall of France the invasion of should have taken at once and as surprising as possible. The British army was very weak then, but it was becoming stronger and stronger. The air attacks were silly. They were unsuitable to reach any of the strategic targets. They could not defeat the RAF, because the RAF could easily retreat north were the German fighters could not attack; they could not destroy the British industry nor end the supply lines at sea. So the whole campaign was just a waste of time and resources.
The Germans should have attacked immediatelly. Air raids against the RN, mine fields at the edges of the channel, then a massive landing of airborne and seaborne troops. The air borne troops should have been able to get two air fields (there were many there). Sure the Germans would not be able to supply them enough to use them as air bases, but at least they would have been able to use them to ship more troops and to refuel the fighters. So the range of the German fighters would have been much longer and the German airforce would have been able to attack most of the Islands territory (the range of the German bombers was sufficient).
Then a landing of some 200,000 German soldiers. It would have been a bloody fight and both sides would have lost a lot. The outcome would have been uncertain.


There were three reasons why the Germans failed:
1) Hitler thought that Churchill would give in, at least when the first bombs would fall.
2) Hitler did not have the intention to defeat Britain and to ruin the British empire. This would have happaned if the invasion had been successful
3) Hitler new that there was a high risk of loosing many divisions and even loosing the campaign and the good reputation he had gained after the fall of France. He thought that it was not necessary to attack Britain, that he would win anyway.
4) He was focused on the USSR.

You're right as to the timing. A landing immediately after Dunkirk -- or even better during that evac -- would have maximized the panic factor and given Germanys forces a huge leverage factor. On the other hand, they had to finish with France in order to take advantage of that same "sense of defeat" shock that they had inflicted. They didn't want France to develop a "second wind."

I've read nobody who could come up with a plausible way to create the sealift capacity required to put that kind of force into the UK with anything resembling heavy supplies. Airlift in the time was hugely limited and while staging fighters through the captured airfields might have been an improvement for the Germans, they really wouldn't have been able to base anything there -- an important limitation. Also, while not impossible, I haven't seen anything that, IMO could truly have prevent the RN from mucking up the whole thing -- killing lots of RN people and units, yes, but actually screening away or destroying it, no.

[Pannonian]

You're right as to the timing. A landing immediately after Dunkirk -- or even better during that evac -- would have maximized the panic factor and given Germanys forces a huge leverage factor. On the other hand, they had to finish with France in order to take advantage of that same "sense of defeat" shock that they had inflicted. They didn't want France to develop a "second wind."

I've read nobody who could come up with a plausible way to create the sealift capacity required to put that kind of force into the UK with anything resembling heavy supplies. Airlift in the time was hugely limited and while staging fighters through the captured airfields might have been an improvement for the Germans, they really wouldn't have been able to base anything there -- an important limitation. Also, while not impossible, I haven't seen anything that, IMO could truly have prevent the RN from mucking up the whole thing -- killing lots of RN people and units, yes, but actually screening away or destroying it, no.

A point little considered in this discussion is that Fighter Command was mostly untouched at this time, while the Luftwaffe would have been at least tired from the campaign in France. If the Home Fleet decided to come south to muck up the crossings, it could do so under air cover provided by 12 and 13 Group, with 11 Group covering the last dash from the Thames mouth to the south coast. Fighters couldn't damage warships, level bombers were useless for attacking warships, and dive bombers were horribly vulnerable to the Hurricanes and Spitfires Fighter Command had in abundance. Trying to cross without having first achieved air superiority of better still, air supremacy, would mean losing the transport fleet, or worse, landing your invasion force then having the transport fleet destroyed behind them.

The air battle was a necessary precursor to the invasion of Britain, but there was no way of achieving the victory conditions of the air battle.

[Franconicus]

You're right as to the timing. A landing immediately after Dunkirk -- or even better during that evac -- would have maximized the panic factor and given Germanys forces a huge leverage factor. On the other hand, they had to finish with France in order to take advantage of that same "sense of defeat" shock that they had inflicted. They didn't want France to develop a "second wind."

[QUOTE=PannonianThe air battle was a necessary precursor to the invasion of Britain, but there was no way of achieving the victory conditions of the air battle. [/QUOTE]
Hitler had to defeat France first. What he did was defeat France quickly, then wait a while and then start a long air campaign. That was wrong! What he should have done was a slow campaign against the French. The Brits would have been forced to help their allies. At that time they had little to offer than the RAF. However, even this help would not have changed the end: in the end French would have been finished and this time the RAF would have been damaged too. And maybe more RN ships due to more evacuations.
A slow operation against France with a simultaneous build up against the UK.

As soon as France surrendered and the last British troops returned home (and the RN suddenly had to defend the Med all by itself) would have been the right time.

Pannonian, what was the air invasion good for. It was never able to weaken the RAF more than it allowed.

The big ships pf the RN would not have been the problem. The smaller ships would have been. It would have been a war of the biggest navy against mines and bombs. In 1940 the ships had only little armors ontheir decks and poor AAA. Stukas were very effective against ships. And the RAF suddenly would have had to fight over the channel under much worse conditions. High casualties on both sides.

How many men would be necesary to beat the British Army? Right after the defeat of France, not many. So there would have been the option of supplying them.

[Watchman]

I'm not wholly convinced a long slow campaign in France would've been a terribly good idea. Wasn't the whole point to get the country to fold fast as the Germans didn't really want to get bogged down in a WW1-style attrition war ? A drawn-out campaign would merely have downplayed the single biggest advantage the Germans had over their opponents early on, namely well-developed mechanized breakthrough concepts. The point of those is sort of defeated if the enemy is allowed to reform and dig into new, better defensive positions isn't it ?

