Carpet Bombing in WWII

[Grey_Fox]

so if your enemy is evil and barbaric it is then morally justified to also behave in such a manner to stop him?

Germany murdered between 6 million and 11 million civilians and POWs in their slave and extermination camps. The Allied bombing campaign against Germany killed about 600,000 German civilians throughout the war. War is not about choosing between good and evil, it's about choosing the action that is less evil to win.

The German army of WW2 was the greatest fighting force of the 20th Century, you do not beat such a thing by being magnanimous, you do it by doing as much as possible to destroy it's infrastructure and war ecomy.

The reason the Blitz failed was because Germany signally failed to attack the three things that make fighting a war possible: industry, power supply, and road and rail networks, and also because it was not carried out in sufficient strenght. The Americans and British realised this and set about to correct it. Unfortunately many of these three targets are located in urban centres, and since there was no such thing as 'precision bombing' it was necessary to use saturation bombing to ensure destruction of these targets.

So now the Soviets don't count as allies, do they?

The war the Western Allies fought was in order to free Poland (and the other nations that were conquered) from German rule. The war the Soviets fought was to repel an invader and to conquer as much territory between Russia and Germany as possible in order to secure it's borders from future German (and capitalist) invasions.

[ShadesPanther]

so if your enemy is evil and barbaric it is then morally justified to also behave in such a manner to stop him?

Germany murdered between 6 million and 11 million civilians and POWs in their slave and extermination camps. The Allied bombing campaign against Germany killed about 600,000 German civilians throughout the war. War is not about choosing between good and evil, it's about choosing the action that is less evil to win.

The Allies didn't know about slave and extermination camps until after the war. There were rumours sure, but there was no evidence.

The war the Western Allies fought was in order to free Poland (and the other nations that were conquered) from German rule. The war the Soviets fought was to repel an invader and to conquer as much territory between Russia and Germany as possible in order to secure it's borders from future German (and capitalist) invasions.

The soviets are usually considered part of the allies but slightly different.
Well The Russians/Soviets had been invaded through Poland many times over the last few centuries, They wanted a buffer zone and they got it.

[Pontifex Rex]

Wait I'm a bit confused about the 88mm guns, so did the Nazis shift the guns back from the front lines to the cities?

Not really,...but probably some. German AA guns were deployed in Luftwaffe flak regiments attached to armies and corps and in the German army's flak battalions in their motor/mechanized divisions. The bombers did not prevent 88s from be deployed to the army (The panzer and Pz Gren divs normally had there two or three batteries) but did redirect the units of the Luftwaffe ground units (flak regiments). Caution needs to be used about the 88s though. Because there was a bomber offensive, more 88s were produced to defend the cities,...but.

It begs the question. Had there been no bomber offensive, would the Germans have built so many 88s in the first place? Probably not, resources would have/could have gone to other projects.

[Rodion Romanovich]

