Atomic Bombs from WWII

[Monarch]

I haven't done enough research, but I have heard that the cost of life, both allied and axis, would be tremendous if the allied powers were to invade mainland Japan. I do however think we should have done a lot better job informing the civilians to leave the city. We did no where near enough.

I agree, in theory. However isn't that basically just handing over your plans to the enemy? It'd have been like telling the Germans when and where we where landing on D-day.

[Alexanderofmacedon]

I agree, in theory. However isn't that basically just handing over your plans to the enemy? It'd have been like telling the Germans when and where we where landing on D-day.

Not really. The point of the atomic bomb was to hit major areas of high industrial activity, like tank factories or gun factories. If they told the civilians they were bombing, then I'm sure the army would get wind of it, but they could not pick up and move these vital factories.

Lars:

You may be right. I think we did in fact fly overhead and give pieces of paper stating what was happening. We did do something, but it was no where near what needed to happen. I may be wrong though, but I did say I needed to do some research.

[Strike For The South]

The bombs were nessacary. The Japnesse were going to fight to the death like they had done time and time before. They were not on the ropes. The USA was just upping the ante with a more powerful weapon it happend throughout history and will continue to happen. The bomb saved many more lives than it cut short.

[Watchman]

The bombs were nessacary. The Japnesse were going to fight to the death like they had done time and time before. They were not on the ropes. The USA was just upping the ante with a more powerful weapon it happend throughout history and will continue to happen. The bomb saved many more lives than it cut short.

"Not on the ropes" ? By what token ? They'd damn near already lost for good the second Pearl Harbor didn't yield the results they were looking for and the European Axis started getting the stuffing kicked out of them. By -45 they in practice had nothing else left than their home isles, and no meaningful offensive military capacity to speak of.

They'd already lost but good. They just weren't willing to admit it and fold.

[Alexanderofmacedon]

War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it.

Too true. I agree.

[Aenlic]

Not going to get involved in an emotional discussion about whether or not it should have been done. People on both sides ignore what really happened to focus on what they want to be true. The truth is somewhere in between.

As for the ability to build a third bomb, we simply didn't have it. Hansford was barely able to produce enough enriched material for 2 bombs in the time they were needed. The enrichment plant was no where near able to make enough for three at the time. The enrichment takes a lot of uranium. People got rich prospecting for uranium in the late 1940's and early 1950's. My father, a geophysicist, did some uranium prospecting on the side while working on his thesis in Colorado in the mid-1950's. I grew up in the 1960's playing with one of his Geiger counters. But in 1945, we didn't have enough enriched uranium available to make more than the two we did make.

[Atilius]

Had nuclear weapons not been used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there is little doubt that a costly invasion of the Japanese islands would have been necessary.

I'm largely summarizing here from Code-Word Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan - and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb, by Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar. Another excellent book, Downfall, by Richard B. Frank tells a similar story.

The Potsdam Declaration, requiring "unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces" and spelling out allied intentions for a conquered Japan, had reached the Japanese government on July 27. The war cabinet, consisting of Prime Minister Suzuki, Foreign Minister Togo, War Minister Gen. Anami, Navy Minister Adm. Yonai, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Umezu, and Navy Chief of Staff Adm. Toyoda, was unwilling to accept it. It is true that the Japanese were trying to get the Russians to mediate negotiations over terms of a surrender. However, they were pursuing terms which would have allowed Japanese officers to supervise the disarmament of their own men, allowed Japanese officers to be tried for war crimes only in Japanese courts, and mandated a short, token occupation of Japan. As the Potsdam Declaration spells out, these terms were unacceptable to the Allies.

At a war cabinet meeting on August 9, three days after the nuclear attack on Hiroshima and the day that news of the Soviet declaration of war reached Tokyo, only Prime Minister Suzuki was clearly in favor of accepting the Potsdam Declaration. Anami, Toyoda, and Umezu definitely favored waiting for an invasion, hoping to inflict a bloody defeat on the US which might allow Japan to win concessions on surrender terms from the Allies. This hope was not unreasonable. As the war ended, Adm. Nimitz was preparing to withdraw US Navy support for Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu, on the grounds that rising Japanese troop strength had seriously jeopardized the success of the landing.

Opinions were apparently unaffected by the news later that day that Nagasaki too had suffered nuclear annihilation. The Home Minister, Abe, said he could not guarantee civil obedience if Japan surrendered and called for continued fighting. The war cabinet was deadlocked. Prime Minister Suzuki then sought a meeting of the war cabinet in his imperial majesty's presence for the (unprecedented) purpose of requesting a decision from the emperor. The audience was granted and each of the members of the war cabinet made his arguments in front of the sovereign. Hirohito opted for surrender, and the government was bound to accept it. The Japanese transmitted acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration to the Allied governments on August 10, but did not inform the Japanese public of the decision.

The people of Japan only began to learn that the government had decided to surrender on August 14 when B-29s began dropping leaflets reproducing the full text of the Japanese surrender message and the American acceptance. Fearing this might provoke a military coup against the government by die-hard officers, imperial chamberlain Kido requested that Hirohito make his intentions clear by means of an imperial rescript announcing the surrender.

A coup attempt was actually under way and Gen. Anami knew of it. Had he not also known of the emperor's decision, he would have supported it. As it was, he didn't betray the officers who launched it and later committed seppuku. On the night of the 14th, conspirators entered the War Ministry, killed the commander of the 1st Imperial Guards Division, and used his seal to issue orders for the Guards to occupy the imperial palace and grounds, and to cut off palace communications except through Guards HQ. Coup supporters took control of the NHK building in Tokyo to prevent broadcast of the emperor's surrender message. Several largely unsuccessful assassination attempts were also made.

The coup had unraveled by the next morning and the surrender broadcast was made early on the 15th.

I think this makes clear that even after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there was still no desire on the part of the Japanese military to surrender unconditionally. Only the stated intention of the Emperor brought (most of) them to heel. Had the bombings not taken place, Hirohito would not have been asked to make the decision for surrender.

[lars573]

Lars:

You may be right. I think we did in fact fly overhead and give pieces of paper stating what was happening. We did do something, but it was no where near what needed to happen. I may be wrong though, but I did say I needed to do some research.

Didn't happen. The US might threatened massive retaliation if they didn't capitulate soon. And propaganda leaflets were dropped all the time.

But a clear warning that said "We bes nuking Hiroshima soon, if you want to live flee!" never happened.

[Grey_Fox]

A conventional bombing raid would have killed just as many if not even more people, so I don't see why you're complaining.

The only difference is that many more of the casualties were caused by radiation, but that was relatively short lived. People live right on top of where both nuclear bombs were dropped, and there is a negligible difference in cancer rates.