Fighting on the eastern front: WWII

[Pontifex Rex]

It isn't as much that spring came late, it was the Balkans that stalled the Germans. It cost them as much as a month of fighting ... more since the troops had to be moved to the borders with the SU.

Hmmm,... I do not believe this is so. Back in late 1940 the original date for the invasion was set for May 15 but it was the weather that delayed the invasion not the Balkan attack. The troops that were used for the invasion of Yugoslavia and then Greece in April 1941 were drawn almost exclusively from Army Group South and the OKW reserves and almost all were back in their start positions in time for the June 22 start date. Casualties had been minimal and the troops were ready on the date of the assault.

The weather may have been bad, I don't really remember, however the employement of troops after the beginning of the attack came out wrong ... the panzers were concetrated north, in terrain that didn't suit them, foolish orders for the tanks to wait for the infantry to catch up cost Germany a decisive victory.

Again, one needs to examine what the plan called for, which was the destruction of the Red Army west of the Dnepr River. Truth be told, the Soviet high command believed the UKraine to be the strategic objective and had deployed the bulk of their best formation in the south. However, the Germans were deployed in a manner that put Moscow as a priority, at least initially, and the results do show how effective the three northern panzer groups were.

As for "foolish orders for the tanks to wait for the infantry" I think the records agains show that the tanks alone were not capable of poreventing the Red Army from making its way out of encirclements. The further the Germans pushed east the worse their supply situation became and no sooner had they reach Smolensk than the logistics system all but collapsed. Coupled with serious Red Army counterattacks east of Smolensk Army group centre was forced onto the defensive, forcing a 4 week halt to offensive operations.

Now, while Moscow may not have been a vital position ... it's fall would have destroyed Soviet morale, just like Stalingrad would have. The Germans also wanted to strike south, at the oil fields first, but Hitler demanded the attack be concentrated on Moscow. Now, that decision was a mixed blessing, the Soviets were expecting a strike at the oil fields, and had concentrated their forces accordingly, however, in 41, those forces would have been insufficent.

Actually it was the German generals who wanted to strike for Moscow and it was Hitler who wanted to strike for the Ukraine and the Donbas. The debate that raged in late July and early August was only settled when Hitler gave the following order:

OKW Order 21
The OKHs 18 August considerations regarding the further conduct of operations in the east do not agree with my intentions.
I order:
1. The most important missions before the onset of winter are to seize the Crimea and the industrial and coal regions of the Don, deprive the Russians of the opportunity to obtain oil from the Caucasus and, in the north, to encircle Leningrad and link up with the Finns, rather than capture Moscow.
2....

This is the point were Hitler actually made the correct move but for the wrong reasons. Had the Germans struck eastward in September they would have done so with their railheads further west than they were while the panzer moved further east. The supply system simply would not have allowed it. More importantly, Army Group South would not have been in position to cover the southern flank as it did historically and the troops destroyed in the Kiev pocket would have been available to attack the salient towards Moscow once the poor weather arrived.

Good discussion.

Cheers.