A few points:
- the massive city bombing wasn't what diverted Lutwaffe attention from the front. It was the city bombing at all that did it.
- remember that also allies suffered from city bombings. It's not just a war crime carried out by the allies.
- it's possible that the massive city bombings from the allies after 1944 (and at the very least the city bombings in 1945 shortly before surrender) delayed German surrender, because it scared German leadership that the surrender wouldn't be met with mercy. It helped those nazis that were punished in the Nurnberg trials convince low-level commanders and regular privates that the allies would show no mercy on surrender even to low level commanders and privates, something that made it more difficult to obtain massive local surrenders, desertions and mutinies before the official surrender. However this is not certain.
- the effectiveness of hurting economy that many thought that city bombing gave is way overestimated. Economy was weakened more by losses in equipment at the front. Also - in hot war resources temporarily become more important than money until after the ceasefire. Money is a strategic weapon used to acquire a strong army before a war, not something that matters much in actual war (at least not in a total war like ww2). Weakening the economy of an opponent in a war is not necessarily that useful. Bombing logistical keypoints such as railway stations, bridges, and factories for military equipment is more useful. In fact, lack of money isn't that much of a problem for a nation at war - just look at the Lend Lease treaty that Great Britain could get even though they were getting economical problems due to Luftwaffe bombings of British cities.
- small city bombings we've established could have some usefulness, but systematic city bombing was hardly that useful. The only time a more massive city bombings could be useful is if the enemy moves all weapons factories into cities, like the Japanese did. Or when the enemy refuses to give up even after clearly strategically losing the war badly, like was the case for the Japanese. In fact, city bombing was what lost Luftwaffe the air war over Britain (it would perhaps still have been lost, but not as early as the early winter 1940), what made Stalingrad such a splendid ground for snipers (again not crucial to the outcome, but it probably helped the Soviets) and IMO it delayed allied advance on Berlin quite a lot. The allies had little else to do in 1941-1944, so there it probably had some usefulness, but the city bombings after D-Day were IMO only hurting the advance. As shown in the Falaise gap battle, even though ww2 bombers were inaccurate, they could wreak havoc as a tactical weapon by bombing rear elements of an army - artillery positions, bridges, railways, supply lines, roads etc., while using limited city bombings (maybe once every second week on average) to divert enemy units from the frontlines. Using the bomb carpet principle against tactical targets worked quite well. Surely not all missions would succeed, but since the targets were close to the own front and own airfields it wouldn't have been so difficult to even carry out several missions a day to compensate for it. Also remember that such bombings cutting off retreat logistics often forces the enemy to leave a lot of equipment in the retreat. One tank is worth at least fifty men from a military perspective, and one tank taken over means two tanks change in relative strength ratio.
- bombings of oil fields and industry itself hurt economy more than actual city carpet bombings. It's easy to see at the time when factories weren't in cities. When factories were moved into cities of course city bombing became more useful for hurting economy and above all strategic strength because then the key strategical targets were in cities. But the actual terror bombing of civilians had little positive impact for whoever did it.
- both sides overestimated the usefulness of the city bombings. The British and Soviets benefitted from being city bombed - it strengthened British morale and helped them understand that it was worth fighting the Germans (the concentration camps were more of rumors than known fact at that time so they couldn't as effectively as the city bombings convince the British that Hitler's rule was insane and ruthless). The Soviets got ideal sniper terrain in Stalingrad.

[rory_20_uk]

- remember that also allies suffered from city bombings. It's not just a war crime carried out by the allies.

Were any as costly as the firebombing of Dresden for example?

- it's possible that the massive city bombings from the allies after 1944 (and at the very least the city bombings in 1945 shortly before surrender) delayed German surrender, because it scared German leadership that the surrender wouldn't be met with mercy. It helped those nazis that were punished in the Nurnberg trials convince low-level commanders and regular privates that the allies would show no mercy on surrender even to low level commanders and privates, something that made it more difficult to obtain massive local surrenders, desertions and mutinies before the official surrender. However this is not certain.

I thought that the Western Allies to refuse the German surrender to only them couldn't have helped.

- the effectiveness of hurting economy that many thought that city bombing gave is way overestimated. Economy was weakened more by losses in equipment at the front. Also - in hot war resources temporarily become more important than money until after the ceasefire. Money is a strategic weapon used to acquire a strong army before a war, not something that matters much in actual war (at least not in a total war like ww2). Weakening the economy of an opponent in a war is not necessarily that useful. Bombing logistical keypoints such as railway stations, bridges, and factories for military equipment is more useful. In fact, lack of money isn't that much of a problem for a nation at war - just look at the Lend Lease treaty that Great Britain could get even though they were getting economical problems due to Luftwaffe bombings of British cities.

It helped, as it helped focus workers on the key industries. The German's failure to streamline their production and designs probably meant that they fought with a distinct material advantage.

- both sides overestimated the usefulness of the city bombings. The British and Soviets benefitted from being city bombed - it strengthened British morale and helped them understand that it was worth fighting the Germans (the concentration camps were more of rumors than known fact at that time so they couldn't as effectively as the city bombings convince the British that Hitler's rule was insane and ruthless). The Soviets got ideal sniper terrain in Stalingrad.

Hitler was not insane. And compared to Stalin he was not ruthless.
Loosing a city to make sniper terrain seems excessive. Snipers don't need that level of destruction to function.

It may have already have been said, but Bomber Harris should have been tried for warcrimes.

[cegorach]

The soviets are usually considered part of the allies but slightly different.
Well The Russians/Soviets had been invaded through Poland many times over the last few centuries, They wanted a buffer zone and they got it.

