UN Security Council Reform

[JR-]

i think the bilderburg group is a bit beyond the scope of this debate.

BOT -

I am totally in favour of India joining the SC.

[Bijo]

i think the bilderburg group is a bit beyond the scope of this debate.

BOT -

I am totally in favour of India joining the SC.

[rory_20_uk]

First off the UN is basically something for the Big Boys to rubber stamp what they want. It functions at all as there are only a few with any real clout. If that wre to be opened up we'd end up with paralysis.

But, to play along...

I liked the idea of NAFTA, Commonwealth, EU being 3 of them with possibly others rotating.

[Conradus]

Apart from adding countries as Brazil, India, ... to the council, I'd say abolish the veto, or in any case make sure the veto can be overruled by a 2/3? or something majority. As it is, the countries with a veto make each action of the council a pain to get on the tracks. Having France over Germany in the council doesn't make much sense either at the moment. If the EU were to grow into one political entity, they'd deserve a place there.

[JR-]

france can project power
france has nukes
france has vast territory
france sits at the heart of french speaking and french associated nations

there is four reasons why france should be on the SC and not germany. :)

[Conradus]

france can project power
france has nukes
france has vast territory
france sits at the heart of french speaking and french associated nations

there is four reasons why france should be on the SC and not germany. :)

On the other hand, Germany can also project power, they could easily develop nukes if the need ever arose, they have more citizens than France and are better developed economically. They're about the same size, but they indeed lack the 'trust' France has in its former colonies.

[lancelot]

On the other hand, Germany can also project power, they could easily develop nukes if the need ever arose, they have more citizens than France and are better developed economically. They're about the same size, but they indeed lack the 'trust' France has in its former colonies.

Actually, I think their projection capabilities are pretty limited- especially overseas stuff. In fact, does German law even permit expeditionary moves now?

And the aquisition of nukes is no reason for a seat on the SC. Having nukes should in theory be the last thing that enters the UN equation.

[JR-]

Actually, I think their projection capabilities are pretty limited- especially overseas stuff. In fact, does German law even permit expeditionary moves now?

And the acquisition of nukes is no reason for a seat on the SC. Having nukes should in theory be the last thing that enters the UN equation.

i believe the constitution does not allow the bundeswher to take part in offensive wars, such as afghanistan, or sierra leonne, rather it can take part in the peacekeeping that happens after the war is concluded. not a terribly useful trait in an SC member.

while i agree that acquiring nukes should not improve your chance of getting on the SC, the simple fact is that those countries with large nuke stockpiles are difficult to remove from the SC. there is a reason why russia keeps spending money on its strategic rocket forces even when the rest of its military has been going down the pan, because as long as they can bring an end to world civilisation via nuclear death we have to treat them with some respect.

[JR-]

On the other hand, Germany can also project power, they could easily develop nukes if the need ever arose, they have more citizens than France and are better developed economically. They're about the same size, but they indeed lack the 'trust' France has in its former colonies.

Germany, categorically, cannot project power anywhere by any means other than rolling a bunch of panzer regiments across the border into a neighbouring country.

it will eventually have quite good airlift capacity, but:

it has zero amphibious capability.

it has zero sea-lift tonnage (equivalent of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary).

i don't believe that the german army even has much of the logistical tail needed for it to operate out-of-area.

and it does not have, and has no intention to acquire, nukes.

it is also chronically underfunded in a way which is halting the bundeswher's attempt at the revolution in military affairs:

http://www.comw.org/pda/9911eur.html#4

4.3.2.

"There is grave concern, however, that the Bundeswehr's reconnaissance and communications capabilities are not up to the tasks of global - or even continental - power projection. This is why all three services seek to modernize their own command, control and communication systems. In addition a modern interservice satellite communication capacity is to be developed. But there are no plans to acquire a Sentry-type airborne reconnaissance capability; the Bundeswehr is quite content relying on NATO's pool. And there is no provision for an operational ground surveillance system (such as the American J-STARS or the British ASTOR system) which could be particularly helpful in out-of-area contingencies."