[Kagemusha]

I agree with Watchman.A slow Campaign could have turned out very bad for Germans.We shouldnt take the French army in WWII that granted.

[Watchman]

Don't most "what if" scenarios, including the ones that can be taken seriously, also suggest that a long grinding war in France would've been if not quite a losing proposition then in any case very sub-optimal one for the Germans ? That's the impression I've gotten, anyway.

The fact that German strategy in both of the World Wars was to try to knock France ("the foremost and strongest bastion of Britain") out ASAP would also suggest something of the sort.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Hitler had to defeat France first. What he did was defeat France quickly, then wait a while and then start a long air campaign. That was wrong! What he should have done was a slow campaign against the French. The Brits would have been forced to help their allies. At that time they had little to offer than the RAF. However, even this help would not have changed the end: in the end French would have been finished and this time the RAF would have been damaged too. And maybe more RN ships due to more evacuations.
A slow operation against France with a simultaneous build up against the UK.

I think you are underestimating the French here. They had been out-manuevered and their will to combat had been damped by the shock of the German advance (4 weeks from the opening attacks to the conclusion of Dunkirk), but their losses had been substantially greater only in aircraft and they still had a substantial number of divisions in place. Given time to solidify their lines and mobilize resources and the battle would have been tougher -- and the Germans were well aware of this. The armor was paused for as SHORT a time as possible (minimum maintenance and re-supply) in order to "keep up the skeer."

Side note: N.B. Forrest was a racist *******, but he would have made one hellaciously good armor general.

The Luftwaffe was not in a position to act against England during that time frame, since their basing structure was too far back to launch a sustained campaign in support anyway. Moving those bases into Belgium and Lille was also part of the required brief pause before striking France after Dunkirk.

Overall, the more I look at blitz operations, the difficulties following the breakthrough are all centered on units operating at the end of a string logistically. As in the tanks and troops could go even further against the shocked opposition, but the bogeys are wearing out and the filters are all half clogged and the new field you just landed your fighter at has fuel...but only hand-pumps to use to fill your bird.

I understand the conceptual point you are making, but Germany's logistical capability at the time would not have supported that approach.

[Aenlic]

Sealion could have succeeded if the bombing of Berlin hadn't completely embarrassed Göring and incensed Hitler, causing them to shift focus from destroying the RAF in preparation for Sealion to terror bombing civilian targets in revenge for Berlin.

Churchill admitted, in his memoirs, that the RAF was on its last legs due to the constant attrition of fields, equipment and supplies by the Luftwaffe campaign prior to the Blitz. He stated that the shift of the bombing to the Blitz of civilian targets gave the RAF the time and rest it needed to reform and resupply and repair, which gave them the ability to win the air battle over Britain. Prior to that they had been losing. This is all according to Churchill, remember.

The bombing of Berlin may very well have been the actual turning point of the war. It led to the disastrous (for Germany and fortunate for the Allies) change of Luftwaffe tactics. It allowed the RAF to recover and eventually turn back the Luftwaffe, which it had been unable to do previously. It forced Hitler to save dwindling air assets and shift much of them to the Eastern front for Operation Barbarosa, leaving the RAF free to gain control over the Western front. Operation Barbarosa was supposed to occur after Sealion's success and with thus with many more assets.

Had Hitler kept his head (what little of it he had) and Göring offered sound advice, then the Luftwaffe would have finished the military air campaign instead of switching to spending air assets on bombing civilian targets from London to Glasgow and Belfast. They had the RAF on the ropes; it was done for. With the RAF decimated and factories and resupply destroyed (the original intent of the bombing prior to the accidental drop inside London and the retaliation bombing of Berlin which led to the Blitz), Operation Sealion could had proceeded with no obstacles.

Assuming the above - maintaining focus on military targets by the Luftwaffe - the Royal Navy and the RAF would not have been able to stop a sea lift from the mainland. The Luftwaffe proved they were capable of bombing as far as Belfast and Glasgow during the Blitz. If they'd not started the Blitz and finished the job on the RAF, then they would have had complete control of the skies above land and sea. The would have been able to bomb any resistance to an invasion into submission. After succeeding with Sealion, it could very possibly have kept the U.S. out of the war considering the pro-fascist standpoint of many in the power elite (Harriman, Ford and others) in the U.S. combined with a general isolationist public due to the horrors of WWI. With Sealion a success, and the U.S. possibly kept out of the European war, Hitler could then have shifted assets to begin Barbarosa. The outcome of Barbarosa would have been entirely different - and the whole war after.

We should consider ourselves lucky that the UK opted to bomb Berlin, leading to the retaliation of the Blitz, which ultimately led to the failure of the previously rather successful air campaign of the Luftwaffe in Britain and thus the failure of plans for Operation Sealion.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Sealion could have succeeded if the bombing of Berlin hadn't completely embarrassed Göring and incensed Hitler, causing them to shift focus from destroying the RAF in preparation for Sealion to terror bombing civilian targets in revenge for Berlin.

Churchill admitted, in his memoirs, that the RAF was on its last legs due to the constant attrition of fields, equipment and supplies by the Luftwaffe campaign prior to the Blitz. He stated that the shift of the bombing to the Blitz of civilian targets gave the RAF the time and rest it needed to reform and resupply and repair, which gave them the ability to win the air battle over Britain. Prior to that they had been losing. This is all according to Churchill, remember.

