An interesting thesis they're putting forward, but I just don't see it supplanting the accepted assessments.

In War 1, Germany did not really seek war with England so much as accept it as the price to be paid for manuevering -- they actually thought the Belgians would quit after token resistance rather than fight -- through Belgium. Schleiffen always thought a BEF would be involved, and just figured it would have to be netted in with the rest of the French left wing. They were even pretty close to accurate as to the number of divisions the Brits would land.

All along, Germany never believed that Russia could begin an offensive in the first month, which they believed gave them just enough time to break France before shifting troops to stave off Russia. They were well aware of the long-term dangers of Russia's huge manpower base (however poorly led/trained), a British blockade, the mobilization of British Empire resources and so on -- they just felt that the decisive blow would have been made before such factors became important. Russia's early offensive, though a debacle tactically, really did take away important troops just before the Marne. Had Germany won at the Marne, it is distinctly possible (though maybe not probable) that the BEF would have withdrawn and France would have been broken in the field.


In War 2, Hitler was merely proceding with the primary agenda -- Lebensraum in the East -- an agend he'd laid out at least as early as Lansdorf Prison. At the time of the Assault, he felt that there was no 2nd front, because English efforts to launch one in France would have been laughable and the fight in the Med was one largely staffed by Italians. Now, why he felt the need to bring the USA in actively -- and thereby give the allies the resources needed for a real 2nd front -- has always been beyond me. Perhaps because he was a drug-addled whack job?