Snipers in WWII

[Randarkmaan]

As far as I know that is true for most snipers...

[Alexanderofmacedon]

No I think the Germans were the only ones who didn't have an observer. Russians did for sure though.

[Idomeneas]

I have read that last one as the partner jumping up and pointing "There he is" and promptly got one in the face...

Neither instance seems very likely.
The first because a good sniper would not fall for such a trick, he would know it. And if he knew Vasily was out there, possibly hunting him, then he would not do that.
The second seems even less likely as the spotter, even if he wasn't a trained spotter (as that story seems it indicate he was not), would damn well know that popping your head up is pretty stupid when you know a good sniper is out there.

While the Germans didn't really love sniping, they were among the few that actually had a sniperschool in the interwar years (and during the war of course). Both the US and UK didn't, and had to 'reinvent' sniping once more. Obviously losing both talent and techniques that could have been honed in the interwar years.

I have heard plenty mention of the Germans employing snipers in the Bocage. That would be a perfect landscape (along with cities) due to the hedges and plenty trees to sit in. Thus the hedges would give the sniper protection, and the targets a feeling of relative security. His position in the tree would however give him a nice view of the landscape (and a good opportunity to hit the enemy in the rear areas), looking down over the hedges. And the fair number of trees would offer him the protection of the targets not knowing where he is, while still not interfering with his vision.
The poor grunts ended up hating this so much that the Germans only needed to put up a rifle, a helmet and a smock to halt advances, while the other side tried to gun down the sniper (who could obviously not be shot down).

And German sniping in WWI is legendary.
So the Germans are interesting in this. Clearly not liking it one bit, but pragmatic and systematical as always about it.
Kind of like that determined kid that eats his vegetables, despite hating them, so he can get strong (belief).

Kraxis this is the version of the story i read in an article too. Zaitsev Had a commisar as observer-bservers were very usefull cause its extremely tiring to focus looking through a scope all the time. So observers scanned the field and snipers got to work only when needed-
The film is not very far from the ''actual'' story. Offcourse there were no romances and idiotic things like that. Zaitsev had some info about were the german was generally. he set up his helmet as bait and waited. The german took the bait and shot the helmet. Comissar then was so enthousiastic when he discovered his position that he blew his cover. the german spread his brains and Zaitsev shot him from distance.

I find this version if this dual ever happened believable. Why? Because its so stupid as only in real life it can get. Propably the comissar was untrained for this job and while he sure wasnt THAT stupid he goofed in the most mortal way. Everybody from time to time does stupid things that makes him wonder ''how the hell did i manage to do this stupidity?''. I think this is one of those cases. If they really wanted to make a dramatic story they would have the german miss or just hit the helmet and Zaitsev killing him with a clear shot. What i think that it may be fiction although its not impossible as it is recorded again is the fact that the killing blow came through the german's scope.

[Papewaio]

Actually not.
Since the notion Marine tends to infer in people a sense of a whole branch of the armed forces. You know the famed 4th branch. Then it would be faulty to consider the naval personell trained in infantrywarfare to me marines.
The SNLF were not enrolled as that. They started out as sailors, but were picked, volounteered ect, for the force. A very different way of making up the force.
Instead of drawing on the traditional infantry pool, they were drawn from the Navy.

Also, in general the officers were naval officers, not some type of 'special' officer trained for the special warfare. This is part of the reason for the rather dismal performance compared to the expected strength.
Generally their only tactic was not budging and the Banzai charge.

Initiative is very important in marines as they will often fight isolated and in small groups. That the SNLF lacked this almost completely marks them as something different from marines.

Marines are a component of the Navy not the Army in a lot of forces. Larger militaries have them as a more independent force, but they generally still do fit within a Navy department.

Also the lack of tactics wasn't just the SNLF, the Banzai charge while feeling for the flanks and enveloping was a general tactic employed by the Japanese military. Works very well against poor troops, it is a meat grinder against better trained and equiped ones. Still it served well all the way from China, Phillipines, Burma all the way to PNG.

Lack of initiative may be more of the culture in the armed forces absolute obediance dulls the self.

Also if initiative is the sole thing that makes a marine... all ANZACs would be classified as marines too.

I think the SNLF showed a change from ad hoc to a more permanent setup in the 20's. A few more decades and they would have formed the kernal to a more western marine setup.

[Kraxis]

Of course initiative isn't the sole defining factor for marines. That is just not very logical.
But initiative is highly important.

What the point is, is that teh Japanese preferred to use Army units in the initial landings if there was supposed to be a defended beach. SNLF were sealanding shock troops, which Marines aren't. Marines are in fact classified as light infantry (though that can be argued).

The SNLF was made for one reason alone. That the Navy would have their own totally loyal troops, so they wouldn't have to depend on the Army. The rivalry between the IJA and IJN is legendary.

And I know that Marines are technically attached to the Navy, but where the SNLF was different was that it didn't have its own recruitment. Suitable men were picked from sailors and led by line officers from the Navy. Marines get their own men and officers.
The fact is that the SNLF troops considered themselves as sailors, not soldiers.

If you want a parallell it would be the Corpsmen of the US Marines. They are also drawn from the Navy rather than a seperate recruitmentpool.
Another parallell would be the SS. The SS was an army within the army (and created due to rivalry), the SNLF was just an army within the Navy (also created due to rivalry).
Both were created (as combattroops, I know the SS started out as bodyguards) to give a strong loyal component for a specific organization. In case of the SS it was the party/Hitler, and in the case of the SNLF it was the Navy.

