Europe’s Soft Underbelly.

[RabidGibbon]

WW2 Strategy discussion time peeps. Were the allies right to invade Sicily and Italy in ‘43? Would the men and material employed in that campaign have been better used in bringing forward the date of
D-Day in northern France? The costly battles at Anzio and Monte Cassino were all products of this southern line of attack, but in the long run do people think that the attack on Italy helped the USSR immediately and the Allies attack on D-Day later on, or was it a squandering of resources that could have been used later to greater effect?

[Lord Winter]

The idea was to open a second front away from the Germans Atlantic wall. Compared to the other the defenses established in the Atlantic the south was a better starting point that could be used to tye down German troops for the future D-day invasion. Now that takes us to the three possible areas, Greece, Italy and France. Out of these Greece would have been even worse, with it's mountainous terrain and the distance between France and N. Africa would cause all sorts of logistical problems, so that leaves Italy. In the long run the Axis couldn't handle the casualties of a war in Italy and that helped the advance in Russia and the D-day invasions.

[Hosakawa Tito]

Attacking Sicily and the Italian mainland also knocked Italy out of the war. Besides keeping vital supplies & troops from the Eastern Front, it may have helped keep Russia in the war. Valuable experience was also gained by conducting these smaller scale amphibious landings and para-drops that aided the planning and logistics for the Normandy invasion to come. After the disaster at Dieppe, there wasn't much confidence in amphious assaults and/or para-drops.

[Marquis of Roland]

Perhaps 1 or 2 divisions more at Normandy at the time of D-Day may have been sufficient to cause enough damage to the allied infantry for D-Day to fail.

The Italian front tied down a lot more than 2 German divisions. It wasted a lot of material that otherwise would've been destined for the Eastern front (but probably wouldn't have made that much of a difference) or to the Atlantic Wall (might have made a huge difference).

[Ring_Master\]

Perhaps 1 or 2 divisions more at Normandy at the time of D-Day may have been sufficient to cause enough damage to the allied infantry for D-Day to fail.

The Italian front tied down a lot more than 2 German divisions. It wasted a lot of material that otherwise would've been destined for the Eastern front (but probably wouldn't have made that much of a difference) or to the Atlantic Wall (might have made a huge difference).

I agree completely, an instant being when there were a number of panzer divisions tied down in Italy which Hitler had wished to use for Operation Zitadel on the Kursk salient although many experts would agree it wouldn't have brought any critical advantage in the actual offensive. Otherwise, the answer is quite clear..

[Franconicus]

The assault of Sicily was mandatory to secure the routes through the Med.

Afterwards, there were two options, southern Europe or Western Europe. Both had their pros and cons. Personally I prefer the Italy/ Balkans scenarion.

The mistake was, that the Allies did not come to an agreement and therefore did both. As a result, the Allies at Italy had not enough resources to break the tough German resistance.

[Wardruid]

The assault of Sicily was mandatory to secure the routes through the Med.

Afterwards, there were two options, southern Europe or Western Europe. Both had their pros and cons. Personally I prefer the Italy/ Balkans scenarion.

The mistake was, that the Allies did not come to an agreement and therefore did both. As a result, the Allies at Italy had not enough resources to break the tough German resistance.

That mistake culminated in the Battle of Cassino, where several thousands of Allied troops died, the battle lasted for half a year I believe, from Dec 1943 to several week before D-Day. The city would have fallen sooner if the Allied army there was better supported.
On the plus side though, It drew alot of troops out of the Atlantic Wall because Hitler's generals themselves were worried about Italy. That also be a reason why the Allies couldn't agree Italy. If I was a general in the The 3rd Reich's Bermacht, I should definitely know that Italy would be a problem.
If understand right five SS tank divisions were supposed to be moved to the Med because of the possible invasion, but they ended up in the Eastern front 'cause the Ruskies were pushing hard. And Oh yeah, Erwin Rommel was almost assigned to Italy until Hitler decided to assign him to the Atlantic wall instead.

[King Kurt]

Sicily/Italy were useful in that the Allies learnt all the lessons necessary for D-Day. Also, it knocked Italy out the war. Also the 15th US airforce operated from bases in Italy and provided a 2nd front for the air war.
The problem was that the land favours the defender - coast on one flank, mountains on the other and a sucession of rivers to cross. The commanders were not the most enterprising as well - the Allies superiority on land and sea were never really exploited after Anzio.
I have been to Monte Cassino and I think it was a miracle that it fell - the mountains are sheer and perfect for defence - why it was not just avoided by landing furthur up the Italian coast I will never understand. On a personal note, I found Monte Cassino one of the most moving places I have visited - a beautiful building in an amazing location - why would anybody want to fight there? - why would anybody want to attempt to attack it? - it appears impregnable.
As for the broader strtegic effects - difficult to tell - it obviously pulled forces from elsewhere, but was the forces used worth it? Perhaps the major effect was that it did open in 1943 a second front against the germans and was part of the overall building up of pressure on Germany which lead to their final defeat.

