It's not easy, running a gulag

[Don Corleone]

I'm not confused, I'm simply astonished.

You're either confused or you're being dishonest. You railed against Pindar's saying that the Human Rights Charter wasn't important and didn't matter.

He never said any such thing.

I don't agree with him on this issue, but I don't need to resort to putting words in his mouth to make a logical argument.

Edit: On the chance that you are in fact really are confused, allow me to explain. Pindar said the UN Human Rights Charter is a piece of rhetoric. Let's say you assumed he meant that it was unimportant or irrelevant. That's not what he meant. The Declaration of Independence is a piece of rhetoric. So is the preamble to the U.S. Constitution. None of these three documents is enforcable law. They are speech, declaring or defending a position. The UN Human Rights Charter is not a body of laws. The UN is not a government. It's an organization. It has no jurisdiction over any particular citizen. It cannot declare that Don Corleone has too many trees in his yard and must cut half of them down. It CAN issue a statement to that affect and call on the State of New Hampshire, the Town of Kingston and/or the United States Congress to pass such legislation. But that statement, without the law being passed by one of the following appropriate authorities, carries no weight. Pindar is highlighting for you that making a statement and having the enforceability of an actual statute are two different things.

[Louis VI the Fat]

The Declaration of Human Rights (DHR) out of the U.N. is a piece of rhetoric. It cannot be taken for more given the legal standing of the U.N. and the moral absurdity that confronts the U.N.

a natural law position that no legal position that goes against the DHR carries, or rather, should carry, legal status.

But this is incorrect Louis. It's not because of the UDoHR that we can argue about contradictions, it's because we've certain moral principles, with or without such Declaration. However Hore clearly wants the Declaration to create a legal obligation. And even if all were right, I don't know why you don't consider it to be an attempt of legal arguement.

I did consider it an attempt at a legal argument, but I wasn't interested in that argument itself, nor Gitmo or anything.

No, what struck me was the ease with which you and Pindar brushed aside the universality of certain human rights, the very concept of it, and your legalistic view of the law. Within the scope of the current argument that the DHR carries no legal status, I can see what you are arguing, and why.

But in general, would you not accept that positive law is not, nor should be, the final word in legality? (Christ, I really need to brush up on my legal jargon)
It is my understanding that law students here, judges in particular, get taught that morality must override the law in cases of gross immorality. For example, the next time somebody issues immoral racial or genocidal laws again, judges are expected not to sanction them in court again.

Sorry for lumping the two of you together btw.

[HoreTore]

Edit: On the chance that you are in fact really are confused, allow me to explain. Pindar said the UN Human Rights Charter is a piece of rhetoric. Let's say you assumed he meant that it was unimportant or irrelevant. That's not what he meant.

Well, the feeling I was left with after reading his posts, was that he didn't think the declaration was important, and that left me pretty astonished, as I've never met a single human being(barring some of the nazi's here, I don't think they have much respect for it) who doesn't believe it to be one of the most important document ever made.

I apologize if I'm mistaken and read too much into his words, of course.

And as for the legal issue, if I haven't made it clear enough, I'll say that I don't really care about whether it's legal or whatever. What I care about, is that it should be the law, treated like it was the law, and respected by every state. Some countries do that, others don't.

Also, I'll say that it doesn't really matter whether it's in a nations law or not. If the states politicians respect it, it's more than enough. The law doesn't really matter at all to the people who can change it. If a US court says that gitmo is legal, then all it takes, is for the politicians to say that it's not, and that will be the final word. Thankfully, no judge can overturn our elected officials...

[Husar]

But in general, would you not accept that positive law is not, nor should be, the final word in legality? (Christ, I really need to brush up on my legal jargon)
It is my understanding that law students here, judges in particular, get taught that morality must override the law in cases of gross immorality. For example, the next time somebody issues immoral racial or genocidal laws again, judges are expected not to sanction them in court again.

That sounds very healthy to me.

Isn't that the reason why many countries have something like SCOTUS (Bundesverfassungsgericht/Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, I think is the equivalent here) to see whether a new law is constitutional and possibly moral?
I'm really just asking, my legal jargon, unlike yours, is almost nonexistant so please bear with me.

The way I see it, since these judges decide about laws, they cannot always apply laws, but have to use morals and what I'd call wisdom for their decisions. Whether they succeed in that or not is another matter, however.

[Don Corleone]

I think Louis has hit the nail on the head and said in one phrase what I've wasted pages speaking to. While not a legal argument, the question of the detainees at Gitmo not being charged or allowed to know the charges against them offends 'natural law'. Sure, the law may legally allow the suspension of their rights. The law is written by man. But Louis's very eloquent Natural Law argument is one I wish to second.

