Fighting on the eastern front: WWII

[Alexanderofmacedon]

Ok, let's begin with the invading armies in Barbarossa. First of all, the German troops entered operation Barbarossa with 3500 tanks, whereas the Soviets had approx. 20,000. As well as tank superiority though, let's take at the numerical advantage.

July 1941, though, amounted to a little more than 5 million men, which was more than the German land forces deployed for Barbarossa.

The German army mobilized 3.2 million men for the operation. The soviets? 5 million.

The number of artillery pieces and aircraft was also heavily in the Soviets' favor

Again, an other important fact. The Soviets had more artillery as well as aircraft. But before we go any further into the operation on the ground during fighting, let's look at a little insight of the brilliance of the German commanders in WWII. First of all we have Adolf Hitler, a brutal man, but a clever man none the less. By leading Stalin into a false sense of security he prepares for war with his grand army. Is that all? Of course not...the Germans have much more up their sleave. Reinhard Hydrich also had a way to trick Stalin into killing his own generals.

He is believed to be the creator of the forged documents of Russian correspondence with the German high command. While it is now known that the Stalin's Great Purge of the Soviet military officer corps was at most tangentially related to this forgeries...

Now that we have seen a bit of the prerequisites the Germans had for the operation we can dive back into the military aspect of the war in the east.

Operation Barbarossa started on June 22, 1941 and lasted until December of the same year, but there is a smaller operation (or battle) in this period called the battle of Bialystok - Minsk. As this part of the operation commenses, key targets are taken out by German air campaigns allowing the German ninth and fourth armies to cross the border. General Pavlov assembled his army and within two days were in the game. They counter attacked the Germans with the 6th, 11th Mechanized and 6th Cavalry Corps.

This attack failed with heavy losses, although it may have allowed some units to escape the western encirclement towards Minsk. In the evening of 25 June, the German XXXXVII. Panzerkorps cut between Slonim and Volkovysk, forcing Pavlov to order the withdrawal of all troops in the salient behind the Shchara River at Slonim to avoid encirclement

As you can see. The first counter attack is repulsed. A second counter-attack by the 20th Mechanized and 4th Airborne Corps fail as well and by June 30th the pocket was completely closed. In it, the German forces surround and eventually destroy the Soviet 3rd, 10th, 13th and portions of the 4th Soviet Armies. The remainder of the Soviet 4th Army fell back eastwards towards the Berezina River. In a matter of 17 days the Soviets lose 420,000 men. Let's jump ahead here to save some time.

The battle of Leningrad, is not the most famous battles, but deffinetly the most famous seige. By December the German army had advanced 600 km to Leningrad and 800 km to Moscow. In Leningrad there wasn't much to tell. The Germans did a good job of basically starving the city into submission. They refused to assault the massivly fortified city, but instead stood waiting outside the gates of Leningrad. They started on September 8th of 1941 and was not taken down until January of 1944 with operation Spark.

In Moscow it was a different story. About an even number of troops from both sides fought in this battle. The lead German Panzer Groupe was about 19 miles from Moscow. At this time fresh Siberian troops ready for winter war were transfered to the front. The Soviet winter had given the Germans a terrible time and the added stress of troops equipped and trained for harsh weather fighting were there. Even with this sort of pressure the Germans hold firm. They hold the line for a long time despite large numbers of men dieing from cold as well as food ration problems. Approx. 248,000 German soldiers die during the battle of Moscow. Many from the elements NOT the Soviet soldiers. The Soviets however, are not so lucky. With the support of good resources as well as winter clothing they are for the most part protected from the winter, but still manage to lose 650,000 - 1.28Million troops. A staggering number compared to a demoralized German army.

By August 21, 1942, the German army had completed there efforts for the "pincer" movement they had been so diligently working for. The German forces start with the Luftwaffe bombing the city to rubble. By the end of August the German troops had taken over the Volga north of Stalingrad.

The life expectancy of a newly-arrived Soviet private in the city dropped to less than twenty-four hours.

After November 19th, the Soviets counter attacked, but it was not the valient Germans they defeated. It was instead, the weak south flank held by the Romanians. The Soviets led attacks on all sides of the German 6th army (as well as parts of the 4th Panzer army).