The bombing of Berlin may very well have been the actual turning point of the war. It led to the disastrous (for Germany and fortunate for the Allies) change of Luftwaffe tactics. It allowed the RAF to recover and eventually turn back the Luftwaffe, which it had been unable to do previously. It forced Hitler to save dwindling air assets and shift much of them to the Eastern front for Operation Barbarosa, leaving the RAF free to gain control over the Western front. Operation Barbarosa was supposed to occur after Sealion's success and with thus with many more assets.

Had Hitler kept his head (what little of it he had) and Göring offered sound advice, then the Luftwaffe would have finished the military air campaign instead of switching to spending air assets on bombing civilian targets from London to Glasgow and Belfast. They had the RAF on the ropes; it was done for. With the RAF decimated and factories and resupply destroyed (the original intent of the bombing prior to the accidental drop inside London and the retaliation bombing of Berlin which led to the Blitz), Operation Sealion could had proceeded with no obstacles.

Assuming the above - maintaining focus on military targets by the Luftwaffe - the Royal Navy and the RAF would not have been able to stop a sea lift from the mainland. The Luftwaffe proved they were capable of bombing as far as Belfast and Glasgow during the Blitz. If they'd not started the Blitz and finished the job on the RAF, then they would have had complete control of the skies above land and sea. The would have been able to bomb any resistance to an invasion into submission. After succeeding with Sealion, it could very possibly have kept the U.S. out of the war considering the pro-fascist standpoint of many in the power elite (Harriman, Ford and others) in the U.S. combined with a general isolationist public due to the horrors of WWI. With Sealion a success, and the U.S. possibly kept out of the European war, Hitler could then have shifted assets to begin Barbarosa. The outcome of Barbarosa would have been entirely different - and the whole war after.

We should consider ourselves lucky that the UK opted to bomb Berlin, leading to the retaliation of the Blitz, which ultimately led to the failure of the previously rather successful air campaign of the Luftwaffe in Britain and thus the failure of plans for Operation Sealion.

This is the classic view presented in my school history books. However, I believe that a more focused discussion on the remaining strength of the RAF, the efficacy of the Luftwaffe in a naval interdiction role, the power of the RN, and Germany's weak sealift capacity undercut this orthodox view. Most of these points have been referenced above by myself and others.

[Kalle]

I think the only way an invasion of England would have been possible was if England and its empire was THE goal for German warfare and even so a long term global strategy would be necessery.

Gibraltar, Malta, rest of Med, Middleeast and even India should be dealt with, prolly before England itself.

Friendly relations with Soviets must be maintained.

American neutrality must be maintained.

All production not necessery for fighting the brits in the med/middleeast goes to expanding naval and air forces with an aim of outproducing Britain and bring naval force at least up to par with English (thus we are talking many years).

All this match up and Britain could be brought to its knees without invasion and even invaded should they still be stubborn.

Anyone of these things not happen I dont see an invasion of England possible.

Kalle

[Aenlic]

This is the classic view presented in my school history books. However, I believe that a more focused discussion on the remaining strength of the RAF, the efficacy of the Luftwaffe in a naval interdiction role, the power of the RN, and Germany's weak sealift capacity undercut this orthodox view. Most of these points have been referenced above by myself and others.

Very well, point by point then, beginning with the RAF.

RAF strength was nonexistent prior to the breathing room given them by the Blitz. Every British airfield was bombed almost nightly, most of the fighter strength was grounded due to lack of repair; because along with the airfields, the UK military manufacturing capacity was also bombed almost nightly. There was no strength to the RAF at that point.

The efficacy of the Luftwaffe in a naval interdiction role has already been argued here; but I'll reiterate it. The Luftwaffe possessed a great capacity for naval interdiction. They were able to bomb Glasgow and Belfast during the Blitz, after all. This means they were fully capable of bombing naval targets in most of the North Sea and the Celtic Sea and all of the Irish Sea. It has already been pointed out how effective Stukas could be in the role, no less the HE's. With the RAF essentially downed, there would be no protection for the RN. Ships with no air cover in a limited sea area like the Channel are nothing but sitting ducks for air attack. D-Day could not have occurred if the allies had not established air supremacy by then.

The power of the RN is covered above.

Germany's weak sea lift capacity. This is the only area in which we agree. But that weakness is compensated for if Germany is able to establish air supremacy prior to the amphibious operations. They were well on the way to doing so before the shift to terror bombing.

It's all well and good to try and be a historical revisionist; as long as you have some basis for the assumptions that you're making. Your history books teach the "classic view" as you call it for a reason. They're based upon the observations and knowledge of people who were there at the time, in positions to know what did and did not occur. We're not talking here about ancient history based on second or third hand accounts written decades or centuries after the fact and thus susceptible to reinterpretation. Unless you can provide some definitive evidence to overturn the classic view, you're just engaging in baseless speculation.

[Pannonian]

Very well, point by point then, beginning with the RAF.

RAF strength was nonexistent prior to the breathing room given them by the Blitz. Every British airfield was bombed almost nightly, most of the fighter strength was grounded due to lack of repair; because along with the airfields, the UK military manufacturing capacity was also bombed almost nightly. There was no strength to the RAF at that point.

12 Group, almost as well equipped as 11 Group by that time, was almost untouched, to the extent that Bader got a bunch of other bored 12 Groupers Leigh Mallory consented to release to go on jaunts with him. If things got unbearably hot for 11 Group, they would have withdrawn north to the midlands while 12 Group would look after London instead. After some R&R, back comes 11 Group, fresh and refitted.

