What could have been done better at Gettysburgh?

[ELITEofWARMANGINGERYBREADMEN88]

Hey,



Since I'm only 3-5 hours drive away from the Famous Civil War BattleField,Gettysburgh, I like to ask you guys what could have been done better on both sides in order of winning.

I find it ironic that the Confederates would go against a well known rule, and charged straight up little round top. Both sides had Forests, and the Chambelin (mis spell his name) was outnumbered if I remember right. I still find it funny how, if you going to charge up a wooden Hill, why don't you crawl up,make yourself less of a taget.


For the 3rd day, Pickett's Charge. Stupid. I can understand marching,keeps them from getting tired, but still. Why have them be in BattleLines where Artilly would blow them to pieces before they could get into Musketrange, and get shot with them also.

[Stig]

You charge a hill because that was they way to do it in those days.

You didn't have helmets, camouflage or anything. You had fancy suits and drums. You walked slowly to the enemy stopped in front of him and started firing. It didn't care how many died, the winning was what mattered. Furthermore the weapons were very different, you didn't have long range rifles, to be accurate you needed to fire at close range.

That was they way how wars were fought, and it worked (atleast till WW1)

[Kagemusha]

In my opinion the whole battle was Strategical mistake. Lee´s and Longstreets original plan was to march toward Washington and force the Union troops to attack them so they could fight a defensive battle in offensive campaign since they were outnumbered.
No matter, first the Confederate cavalry failed miserable in scouting the Union force and after that the lead Column of Confederate army was sucked in the battle becouse they really were not aware what they were up against when they first engaged Bufords cavalry.
After the first days events and the arrival of the main force of Union army the battle was practicly lost. At this point Lee made the final mistake to fight there,while Longstreet opposed Lee´s decision vigorously.

[matteus the inbred]

Hmmm, I thought the high casualty rates in the ACW were due to the use of old style Napoleonic infantry tactics combined with increasing technology (rifled firearms/artillery, repeating firearms, trench systems etc. the 'first modern war' thing).
Tactically, both sides tended to adopt French infantry and cavalry manuals, leading to mass infantry attacks, formal cavalry charges and insufficient close support artillery, the sort of thing that lost the French the Franco-Prussian war. By the time of Gettysburg, both sides could adopt more mobile and 'combined arms' tactics, although the Confederates tended to do this much better.
Crucially, as Kagemusha says, the Confederate cavalry was missing, poorly handled or underused for much of the battle, and Lee's tendency to give a lot of latitude to his subordinates probably meant his army missed opportunities on both the first and second days of the battle. For example, General Ewell was given the option by Lee of assaulting Cemetery Hill on the first day, which would have altered subsequent proceedings hugely, but being inexperienced, chose not do so.
Quite a few of Lee's subordinates were similarly inexperienced and Lee probably overestimated his admittedly superior troops. The impression I get from the ACW is that both sides were much better on the defensive than when forced to manoeuvre and attack, something only veteran stroops can consistently do well. Had he had Stonewall Jackson still with him, and not allowed Stuart's cavalry to become too detached to affect proceedings on the first day, Lee would probably have been able to break through the Union lines and win the battle.
Pickett's Charge, while a great romanticised moment in the war, failed predictably with heavy casualties, a trend in 19th century warfare that probably saw it's ultimate expression at Omdurman in 1898.

[ELITEofWARMANGINGERYBREADMEN88]

You charge a hill because that was they way to do it in those days.

You didn't have helmets, camouflage or anything. You had fancy suits and drums. You walked slowly to the enemy stopped in front of him and started firing. It didn't care how many died, the winning was what mattered. Furthermore the weapons were very different, you didn't have long range rifles, to be accurate you needed to fire at close range.

That was they way how wars were fought, and it worked (atleast till WW1)

you charged a hill like that becauses your leaders were stupid. Stupid,Who Lee? Yes in this Battle, If He was smart, he would have had a battle plan.
It worked walking up a hill? don't think so.

[Stig]

Warman, they charged up a hill because that was the way to do it.
If I have a hill and someone wants to attack me he will charge it. That was the only way to do it back then, fact.
You don't send one platoon round the side, etc etc.
You just march 5000 men onto it and start fighting, different times.