Not really they wanted SATELITE state not a buffer zone because imposing a government you have to sustain using large army based on its territory is not the greatest idea to have a buffer - rather to fuel hatered and rebellion - the SU was never interested in buffor states it was interested in conquest so their citizens had nowhere to run away or to compare with.

[Kraxis]

The Allied bombing campaign against Germany killed about 600,000 German civilians throughout the war.

I'm not going to jump into such a deep discussion... not fully.

But I will comment this use of figures.

600,000 killed Germans is what is certain... You know, when people have been found dead, identified and buried (or what else has been done). What every historian I have spoken to about this subject agree on is that most of the dead have never been found.
For instance the most pessimistic sources claim 50,000-70,000 killed in Dresden. That is from the sources of citizens of the city.
What most people tend to forget is that the city of about 500,000 had a population estimated to have been just above 2 million at the time of the bombings.

How? Well, Dresden was obviously an important junction, if not very vital. It was the perfect spot to drop refugees from Poland and East Prussia off. Also, the weakening of the citydefences (as well as the lack of any heavy industry) actually led the local leadership to belive that the city would be spared. After all, it had been far more important earlier and not been bombed, why should it now?

In any case the city was crammed full of civilian refugees living in the streets. The shelters and basements could not house them (were already occupied).
I doubt I need to inform you what happens when a firestorm is added to the mix.
A particularly nasty piece of info I got from a survivor (from a program abou bombing) was that he and other people were trying to flee from the firestorm, but they could not get away. They were pinned by the wind. Then a woman with a baby tried to shift position, but horribly the wind yanked the baby from her arms and... well again no need for explaination.

And since we are on about the firestorm in Dresden, how about the fact that the Allies changed tactics this time, and actually had two waves closer together than before. First wave with the initial firebomb/HE mix, the next wave with a pure HE load. The theory behind this was that the first wave would start fires (but perhaps not a firestorm), firefighters come out of their burrows to fight the fires. In other cities they were perhaps not able to kill the firestorms, but they prevented their spread.
This time however the next wave caught them out. Wether they stayed and got killed or fled, the result was the same, the firefighters were out of the picture (in the second case because their equipment was lost). The firestorm could now engulf the entire city unopposed.

The continual bombing of the city also forced people to stay in their cellars and the shelters. Well, with the spreading firestorm they could not survive there. These were the ones to be found afterwards (killed by lack of oxygen).

The bombing of Dresden was the most perfect bombing ever. The most systemized, most determined and most likely the most 'effective' ever.
Nobody knows how many died in Dresden, but I have heard figures as high as 500,000, for as it was argued, afterwards the refugees were gone. Couldn't be in the city, the surrounding area was relatively empty, and the options to get away with trains and such was lost in the first raid. They had simlpy ceased to exist.
Refugees are of course not very easy to work with as they are not properly organized or counted (at least not with this amount). That is why they often vanish from calculations.
Nobody knows how many German refugees were killed by Red Army soldiers, run over by tanks, gunned down by fighters ect ect. The only figure that can be said is 'a lot'.
Go to the thin peninsula by Gdansk (Danzig)... There you will still find remnants of the dead people... Even bones. I have been there, and the atmosphere is quite unpleasant, not the city of course.

And do not forget that while the Germans were not very nice, and certainly attacked the hospitals and the like as mentioned, the Allies were not any better.

The old people in southern Jutland (in Denmark) still curse the Allied Jabos... They, an occupied people got strafed in the fields, on the roads, whereever. Luckily not many died from this as most attention was in Germany. But the simple fact that fighter/bombers attacked obvious civilians in an occupied country is apalling! Maybe they thought they were Germans? But that doesn't make it much better.
Nor the factthat Danish Red Cross convoys got shot up every time they tried to get to the Danish prisoners in German camps in last months... Real clever by the fighter/bombers!
Added to their almost patholigical overestimations of their kills on tanks and equipment I have a strong dislike for them.

I guess I did join the discussion...

[ChewieTobbacca]

On the case of Japan:

Aerial bombing wasn't the biggest reason for Japan's capitulation - though the atomic bombings certainly hastened the surrender and prevented an invasion of the Japanese mainland. The biggest reason for Japan's fall was the U.S. Navy (and, namely the Silent Service - the submarines, which accounted for 55% of Japanese tonnage sunk in WW2 despite being 2% of the Navy's personnel). Japan, being an island nation, had to import its resources and food and simply could not do so (having nearly its entire fleet and aviation at the bottom of the sea certainly was also important).