[English assassin]

What was the alternative? I can't see how a cross channel venture could have been launched in 1943, too few landing craft. Italy was at least doing SOMETHING, although all too little for Stalin's tastes. IMHO D Day was not possible in 1943 no matter what, and the Italian campaign had no effect on the resources available for D day in 1944.

Knocking Italy out of the war is a bit of a red herring though, once her fleet was taken out she really had no offensive capability (or manufacturing capacity) at all.

I reckon it was a basically irrelevant side show, handy for propaganda and learning from mistakes but strategically irrelevant.

[The Foolish Horseman]

The attack on sicily was beneficial in two ways:

1) it helped draw troops from france, aiding to allowing britain to prepare for D-Day by wiping out these divisions

2) it helped draw troops form the estern front, allowing the russians eventually to find a hole in the defences

3) it knocked one of Germany's allies out of the war, thus cretaing a morale blow for the third reich

[Lord Winter]

2) it helped draw troops form the estern front, allowing the russians eventually to find a hole in the defences

I disagree here, The russians would have broken through anyway, the germen man power just couldn't recover after Stalingrad and Kursk.

[Wardruid]

Destroyer's right, the Germans were lost every battle with the Russians since Stalingrad. Heck, the Eastern front was a key factor in sapping troop strength out of the Italian and Normandy fronts. The Bermacht was sending depleted divisions and wounded to those places. The East also sapped most of the war materials, guns, haltracks, tanks and aircraft. The Germans were more afraid of the Soviets than the Western Allies

[cegorach]

Addressing the main question.


The invasion of Sicily was am must.
Attack on Italy should be better prepared - especially with the netire later struggle for Cassino in mind, which later was wasted too -thanks to stupidity of Clark of course.

When it comes to the next step. I think tah landing in Yugoslavia/Albania was the best possible scenario.

From 1943 Hungary and Romania (Bulgaria too) tried to negotiate their way out of the entire war.
The events of 1944 clearly show how fragile was German situation in the entire region.
Besides only this could deprive Stalin of his later conquests.

Invasion of France gave the allies certain support from the newly organised French forces, but attacking the Balcans would attract immediate support of much larger forces and might activate Turkey as well.

French forces could be used in Italy this way or in some sort of supplementary attack on southern France (this would support attack in Italy as well).

[Hepcat]

I've been doing quite a lot of research on the Italian Front for a project. And I believe it was important, though it became the forgotten front. Even a lot of Kiwis don't know anything about the Italian Front even though that was where our troops were stationed. Everyone get fixated on DDay.

And Oh yeah, Erwin Rommel was almost assigned to Italy until Hitler decided to assign him to the Atlantic wall instead.

Hitler did post him in Italy for a while but got sick of Rommel's "pessimism" because he wanted to withdraw all German troops to a defensive line further north and believed that trying to hold the south was simply a waste of men and materials.

As far as I understand Cassino was so costly because of the same reasons Stalingrad was. After such heavy bombing the city was reduced to rubble. It was house for house fighting and the Germans had tunnels connecting buildings together so they could get around quite easily and survived the heavy bombing.

But remember that apart from a few instances (Like Anzio and Cassino) the Italian front was a steady advance and it would have been hard to march and army from France over the alps to fight in Italy if they had of just invaded France.

Well thats my opinion anyway. Feel free to disagree.

[Pannonian]

Addressing the main question.


The invasion of Sicily was am must.
Attack on Italy should be better prepared - especially with the netire later struggle for Cassino in mind, which later was wasted too -thanks to stupidity of Clark of course.

When it comes to the next step. I think tah landing in Yugoslavia/Albania was the best possible scenario.

From 1943 Hungary and Romania (Bulgaria too) tried to negotiate their way out of the entire war.
The events of 1944 clearly show how fragile was German situation in the entire region.
Besides only this could deprive Stalin of his later conquests.

Invasion of France gave the allies certain support from the newly organised French forces, but attacking the Balcans would attract immediate support of much larger forces and might activate Turkey as well.