[HoreTore]

I think Louis has hit the nail on the head and said in one phrase what I've wasted pages speaking to. While not a legal argument, the question of the detainees at Gitmo not being charged or allowed to know the charges against them offends 'natural law'. Sure, the law may legally allow the suspension of their rights. The law is written by man. But Louis's very eloquent Natural Law argument is one I wish to second.

Seconded again. Or would that be "thirded"?

[Louis VI the Fat]

I wonder, Husar, whether we aren't having one of those continentals versus the rest discussions. It is by no means coincidental that I would've come up with an example of 'racial and genocidal laws'. There's a history to it, eh? Germany, France or Norway, we, our judicial systems, all messed up last time that legal positivism was in vogue.

Here's a famous legal theorist, exemplary for the shift in opinion in (continental?) legal theory from extreme positivism to natural law after 1945:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Gustav Radbruch, born November 21, 1878 in Lübeck; died November 23, 1949 in Heidelberg, was a German law professor and political figure.


Life
Radbruch studied law in Munich, Leipzig and Berlin. He passed his first bar exam ("Staatsexamen") in Berlin in 1901, and the following year he received his doctorate with a dissertation on "The lessons of adequate Causation." This was followed in 1903 by his qualification to teach criminal law in Heidelberg. In 1904, he was appointed Professor of Criminal and Trial Law and Legal Philosophy in Heidelberg. In 1914 he accepted a call to a professorship in Königsberg (today's Kaliningrad), and in 1914 he accepted one at Kiel.

Radbruch was a member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), and held a seat in the Reichstag from 1920 to 1924. In 1921-22 and throughout 1923, he was Justice Minister in the cabinets of Joseph Wirth and Gustav Stresemann. During his time in office, a number of important laws were implemented, such as those giving women access to the justice system, and, after the assassination of Walter Rathenau, the Law for the Protection of the Republic.

In 1926, Radbruch accepted a renewed call to lecture at Heidelberg. After the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, Radbruch was dismissed from his civil service post, as the universities were public entities. During the Nazi period, he devoted himself primarily to cultural-historical work. Immediately after the end of the Second World War in 1945, he resumed his teaching activities, but died in 1949 without being able to complete his planned updated edition of his textbook on legal philosophy.





[edit] Work
Radbruch's legal philosophy derived from Neokantianism, which assumes that a categorical cleavage exists between Being (Sein) and Should (Sollen). According to this view, "Should" can never be derived from "Being." Indicative of the Heidelberg school of Neokantianism to which Radbruch subscribed was that it interpolated the value-related cultural studies between the explanatory sciences (Being) and philosophical teachings of values (Should).

In relation to the law, this triadism shows itself in the subfields of legal sociology, legal philosophy and legal dogma. Legal dogma assumes a place in between. It posits itself in opposition to positive law, as the latter depicts itself in social reality and methodologically in the objective "should-have" sense of law, which reveals itself through value-related interpretation.

The core of Radbruch's legal philosophy consists of his tenets the concept of law and the idea of law. The idea of law is defined through a triad of justice, utility and security. Radbruch thereby had the idea of utility or usefuleness spring forth from an analysis of the idea of justice. Upon this notion was based the Radsbrucian formula, which is still vigorously debated today. The concept of law, for Radbruch, is "nothing other than the given fact, which has the sense to serve the idea of law."

Hotly disputed is the question whether Radbruch was a legal positivist before 1933 and executed an about-face in his thinking due to the advent of Nazism, or whether he continued to develop, under the impression of Nazi crimes, the relativistic values-teaching he had already been advocating before 1933.

The problem of the controversy between the spirit and the letter of the law, in Germany, has been brought back to public attention due to the trials of former East German soldiers who guarded the Berlin Wall--the so-called necessity of following orders. Radbruch's theories are posited against the positivist "pure legal tenets" represented by Hans Kelsen and, to some extent, also from Georg Jellinek.

In sum, Radbruch's formula argues that where statutory law is incompatible with the requirements of justice "to an intolerable degree", or where statutory law was obviously designed in a way that deliberately negates "the equality that is the core of all justice", statutory law must be disregarded by a judge in favour of the justice principle. Since its first publication in 1946 the principle has been accepted by Germany's Federal Constitutional Court in a variety of cases. Many people partially blame the older German legal tradition of legal positivism for the ease with which Hitler obtain power in an outwardly "legal" manner, rather than by means of a coup. Arguably, the shift to a concept of natural law ought to act as a safeguard against dictatorship, an untrammeled State power and the abrogation of civil rights.

