Fighting on the eastern front: WWII

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Ah..the great debate resurfaces once more.

Could the Germans have defeated Soviet Russia?

Good sources for the argument:

Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted, by Russell H.S. Stolfi. University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. Hardcover. 280 pages. Photographs. Maps. Notes. Bibliography. Index.

-- argues that the Wermacht had the tools and Hitler had the will, but that Hitler did not have the nerve to follow through properly with a Blitz.

Slaughterhouse: Handbook of the Eastern Front, by David Glantz, et. al. Aberjona Press.

-- a more conventional view, but emphasizing the many operations that have not received the publicity of major actions such as those at Lenigrad and Stalingrad. Some interesting things on Soviet defeats in '42 and '43 as their new mechanized forces learned their trade.

[ChewieTobbacca]

I think what most people CAN agree on is that had Germany unleashed this attack on any other country in the world, it's highly unlikely that country could have came out victorious.

All the more annoying when I hear the uneducated say that the U.S. is almost entirely why WW2 was won...

[Keba]

The Allied commanders were less bold for a very simple reason. Western democracies cared about casualty lists in combat, the Russians didn't. The western allies attempted to minimize casualites on their side, which made them appear somewhat indecisive.

The Soviets simply didn't care ... there was a quote of Zhukov's (I think, it could have been Konev, though): 'If my infantry runs into a mine-field, I want them to march over it like it wasn't there.' Hardly an attitued a western commander would have had.

And that attitude won the war.

Interesting tidbit ... the USA provided trucks for what would become the famed Katyusha. The words USA were stenciled on the truck above the white star. The Soviets repainted the star red, but the letters remained (they didn't have that much time), so the common agreeance among the soldiers was that the letters stood for: to kill that son-of-a-bitch Adolf.

[Pannonian]

The Allied commanders were less bold for a very simple reason. Western democracies cared about casualty lists in combat, the Russians didn't. The western allies attempted to minimize casualites on their side, which made them appear somewhat indecisive.

The Soviets simply didn't care ... there was a quote of Zhukov's (I think, it could have been Konev, though): 'If my infantry runs into a mine-field, I want them to march over it like it wasn't there.' Hardly an attitued a western commander would have had.

And that attitude won the war.

The rationale was that the principal purpose of a minefield is not to destroy a unit, but to pin it down so that supporting artillery can blanket them with fire. Walking through a minefield as if it didn't exist was therefore actually the best way of minimising casualties. IIRC British paratroopers in the Falklands took the same view, ignoring the relatively minor problem of the minefield to get to the major problem of the Argentine troops defending the position.

[Mount Suribachi]

The Allied commanders were less bold for a very simple reason. Western democracies cared about casualty lists in combat, the Russians didn't. The western allies attempted to minimize casualites on their side, which made them appear somewhat indecisive.

Also, the allies just weren't as populous as Russia. By 1944 the British were disbanding regiments in order to keep other units at full strength, Canada was letting prisoners out of jail to fill the ranks etc. Only America had anything like the numbers of men Russia had and they had 3 things draining their manpower that Russia didn't. An enormous Air Force. An enormous Navy. And a war on either side of the globe.

And given the low life expectancy of green soldiers in the US Army due to their abominable replacements system, their GIs didn't fare much better than their Soviet counterparts.

[Randarkmaan]

And given the low life expectancy of green soldiers in the US Army due to their abominable replacements system, their GIs didn't fare much better than their Soviet counterparts.

Hmm... I haven't heard much about this "abominable replacement system" before, would you be keen to tell me about it? Because I'm actually pretty interesting in getting to know (no sarcasm).

[Kraxis]

I haven't heard that as well, but I will try to explain what it could be.

The US doctrine was centered on Tail rather than Teeth. Meaning the best went to the rear, while the infantry got what the other had left over (sorry if this offends someone, but that was how it was, and the other services couldn't take ALL the best anyway). So technically the infantry wasn't really that great (oddly enough the worst seems to have been the mechanized infantry, also called Gypsies for their tendency to collect stuff and bring it along on their transports), and the Tail was huge!
There is a truth in the American saying: "Behind every fighting man are 20 other men." That is literal, if a bit more than the truth.