Also, the UK was outproducing Germany in fighter planes because the main manufacturing centres are up north (Coventry is probably the southernmost). Southern England is farmland, as a rail trip in the south would tell you.

Another point is that RAF pilots who survived being shot down returned to action, while Luftwaffe pilots were captured. In every aspect of attrition the Luftwaffe was losing.

The efficacy of the Luftwaffe in a naval interdiction role has already been argued here; but I'll reiterate it. The Luftwaffe possessed a great capacity for naval interdiction. They were able to bomb Glasgow and Belfast during the Blitz, after all.

Dropping bombs does not constitute bombing range. Dropping bombs with effect, and to be able to carry out such operations on a regular basis constitutes bombing range. Despite dropping a few bombs on Tokyo, the Doolittle raid did not mean the US could include Tokyo in its bombing range. Only when they could reliably bomb Tokyo without excruciating losses caused by lack of fighter cover could they realistically make that claim. The Luftwaffe's fighter cover did not extend much beyond London.

This means they were fully capable of bombing naval targets in most of the North Sea and the Celtic Sea and all of the Irish Sea. It has already been pointed out how effective Stukas could be in the role, no less the HE's.

With the RAF essentially downed, there would be no protection for the RN. Ships with no air cover in a limited sea area like the Channel are nothing but sitting ducks for air attack. D-Day could not have occurred if the allies had not established air supremacy by then.

And yet they were ineffective in the Norwegian campaign in much more favourable conditions. If the Home Fleet sailed south, it would do so under extremely heavy fighter cover first from 13 Group, then 12 Group until it reached the Thames. A mixture of 10 and 12 Group would probably cover the rest of the route. And how effective were Stukas against Hurricanes and Spitfires? Goering withdrew them from action because they couldn't compete.

The power of the RN is covered above.

Germany's weak sea lift capacity. This is the only area in which we agree. But that weakness is compensated for if Germany is able to establish air supremacy prior to the amphibious operations. They were well on the way to doing so before the shift to terror bombing.

The German transports collected for the operation weren't even seaworthy. Even if we remove the RAF and RN from the scenario, the German transports still can't survive the Channel crossing. Even if they survive the initial crossing, they'll still need to weather at least a couple of weeks of constant resupply without serious losses before the invasion force can start looking inland. Are you aware that a modern army can't just be dumped on an enemy shore and be left to campaign?

It's all well and good to try and be a historical revisionist; as long as you have some basis for the assumptions that you're making. Your history books teach the "classic view" as you call it for a reason. They're based upon the observations and knowledge of people who were there at the time, in positions to know what did and did not occur. We're not talking here about ancient history based on second or third hand accounts written decades or centuries after the fact and thus susceptible to reinterpretation. Unless you can provide some definitive evidence to overturn the classic view, you're just engaging in baseless speculation.

Read the urls at the start of the thread. Also note that Sandhurst has wargamed Sealion on several occasions, each time ignoring many of the practical problems the Germans had and assuming that they would have perfect organisation and commuinications from the start. Even given extremely favourable conditions from which to start, the German side always ended up having to evacuate with most of their invasion force lost.

As I see it, you've ignored all the problems facing the Germans, magnified their success, discounted British successes and plans, and concluded therefore that the Germans would win.

Here's a nice discussion about the subject. Page 3 has a post from a participator in the original 1974 wargame.
http://www.wargamesdirectory.com/htm...Page=1&ID=1857

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Adding to Pan-man's post previous to this, I'd also note that the efficacy of the Luftwaffe against ships was mixed.

Stukas were one of the few effective types they possessed for shipping attacks and while Stukas sank a number of RN ships during the war, including 2 light cruisers, they never sank any of the heavier units they faced.

Part of this was ordinance related. The German 550lb AP bomb was decent ordinance, but 550 - pounders were of limited effect against heavy cruisers or better throughout the war. The Stuka could haul an 1100 pounder, which would have fared better, but could only do so by trading off range and getting rid of the gunner for that flight. (plugged in Stuka BomB Ship and did some reading -- NOT wiki)

The Germans really didn't use torpedos from a/c during the war, and would thus have had a lot of trouble taking on the British major surface units. It wouldn' take much effort from one or two County-class (much less a Rodney or KGV) to bust up a cobbled-together barge fleet.

As Pan-man suggests, there is evidence that the Luftwaffe may have been capable of air superiorty (using the tactics you outline) but air supremacy was unlikely at best. Without virtually absolut supremacy they could never have effectively interdicted the RN. Moreover, even with air supremacy over the narrows of the Channel, I don't think they could have taken out 90%+ of the RN's major surface units prior to them damaging/destroying much of the limited sealift the Germans had.

[Aenlic]

12 Group, almost as well equipped as 11 Group by that time, was almost untouched, to the extent that Bader got a bunch of other bored 12 Groupers Leigh Mallory consented to release to go on jaunts with him. If things got unbearably hot for 11 Group, they would have withdrawn north to the midlands while 12 Group would look after London instead. After some R&R, back comes 11 Group, fresh and refitted.

Also, the UK was outproducing Germany in fighter planes because the main manufacturing centres are up north (Coventry is probably the southernmost). Southern England is farmland, as a rail trip in the south would tell you.