The Soviets had completely encircled the 6th army, as well as many of the Axis death toll numbers come from Hungrian, Romanian and other countries rather than German, shows more of the German strength. Moreover, the casualties STILL do not add up. Even when encircled and lacking much needed supplies the axis casualties hold up at around 740,000 killed, while the Russians, with many advantages manage to again lose 750,000 + soldiers. Take into consideration only 400,000 of the axis casualties were German.

One more thread of long exhausting research like the snipers thread

Have fun!

[Csargo]

Is this just for your fun Alexander? Or are we supposed to argue with you. If you would like I have no problem with that :P But other than that very good post.

[Reverend Joe]

What you don't really take into account is that the Soviets 1) started the war with crap machinery and 2) used a lot of mass assault tactics, because they relied so heavily on levies.

And you may point out the staggering losses, but you do not point out the important factor, in the long run: it worked. Ghastly and bloody as hell, but it worked. The Russians could afford to lost many times as many conscripts as the Elite german armies, who had one hell of a time training new soldiers up to the crack level they had once had.

[Strike For The South]

THE GERMANS WERE NOT SUPER SOLDIERS. As for the Russikes high losses they can be to attributed to the fact they were commies and to the fact that all commies suck enso facto Russikes suck. Besides America won WW2 single handedly with no help. If you disagree you are a commie and as mentioned in said post you SUCK!

[BalkanTourist]

I am sorry, I have to say this, but I had a lot more respect for you, SFTS. That's a very childish post.

[Strike For The South]

I am sorry, I have to say this, but I had a lot more respect for you, SFTS. That's a very childish post.

Ahh that may be but I know AOM in real life and his German supersoldiers get tiresome. Yes the Germans were better in nearly everyway but the Russians had #s cliamate and they were fighting for there very survuvial. I doubt the Germans couldve have ever taken the Russian bear down excluding an equal strong japeneese force coming in from Sibera. Even then the Russian bear is a very formidable foe.

[Alexanderofmacedon]

Is this just for your fun Alexander? Or are we supposed to argue with you. If you would like I have no problem with that :P But other than that very good post.

I just wanted to spark new discussion, which it seems to have done. And yes, this was just for my 'fun' I guess...I'm such a nerd!

[cegorach]

[QUOTE=Alexanderofmacedon]

First of all we have Adolf Hitler, a brutal man, but a clever man none the less. By leading Stalin into a false sense of security he prepares for war with his grand army.

Not really clever. If he was clever he should have prepared the army for winter - it is IMPOSSIBLE to win before winter in Russia - only ythe armies which were prepared ( Mongols, Lithuanians, Poles) were visctorious, others died.

Of course not...the Germans have much more up their sleave. Reinhard Hydrich also had a way to trick Stalin into killing his own generals.

It is a joke ? A myth, Stalin got rid of enemies using Hydrich as a perfect excuse, besides these men were hardly brilliant. Stalin needed fanatically loyal men so he killed those with too much ambition.

After November 19th, the Soviets counter attacked, but it was not the valient Germans they defeated. It was instead, the weak south flank held by the Romanians. The Soviets led attacks on all sides of the German 6th army (as well as parts of the 4th Panzer army).

Yes, Germans never lose ! Actually they should have use better protection if they thought that there will be a counterattack - in other words - they sucked ! It was German idea to keep Romanians here and they payed the price when the badly armed allies were overrun.

Even when encircled and lacking much needed supplies the axis casualties hold up at around 740,000 killed, while the Russians, with many advantages manage to again lose 750,000 + soldiers. Take into consideration only 400,000 of the axis casualties were German.

So ? The Russians ALWAYs were losing more soldiers than their enemies - perhaps only during the war with Turkey in 1878 it was different, but the truth is simple THEY NEVER CARED. The difference would have to be massive to make them ask for peace just like in the wars with Poland in 1578-82 or in 1918-20. The Germans were unable to achieve that so they lost.

Regards Cegorach

[Gurkhal]

Yes, Germans never lose ! Actually they should have use better protection if they thought that there will be a counterattack - in other words - they sucked ! It was German idea to keep Romanians here and they payed the price when the badly armed allies were overrun.