So actually the US forces generally lacked infantrymen, while on paper they were ready for combat. That meant as soon as losses were taken, they hit harder than either the German or British suffered. It also meant that the average infantryman would not likely have as good a chance of survival as the British infantryman (though that can also be contributed to the British lack of risking the infantry and using armour instead, while the US used the infantry in the first lines).
The percentagewise losses among fighting troops could very well be very high, if not all that immense in actual numbers.

[Mount Suribachi]

Kraxis hits on part of what I was on about. I believe only 1 in 4 of the US Army in WW2 were "front line", although that number may be skewed by the fact that the Air Force was part of the Army at that time. Also, army recruits got a choice as to which branch of the service they wished to join. This meant that the air force got lots of smart, highly motivated pilots but the army proper lacked good quality officers and the infantry became something of a dumping ground for the worst quality recruits. This problem was further compounded by the rule that exempted 10% of college-eligable draftees from military service (to try and preserve some of the bright young minds)

Again, as Kraxis hints at, US Army doctrine differed from say, British Army doctrine. The sizes and force compositions of both armies reflected this. A British infantry Brigade might have 3 Battalions. 2 would be on the front line, the 3rd would be in reserve/refitting/recuperating and after several days would replace one of the other 2 battalions. The US Army on the other hand kept their units on the front line and they rarely got a rest. If they took heavy casualties, they wouldn't be pulled back and refitted, they would be sent a batch of replacements and kept on the line. The only way out was to be killed or wounded.

And herein lies the problem. Replacements were taken from a giant pool known as Replacement Depots (the infamous and hated "repple depples"), and apportioned as requested by unit commanders at the front. They were just sent to reinforce units to fill gaps. These green young soldiers were naturally not welcomed by the veterans at the front and little attempt was made to integrate them into their squads/platoons and they usually were dead/wounded very quickly. I read one GI saying that if you survived 5 days you were considered a veteran.

The replacement pools were also filled out by wounded soldiers returning to duty. And they were treated just like the soldiers fresh out of training - assigned without a care or a thought to which unit they had belonged to before they were wounded.

And this goes to the heart of the problem. When it all comes down to it, men don't fight for King or Country, they fight for their mates either side of them. Except, when you're thrown in with a bunch of strangers who don't know you or trust you, that motivation that makes you fight disappears.

It also contrasts again with the British regimental system. Men in a unit were generally all from the same area. They trained together. When they were wounded, they were returned to their old unit when they recovered. The Germans also did the latter, the only American units that followed this practise were specialised units like the Airborne or Rangers.

What this policy ultimately meant was the US Infantry divisions often lacked cohesion and continuity, resulting in higher casualties than maybe they should. Between D-Day and VE-Day four US Inf divisions suffered over 200% casualties. Several others approached that.

Stephen Ambrose goes into this in some detail in Band of Brothers and especially Citizen Soldiers

[Pontifex Rex]

Interesting tidbit ... the USA provided trucks for what would become the famed Katyusha. The words USA were stenciled on the truck above the white star. The Soviets repainted the star red, but the letters remained (they didn't have that much time), so the common agreeance among the soldiers was that the letters stood for: to kill that son-of-a-bitch Adolf.

Sorry Keba but that is simply not true. The Kats were first used in mid-1941 and were based on a Russian chasis. Perhaps some were later used but the majority of the trucks (more robust and with larger cargo capacity) supplied by the US were used to haul troops and supplies. I have not seen any photos of a Katyusha on a US truck chasis.

[Keba]

Not really true accept in being true to the myth. The spring of 1941 came late and the rains stayed longer than normal. Guderian himself has stated that they could not have attacked sooner since the rivers were still swollen (in particular the Bug) and the ground too soft in Poland and East Prussia for large scale movement of armoured units.