The Luftwaffe bombed Belfast and Glasgow. Unless you're claiming the main manufacturing plants were in the Faroes, just what, exactly do you consider too far north to be hit? Keep in mind that the main manufacturing plants were in Sheffield and Manchester, which also happen to be the two of the hardest hit towns after London during the Blitz. ;) Other North country towns heavily hit during the Blitz (remember this is when you suppose that Leigh-Mallory's Big Wings would have been able to control the skies when Park's 11th were down) besides those two above include Leeds, Newcastle, Liverpool, Hull and more. Is that far enough north? It's the heart of the British industrial north.

Another point is that RAF pilots who survived being shot down returned to action, while Luftwaffe pilots were captured. In every aspect of attrition the Luftwaffe was losing.

A good point. Except that Park himself stated that he would lose a war of attrition.

Dropping bombs does not constitute bombing range. Dropping bombs with effect, and to be able to carry out such operations on a regular basis constitutes bombing range. Despite dropping a few bombs on Tokyo, the Doolittle raid did not mean the US could include Tokyo in its bombing range. Only when they could reliably bomb Tokyo without excruciating losses caused by lack of fighter cover could they realistically make that claim. The Luftwaffe's fighter cover did not extend much beyond London.

This is just not a sensible argument. The Luftwaffe bombed the North country repeatedly, especially Sheffield. The comparison to Doolittle's one-time raid is specious, at best. If, as you claim, it's all about fighter cover, then why was 12 Group unable to stop the bombing of the industrial north until much later, after the Blitz began and the targets were shifted to civilian centers?

And yet they were ineffective in the Norwegian campaign in much more favourable conditions. If the Home Fleet sailed south, it would do so under extremely heavy fighter cover first from 13 Group, then 12 Group until it reached the Thames. A mixture of 10 and 12 Group would probably cover the rest of the route. And how effective were Stukas against Hurricanes and Spitfires? Goering withdrew them from action because they couldn't compete.

This is entirely incorrect, in my opinion. Prior to the Blitz stopping the bombing of military targets, 13 Group couldn't stop the bombing of Newcastle. 12 Group couldn't stop the bombing of the industrial centers. 11 Group certainly couldn't stop anything at all, and 10 Group didn't stop the bombing of Bath, Exeter, Plymouth or even Cardiff. The Home Fleet couldn't sail south, prior to the stupid mistake made by Hitler, with Göring's acquiescence, of switching from bombing military assets to civilian ones. After that, when the RAF had time to recover, absolutely. I'd agree with you then.

Göring didn't withdraw the air assets until ordered to do so, after the RAF had retooled and was finally able to begin winning the Battle of Britain. At that point Hitler insisted the majority of those assets be switched to Barbarosa in the hope that a Russian defeat would make the Brits capitulate. Hitler was an idiot, among many dubious other things. Göring wasn't much better. Hitler said bomb cities, Göring wagged his tail and complied. I'm sure a lot of people, from fliers like Galland to the Heergruppe field marshall's like von Runstedt, were pulling their hair in dismay.

The German transports collected for the operation weren't even seaworthy. Even if we remove the RAF and RN from the scenario, the German transports still can't survive the Channel crossing. Even if they survive the initial crossing, they'll still need to weather at least a couple of weeks of constant resupply without serious losses before the invasion force can start looking inland. Are you aware that a modern army can't just be dumped on an enemy shore and be left to campaign?

Not seaworthy? Are you kidding? The Norman's landed 8000-10000, including their supplies and mounts for perhaps as many as 4000 knights, in the 11th century, having crossed the channel in boats which would have made the every ship in the German invasion fleet look like the Queen Mary. The Kriegsmarine could have used Rhine barges, of which they had more than enough, to ferry the troops and equipment. Remember, I'm talking about conditions in which the Luftwaffe has complete air supremacy, the same conditions which existed in Southern England prior to the Blitz.

Read the urls at the start of the thread. Also note that Sandhurst has wargamed Sealion on several occasions, each time ignoring many of the practical problems the Germans had and assuming that they would have perfect organisation and commuinications from the start. Even given extremely favourable conditions from which to start, the German side always ended up having to evacuate with most of their invasion force lost.

In 1974, Sandhurst wargamed the operation on the assumption that conditions were historical, i.e. an invasion conducted under the conditions which actually existed prevailed. This meant an invasion with the RAF in a strong position due to the rest it received during the Blitz. The Sandhurst study assumed that the Luftwaffe didn't yet have air superiority during the operation. I am specifically arguing that it would have had air supremacy, not just superiority, had the Blitz not been started. That changes the conditions. Sandhurst has never studied Operation Sealion based on that possibility.

As I see it, you've ignored all the problems facing the Germans, magnified their success, discounted British successes and plans, and concluded therefore that the Germans would win.

Fair enough. But as I see it, you're doing the same from the other side. You're ignoring German successes and capabilities and arguing for conditions which did not exist prior to the Blitz and which I maintain would not have existed afterwards except for the Blitz. ;)

Here's a nice discussion about the subject. Page 3 has a post from a participator in the original 1974 wargame.
http://www.wargamesdirectory.com/htm...Page=1&ID=1857

And here Seamus was accusing me of using the "classic view"? ;)

And I'll reply to Seamus' post here too, to save double posting.

Adding to Pan-man's post previous to this, I'd also note that the efficacy of the Luftwaffe against ships was mixed.

Stukas were one of the few effective types they possessed for shipping attacks and while Stukas sank a number of RN ships during the war, including 2 light cruisers, they never sank any of the heavier units they faced.

