Many times the question has been asked. “Could the Mongols have conquered Europe?” The subject has been debated over and over, with the various arguments put forward for and against. I decided to compile some information relevant to the question and at the same time, explaining some of the reasons why the campaign into Europe was abandoned.
Various opinions have been aired as to the Mongol withdrawal from Hungary, citing anything from lack of pasture to resistance being too strong. Generally the death of Ogodei Qa’an as the primary reason has been questioned; indeed some find this a somewhat fanciful notion and dismiss it as romantic nonsense or simply a convenient excuse. Let us look at some facts about the Mongols and their Empire.
It was almost by accident or, at least, a series of events that the Mongols were unleashed upon the hapless populations of Russia and Eastern Europe. The treacherous behaviour of the Governor of Otrar brought savage retribution upon the people of Khwarazm and the pursuit of Shah Muhammad by Jebe and Subedei brought the Mongols into Georgia, after they had first secured tribute from the Atabeg of Tabriz. The Georgians were preparing for the 6th Crusade and their King; George IV had a permanent bodyguard of over 30,000 Qipchaq cavalry. Their intelligence had reported the Mongols as looters rather than the efficient armies of a now great Empire which led the Georgians to believe they could easily see them off. News arrived that 20,000 Mongols were advancing towards Tiflis and full of confidence, George IV rode out to meet them with an army of around 70,000. The Mongols began a retreat as the Georgian cavalry charged until they were exhausted, stretched out and too tired to retreat or rally. The Mongols turned and advanced under a screen of arrows, driving a wedge into the Georgian army. The King withdrew to his capital to await a siege; some of his shattered army attempted a stand but were crushed. Two weeks later, scouts reported that the Mongols had gone and the Georgians convinced themselves that they had inflicted enough casualties that the Mongols had decided to look for easier targets elsewhere.
The Mongols however were a reconnaissance force and had perhaps been tempted by the lure of riches; both Subedei and Jebe agreed that they had enough to buy any allies and that battles should be fought only when threatened since they were not sufficient in strength to fight a series of battles or to besiege large towns and cities. In the winter they headed up the east coast and again the Georgians rode out to meet them. This time they kept their order and stayed out of range of Mongol arrows. They were ambushed from the side of a pass and when they turned to engage, they were hit in the flank and routed. The King escaped with his rearguard and Jebe and Subedei had unwittingly left Georgia defenceless and unable to field another army.
From Georgia they crossed the Caucasus, bought off the Qipchaq army waiting for them, defeated an Alan, Bulgar, Khazar alliance, hunted down the Qipchaqs and defeated them also, recovering their booty. They divided their strength and went about securing allies, spreading propaganda, placing agents, drawing maps of Hungary, Poland, Bohemia and Silesia and conducting surveys and a census. Their mission was complete they now began the journey home but as we know, their most astonishing feat lay ahead, the Battle of Kalka River. The Russians and their Qipchaq allies were destroyed and yet again the Mongols had displayed their ruthless efficiency.
This remarkable achievement by so small a force should indicate that a large Mongol army would require a huge effort to halt it. The amount of information gathered by Jebe and Subedei would also indicate that they would return.
This was the lead up to an invasion that destroyed the armies of Russia, Poland and Hungary; that saw Mongol scouting parties almost in Vienna. Bulgaria was subjugated and then…..the Mongols withdraw. Are we to believe that suddenly they discover that there is insufficient pasture? I do not believe this theory for one minute; this information would have been known since the reconnaissance by Jebe and Subedei. Since we know that the news of Ogodei’s death reached the invasion force and that they promptly returned home, there must be more than an element of truth that this was the reason for Mongol withdrawal. Batu did not return and from this point forth, the Mongol Empire was fraught with intrigue and internecine disputes.
Let us take a closer look into what was happening and the way things were done in this Mongol Empire.
