Lee's blood was up.

The 1st is hard to fault anyone for, a meeting engagement rarely proceeds according to any strategic plan. Buford and company just held a little better than usual and the Rebs didn't have enough energy left that day to put in a chin shot.

When the double envelopement effort of the 2nd failed to be decisive, he should have broken it off as a bad business.

Had he waited defensively on the 3rd, he could have begun a long flanking effort on the 4th -- actually screened by cavalry the way it was supposed to be -- and found better ground to face Meade again.

Lee believed in the greater ability of his soldiers -- with a lot of truth to it. Not only did they get across that field, but Lo Armistead came within an ace of triggering a localized panic at the Angle and achieving a break-through. Meade certainly had reserves to try to counter this, but many of his better regiments had been shot out and many of the AotP's regiments had fairly fragile morale. A few moment's more panic and just a dash of luck and it still might have worked. That they came that close to success despite the insane tactical choice to attack there and then says alot about those troops.