On carpet bombing:

What is known now, though, is that carpet bombing does not bring the same results as theorized: that it would bring about swift surrender of the enemy. Whether it was necessary or not, in the end, we did learn, and since WW2, cases of carpet bombing have decreased dramatically. As pointed out, when we realized that crippling Germany's oil and rail industry was important, we targetted those places and we saw results on the battlefield. With the advent of more accurate bombing and weapons, we have bombed strategic targets and civilians less.

That today the air forces of the world do not see carpet bombing as a main strategy is a sign that they understand its actual effects.

And for infantry, it might be a blessing to not have to enter a city in ruins where every piece of rubble can be a strong point of defense.

[Kraxis]

Indeed... Which was the most effective airattacks in WWII? Here I'm speaking of attacks that had an impact on the war itself.

I'll mention those I consider the best (against Germany, I don't know enough about Japan):

The Dam Bust.
While it's effect was limited in the long run it showed that a small pinpoint attack could very well create a huge effect. What the RAF failed to do wa a followup attack after three weeks when the dams had been rebuilt.
Speer himself has mentioned in memoirs that such an attack would likely have left the Germany industry out of the fight for half a year or so.
So the attack was correct but the doctrine was faulty (further attacks of te like were scrapped because the Germans rebuilt the dams so fast).

Schweinfurt and Regensburg.
That is a very controversial one, I know. Often mentioned as a case of what not to do by historians.
But once more they have been hugely singleminded. They look at the losses to the bombers, which were absolutely huge! Again doctrine failed, or the will to suffer the losses needed.
The effects on German ballbearing capacity was astounding. 50% decrease if not more. The first attack had only limted impact, but the second caused a huge disruption. The already weakened plants got almost flattened. Very effective.
If another raid had been launched a week or so later while other raids targeted the other ballbearing plants, Germany would have been crippled. She wouldn't have had enough time to spread out the capacity and change to glidebearings (they managed to use that in around 10% of all the bearings after the attacks).
Again Speer consider this a huge mistake by the Allies that they didn't follow it up properly, but the effects were still good, though they were made up for within reasonable time (the German stockpiles of ballbearing just managed to keep her going).

The synthetic oils strikes.
Of course this has to be mentioned. Hugely effective campaign, somethign that should have been put into effect right away and with all the resources possible. If done correctly it could perhaps have crushed German capacity to fight even before D-Day.

The raids on Ploesti.
Similar to Schweinfurt in that what could possibly have crippled Germany, but for some reason was not carried out with the needed 'oompf'.

Looking over the list it becomes clear that the Allies lacked patience, seeking the one KO punch that would finish the war. This one-eyed approach blinded them to the possible results of sustained attacks.
Had these attacks been carried out withthe proper force I have little doubt that Germany would not have lasted to Christmas 1944.
No power to the industry, no fuel an no bearings to keep her machinery working. It would have been early 1945 right after D-Day. Infantry facing proper armies.

[Mount Suribachi]

Also, the weakening of the citydefences (as well as the lack of any heavy industry) actually led the local leadership to belive that the city would be spared. After all, it had been far more important earlier and not been bombed, why should it now?

One of the great myths about Dresden is that is was never bombed before the infamous attack. Not true, the USAAF & the RAF had both attacked it previously. As for the attack in question, it was actually instigated by the Russians who were closing in on the city and wanted it bombed.

The bombing of Dresden was the most perfect bombing ever.

RAF crews who participated on the raid regarded it as the "perfect" mission - but not for the reasons you state. Everything went right. The weather was just right in every way, all the spoofs & feints worked to perfection, fooling the nightfighters. Most of the cities 88s had been removed to defend against Russian tanks. IIRC the RAF only 6 bombers that night.

As for your 500,000 death toll, its clearly fanciful and based more on anti-bombing hysteria than the facts. Even David Irving, author of the highly controversial Dresden retracted his 200,000 death toll in a letter to The Times, and accepted the official death toll of 18,375, with an estimated "grand total" of around 25,000. Thats still a lot of dead people I grant you though.

At this point I shall also throw in the mix the 4,000 political prisoners held just outside the city who had dug their own graves the morning of the Dresden raid. They were all due to be executed the next day. The raid on Dresden saved their lives.