When Chingis Khan died he left each of his remaining sons an appanage. That of his eldest son Jochi, who had died, was handed in turn to his eldest, Orda. As the youngest of the Khan’s four sons, Tolui received the Mongol homelands; this meant he also inherited the Imperial army. Though Ogodei would be the next to rule, he was constantly aware that his own personal army could not match that of his younger brother. In fact there is a distinct possibility that Tolui had designs on ruling himself until Yeh-Lu Chu-Ts’ai, advisor to Chingis Khan, convinced him to uphold his father’s wishes. Ogodei was not the incompetent drunk that some people believe; he had a weakness for wine which was true of most of the Mongols. Aware of this possible threat to his rule, Ogodei, from the Capital in Qara Qorum was able to keep an eye on Toluid affairs in the homeland especially since Tolui spent much of his time fighting in Northern China. When Tolui died in 1233, Ogodei even tried to strengthen his holding by marrying his eldest son Guyug to Sorqaqtani who was Tolui’s widow but she declined the offer.
Ogodei had the right as Qa’an to nominate or confirm nominations of heads of his brothers Uluses but in order to maintain primacy over the regional Khans he needed the means to support his establishment and power base. He set up regional administration to ensure the larger portion of local revenues was directed into the Imperial treasury, thus strengthening his authority over his brothers. Their rights could not be ignored however and ensuing disputes brought about the development of joint administration later in his reign.
Ogodei had the authority to mobilise troops from each Ulus, as can be seen by the list of ten Princes present in the Western campaign but he was unable to transfer Toluid troops to the command of his son Qoten without dispute, even after Tolui’s death. They were part of the Toluid Ulus and therefore beyond his jurisdiction.
The death of Ogodei threw Mongol politics into turmoil, as the five year interregnum confirms. His wife Toregene served as regent and it was during this period (and before) that her scheming secured the title for her eldest son, Guyug. Ogodei’s first choice to succeed him had been his third son Qochu who was killed in action, he then nominated Qochu’s son Shiremun. Failure by the Ogedeid house to uphold the will of the Qa’an was one of the reasons put forward by the Toluids to justify their claim on the Qa’anate. Since Shiremun was only young, Guyug’s elevation may have been achieved sooner but Batu had become ‘Aqa’ (the title means elder) when Chagadai died in 1242. Remembering the public insults that were aimed at him by Buri and Guyug, Batu did all in his power to stall procedure including nominating Mangku. Mongol custom demanded that all notables should attend a Quriltai to officially appoint the next ruler. Batu was aware that Toregene had achieved her aims, surrounding herself with supporters of Guyug and her plotting even threatened his own position.
After almost five years, Guyug was finally elected but the bitter dispute between himself and Batu meant that further expansion west would not resume or at least, not while Batu was head of that region. In fairness to Guyug, a man remembered for his sullen disposition, he undid most of the damage created by his mother, ridding the Imperial court of its schemers; though one unpopular edict was his insistence for written acceptance that the Qa’anate should reside within the house of Ogodei.
Matters of state kept Guyug busy for almost two years during which, Batu alone was responsible for administration in his new holding. Guyug sent troops to arrest Batu’s viceroys in the Caucasus while he rode to the Ili region, demanding that Batu meet him there to offer submission in person. Batu had also received word from Sorqaqtani that Guyug intended to have him arrested and executed, so in 1248, for the first time since Chingis had united them, two Mongol armies mobilised for conflict. The confrontation did not occur, Guyug died en route and Batu, now the most powerful individual in the Mongol world, set in motion a series of events that would permanently change the Mongol Empire.
Guyug’s widow Oqul-Ghaimish was Regent and trying to gain support for Shiremun. Not willing to allow this monopolising by the Ogodeids, Sorqaqtani set herself up in opposition. The military supremacy of the Toluids gave her the support of the majority of the Noyans and with Batu’s backing; she campaigned for her son, Mangku.