If they thought there would be a counter-attack, then the flank protection would be better. But the Germans belived the Russians to have exhausted themselves over the last two years, something which seemed rather realistic at the time if you ask me. And since then a Sovjet counter-attack would seem unlikly it would make sense to keep the low-quality troops at a place where fighting in any greater degree wasn't likly to happen and from where high-quality troops could then be taken from simple guard duties and put where they were needed.

Once the offensive came the Germans and their allies were simply to supprised to be able to respond quickly enough and powerful enough. Hitler's well known confidence in that fixed defences could withstand anything also made what it could to make the disaster greater.

In my opinion the Germans didn't really do anything wrong, it was the Sovjets who did things right.

[Keba]

And the high losses were that sole bit of luck for the West. Despite the numerical superiority, by the time the Red Army reached Germany, both sides were running out of men. The situation also saw the transition of the Red Army to smaller numbers and better equipment, to make up for the lack of manpower.

IIRC, casualties for the Soviets amounted, overall, to some 20,000,000 people, some 8,000,000 soldiers. This number does not take into account the wounded and maimed that could not continue waging war.

The Soviets had high losses because that is the way Russians waged war. It was like that before the Soviet Union, and it was like that in WWII. One might say that they conformed to the rule that soldiers should fear their own officers more than the enemy.

Hitler's greatest miscalculation was the attack on Yugoslavia and Greece. That cost him months. Second was the insistence on concentrating Panzers on the north part of the front, a terrain which did not suit them. Third was the order for the Panzer divisions to halt a few hundred kilometers from Moscow so the infantry could catch up ... which gave time for the defenders to prepare.

Now, for all those mistakes, the Germans would have won if they faced any other army. The Soviets were fully willing to send their men to die so they could accomplish the objective (in the battle of Stalingrad, a division was sent out against the Germans to buy time for the rest of the defenders, the officers knew full well it was a suicide mission, the soldiers did too, and yet they went in, and suffered 99% losses). If they faced any other army, especially those of the Western Allies, they would have won, simple as that.

[Kraxis]

IIRC, casualties for the Soviets amounted, overall, to some 20,000,000 people, some 8,000,000 soldiers. This number does not take into account the wounded and maimed that could not continue waging war.

You recall correctly, if not rightly... Yes I know it is odd.

These figures are what Krushev let out. A sort of "look how bad we suffered". But these last 15 years it has been calculated that the Russian losses amounted to perhaps as much as a couple million past 30 million. With almost half being military.

In Georgia, Stalin's homeland, 95% of the male population in fighting capacity was killed, and since it wasn't really occupied for long, this has to have been due to Stalin himself ("what did you call my moustache? Boys take him out and shoot him") and military action. Pretty steep I would say.

In any case the Russians won it. Germany always lacked those last few divisions they had bottled up in France, Africa, Norway, Yugoslavia ect ect. Some have estimated that five infantry divisions would have been enough to take Moscow, completely surround Leningrad and hold the line during the winter offensives. Small margin... Whether you beleive it is up to yourself, this can't really be proven.

[Keba]

The main problem with counting casualties is the chaos of the first years. The dead were not properly logged during the retreat. Add to that the attempts to form a milita to fight, the losses are likely to be much higher than the official 8,668,400 soldiers. Some authors place it as high as 26,400,000 dead soldiers, although most find that number unrealistic, and estimates are around 16,000,000 soldiers dead total during the war.

The other problem is the casualties of civilian populations which, due to the fact that they often include the dead soldiers, range widely, from 17,000,000 (Sokolov) to as high as 40,000,000 (Kozlov, although this number includes the dead from other causes as well (frostbite and starvation to name two), as well as potential demographic growth loss due to casualties)).

Nevertheless, the numbers of killed are staggering. Not to even begin counting the injured, wounded who might have died later (medical casualties alone are 18,000,000, 15,000,000 of which are wounds or psychiatric disablement). And those figures are solely for the Soviets.

The Soviet Union bore the brunt of World War II, and it is, like mentioned alredy, doubtful that any other nation in the world would have continued waging war following such losses ... they also prevented a third world war from being started following the second one, Soviet losses were simply too high for the war to continue (by the siege of Berlin, Soviet troops weren't all that different in composition from the German units, a lot of young boys and old men, very few actual soldiers).