War back then was different. You didn't have a home front that would start complaining about casualties, if 2000 men have to die, so be it, aslong as you win.
War was seen as something romantic yes, you would march to the enemy, form the line, fire, fix bayonets and charge. That's how you did it. But really with the coming of the machine gun this changed. It meant cavalry came out of use, but in WW1 you would still slowly walk at the enemy to attack him. Tho there was a change, little companies were used more often. It wasn't an entire division in a line, it was walking to them, then doing seperate tasks.

The first war were this really changed was WW2, were sub-machine guns and tanks had a big role.

We're not used to making war like this, but back then they didn't know any different. For us it's easy to speak after the battle, but you need to know what the commanders knew.

[ELITEofWARMANGINGERYBREADMEN88]

Warman, they charged up a hill because that was the way to do it.
If I have a hill and someone wants to attack me he will charge it. That was the only way to do it back then, fact.
You don't send one platoon round the side, etc etc.
You just march 5000 men onto it and start fighting, different times.

War back then was different. You didn't have a home front that would start complaining about casualties, if 2000 men have to die, so be it, aslong as you win.
War was seen as something romantic yes, you would march to the enemy, form the line, fire, fix bayonets and charge. That's how you did it. But really with the coming of the machine gun this changed. It meant cavalry came out of use, but in WW1 you would still slowly walk at the enemy to attack him. Tho there was a change, little companies were used more often. It wasn't an entire division in a line, it was walking to them, then doing seperate tasks.

The first war were this really changed was WW2, were sub-machine guns and tanks had a big role.

We're not used to making war like this, but back then they didn't know any different. For us it's easy to speak after the battle, but you need to know what the commanders knew.

Of course It Was the way to Do it Stig, How else would you do it back then?


"For us it's easy to speak after the battle, but you need to know what the commanders knew"

Of course I do. Rushing up hill without any "Good" Artilly Support, is completely stupid.Second, you don't send wave after wave up,hoping they give up, unless you got a crap load of troops to kill off while trying. You Don't Rush up,making yourself big tagets.

I can point out so many mistakes in this battle

Having 12,000-15,000 troops March Across a Open Field to march to the Union Forces 1-1 1/2 miles away (I presume) in a Neat Fancy Formation was Ironic. Good Targets

[Kraxis]

Technically the CSA could have mounted infiltration tactics. Their troops were generally not given uniforms, so they wore their homemade clothes, often grey, brown and green, often in combination. Imagine this coupled with the low soft widebrimmed hat they often wore, they could 'easily' blend into the undergrowth.
Further, the CSA infantry was generally made up of the poor whites of the south. That meant hunters, trappers, outback farmers and the likes. Men who knew how to stalk, shoot and hunt, and especially knew the value of being silent and stealthy.

At Shiloh the CSA got some initial advantages by advancing relatively stealthily. Some units basically managed to sneak into Union camps before being spotted. At that battle the troops and their immediate commanders managed to use the best qualities of the them.
Gettysburg was perhaps less forested, but similar actions could have been fought. And the mistakes of that battle could be avoided (marching to the sound of guns, not good when they guns are your enemy's).

It could even have been done at night.
There was a battle, I believe, being fought at dusk and early darkness, where the CSA troops were decidedly better than their opponents (could be the better initiative of the low level officers and the skill of the individual soldiers that made the difference greater than at day).

So, personally I believe the CSA could relatively easily have discarded the oldfashioned offensive tactics for more unconventional ones of infiltration, tactical flanking and the use of cover.
At times the deadly and 'stupid' linecharges had to be made of course (getting that vital position NOW would require that), but that does not preclude any chance of using the other tactics in general.

But this would have demanded a complete rethinking of the military for the CSA, and they lacked the military philosophers needed to makes such changes and the time to come up with it. And further, they lived by the rule "if nothign is broken, don't fix it". So since they were generally winning most of the time, why should anything be changed?