Part of this was ordinance related. The German 550lb AP bomb was decent ordinance, but 550 - pounders were of limited effect against heavy cruisers or better throughout the war. The Stuka could haul an 1100 pounder, which would have fared better, but could only do so by trading off range and getting rid of the gunner for that flight. (plugged in Stuka BomB Ship and did some reading -- NOT wiki)

The Germans really didn't use torpedos from a/c during the war, and would thus have had a lot of trouble taking on the British major surface units. It wouldn' take much effort from one or two County-class (much less a Rodney or KGV) to bust up a cobbled-together barge fleet.

As Pan-man suggests, there is evidence that the Luftwaffe may have been capable of air superiorty (using the tactics you outline) but air supremacy was unlikely at best. Without virtually absolut supremacy they could never have effectively interdicted the RN. Moreover, even with air supremacy over the narrows of the Channel, I don't think they could have taken out 90%+ of the RN's major surface units prior to them damaging/destroying much of the limited sealift the Germans had.

Again, I'll have to insist that you reconsider the conditions which existed prior to the Blitz. The Luftwaffe achieved air superiority over most of Britain, and air supremacy over the South. It wasn't until after the Blitz that the RAF was able to recover enough to put a dent in the bombing campaign.

The Stuka, as you say would have been ineffective against larger ships, for the most part. But remember, you're talking about the Home Fleet moving south into the Channel to interdict an invasion fleet. That puts them in range of both the heavier loadout Stukas and Luftwaffe fighter air cover. You've forgetten to mention the Ju-88's, which alone were able to carry from 1500-2000kg loadouts (more if needed, but that was standard), even with the A-1's and A-5's available at the time. Then you also have the Dornier 17's which carried 1000kg and the HE-111's with 3000kg. Also, one of the uses of the JU-88 was specifically as a anti-shipping torpedo bomber. In fact, that was one of its first uses of the A-1 version in WWII, in Norway in 1939.

The RN was not a factor, and wouldn't have been, except for the Blitz allowing the RAF to recover. The RAF proved it wasn't a factor until the Blitz. The Sandhurst studies were not done using these conditions. They were done assuming post-Blitz RAf conditions. By then, certainly, Operation Sealion would have been a dismal failure. But, I'll say it again, had the Blitz not occurred, then Sealion had all the conditions necessary to succeed.

That's just my considered opinion, of course. If we weren't the argumentative and combative types, then we wouldn't be here discussing this in forums dedicated to wargaming!

[Kagemusha]

Very good post Aenlic!Like i sayed earlier i also think it had been possible with Air supremacy.Aenlic just made his post lot better.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Aenlic:

Good post. I'm now reading about LFT 5b's etc. I still think you're over-rating the Luftwaffe's ability to stop the RN cold (and that's what it would've taken, as it would have been an at-all-costs attack for them) but I have clearly under-rated their ship interdiction abilities. I will therefore re-calibrate my head, bone up, and post later after more consideration. Fun argument.

[Rodion Romanovich]

A few more thoughts:

- If Sealion would have been attempted, wouldn't the British Mediterranean fleet have been pulled back to assist if necessary? There must at least have been a feeling among German High Command that it could have happened. But on the other hand, wasn't effective radar controlled anti-air attached to ships much later, some time during 1942 or even later? Which meant British ships probably weren't that good at anti-aircraft fighting.
- When exactly did the air war over Britian reach a state of German air superiority? Wasn't that in the middle of August that the Luftwaffe offensives started to get some superiority over Britain. August was too late for an invasion according to normal doctrine. Which meant the invasion probably couldn't happen that same year, so early 1941 would have been the first possibility, but by then the air war over Britian had already been lost by Luftwaffe. By November or so the Blitz was carried out. Already in December 1940, RAF was able to carry out daylight bombings over several targets on the mainland. The German planes moved to the Mediterranean to assist first the Italian fleet and Rommel, then also the invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia can't have had a too important role in this defeat in the air war over Britain - having kept them in France wouldn't have changed much.
- Another factor speaking against an invasion attempt in late 1940 was that there was no way of telling whether France had calmed down or could turn into open war again at that time. So April or May 1941 was probably the first good chance for an invasion.
- However in April 1941 British air strength was enough to carry out a raid against the cruisers Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, which were damaged, later making them unable to join Bismarck's cruise. In May, Bismarck was sunk, British aircrafts having some role in the engagement, and British ships no longer being so scared by the Luftwaffe they didn't dare moving ships almost freely through the channel. With 3 of the most important Kriegsmarine ships out of action the invasion was then out of the question.
- The German occupation of the channel islands suggest that Germany would probably have been able to insert forces in Britain, but the supplying capabilities would then have been the crucial problem.
- The moving of half of Britain's tank reserve to the Mediterranean theatre showed that British command considered Sealion impossible in 1941 (I think it was then that they moved the tanks there, but not sure)
- The two chances of a successful Sealion would then probably be: a rush in August 1940, or withdrawing from the air war in Britain during late 1940, then beginning air offensives again in early 1941, and in either case refrain from bombing cities. RAF would probably have plenty of time to build up during that time, as well as buying planes from USA. So as so many other times, naval duels would have decided the war. Being able to effectively cut off supplies to Britain with subs and other methods would have been difficult.