[Alexanderofmacedon]

[QUOTE=cegorach]

Not really clever. If he was clever he should have prepared the army for winter - it is IMPOSSIBLE to win before winter in Russia - only ythe armies which were prepared ( Mongols, Lithuanians, Poles) were visctorious, others died.




It is a joke ? A myth, Stalin got rid of enemies using Hydrich as a perfect excuse, besides these men were hardly brilliant. Stalin needed fanatically loyal men so he killed those with too much ambition.





Yes, Germans never lose ! Actually they should have use better protection if they thought that there will be a counterattack - in other words - they sucked ! It was German idea to keep Romanians here and they payed the price when the badly armed allies were overrun.



So ? The Russians ALWAYs were losing more soldiers than their enemies - perhaps only during the war with Turkey in 1878 it was different, but the truth is simple THEY NEVER CARED. The difference would have to be massive to make them ask for peace just like in the wars with Poland in 1578-82 or in 1918-20. The Germans were unable to achieve that so they lost.

Regards Cegorach

I would expect this from a Pole! Excellent post.

[Rodion Romanovich]

The Soviets didn't have nearly the same mobility for their divisions as the Germans at the outbreak of Operation Barbarossa, even despite advantage in number of tanks and planes. They hadn't developed motorized divisions of the same kind as the German and hadn't practised and planned for a mobility of that type in their military doctrine - something that is worth a thought, it's not only about numbers in equipment. Another important point is that Stalin had sent a lot of the more capable generals to death camps because they weren't communists, replacing them with less able generals. Operation Barbarossa was a shock operation including the element of surprise in the attack, a careful plan for missions for the aircraft and tanks taking advantage of precise intel about the distribution and strength of the Soviet forces. The initial advances were planned according to this accurate intel so that in almost every initial engagement the Germans would engage a smaller, weaker Soviet force isolated from others. The victories won during the first two days were entirely due to shock effect and backstabbing, a luxury not often given to commanders. It wasn't any brilliant achievement other than in perhaps intel, recon, and an ambitiousness in taking advantage of the element surprise rarely seen in other military operations. The more important thing was what came after the initial few days of Barbarossa. There, the Germans did a job that could be considered strategically impressive, but you could also blame it more on the Soviet lack of experience in fighting blitz tactics previously. While the Germans had had practise wars vs Spain, Poland, France and Britain previously, the Soviets had only fought the Polish and had some engagements to the east, but hadn't had any practise similar to the German practise. If you look at the war after Zhukov was brought back from the camps, he quickly reestablished the crumbling Soviet lines in a withdrawal operation that I would consider one of the most impressive military operations of the 20th century warfare.

The first interesting event was when Hitler ordered to reinforce the offensive to the south instead of pushing forward more aggressively towards Moscow. Instead he fell for the temptation of pursuing the rapidly retreating southern flank, crossing the Dnepr, wasting much energy in the river crossing and even more in the following advance, where neither supplies nor Luftwaffe could keep up and provide very good support. In not capturing Leningrad, the Wehrmacht didn't only lose the chances of taking Moscow, but also lost the support from the Finnish troops who had much experience in fighting the Russians and fighting in the difficult terrain to the north. The Finnish troops thus aborted the attempts to capture Murmansk, and as a result this important harbor was kept open during the entire war, allowing allied convoys to supply the Soviets with tanks and weapons. In losing the battle for the northern flank already in 1941 and the reestablishment of the Soviet line, many Germans already saw the war as lost when the first Soviet counter-offensives begun. If you look at some of the commander changes in 1941, you'll see that first one commander requests to be replaced because of "disease". Shortly afterwards a great number of other German commanders resign with similar excuses. You get the impression of a fear of Hitler even among both the ranks and the command, due to the terror of the SS, Gestapo and other institutions. Nobody dared argue against Hitler's decision to redirect the main offensive south even if it was a big mistake, hardly a nice work climate. And in 1941, many rightly believed that German defeat was near. The Soviet early raids on Berlin and the Ploesti oilfields had also been important propaganda victories for the Soviets, with the full result being visible in Germany by the winter 1941, when also the strategical situation for the Wehrmacht got critical.