[matteus the inbred]

Pickett's Charge was indeed almost a foreshadowing of the Somme offensive. Some 150 or so of Lee's guns spent the afternoon pounding the Union positions, before he sent his troops in, troops that he believed (and after 2nd Manassas and Chancellorsville, who could blame him?) were capable of storming anything.
As it turned out the bombardment was not as effective as he thought, and his troops could not overcome the basic odds of such an attack. It was a mistake the Lee had made before, at Malvern Hill.
I agree with BHC, Lee was not as smart as usual at Gettysburg, probably due to overconfidence. Napoleon, Grant, Marlborough, Wellington, all did something similar in their careers. Sometimes, you just have to send the boys in and hope some of them get through.

[Don Corleone]

First, Lee had put all his brigade & divisional commanders under strict orders NOT to engage the enemy. The fact that AP Hill, and Henry Heth (the corps & divisonal commanders that started the skirmish respectively) weren't flogged and court martialed afterwards is amazing.

Anyway, in the first day, the CSA could have and should have won it outright. When the Union cavalry pickets finally did break, the CSA had some tremendous, though short lived, tactical advantages. However, for some reason, Old Baldy, Robert Ewell, decided to hold up at Cemetary Hill and would not press the attack. Had he, O.O. Howard's 12th corps almost certainly would have been overrun, putting Ewell on Hancock's 1st corps rear flank. The Union would have had to have withdrawn. Instead, Ewell ordered Early and company to hold up, allowing Sedgwick to come in and bolster Howard, ensuring the CSA didn't get any of the highlands to the south and east of town.

On the 2nd day, the day Lee sent Longstreet to charge the roundtops, you have to look at just how good that terrain was. IF Longstreet had taken it, and the CSA could have mounted their Parrott guns up on top of those hills, the Union would have been in serious trouble. What's more, there's no reason to believe that if Longstreet hadn't delayed and stalled that he couldn't have actually taken it. He whined about about it for so long, his glum assessment became a self fulfilling prophecy.

On the 3rd day, Pickett's charge defies logic. It's almost as though Lee was possessed. It was very uncharacteristic for him, as he was painfully aware of the numeric advantages the Union possessed and just how dear each and every casualty was to the CSA.

On the Union side, there's a whole hatful of stupid things that they did. First, O.O. Howard, on the first day... Who orders their men to enter a densely wooded grove, then just stop? He's damn lucky he and his men survived that day and he very easily could have been wiped out. On the 2nd day, Sikes' adventures in the Peach Orchard border on criminal stupidity and disobediance. Meade had a fairly strong defensive line set up and Sikes decided to open a huge hole right at the lynch pin, because he wanted to impress some journalists he had along with him. He was damn lucky to have lost only his leg... McLaws and Lafyette had him surrounded on 3 sides and came this || close to pinching his entire corps off from the main union line. Not reinforcing the roundtops was incredibly stupid, and it's amazing that Chamberlain was able to hold.

On the 3rd day, the Union sat back and waited. Given their shortsighted offensive maneuvers up until then, this was probably their wisest move thus far in the war. The only thing I don't understand is why they didn't have a counter-strike prepared for Pickett's charge. They knew it was coming for close to an hour, and once the 1st corps turned the tide at the bloody angle, they should have sprung... The CSA would have been divided in half and possibly the entire ANV would have been destroyed. They had to settle for chasing the hospital trains the following day, slim pickings at best.

[Kagemusha]

If we speak tactically about the battle one intresting question is ,what would have happened on the second day if Longstreet would have accepted General Hoods idea that instead of attacking against little round top with his division he would have moved around big round top and placed his artillery in there? That way he could have flanked the end of Union line and his artillery would have been in wonderfull position to support the division. I bet that if the Corps commander would have been Jackson instead Longstreet it would have happened.

[Reverend Joe]

On the 3rd day, the Union sat back and waited. Given their shortsighted offensive maneuvers up until then, this was probably their wisest move thus far in the war. The only thing I don't understand is why they didn't have a counter-strike prepared for Pickett's charge. They knew it was coming for close to an hour, and once the 1st corps turned the tide at the bloody angle, they should have sprung... The CSA would have been divided in half and possibly the entire ANV would have been destroyed. They had to settle for chasing the hospital trains the following day, slim pickings at best.