[Pannonian]

The Luftwaffe bombed Belfast and Glasgow. Unless you're claiming the main manufacturing plants were in the Faroes, just what, exactly do you consider too far north to be hit? Keep in mind that the main manufacturing plants were in Sheffield and Manchester, which also happen to be the two of the hardest hit towns after London during the Blitz. ;) Other North country towns heavily hit during the Blitz (remember this is when you suppose that Leigh-Mallory's Big Wings would have been able to control the skies when Park's 11th were down) besides those two above include Leeds, Newcastle, Liverpool, Hull and more. Is that far enough north? It's the heart of the British industrial north.

How regularly were they bombed, and to what extent? One of the lessons learnt in WW2 about strategic bombing is that bombing factories does not by itself stop production, they need to be prevented from coming back into action. London endured the blitz, but in objective terms the bombing wasn't particularly effective, and didn't greatly affect the production capacity of the capital. In comparison, some German cities were hit even harder by Bomber Command later on, yet still carried on.

For strategic bombing to strike effectively, you need accuracy, or failing that, weight. You need to either hit the useful targets with precision, or you need to deliver such weight of firepower that the whole area is flattened. The Luftwaffe failed to achieve the first because of harassment from Fighter Command, while their bombers weren't capable of delivering the second in the face of harassment (in the west, only the Lancaster and the B-17s had the required heavy capacity). Following that, you need to either destroy the area so thoroughly that it's beyond repair, or you need to pay regular and effective visits. The Luftwaffe never achieved the first, and never achieved the second either (not even with London).

A good point. Except that Park himself stated that he would lose a war of attrition.

And Goering and Kesselring thought their pilots were disappearing at an unacceptable rate. Stukas among other planes were withdrawn from action because they were unsuitable for the air battle, and probably also because they were singled out as easy targets by RAF pilots.

Both sides were seduced into thinking they were winning thanks to the inflated killrates claimed by their pilots, both sides swung to the other extreme when facing the scores of their pilots lost when it was plain the enemy wasn't giving up.

This is just not a sensible argument. The Luftwaffe bombed the North country repeatedly, especially Sheffield. The comparison to Doolittle's one-time raid is specious, at best. If, as you claim, it's all about fighter cover, then why was 12 Group unable to stop the bombing of the industrial north until much later, after the Blitz began and the targets were shifted to civilian centers?

This is entirely incorrect, in my opinion. Prior to the Blitz stopping the bombing of military targets, 13 Group couldn't stop the bombing of Newcastle. 12 Group couldn't stop the bombing of the industrial centers. 11 Group certainly couldn't stop anything at all, and 10 Group didn't stop the bombing of Bath, Exeter, Plymouth or even Cardiff.

How heavily and how regularly were they bombed? Even in the south, within range of their fighter cover, German bombers were regularly unloading their bombs off target or even early and returning home (the east end was flattened despite having no valuable targets nearby). From the US perpective, Catch 22 gives a good picture of the difficulties of bombing accurately enough to be useful.

Before the introduction of night fighters, bombers would often carry out attacks by night, as this gave them protection from their principal enemy. However, navigation became far, far more difficult, and the rule was that dropping one's bombs within 2 miles of the designated point was considered an acceptable result. Acceptable from the point of view of the bomber, and close enough to be able to claim that such and such a city was bombed, but certainly not close enough to be useful.

The Home Fleet couldn't sail south, prior to the stupid mistake made by Hitler, with Göring's acquiescence, of switching from bombing military assets to civilian ones. After that, when the RAF had time to recover, absolutely. I'd agree with you then.

If the bombers bomb by day, they're vulnerable to fighter attack. If they bomb by night, their chances of hitting moving targets in the water drops to effectively zero (note that there is no area effect when bombs land in the water). That's discounting the deterrence effect of AA fire offered by those warships.

Göring didn't withdraw the air assets until ordered to do so, after the RAF had retooled and was finally able to begin winning the Battle of Britain. At that point Hitler insisted the majority of those assets be switched to Barbarosa in the hope that a Russian defeat would make the Brits capitulate. Hitler was an idiot, among many dubious other things. Göring wasn't much better. Hitler said bomb cities, Göring wagged his tail and complied. I'm sure a lot of people, from fliers like Galland to the Heergruppe field marshall's like von Runstedt, were pulling their hair in dismay.

http://info-poland.buffalo.edu/britain/airbattle.html
http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/britain_40.htm

These take the conventional view, but note the numbers.

Not seaworthy? Are you kidding? The Norman's landed 8000-10000, including their supplies and mounts for perhaps as many as 4000 knights, in the 11th century, having crossed the channel in boats which would have made the every ship in the German invasion fleet look like the Queen Mary. The Kriegsmarine could have used Rhine barges, of which they had more than enough, to ferry the troops and equipment.

Did the Normans have to continue to supply their troops from Normandy? Also, what was the weather like at the time of Sealion?

1066 is hardly relevant to the discussion of transporting a modern army across the channel in the face of opposition. 1944 would be closer to the mark. The Mulberries were designed by a great seafaring nation, and built with multiple safeguards to ensure their survival in Channel conditions. Yet one of them was destroyed by the sea a week after construction. Although admittedly the one built by the great seafaring nation survived into current times.

Remember, I'm talking about conditions in which the Luftwaffe has complete air supremacy, the same conditions which existed in Southern England prior to the Blitz.

Air superiority is when your planes can enter an area and leave again with a good expectation of returning home safely. Air supremacy is when your planes enter an area and not expect any significant enemy harassment from the air. The latter was what the allies achieved over Normandy in 1944. The Luftwaffe never achieved even the first.