However then comes the second interesting event of the Eastern front war. The Soviet counter-offensives by Zhukov had nearly encircled and eliminated the northern German panzer spearhead, when Stalin intervened in a way similar to Hitler's intervention during the autumun. Instead of continuing to concentrate the offensives to the north, Stalin ordered offensives along the entire line as a propaganda action similar to how Hitler believed terror and propaganda would be more important than strategy in defeating the enemy. As a result of Stalin's orders, none of the offensives got strong enough to break the German lines, and the northern panzer spearhead survived the winter. While the early offensives seem to have had quite low Soviet casualties while inflicting many German casualties, the following offensives were powerless and gained nothing else than worthless ground for the massive loss of lives and equipment such as tanks for the Soviets. As a result of the offensives, the Germans could soon prepare a spring offensive against a weakened and exhausted Soviet army, and in 1942 pushed on towards the Volga. However because they had given up the war on the northern flank after the defeats in 1941, the rest of the war was thereby without doubt lost, considering that pushing on to the south could only take them to another river line, the Volga, where the Soviet artillery and infantry based armies were extremely effective when used to defend river crossings.

The German spring offensive of 1942 was admittedly well-coordinated and tactically impressive on the way towards the Volga, but again Hitler made a strange intervention, repeatedly ordering one of the key panzer units back and forth along the line and preventing it from taking part in any of the action while the other units took more damage than would otherwise have been necessary. By the time the Germans got close to the Volga, their advance was already slowed down, and it was hardly surprising that they would stand no chance in pushing on much further after crossing the river. The fact that the Soviets chose to strike the Romanian, Italian and Hungarian parts of the axis line in their counter-offensive was hardly surprising, because the auxiliary regiments had arcaic tanks and equipment of much lower quality than the Germans. It's normal military procedure in such a situation to strike the part of the line believed to be weakest. That doesn't mean the line wouldn't have been broken if held by German forces. It's possible that it was even benefitial for the Germans that it wasn't German-held lines that were attacked by the first powerful wave of the Soviet offensive, because if so they would no doubt have been lost just like the auxiliary regiments were. So it can hardly be blamed on the auxiliaries that the line was broken, seeing as the Soviets had amassed an enormous superiority for the counter-offensive and the Germans were already exhausted by the river crossings. After the Volga line and Stalingrad encirclement, Hitler's interference again proved counter-productive, as he prevented any quick counter-operation from being carried out by not allowing the army in Caucasus to give up ground and retreat. If it had retreated quickly, it could possibly have encircled the Soviet pincers over the Volga and challenged the Soviet counter-attack at an earlier stage. Instead, the 3 German key units for a long time fought isolated in 3 different locations without being able to support each other - a crucial mistake when fighting a numerally superior opponent with lower-quality equipment and training (the Soviets were mostly levies). One group was captured in the Stalingrad pocket, another in the Caucasus, and a third near Kharkov. However even if Hitler hadn't intervened, the German defeat would have been certain after the Stalingrad encirclement, seeing as they would then hardly have had the offensive power to launch another offensive over the Volga, which would have resulted in a similar situation to that before the Kursk offensive.

The Kursk offensive was the final interesting event. The Soviets knew the Germans would have to win on the eastern front to have any chance at all of winning the war, even if the allies weren't keeping their promise of opening another front to the west, so a German attack was inevitable. The Soviets did the right thing in just waiting for it, so that they could stop it by defense in depth + switft counter-attacks - the anti-blitz tactic the Soviets had developed and perfected by 1943 - and in the process eliminate much of the German key elite units used for the offensive, to enable a quick Soviet advance in response. When Operation Zitadelle finally came, the Soviets took full advantage of their intel and the low-quality troops they had at their disposal, and managed to win a crucial victory where a large portion of the crucial German tank reserve was wiped out.