[Watchman]

Ah, Montgomery was meticulus, but slow as hell (symptomatic of many British leaders, meticulus, slow, thoughtful, cautious. Result of Trenchicus Warfaricus)

Patton managed to gasp the whole blitz thing...

By then the Brits had learned to be careful. They had to wage war all over the place, from Far East to the Med to (eventually) northern France, with rather limited manpower reserves. They also noticed the tide had turned. It's only natural they preferred to proceed with caution and make all the possible preparations to hopefully gain every edge over the other guy they could - they had a dire need to minimize their casualties as far as possible, as well as good reasons to believe they were already winning so there was no point in being too hasty and making stupid mistakes that way.

Sceptical as I generally am, I can actually believe those crazy head counts attributed to Finnish snipers in the Winter War. Red Army tactics, training and leadership were so obscenely defective particularly in the early phase they resulted in some rather mind-boggling casualty figures, and greatly helped the overstretched and hard-pressed Finns hold the line. Crack marksmen skilled in woodcraft no doubt had a field day there, although they weren't necessarily all that happy about it; an old relative by marriage of mine was a sniper in the war, and has never ever talked about it to anyone...

I guess watching people die through a scope can start getting at you.

The Germans had just about the single most sophisticated sniper institution in Wolr War One. While I can see why there could be some antipathies against the profession it would strike me as strange indeed if they made any move to abandon it in the Second - romantic notions of how modern war was waged having been quite thoroughly buried in the cratered no-man's land of the Great War, thankyouverymuch.

[Marshal Murat]

The British slowly grasped the blitzkrieg concept. In the Far East, they had to change their tactics. Overall, however, the British waited until they had overwhelming favorable odds before attacking.
Not that that is bad. But at Arnhem, closing the pocket on the Germans in the Battle of the Bulge. Overall, many British commanders were conservative.

Another is that the Finns targeted field-kitchens. There are reports from the Winter War, where Finns would attack field kitchens, starving Red Army soldiers. During the Winter War, the Russians attacked in thick columns of men, through forests and tundra. Effective against Western Europe, it was a death-trap in Finland (Suoasallasami)

[Kraxis]

although they weren't necessarily all that happy about it; an old relative by marriage of mine was a sniper in the war, and has never ever talked about it to anyone...

I guess watching people die through a scope can start getting at you.

Are you really surprised?
I have heard interviews with such men, and two destinct groups pop up. The "so what" people and the "never again" people. The "never again" people can also be divided up into two broad groups.
The ones who are similar to the "so what", but feel bad about not feeling anything. Which I suppose is the worst.
And the ones who suppressed their inherent revulsion at each shot.

[Grey_Fox]

The British slowly grasped the blitzkrieg concept. In the Far East, they had to change their tactics. Overall, however, the British waited until they had overwhelming favorable odds before attacking.
Not that that is bad. But at Arnhem, closing the pocket on the Germans in the Battle of the Bulge. Overall, many British commanders were conservative.

This is true of the Western Allies in general, not just the British. The Americans allowed the Germans to escape from the Falaise Gap for instance, even though they were surrounded on three sides and could easily have been cut off and totally destroyed with a bit more effort.

[Kraxis]

Perhaps they could, but the fact remains that the US forces that went round had been driving hard and had a very long supplyline (going all around the Germans to the Mulberries). They were not up to strength.
And teh Canadians learned a hard lesson in determined defense when they ran into the German flankprotection. Undoubtedly the other side would have fought as hard. The result could have been that the gap was not closed at all (if the US forces had expended their remaining strength while the German defenders were still up to the task of defending).

Now a lot must be risked in war, but I can understand if the Allied commanders thought it was better to wait until the US forces were a bit more ready. It was to them a case of 'all-or-nothing' or 'a good deal'. And given how Germany already looked to be finished, then it seems very attractive to go for the sure thing rather than risk the Germans getting away.

[Samurai Waki]

slow and tedious planning doesn't always make for the best end result. Monty did good in North Africa and to some extent Italy because he was facing wide pockets of German resistance and knew how to disassemble them piecemeal. However, Market Garden was a different story, this was the first time he had to focus on heavily concentrated forces, but he approached the theater like he Approached N. Africa and Italy. The Pegasus Bridge incident was just a disaster, as well as allowing his very well trained Polish AB units to become isolated and slaughtered, and thinking that XXX Corp. could reach Eindhoven and Arnhem unimpeded within a day or two from Antwerp was fool hardy at best. In Theory the plan should have worked, but he wasn't counting on the most important element in the whole scenario, and that was the German's will to fight.

Not that I don't think Monty was a fine general, and really saved the Allies from disaster in North Africa, but I think it would have been best to let Gen. Eisenhower and Bradley (both who were experienced in that kind of operation) do the major planning, but Pride got in his way, I mean who wants to listen to a 'Yank' ?

Okay I've derailed this thread.

[Alexanderofmacedon]

Yes please, back to topic

[Kraxis]

Nah... Obviously not many have chosen to go back to eh snipers, so why not.

The trouble with Market Garden was that it lay in the British zone and Monty was the best there was there. There was no choice. The Americans didn't go planning offensives in the British zone, and the British didn't in the American zone. When Monty took over during the Ardennes, it was an unpresedented action (but very much called for).

So you can say the operation was doomed to fail. Personally I believe it was doomed to fail in any case because of the two resting SS Panzer divisions and the impossible landingconditions at Arnhem. Arnhem would simply not fall.
But all the other troubles just added to this and made it worse.