It isn't as much that spring came late, it was the Balkans that stalled the Germans. It cost them as much as a month of fighting ... more since the troops had to be moved to the borders with the SU. The weather may have been bad, I don't really remember, however the employement of troops after the beginning of the attack came out wrong ... the panzers were concetrated north, in terrain that didn't suit them, foolish orders for the tanks to wait for the infantry to catch up cost Germany a decisive victory. Now, while Moscow may not have been a vital position ... it's fall would have destroyed Soviet morale, just like Stalingrad would have. The Germans also wanted to strike south, at the oil fields first, but Hitler demanded the attack be concentrated on Moscow. Now, that decision was a mixed blessing, the Soviets were expecting a strike at the oil fields, and had concentrated their forces accordingly, however, in 41, those forces would have been insufficent.

It should also be added that the Red Army was in the process of a series of reforms and that the purges of the army had hurt badly. The learning curve was steep but one can clearly see the improvement in the combat techniques as early as Nov 1941. By late 1942 they are beginning to put into practice the operational doctrine known as "Deep Battle" which would prove to be far superior to blitzkrieg and better than anything developed by the western allies. The weather and Russian numbers are the old excuses of the defeated German officers and offer only a simplistic view of a hugely complex issue.

It was an idea on paper as early as '34, I believe. The reforms were intiated following the Winter War, where the Soviet army showed it's lack of ability. However, in the initial stages of the war, the proponents of static defense were more numerous and powerful, in general. By the time that the concept was actually employed, Stalin had learned to listen to his commanders, something that Hitler never did.

Sorry Keba but that is simply not true. The Kats were first used in mid-1941 and were based on a Russian chasis. Perhaps some were later used but the majority of the trucks (more robust and with larger cargo capacity) supplied by the US were used to haul troops and supplies. I have not seen any photos of a Katyusha on a US truck chasis.

Dunno, it was in one of the books I read on the subject ... IIRC, the Russians did order a whole lot of trucks from the USA as part of the war effort. The book claimed that they were used for Katyushas, however, I can no longer remember which book it was.

[Pannonian]

It isn't as much that spring came late, it was the Balkans that stalled the Germans. It cost them as much as a month of fighting ... more since the troops had to be moved to the borders with the SU. The weather may have been bad, I don't really remember, however the employement of troops after the beginning of the attack came out wrong ... the panzers were concetrated north, in terrain that didn't suit them, foolish orders for the tanks to wait for the infantry to catch up cost Germany a decisive victory.

Arras is an example of what happens when the panzers disregard their infantry support completely. The Soviets later solved the problem of necessary infantry support by having the accompanying infantry ride on the tanks themselves, something made possible perhaps by the position of the turret.

[Kraxis]

The Soviets later solved the problem of necessary infantry support by having the accompanying infantry ride on the tanks themselves, something made possible perhaps by the position of the turret.

Actually they learned the practice from the Germans in Barbarossa. If you look up the pictures from that campaign you will often see German infantry riding tanks.

But where the German infantry rode for comfort and tactical advantages, the Russians devised the idea to be an entire doctrine for certain shock troops (generally the tank-riders carried only submachineguns). Similarly the Katyusha was taken in as a result of the effectiveness of the Nebelwerfer.
But in both cases the Russians took a good idea and expanded on it. For isntance the German Nebelwerfer was a number of tubes on a small carriage. Pretty simple, but the Russians did like they did with everything else, thought of how to make it faster and simpler. Easy, remove the spin and add fins, and mount it on a truck, just like the masses of AA guns.
Then it was the turn of the Germans to learn, and they did as they always did. How could eh weapon be made better in ALL aspects? Well mounting the rockets on a fully armoured halftrack would make it a lot easier to use (six tubes had been mounted on the sides of an open halftrack with limited success), and a lot better protected. But that was expensive... as usual...

But riding tanks was a specific task for specific infantry. A lot of stories surround these shocktroops, and not all are nice, in fact they were supposedly the worst of the lot.

[Pontifex Rex]

It isn't as much that spring came late, it was the Balkans that stalled the Germans. It cost them as much as a month of fighting ... more since the troops had to be moved to the borders with the SU.

Hmmm,... I do not believe this is so. Back in late 1940 the original date for the invasion was set for May 15 but it was the weather that delayed the invasion not the Balkan attack. The troops that were used for the invasion of Yugoslavia and then Greece in April 1941 were drawn almost exclusively from Army Group South and the OKW reserves and almost all were back in their start positions in time for the June 22 start date. Casualties had been minimal and the troops were ready on the date of the assault.

