
Originally Posted by
Seamus Fermanagh
The problem with adopting a defensive posture in the West and turning East was a matter of time/distance/logistics.
France would still have begun their "offensive a outrance" and would have been brought up short just as calamitously. Germany would have been unable to push forward through the heart of the French defenses. Stalemate.
In the East, however, 2 year to defeat Russia would have been way too omptimistic. AH forces were notoriously ineffective in the attack and under coordinated. Russian forces were incredibly numerous and surprisingly brave/resilient -- especially in defense. Russian logistics, production, and transport were all excreble and would have (did) led to their defeat in the field. But the same vast distances, huge numbers of men, and miserable transportation net would have made decisive action against Russia exceedingly slow. This was the original reason for the decision to attack France with the bulk of the German army in the first place.
Historically, Germany's defeat of Russia was more a product of Russia's internal dissolution than German success on the field. Germany did win most of the battles, but the numbers they faced were daunting and slowed any real forward progress despite the poor equippage and leadership. The Russia would break apart was nearly inevitable. The level of corruption under the last Romanov's was staggering and the whole society teetered on the brink. Even so, defeat from those causes took nearly 3 years.
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