In France, like in Germany, the Conseil Constitutionnel, the constitutional council, tests laws not only for compliance with the constitution, but also, since after the war, with general principles of morality. In effect, against the Declaration of the rights of man and of the citizen of 1789, which is assumed to be universal.
Courts too, from the highest to the lowest, can refuse to follow laws and directives that are contrary to general principles of morality as expressed in declarations of human rights.

[Edit: "I wonder, Husar, whether we aren't having one of those continentals versus the rest discussions". apparantly not, Don C. posted while I was typing this post]

[Husar]

I think when it comes to morals I can almost always agree with Don C, he's almost a continental in that regard.

I think the word judge in itself says that a judge should be able to do more than follow strict guidelines, he should judge a case based on his wisdom(which he hopefully has) and sometimes according to the law.

IMO laws are originally meant to be the written form of morals which are enforced by the state. Of course today we have a whole "industry" around them and they cover a lot more things, but essentially many of them still say "don't steal", "don't kill" etc. We just managed to make them a lot more complicated.

[Soulforged]

No, what struck me was the ease with which you and Pindar brushed aside the universality of certain human rights, the very concept of it, and your legalistic view of the law. Within the scope of the current argument that the DHR carries no legal status, I can see what you are arguing, and why.

I've to leave something very clear, I'm all about human rights. Between those human rights (politic rights) there's one called the right to self-determination, this is at the center of the UN spirit, and it doesn't matter how contrived it might seem, the americans have decided that none of the Conventions should be ratified, and on this situation I cannot argue more than from a moral point of view, from that moral point of view I see this detention centers as aberrations, but it's an american aberration only...

But in general, would you not accept that positive law is not, nor should be, the final word in legality? (Christ, I really need to brush up on my legal jargon)
It is my understanding that law students here, judges in particular, get taught that morality must override the law in cases of gross immorality. For example, the next time somebody issues immoral racial or genocidal laws again, judges are expected not to sanction them in court again.

Judges must return, at least in my legal system, to moral principles only as ultima ratio, there's a lot that they've to observe first in order to reach that point. This is simply because every case has to reach a resolution. My opinion is that that shouldn't change, processes and forms should be respected in principle everytime because outside them there's chaos, and this rule should be observed with more care as we escalate on the importance of the position and the decision. There's a process that we can access in my country outside our legal limits, wich is the international process for human rights. As I said this has to be put on context as the US has not accepted such process before the corresponding organs, though I'm of the opinion that they should have done it. What you said is very important Louis, and if now we have certain moral rules introduced in the rigid and sometimes injust structure of law is because of the estimuli of the philosophy of Natural Law. But this same philosophy confuses doctrine with identification too much for the good of its own coherence. There's no need to accept the premises of Natural Law to gain its advantages.

[Pindar]

I'm not confused, I'm simply astonished.

Your astonishment is a reflection of your confusion. See The Don's post: 121 particularly this: "Pindar is highlighting for you that making a statement and having the enforceability of an actual statute are two different things."

Well, the feeling I was left with after reading his posts...

Not to sound harsh, but when reading my posts the actual language I use is important. It trumps feelings.

[Pindar]

No, what struck me was the ease with which you and Pindar brushed aside the universality of certain human rights, the very concept of it, and your legalistic view of the law. Within the scope of the current argument that the DHR carries no legal status, I can see what you are arguing, and why.

My posts have been in response to the positions offered insofar as I could understand them. I asked specifically about whether legal argument(s) were being made and dealt accordingly with such. I have pointed out the distinction between assertion and argument and hopefully justifiability. In short, my posts have looked at the points offered to the table and not any intention that may or may not lie behind them as such is far too nebulous a business.

But in general, would you not accept that positive law is not, nor should be, the final word in legality? (Christ, I really need to brush up on my legal jargon)
It is my understanding that law students here, judges in particular, get taught that morality must override the law in cases of gross immorality. For example, the next time somebody issues immoral racial or genocidal laws again, judges are expected not to sanction them in court again.

If one wants to make an appeal to natural law it can certainly be done. If you are interested in such fair I would recommend Russell Hittinger's work. He is a fine advocate for natural law theory. Here's the rub. One cannot sustain a natural law posture without thereby ascribing to the larger metaphysic that grounds such. This can be a problem for a secular government or individual.

[HoreTore]

Your astonishment is a reflection of your confusion. See The Don's post: 121 particularly this: "Pindar is highlighting for you that making a statement and having the enforceability of an actual statute are two different things."



