http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/...de_moraes.html
In writing this post I declare an interest. As a British Asian male travelling by air and Eurostar most weeks, I am stopped and searched regularly. Since 9/11 I've noted the frequency of these stops increase in comparison to my white colleagues, and have, as an MEP, taken up the cases of people who believe they have been unfairly targeted. And if you believe that this can be just a minor inconvenience, then ask one of my constituents who was strip-searched because they had been "profiled" - with nothing found.
However, it is not principally because of the potential unfairness of targeting particular ethnic groups that the current rush to profiling should be resisited; it is because it simply doesn't work - and can be counterproductive.
Where is the evidence that something which seems as logical as targeting "muslim" looking passengers does not work? In June of this year I convened a meeting of NGOs and senior EU figures - including the EU anti-terrorism coordinator Gijs de Vries - to hear exhaustive research from the Open Society Institute (OSI) showing that the implicit premise that race or religion is an accurate predictor of terrorist activity was a recipe for disaster. In short, good intelligence, community support, good policing and sharper aviation security were needed. Profiling on a large scale was not.
Alhough it has no consistant name, ethnic profiling has now become a major component of the fight against terrorism in several European countries including the UK, France and Germany. In the UK the proportion of "Asians" stopped by police under the new anti-terror legislation tripled in the 18 months following 9/11. To date, not one of these has resulted in conviction for a terrorism offence.
Massive data-mining operations in Germany from the end of 2001 until early 2003 collected sensitive personal information about 8.3 million people - but did not identify a single terrorist subject. Other manifestations of ethnic profiling in Europe researched by the OSI included invasive raids on mosques and mass identity checking - again producing no chargeable suspects.
So where have the relatively small number of captured and convicted terrorists come from? Virtually all have been the product of intelligence-based investigations over extended periods focused on time-bound and event-specific matters, not racial groups or stereotypes.
By branding whole communities as suspect, ethnic profiling not only legitimises prejudice amongst the general public: it can also engender feelings of humiliation and resentment amongst targeted groups. On a practical level, police and intelligence gained from communities can dry up through lack of cooperation amongst the overwhelming moderate majority.
Most importantly, profiling may divert attention from actual threats that fall outside the prescribed criteria. Before the 7/7 attacks on London, MI5 had come across the the leader of the bombers in connection with another plot - but had not pursued him because he did not fit their profile.
Finally, the more predictable law enforcement profiling becomes, the easier it becomes for terrorists to adapt. For example, the UK Government concluded in its report on the London bombings published this year that "there is no consistent profile to help identify who may be vulnerable to radicalisation".
The solutions to detecting terrorists lie in well-resourced intelligence work with communities of interest. As one senior Netherlands counterterrorism official observed in the OSI research, "community relations achieve results; stop and search does not". Most EU countries were also found wanting in their ability to monitor the effectiveness of their law enforcement agencies. The very secrecy of intelligence gathering should not preclude appropriate monitoring mechanisms.
Finally, at the airport the existing level of profiling which probably sees me being stopped more often than the now famous "family in flip-flops on holiday" should not be taken to extreme levels. Instead, for example, our UK airports should invest in hugely improving their technology - such as in the faster and more effective screening of hand luggage.
We must address the threat of terrorism effectively. It is possible to do this by avoiding a policy like ethnic profiling, which strikes at the heart of the social contract linking law enforcement to the communities they serve.
Re: Racial Profiling for Terrorists: Good or Bad?
Originally Posted by Louis VI the Fat
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