What could have been done better at Gettysburgh?

[ELITEofWARMANGINGERYBREADMEN88]

You charge a hill because that was they way to do it in those days.

You didn't have helmets, camouflage or anything. You had fancy suits and drums. You walked slowly to the enemy stopped in front of him and started firing. It didn't care how many died, the winning was what mattered. Furthermore the weapons were very different, you didn't have long range rifles, to be accurate you needed to fire at close range.

That was they way how wars were fought, and it worked (atleast till WW1)

you charged a hill like that becauses your leaders were stupid. Stupid,Who Lee? Yes in this Battle, If He was smart, he would have had a battle plan.
It worked walking up a hill? don't think so.

[Stig]

Warman, they charged up a hill because that was the way to do it.
If I have a hill and someone wants to attack me he will charge it. That was the only way to do it back then, fact.
You don't send one platoon round the side, etc etc.
You just march 5000 men onto it and start fighting, different times.

War back then was different. You didn't have a home front that would start complaining about casualties, if 2000 men have to die, so be it, aslong as you win.
War was seen as something romantic yes, you would march to the enemy, form the line, fire, fix bayonets and charge. That's how you did it. But really with the coming of the machine gun this changed. It meant cavalry came out of use, but in WW1 you would still slowly walk at the enemy to attack him. Tho there was a change, little companies were used more often. It wasn't an entire division in a line, it was walking to them, then doing seperate tasks.

The first war were this really changed was WW2, were sub-machine guns and tanks had a big role.

We're not used to making war like this, but back then they didn't know any different. For us it's easy to speak after the battle, but you need to know what the commanders knew.

[ELITEofWARMANGINGERYBREADMEN88]

Warman, they charged up a hill because that was the way to do it.
If I have a hill and someone wants to attack me he will charge it. That was the only way to do it back then, fact.
You don't send one platoon round the side, etc etc.
You just march 5000 men onto it and start fighting, different times.

War back then was different. You didn't have a home front that would start complaining about casualties, if 2000 men have to die, so be it, aslong as you win.
War was seen as something romantic yes, you would march to the enemy, form the line, fire, fix bayonets and charge. That's how you did it. But really with the coming of the machine gun this changed. It meant cavalry came out of use, but in WW1 you would still slowly walk at the enemy to attack him. Tho there was a change, little companies were used more often. It wasn't an entire division in a line, it was walking to them, then doing seperate tasks.

The first war were this really changed was WW2, were sub-machine guns and tanks had a big role.

We're not used to making war like this, but back then they didn't know any different. For us it's easy to speak after the battle, but you need to know what the commanders knew.

Of course It Was the way to Do it Stig, How else would you do it back then?


"For us it's easy to speak after the battle, but you need to know what the commanders knew"

Of course I do. Rushing up hill without any "Good" Artilly Support, is completely stupid.Second, you don't send wave after wave up,hoping they give up, unless you got a crap load of troops to kill off while trying. You Don't Rush up,making yourself big tagets.

I can point out so many mistakes in this battle

Having 12,000-15,000 troops March Across a Open Field to march to the Union Forces 1-1 1/2 miles away (I presume) in a Neat Fancy Formation was Ironic. Good Targets

[Kraxis]

Technically the CSA could have mounted infiltration tactics. Their troops were generally not given uniforms, so they wore their homemade clothes, often grey, brown and green, often in combination. Imagine this coupled with the low soft widebrimmed hat they often wore, they could 'easily' blend into the undergrowth.
Further, the CSA infantry was generally made up of the poor whites of the south. That meant hunters, trappers, outback farmers and the likes. Men who knew how to stalk, shoot and hunt, and especially knew the value of being silent and stealthy.

At Shiloh the CSA got some initial advantages by advancing relatively stealthily. Some units basically managed to sneak into Union camps before being spotted. At that battle the troops and their immediate commanders managed to use the best qualities of the them.
Gettysburg was perhaps less forested, but similar actions could have been fought. And the mistakes of that battle could be avoided (marching to the sound of guns, not good when they guns are your enemy's).

It could even have been done at night.
There was a battle, I believe, being fought at dusk and early darkness, where the CSA troops were decidedly better than their opponents (could be the better initiative of the low level officers and the skill of the individual soldiers that made the difference greater than at day).