The Ogodeid and Chagadaid Princes boycotted the Quriltai assembled under Batu’s brother, Berke. Mangku was elected in 1251. A further twist saw a systematic purge of the Ogodeid and Chagadaid houses after a plot to sabotage the election and arrest Mangku and Batu was discovered. The main conspirators were executed; Buri, Yesu Mangku and Noqa (Guyug’s son) found themselves at Batu’s mercy. He showed them none. Shiremun was exiled to service in China thanks to Qubilai’s intervening plea for leniency; Mangku agreed but ordered his execution later. Expansionist plans started by Guyug into Syria and Southern China, were taken up by Mangku and Batu, who had given him the throne, enjoyed virtual autonomy in the West.
As was the case with any campaign, troops from each Ulus were provided and this was true of the Mongol campaign under Hulegu. Though to all intents independent, Batu was still expected to provide his share. We can fairly assume that by now, Batu had resigned himself to the fact that he would not see further expansion west and after he died in1255, it seems the idea was totally dismissed as the Mongol Empire continued to erode its own power.
The ‘Golden Horde’ has to be considered as the first element of a split within the Mongol Empire and they further alienated themselves under Berke who had converted to Islam. Hulugu’s execution of the Caliph of Baghdad was the supposed catalyst, though it is far more likely that the disputed south Caucasus region was the real reason for Golden Horde/Ilkhanate hostilities. Berke allied himself with the Mamluks and even provided them with Golden Horde troops.
By this time an Ogodeid Prince was rising to power in central Asia. This was Qaidu, whose interference in the separate Uluses seriously undermined Mongol plans. When Mangku died in 1259, Civil war broke out between Qubilai and Ariq Bukha. Qaidu sided with Ariq Bukha as did Berke, who provided Qaidu with troops. Hulegu was now in a dangerous position with hostile forces on all sides. He withdrew to secure his position and meanwhile certain White Horde Princes within his campaign force, were executed. Qubilai was eventually victorious but enmities within the individual Khanates were too deep to be reconciled. The downward spiral was now out of control.
Many historical sources point out the difficult time the Mongols experienced while trying to subdue the Song in southern China but almost all fail to look at the complete picture. The Song campaign was to all intents a ‘Yuan’ affair. Many Imperial troops were on loan to Hulegu; Civil war between Qubilai and Ariq Bukha; constant interruption by Qaidu, one of which allowed the Song to rebel and rally and thus prolong the struggle. Hardly any give the Mongols the credit they deserve for finally subduing the Song in a naval battle, a far cry from steppe warfare which is seen as their only strength.
Returning to the question of European conquest, the facts should prove that it was Ogodei’s death that ultimately saved Europe. Subedei is universally accepted as the strategic mind behind the Western campaign but some prior events in China almost denied him the chance of historical notoriety. He fell out of favour with Ogodei after failing to support another Mongol general. During the initial campaigns of Chingis and the reconnaissance of the western steppe, Subedei had been subordinate to Jebe. He retained his command with the intervention of Tolui, who championed his cause and he proved his genius in Russia, and Eastern Europe. Though Hungary was the target of the drive into Europe, the diversionary force under Orda in Poland left the country defenceless. The scouting force of Qadan pursued Bela IV throughout the Balkans and Dalmatian coast. Qadan was eventually driven from the field by a Croatian army but in fairness, he was extremely stretched, low on supplies and his troops were exhausted. Even though, he was still able to exact tribute from Bulgaria who submitted and recognised Batu as their overlord. With Mongol patrols as near as sixty miles from Venice and a reconnaissance force deep into Austria as far as Wiener Neustadt, the Europeans were panicking but still the petty squabbles persisted and there was no sign of unity against this threat. With no intervention, the main Mongol force could easily consolidate, reinforce and push on into Austria, Poland and Italy.
Some time ago I was part of a debate on the question of the Mongol Empire and the succession of its leaders. It was suggested by some that Chingis failed to secure his Empire by not naming a successor with the ability and disposition to continue the conquests; in other words that his best military commander should have become the next leader. I did not agree as there is far more than military supremacy to be considered when ruling an Empire. Ogodei had his commanders and he could rely on them. No matter who became Qa’an I would argue that at some point there would be a disgruntled party, feeling they have the same rights, to dispute the outcome and each generation would produce more of these disputes

.........Orda