French forces could be used in Italy this way or in some sort of supplementary attack on southern France (this would support attack in Italy as well).

Churchill wanted to drive north through the Balkans to contest eastern Europe with the Soviets, but the Americans had already accepted British advice to attack North Africa, and they weren't going to be lured into a sideshow again. If the British wanted continued American participation in the European war, the main theatre would have to be NW Europe, and the time to attack would have to be ASAP. NW Europe had unanimous support from the American side, and IIRC a majority on the British side as well. Churchill was the only one seriously pushing for the Balkans.

[Oleander Ardens]

1. The western allies did something other than bombing - given limited german manpower and ressources every decent try was streching the streched even further,

2. Although the Germans did lose most battles against the Soviets after Stalingrad they scored some impressive victories too. The inflicted more casualities on the Soviets than vice versa and that with shambolic ressources. Every man and tank send against the Invasion forces was sourly missed in the east..

3. It helped to prepare the western Allies for the big Day. It also showed that man against man the german soldier came usually out on top. Difficult terrain and conditions which evened the play level was to avoided as much as possible - Cassino docet. Still Hürtgen forest came...

OA

[Veho Nex]

This is a totaly pointless comment but gunna say it any ways D-day is another name for invasion day not exactly sure what it means but it was called operation husky or the invasion of normandy. There were several "D-Days" in the pacific and about 4 in the atlantic.

[Lord Winter]

This is a totaly pointless comment but gunna say it any ways D-day is another name for invasion day not exactly sure what it means but it was called operation husky or the invasion of normandy. There were several "D-Days" in the pacific and about 4 in the atlantic.

D is the start day of the operationlike you said, if comes from millitary notation in invasion plans. So for example if the plan calls for the taking of city x on the third day that would be written as:
D+3 take city x...

Also I thought husky was Scilly? Wasn't overlord d-day?

[AntiochusIII]

Also I thought husky was Scilly? Wasn't overlord d-day?

Yes, Husky is the Allied invasion of Sicily. D-Day's codename is Overlord; there were a lot of codenames for individual stages of the operation, though -- Overlord is just the general name encompassing the whole shebang.

I think Italy was a necessary move. Sure, the Italians as a naval and air force had been neutralized completely before that; but they could've supported the Germans in France; and, more importantly, more German divisions would've been in France. It's unlikely that this would stop the Soviet advance from the East, but D-day's chance of failure would increase greatly with more German troops to challenge the Allied beachhead, or encircle and break it, or whatever they did when they were fighting wars back in the day.

The Allied presence stretches the thin ranks of the Germans even worse than it already was. The experience on operations was probably valuable, but I have no way to measure that. And I think knocking Italy out of the war succeeded in annihilating the illusion of a coherent Axis line of defense further.

[MilesGregarius]

What no one is considering here are the economic imperatives for both the invasion of Italy and a second front in NW Europe.

In addition to the political benefits, knocking il Duce's Italy out of the war degraded, though did not eliminate, the value of Italian industry to the German war effort. It also denied the Reich a significant amount of manpower. Finally, it reduced Italy from the status of a, perhaps marginal, contributor to the Axis to a decided drain upon German resources as Germany had to treat her erstwhile ally as an occupied nation with all the problems that entails, further diminishing the German manpower pool.

Similarly, outside of Germany proper, the highest concentration of industry under German control lay in NW Europe. Denying Germany this industrial base outweighed any immediate gain that could be had in the Balkans. The only exception to this would have been the Romanian oilfields, but the Soviets would in all probability have gotten them first even if the Western Allies had invaded the Balkans instead of France in 1944.

Logistically, the close proximity of France/Benelux to the UK greatly facilitated a sustained fighting effort there that would have been much more difficult to maintain had the main effort been made via the Balkans. Further, the terrain of France was far more conducive to the large-scale deployment of forces than the mountains of large areas of the Balkans.

Viewed through a Cold War prism, invading the Balkans seems like it would have averted many of the subsequent problems the world faced. It's far from clear, however, that such an endeavor would have been as successful as the actual NW European campaign was. Where would we be if Zhukov and Koniev raced past Berlin to the North Sea and the Ruhr while Patton and Montgomery slogged their way through the Carpathians or the Julian Alps (or if Stalin ordered his generals to effectively box the Allies into the Balkans)? What if the Germans used their secure western flank to stage a prolonged fighting withdrawal to extend the war until Hitler's superweapons could be brought to bear (Me-262s in mass production!)? And lest we forget, for all his political genius, Churchill's previous strategic "masterstroke" was the debacle that was Gallipoli.