In summary I think both the Germans and the Soviets suffered a lot from bad decisions made by their political leaders who knew nothing about warfare. The generals of both sides did a quite good job given the orders they received from above, but I would hardly say the Germans or Soviets were superior to their opponents. I also would say that even if the Germans hadn't received the contra-productive orders from Hitler that were devastating to their forces, they wouldn't have been capable of winning in the long term. Holding the Soviet Union would have been impossible with the war to the west, the blockades and the trade embargoes, even if the British, French and Americans together were a much smaller threat than the Soviet Red Army. It would have been difficult to enforce the surrender and handing over of all Soviet equipment, and easy for Soviet partisans to hide weapons, tanks and other equipment for partisan activities even if Stalin had signed a surrender. That the Germans would have been able to press on past the Urals doesn't seem anywhere near realistic, and if there would have been a Soviet defeat it would only have been temporary. On the other hand if Stalin hadn't intervened in 1941 I don't think the Soviet would have been able to win the war that much faster, perhaps winning by 1943 or 1944 at the earliest.

[Brenus]

“An offensive army as we see”: Yes, it was. The Soviet doctrine was to counter attack at any opportunity, and to be very aggressive. The first task for the Red Army was first to learn to fend, then they succeeded to over-come the best trained German crews… When the tactic known as the shield and the sword (Kursk) was implemented, it gave them victory and they took the initiative. The German will never got it back.

[Pontifex Rex]

Ok, let's begin with the invading armies in Barbarossa. First of all, the German troops entered operation Barbarossa with 3500 tanks, whereas the Soviets had approx. 20,000.

Ok, lets As others have posted this number in closer to the 14,000 mark and of these as many as 2/3 were "off the road" due to maintenance and spare part probalems (varied between units). Further, since most units were not concentrated on June 22, they could not and did not fight as divisions, oftern the ammunition or fuel depots were 100 miles or more from the tank parks, sub units could be even further apart.. The poor maintenace levels have their roots in the five year plans and the emphasis on numbers,...but not spare parts. So,...many tanks, not enough widgets to keep them running.

As well as tank superiority though, let's take at the numerical advantage.The German army mobilized 3.2 million men for the operation. The soviets? 5 million.

Nope. It was 4.4 million Axis troops in the attacking zones (including airforce personnel) versus 2.6 million Soviet army and air force troops in the western military districts. The total of 5.5 million Russian troops was for the entire country. Here are some stats for just the ground troops (in millions):

June 22 - 3.7 Axis vs 2.2 RA
Sept 11 - 4.02 Axis vs 3.46 RA
Nov 1 - 3.5 Axis vs 2.2 RA
Dec 1 - 3.4 Axis vs 4.19 RA

Add in strategic surprise, poor Red Army training, poor equipment, poor supplies and the results are not hard to understand.

Operation Barbarossa started on June 22, 1941 and lasted until December of the same year, but there is a smaller operation (or battle) in this period called the battle of Bialystok - Minsk. As this part of the operation commenses, key targets are taken out by German air campaigns allowing the German ninth and fourth armies to cross the border. General Pavlov assembled his army and within two days were in the game. They counter attacked the Germans with the 6th, 11th Mechanized and 6th Cavalry Corps.

Alex,...please. The Bialostok defences were not taken out by any air attack but by the attacks of 4 German armies possessing strategic surprise, numerical advantage, better tactical and doctrinal method.

The Soviets had completely encircled the 6th army, as well as many of the Axis death toll numbers come from Hungrian, Romanian and other countries rather than German, shows more of the German strength. Moreover, the casualties STILL do not add up. Even when encircled and lacking much needed supplies the axis casualties hold up at around 740,000 killed, while the Russians, with many advantages manage to again lose 750,000 + soldiers. Take into consideration only 400,000 of the axis casualties were German.

Hmmm,...don't build your shrine to Nazi Germany just yet Alex. The axis armies lost some 1.5 million troops between August 1942 and Feb 1943 from five axis armies (German IV Panzer and VI Army, Rumanian III and IV and Italian VIII). Thirty-two divisions and three brigades were destroyed entirely, 16 more divisions were shattered and another 20+ abandoned their heavy equipment and transport. 3500 tanks (7 months production) along with 12,000 guns (6 month production) and over 3000 aircraft (4 months production) were also lost. The Germans and their allies allies lost enough equipment to outfit some 75 divisions by the end of campaign. Soviet losses, both civilian and military, are pegged at about 1.0 - 1.1 million with equipment losses being far less than that of the axis armies.