In 1974, Sandhurst wargamed the operation on the assumption that conditions were historical, i.e. an invasion conducted under the conditions which actually existed prevailed. This meant an invasion with the RAF in a strong position due to the rest it received during the Blitz. The Sandhurst study assumed that the Luftwaffe didn't yet have air superiority during the operation. I am specifically arguing that it would have had air supremacy, not just superiority, had the Blitz not been started. That changes the conditions. Sandhurst has never studied Operation Sealion based on that possibility.

The participants of the 1974 exercise were surprised (Galland among them) when the game started with the assumption that the forces would be allowed to land without interference. None at all, from the RN, Fighter Command or Bomber Command.

In reality, the transports were bombed and 10% lost even before they were in position to embark troops. Those Bomber Command operations would have taken place close to mainland Europe, far from their British bases and close to the Germans. How would those transports have fared under combined attack from all sea and air units closer to Britain? Note that all the British need to do is sink enough transports to make resupply of any invasion force impossible. Once that happens, it doesn't matter what happens on the ground or in the air, no supply means no successful ground campaign. The Normans were able to live off the land once they had made the crossing. The modern German army could not have done so.

[Aenlic]

Those are some great points, Pannonian. For the argument on air supremacy, I'd refer you to statements made by Churchill and Park regarding the time just prior to the beginning of the Blitz. Everything points to 11 group being completely out of the action. This was achieved by constant bombing of airfields, supply and manufacturing. The bombing was well on the way to making it impossible for the other 3 groups to fly as well. I'm not just making this up. This was Churchill's own estimation of where things stood prior in the summer of 1940. If the enemy can't keep its planes in the air, that is air supremacy, whether its achieved by overwhelming them in the air, as we achieved late in the war, or by removing the ability ro rearm, resupply and repair the planes as the Germans came very close to achieving in 1940, doesn't matter. It's still air supremacy.

On the matter of sea transport. Rhine barges are perfect for transporting large numbers of troops and equipment. Germany had thousands of them available, and close to the needed locale, under air cover. They were the WWII equivalent of a huge fleet of C-130's. Much of Western European commerce was transported by the barges, and not just on the Rhine.

I still take exception to the 1974 Sanhurst wargames, from the standpoint of the current discussion. Sandhurst assumed a viable British air response based on conditions which prevailed after the heroic efforts of the RAF at the later part of the Blitz. We're talking here about if the Blitz hadn't occurred and Germany had instead continued its destruction of RAF capabilities.

As for ships and bombing them, one of the main reasons that D-Day tok so long to occur was the need for air supremacy over the Channel. D-Day could not have occured until we had it. For that same reason, the Home Fleet could not have sailed south into the Channel until we had it. The Germans could not have invaded without it. I merely submit that had it not been for the Blitz, they would have had the requisite air supremacy to succeed.

I agree it's largely a huge what-if, and I am taking a rather extreme viewpoint. It's certainly fun to discuss!

For LegioXXXUlpiaVictrix:

Great points. On the issue of timing. I'd say that August to October would be the ideal conditions for a crossing. The Normans managed it in October. This is also the peak season for Channel swimmers. ;)

An interesting point about the withdrawal of the Mediterranean Fleet. Some interesting side issues are raised by that idea. How would that have affected Italy, or the Aegean conflicts? Might it have resulted in even less trouble for the Germans from southern France, if Italy were able to freely interdict that area instead? Would it allow Germany to consolidate control in North Africa? That makes for a lot of interesting ramifications to how an impending Operation Sealion would have affected the Mediterranean.

[Pannonian]

Those are some great points, Pannonian. For the argument on air supremacy, I'd refer you to statements made by Churchill and Park regarding the time just prior to the beginning of the Blitz. Everything points to 11 group being completely out of the action. This was achieved by constant bombing of airfields, supply and manufacturing. The bombing was well on the way to making it impossible for the other 3 groups to fly as well. I'm not just making this up. This was Churchill's own estimation of where things stood prior in the summer of 1940. If the enemy can't keep its planes in the air, that is air supremacy, whether its achieved by overwhelming them in the air, as we achieved late in the war, or by removing the ability ro rearm, resupply and repair the planes as the Germans came very close to achieving in 1940, doesn't matter. It's still air supremacy.

The northernmost airfield to see heavy action was Hornchurch. That's in Essex, and now is part of London. North of Hornchurch, the airfields were almost untouched. Heck, Hornchurch itself was almost untouched, just its fighters.

I haven't yet read a source that points to attacks on airfields being effective. Most accounts of 11 Group being at breaking point usually talk of the exhaustion of the pilots, not the resources on the ground. The ground resources, except perhaps for the RADAR stations, were never seriously at risk, only the skilled personnel. And Dowding planned to withdraw those skilled personnel to rest and refit should they not be able to take the frontline any longer, in which case the fighter combat would become less intense, but 12 Group would take over the harassment of bombers, especially unescorted ones.

Fighter Command had a lot of fighters, and a lot of pilots, and in both areas solid numbers released since the war (rather than the fears of various individuals) show that they were steadily moving in favour of Britain. Combine with airfields that were south enough to allow flytime over the south coast, especially with the advantage of RADAR both static and mobile, observations corps, etc. that allows efficient allocation of resources.

And I have yet to see an explanation of how Stukas and Ju-88s, so horribly vulnerable to Hurricanes in the BoB, would be able to destroy the Home Fleet when it's staying close to the British coast and hence under air cover, while the German planes would be ranging far from home. No matter how far west or north you base your planes, the coast of Britain is still closer to Britain than to continental Europe.