Failing to pursue the Confederate army was one of Meade's greatest failings, and, if I recall correctly, one of the reasons he was finally fired from the command of the Army of the Potomac. I might be confusing Meade with a different general, but I believe this hesitance and fear of risk was a problem that dogged Meade for years; he refused to advance at a pace slower than a crawl, even when the odds were greatly in his favor, and he lost a great number of advantages because of this.

[Derfasciti]

Gettysburg could have been one by the south. For one, just the mere presence of Stonewall Jackson and his cleverness might have changed the strategy around completely for the south.

Had the south taken little round top by going around, like I believe Heath wanted to do, they could have probably turned the entire Yankee army's flank, smashing the Potomac army within the day.


Perhaps the most decisive of all was J.E.B. Stuart's absence. He was the main intelligece gatherer for the Army of Northern Virginia and him not being there dealt a severe blow to Lee's ability to make good decisions.


I recomend you reading some Alternate Civil War books. There are many and quite a few I believe focus on Gettysburg.

I believe had the south won that battle, there would've been and still might be a Confederacy of one sort or another.

[King Kurt]

Kraxis - I'm not sure that the Confederates could have developed infiltration tactics for use in the ACW. The raw material was there, but the need for the high degree of training and coordination for such tactics effectively ruled it out. The nature of armed forces then meant that training was rudimentry and with mussle loading muskets you needed a line of men firing together to achieve the best result. The exception to this were the skirmishers - and arguebly the Union had the best of these in units like Berdan's Sharpshooters - mind you, breech loading weapons helped, but Berdan's were high morale and highly trained. In the mussle loading musket period the troops closest to your infiltration tactics were arguebly the British Rifle regiments in the Napoleonic wars. These troops were highly trained, very high morale and more importantly career soldiers with a lifetime in the army. The Confederates were often high morale, but their discipline and training meant they were not suited to such tactics.

Finally - Derfasciti - The South could have won at Gettysberg - if the North made a few more mistakes and the South made less - but it would have not made a difference in the long term - the resources of the North and especially the naval blockade meant the result was inevitable. An opportunity to win the war probably only existed in the first few months when some form of dazzling military campaign to actually threaten Washington would have swung world opinion - especially the English - behind the south. Once the North's industrial might was fully committed, the result was as inevitable as the US's defeat of Japan in WW2.

[Kraxis]

Actually the CSA only needed more coordination between their lower ranked officers. The troops themselves were capable of this.
When their lives were on the line they would follow orders as they could easily see the sensibility to sneak forward and move fluidly. And at the same time they would see the folly of exposing the infiltrators.
This wouldn't be something for all of course, as some would be needed to fix the attention of the Northern troops, but if the CSA managed to constantly flank the northern units in tactical battles by infiltrating, then you can be sure the war would change.

One could even imagine them sneaking up on the Northern line at Gettysburg in the forest and then attacking them in melee. Such a surprise would be nasty for a formed unit facing in another direction.

The lack of discipline would in fact be a benefit as each soldier would seek the most beneficiary route to the top. It would be in the formed ranks that the lack of discipline would hurt the most.

[Pontifex Rex]

I recomend you reading some Alternate Civil War books. There are many and quite a few I believe focus on Gettysburg.

Why not read about what *actually* happened instead of fantasizing over what might have been? There is no way of knowing what effect Jackson would have had. There is no way of knowing what would have happened if the battle had placed the ANV closer to Washington. Alternate history is not history and no conclusions can be drawn from the works of Turtledove, Stirling or the others. They may be a fun read but they are nothing more than guess work,...period.

Lee was simply overconfident, he had not lost a major battle before and thought the elan of his army would overcome the superior enemy numbers as had in the past. It is also important to note that the Union army of the summer 1863 was not the same army that marched to Bull Run in 1861, they had learned from their earlier defeats and were gaining the tactical advantages brought by better technology. The strategic advantage was also theirs in the form of a demographic and indutrial advantage,...after Gettysburg the South would have been well advised to have surrender.

Cheers.