The weather may have been bad, I don't really remember, however the employement of troops after the beginning of the attack came out wrong ... the panzers were concetrated north, in terrain that didn't suit them, foolish orders for the tanks to wait for the infantry to catch up cost Germany a decisive victory.

Again, one needs to examine what the plan called for, which was the destruction of the Red Army west of the Dnepr River. Truth be told, the Soviet high command believed the UKraine to be the strategic objective and had deployed the bulk of their best formation in the south. However, the Germans were deployed in a manner that put Moscow as a priority, at least initially, and the results do show how effective the three northern panzer groups were.

As for "foolish orders for the tanks to wait for the infantry" I think the records agains show that the tanks alone were not capable of poreventing the Red Army from making its way out of encirclements. The further the Germans pushed east the worse their supply situation became and no sooner had they reach Smolensk than the logistics system all but collapsed. Coupled with serious Red Army counterattacks east of Smolensk Army group centre was forced onto the defensive, forcing a 4 week halt to offensive operations.

Now, while Moscow may not have been a vital position ... it's fall would have destroyed Soviet morale, just like Stalingrad would have. The Germans also wanted to strike south, at the oil fields first, but Hitler demanded the attack be concentrated on Moscow. Now, that decision was a mixed blessing, the Soviets were expecting a strike at the oil fields, and had concentrated their forces accordingly, however, in 41, those forces would have been insufficent.

Actually it was the German generals who wanted to strike for Moscow and it was Hitler who wanted to strike for the Ukraine and the Donbas. The debate that raged in late July and early August was only settled when Hitler gave the following order:

OKW Order 21
The OKHs 18 August considerations regarding the further conduct of operations in the east do not agree with my intentions.
I order:
1. The most important missions before the onset of winter are to seize the Crimea and the industrial and coal regions of the Don, deprive the Russians of the opportunity to obtain oil from the Caucasus and, in the north, to encircle Leningrad and link up with the Finns, rather than capture Moscow.
2....

This is the point were Hitler actually made the correct move but for the wrong reasons. Had the Germans struck eastward in September they would have done so with their railheads further west than they were while the panzer moved further east. The supply system simply would not have allowed it. More importantly, Army Group South would not have been in position to cover the southern flank as it did historically and the troops destroyed in the Kiev pocket would have been available to attack the salient towards Moscow once the poor weather arrived.

Good discussion.

Cheers.

[Alexanderofmacedon]

My eyes hurt badly!

[Pontifex Rex]

Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted, by Russell H.S. Stolfi. University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. Hardcover. 280 pages. Photographs. Maps. Notes. Bibliography. Index.

-- argues that the Wermacht had the tools and Hitler had the will, but that Hitler did not have the nerve to follow through properly with a Blitz.

Stolfi is not a good source for examining the events of 1941 or the war in the east. He all but ignores the open Russian archives, uses German sources too heavily, ignores logistical realities and the role they played in the campaign in 1941, and on and on. His work has been roundly criticised as heavily biased and has been taken apart by his peers quite vigorously.

Slaughterhouse: Handbook of the Eastern Front, by David Glantz, et. al. Aberjona Press.

-- a more conventional view, but emphasizing the many operations that have not received the publicity of major actions such as those at Lenigrad and Stalingrad. Some interesting things on Soviet defeats in '42 and '43 as their new mechanized forces learned their trade.

This particular volume by Colonel Glantz is a reference guide and not really meant as a text on the war. I would suggest his "When Titans Clashed", "Before Stalingrad" "Stumbling Colossus" and " Colossus Reborn". I would also think that the work of Glantz is far more controversial in that he does much to undo the "weather and Hitler" excuses of German officers and post-war writers such as Liddel-Hart and others.

Glantz and others have gone a long way towards dispelling the myths left to us by Manstein, Guderian, v Luck, v Mellenthin and others about the war in Russia. Since the opening of the Russian archives in 1990 plus other newer works based on de-classified western and German sources the idea of weather and "Russian hordes" has, rightfully, been put aside.