So, personally I believe the CSA could relatively easily have discarded the oldfashioned offensive tactics for more unconventional ones of infiltration, tactical flanking and the use of cover.
At times the deadly and 'stupid' linecharges had to be made of course (getting that vital position NOW would require that), but that does not preclude any chance of using the other tactics in general.

But this would have demanded a complete rethinking of the military for the CSA, and they lacked the military philosophers needed to makes such changes and the time to come up with it. And further, they lived by the rule "if nothign is broken, don't fix it". So since they were generally winning most of the time, why should anything be changed?

[Atilius]

...so they wore their homemade clothes, often grey, brown and green, often in combination...

The Confederates were often so poorly clothed that, on the numerous occasions when they captured Union supply depots, they were happy to exchange their worn-out rags for Union uniforms. This was a frequent source of confusion on the battlefield throughout the war.

[Kraxis]

The Confederates were often so poorly clothed that, on the numerous occasions when they captured Union supply depots, they were happy to exchange their worn-out rags for Union uniforms. This was a frequent source of confusion on the battlefield throughout the war.

Indeed!
The most prized loot for the CSA infantry was neither food, weapons, ammo, booze or even silver/gold, it was boots! And I can perfectly understand why.
With their own homegrown footwear wearing out within a month or so, militarygrade boots would be a hugely welcome piece of equipment. I can't imagine how it would feel to march around barefoot at the distances these armies marched on dirt-/gravelroads.

However, the most troublesome confusion was in the beginning when the CSA infantry was actually outfitted fairly well with grey uniforms. The USA infantry was of course generally blue with a few red-panted regiments, zoaves or something like that.
But there were a few regiments with grey uniforms, and at the first Bull Run one unit got blasted by friend and foe alike. The rebels routed them with a close distance volley (surprise I guess), then the blues thought they were rebels charging them and gave them a nasty pasting as well.

And this wasn't enough for them to change the unitforms right away. It took some time and afew battles before the uniform was... ehh... uniform.

[CBR]

Technically the CSA could have mounted infiltration tactics. Their troops were generally not given uniforms, so they wore their homemade clothes, often grey, brown and green, often in combination. Imagine this coupled with the low soft widebrimmed hat they often wore, they could 'easily' blend into the undergrowth.

If you by "infiltration tactics" mean tactics like we start seeing in WW1 then I disagree. The weapons used and the effect on the battlefield are completely different. The closest thing would be skirmishers and snipers but they couldnt do much more than harass the enemy.

I doubt the Union troops were as unprepared as they were at Shiloh so the Confederates had little chance of repeating such a surprise attack.

AFAIK they tried to flank whenever they had the chance but sometimes that wasnt possible on the tactical level because of troop densities. And then the only flanking possible would be corps/army level.


CBR

[ELITEofWARMANGINGERYBREADMEN88]

Including that their Artilly Killed and Destroyed Very Few Union Soliders/Cannons during their 2- 2 1/2 our barrage..


I think if they would have move at Night,they might have been locked in a huge battle then..

[Kraxis]

Flanking at tactical level was often impossible because of the visibility. Mostly when the tactical officers became aware of the need or possibilty, the other side had spotted them. So when they marched off to flank they could respond. However, if they had been more fluid and less in ranks and files such would have been possible.

Also, while the rifles in WWI were better (obviously) the combat inside the trenches was very much similar to the melee the infantry in the ACW experienced. A single shot then with bayonet from there on. And that was what the infiltration was about.

Northern armies were notoriously lax in anything but the most obvious way. They simply didn't have the same heart into the war as the CSA troops, generally of course (there were the regulars which tended to best the CSA troops in all departments).
They hadn't really advanced that much since Shiloh (in this department).

[matteus the inbred]

Pickett's Charge was indeed almost a foreshadowing of the Somme offensive. Some 150 or so of Lee's guns spent the afternoon pounding the Union positions, before he sent his troops in, troops that he believed (and after 2nd Manassas and Chancellorsville, who could blame him?) were capable of storming anything.
As it turned out the bombardment was not as effective as he thought, and his troops could not overcome the basic odds of such an attack. It was a mistake the Lee had made before, at Malvern Hill.
I agree with BHC, Lee was not as smart as usual at Gettysburg, probably due to overconfidence. Napoleon, Grant, Marlborough, Wellington, all did something similar in their careers. Sometimes, you just have to send the boys in and hope some of them get through.