4.3.3.

Despite the priority that German planners have given to power projection and crisis stabilization, there have been to date no official German statements clearly delineating the kinds of scenarios for which the Bundeswehr is developing crisis-reaction forces. The only available guidance indicates a need to be able to commit "up to one Army division" to a crisis reaction mission over an extended period of time. But how large a division? In separate theaters? For how long exactly? What type of conflicts and missions? All this remains a mystery.

4.5

Germany still lacks a comprehensive, well-integrated official vision or blueprint mapping the way to the future for the armed forces. Instead, there are only a few pieces of the puzzle: a somewhat tentative list of equipment to be procured between now and 2011, budget projections through 2002, and the force structure scheme of 1994, which is to be fully implemented by 2000/2001. And, as noted above, these are contradictory in some respects, vague in others. However, the so-called Red-Green-coalition, which took over Federal Government in the fall of 1998, decided to set up an expert commission with the task of exploring options for the further development of the Bundeswehr. Its report can be expected before summer 2000.

As a consensus has taken form around the proposition that the German armed forces cannot hope for substantial (real-term) budget increases, there seems to be no alternative to reducing active strength in order to break the current modernization deadlock. Three variants of such a policy are being ventilated in expert circles:

(i) Transition to an all-volunteer force

Proponents see an all-volunteer force as a dedicated, high-tech intervention instrument nearly reaching US standards. But adoption of the all-volunteer path would require a reduction of active strength to about 170,000 (plus limited mobilization potential). A volunteer military any larger than this would not be able to cover the relatively hefty bills for operations and procurement required by a high-technology force geared to intervention missions. Such a force would not constitute a "pillar of solidity" in Central Europe, nor would it lend itself easily to integration with most neighboring armies. But it could lead to the sociopolitical isolation of the military as a professional caste (which has been particularly problematic in Germany's past).

(ii) Limited reduction of active strength (conscription maintained)

The Bundeswehr could be reduced to 250,000 - 260,000 soldiers (with a still considerable mobilization potential). Since this size would include "inexpensive" conscripts, the savings should be sufficient for a general, thorough modernization program (which would include high-tech items only on a selective basis, not as an obsession). Conscription could be socially stabilized at this reduced force level, making almost everyone serve who is fit and not a conscientious objector, by raising the fitness standards, by slightly increasing the proportion of conscripts in the forces, and by reducing the terms of service from 10 to 9 months. The resulting force would still be large enough to integrate itself with most of the neighbors and form a solid block in the middle of Europe. It would also be intervention- capable, but less dependent on strike elements and more on formations dedicated to control and protection missions. Such a military would also possess less provocative potential, especially if restructured in a more defensive manner.

(iii) Voluntary elite plus conscript militia

This option remains vague. Its proponents are not worried about the prospect of producing a two-tier force with inherent problems of cohesion. They would like to preserve the draft system (a holy cow in Germany) mainly for symbolic reasons. They view the conscript element as an inexpensive way to provide for basic home protection only. Most of the available resources would go to the crack intervention element, consisting of precious volunteers. However, the current and foreseeable security environment makes a homeguard (militia) for Germany look useless. Useless, but not necessarily "cheap" - after all, it would still require training, equipment, and an infrastructural foundation. Thus, this scheme would not likely generate enough savings to underwrite the requirements of the sizeable all-volunteer component equipped with cutting-edge equipment.

[Strike For The South]

Texas is bigger than France. Allot bigger actually. [img=https://img145.imageshack.us/img145/1681/tnbiggerthanfrancekf9.th.jpg]

[Conradus]

Luckily though, there aren't more Texans than there are French.

[Marshal Murat]

Except when the fields need harvesting.

[Pindar]

what does human rights have to do with this?

Redleg is spot on. Earlier in the thread (post 32) I quoted from the Preamble of the UN:

We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom...

Human rights are central to, and lay out the parameters of, the UN.