Shields on Panzer Tanks

[Pannonian]

Additional side note - On the show, Top Ten: Tanks, they mentioned that the German tanks were the first to incorporate radios making the coordination of the blitzkrieg possible.

A Guderian innovation derived from the Versailles restrictions. Germany was forbidden from having tanks, so he put radios on cars and exercised with them instead.

[Watchman]

I wouldn't be so sure of the requirement of radios for effective blitzkrieg. The Soviets were notoriously low on such high-tech equipement as radios (commanders' tanks were often the only ones that had then, communications between the tanks being often handled with flags...) and have gone to the books as dispensing with such trivialities as fuel meters in fighter planes too. None of that kept them from conducting very effective mechanized "deep combat" operations once the Red Army had gotten properly reorganized however.

Not that having decent numbers of radios and such around, like the Germans and Western Allies did, didn't be of considerable help in tactical C-and-C of course. But then again the Soviets regularly made up for sophistication and finesse with raw numbers and tenacity. Whatever works, I guess.

[Kraxis]

Actually the Russians began installing radios in their tanks after their hard learned lessons from the Germans. And by the time the T34/85 made it's appearance, they all carried radios.

About the skirts: From the second link.

The icing on the cake for me was the Kummersdorf testing results which clearly stated in Feb. 1943 that ATR and 76mm HE rounds (not HEAT) were tested against schurzen with positive results. After the tests, it was ordered that all Pz III and Pz IV would be fitted with the plating at the factory and in service units would be field upgraded. This original German source is hard to argue with.

Heat? No...
It is actually interesting that they tested the HE round. I read an account of a Sherman that ambushed three PzIVs, and it was out of AP rounds. So it used HE, and with very convincing results as the German tanks began to burn or even exploded from this. Suffice to say the crew was quite surprised. Apparently these were skirtless tanks as teh account mention attacks into the flank.

[Watchman]

Actually the Russians began installing radios in their tanks after their hard learned lessons from the Germans. And by the time the T34/85 made it's appearance, they all carried radios.

Fair enough, but the /85 was a pretty late arrival. I'm under the impression Operation Uranus for example, something of a textbook Deep Combat/Blitzkrieg job, was still for the most part conducted with rather primitive communications (I've read the tank unit that captured the main German airfield was in fact out of communication with the rest of the army for a few days after the fact...). The Soviets had yet to establish a strong enough position by that point to be willing to spare attention to luxuries like radios in every tank instead of just rolling lots of minimally equipped but functional machines out of the Ural Front tankograds, I understand.

[Pontifex Rex]

Fair enough, but the /85 was a pretty late arrival. I'm under the impression Operation Uranus for example, something of a textbook Deep Combat/Blitzkrieg job, was still for the most part conducted with rather primitive communications (I've read the tank unit that captured the main German airfield was in fact out of communication with the rest of the army for a few days after the fact...).

T34-85 was first used in reasonable numbers in March of 44. Uranus was the first major use of the concepts of Deep Battle but was an interim step in overall development of Red Army doctrine. Whereas in 1941 the depth of a offensive seldom reached a depth of 100 kms, by 1942 (Uranus) they managed to penetrate 200-250 kms and by 1944 upwards of 500 kms (Bagration). In fact, it is 1944 that the Red Army doctrine and 'deception' techniques reach their pinnacle with the destruction of the Germans Army Group Centre.

....The Soviets had yet to establish a strong enough position by that point to be willing to spare attention to luxuries like radios in every tank instead of just rolling lots of minimally equipped but functional machines out of the Ural Front tankograds, I understand.

Next to the 2 1/2 ton truck the next piece of Lend-Lease kit that possibly contributed the most to Soviet success were the tens of thousands of radio sets, many of which found their way into tanks. US radios were of better overall quality and more efficent than Russian models so the Soviets preferred the imports to producing their own. It was not really a matter of luxuries.

[DemonArchangel]

What is the "depth" of an offensive really supposed to mean in any case? I've heard the term being tossed around, but I have no clue what it means.

[CBR]

What is the "depth" of an offensive really supposed to mean in any case? I've heard the term being tossed around, but I have no clue what it means.

Well one wants to go deep as one want to capture real estate and surround enemy units. But the ability to go deep is a question of having a proper supply system so the lead units wont run out of gas and be vulnerable to counter attacks. Command and control is another thing as an attacker might simply make a mistake in going too deep only to have his front units getting cut off.

The Russians became better at going deep as the war progressed, as they became more experienced and got relatively stronger than the German army.


CBR