[Don Corleone]

First, Lee had put all his brigade & divisional commanders under strict orders NOT to engage the enemy. The fact that AP Hill, and Henry Heth (the corps & divisonal commanders that started the skirmish respectively) weren't flogged and court martialed afterwards is amazing.

Anyway, in the first day, the CSA could have and should have won it outright. When the Union cavalry pickets finally did break, the CSA had some tremendous, though short lived, tactical advantages. However, for some reason, Old Baldy, Robert Ewell, decided to hold up at Cemetary Hill and would not press the attack. Had he, O.O. Howard's 12th corps almost certainly would have been overrun, putting Ewell on Hancock's 1st corps rear flank. The Union would have had to have withdrawn. Instead, Ewell ordered Early and company to hold up, allowing Sedgwick to come in and bolster Howard, ensuring the CSA didn't get any of the highlands to the south and east of town.

On the 2nd day, the day Lee sent Longstreet to charge the roundtops, you have to look at just how good that terrain was. IF Longstreet had taken it, and the CSA could have mounted their Parrott guns up on top of those hills, the Union would have been in serious trouble. What's more, there's no reason to believe that if Longstreet hadn't delayed and stalled that he couldn't have actually taken it. He whined about about it for so long, his glum assessment became a self fulfilling prophecy.

On the 3rd day, Pickett's charge defies logic. It's almost as though Lee was possessed. It was very uncharacteristic for him, as he was painfully aware of the numeric advantages the Union possessed and just how dear each and every casualty was to the CSA.

On the Union side, there's a whole hatful of stupid things that they did. First, O.O. Howard, on the first day... Who orders their men to enter a densely wooded grove, then just stop? He's damn lucky he and his men survived that day and he very easily could have been wiped out. On the 2nd day, Sikes' adventures in the Peach Orchard border on criminal stupidity and disobediance. Meade had a fairly strong defensive line set up and Sikes decided to open a huge hole right at the lynch pin, because he wanted to impress some journalists he had along with him. He was damn lucky to have lost only his leg... McLaws and Lafyette had him surrounded on 3 sides and came this || close to pinching his entire corps off from the main union line. Not reinforcing the roundtops was incredibly stupid, and it's amazing that Chamberlain was able to hold.

On the 3rd day, the Union sat back and waited. Given their shortsighted offensive maneuvers up until then, this was probably their wisest move thus far in the war. The only thing I don't understand is why they didn't have a counter-strike prepared for Pickett's charge. They knew it was coming for close to an hour, and once the 1st corps turned the tide at the bloody angle, they should have sprung... The CSA would have been divided in half and possibly the entire ANV would have been destroyed. They had to settle for chasing the hospital trains the following day, slim pickings at best.

[Kagemusha]

If we speak tactically about the battle one intresting question is ,what would have happened on the second day if Longstreet would have accepted General Hoods idea that instead of attacking against little round top with his division he would have moved around big round top and placed his artillery in there? That way he could have flanked the end of Union line and his artillery would have been in wonderfull position to support the division. I bet that if the Corps commander would have been Jackson instead Longstreet it would have happened.

[Reverend Joe]

On the 3rd day, the Union sat back and waited. Given their shortsighted offensive maneuvers up until then, this was probably their wisest move thus far in the war. The only thing I don't understand is why they didn't have a counter-strike prepared for Pickett's charge. They knew it was coming for close to an hour, and once the 1st corps turned the tide at the bloody angle, they should have sprung... The CSA would have been divided in half and possibly the entire ANV would have been destroyed. They had to settle for chasing the hospital trains the following day, slim pickings at best.

Failing to pursue the Confederate army was one of Meade's greatest failings, and, if I recall correctly, one of the reasons he was finally fired from the command of the Army of the Potomac. I might be confusing Meade with a different general, but I believe this hesitance and fear of risk was a problem that dogged Meade for years; he refused to advance at a pace slower than a crawl, even when the odds were greatly in his favor, and he lost a great number of advantages because of this.