Not to sound harsh, but when reading my posts the actual language I use is important. It trumps feelings.

You still haven't stated whether you support it or not, nor whether you believe it to be good or not. However, I still have the feeling that you do not, so I'll continue being astonished until you correct me.

[Louis VI the Fat]

Judges must return, at least in my legal system, to moral principles only as ultima ratio, there's a lot that they've to observe first in order to reach that point.

Naturally, and rightly so.

I have pointed out the distinction between assertion and argument and hopefully justifiability.

Naturally, and rightly so.

I would recommend Russell Hittinger's work. He is a fine advocate for natural law theory. Here's the rub. One cannot sustain a natural law posture without thereby ascribing to the larger metaphysic that grounds such. This can be a problem for a secular government or individual.

I had never heard of him before. A quick google led me to this interview with Hittinger. Is there any work of his, any online essays, that you'd recommend in particular?

Also, strangely enough, I would say that natural law is one of the areas where secular and religious metaphysics can be reconciled. An American Catholic theocon and a secular Euro liberal could find agreement.



Here's a very interesting article. It's a PDF so I can't quote from it. It explains why the Americans think they have the better legal arguments, yet the Euros accusse them of lawlessness in international affairs. It is so much a recapitulation of this thread and similar ones it's untrue....

[English assassin]

You still haven't stated whether you support it or not, nor whether you believe it to be good or not. However, I still have the feeling that you do not, so I'll continue being astonished until you correct me

He did, actually.

As to the content of the DHR: by and large I think its good stuff

.

No, what struck me was the ease with which ...Pindar brushed aside the universality of certain human rights, the very concept of it, and your legalistic view of the law.

Well, if a lawyer is not allowed to have a legalistic view of the law, who can?

I struggle with the idea of natural law, qua law. Obviously it may be said to be a natural law that parents love (should love) their children, but in the context of what we would understand by a law, it is a dangerous concept IMHO. Again with apologies for being a tiresome functionalist, for a law to be a law it must in the final degree be enforceable in a court and give rise to real consequences. Otherwise it is comething else, a "nice idea" or an "interesting theory" maybe. Natural law cannot exist in a state of nature, it can exist only in the context of a legal system.

And, as I understand natural law, how does one examine the courts claim to have the right to enforce this law? At least in the UK parliament can legislate to reverse a decision if need be, or to reformulate a whole area if the courts have got in a tangle. What would one do if the courts idea of natural law differed from the people?

Really, other than your faith that the judges would behave wisely, how does this differ from the Stuart claim to rule above the law?*

(*other than the courts having only judicial functions of course)

[Don Corleone]

Pindar,
I disagree with your hinting that an appeal to Natural Law presupposes a higher power. Hobbes talked about Natural Law as that which went against man's nature and proscribing those acts which by their commitment, man would be destroying his inner self (actually rather apropos here). Similarly, nothing in Locke's writings requires a divine being as the guaranteer (sp?) of those inalienable rights. I happen to agree with you that God ulitmately is, but nothing requires a belief in God to accept the existence of inalienable rights and the fundamental nature of man.

I think you're assuming by Natural Law, Louis is borrowing from Aquinas. That's one version of Natural Law, the perfection of the law under man's limited intelligence that approaches, but does not equal divine law. But that's not the only usage.

As long as we're talking about moral imperatives, couldn't I argue that the detention of somebody and depriving him of his liberty without offering proof as to the danger he poses a very un-Christian thing to do? Unlike St. Paul, who I'll grant you seems to endorse better treatment towards Christian brothers than the world at large, Christ Himself actually argues that we are under moral compunction to treat all in the best fashion possible, Christian and non-Christian alike. There is no exception for the 'other'.

[Soulforged]

I disagree with your hinting that an appeal to Natural Law presupposes a higher power. Hobbes talked about Natural Law as that which went against man's nature and proscribing those acts which by their commitment, man would be destroying his inner self (actually rather apropos here). Similarly, nothing in Locke's writings requires a divine being as the guaranteer (sp?) of those inalienable rights. I happen to agree with you that God ulitmately is, but nothing requires a belief in God to accept the existence of inalienable rights and the fundamental nature of man.

The concept of Natural Law in Hobbes corresponds the Natural State of the contractualists, it has nothing to do with the philosophy of Natural Law. However, Pindar never said that one has to accept a higher being, what you have to accept is a metaphisical conception of law previous to human positive action, wich is greater than the latter and therefore this one has to fit the previous one. The first one always emmanates from a higher authority, be it God or the Self Evident principles of Law that are presumed known by everyone through rational process.

[Xiahou]

As long as we're talking about moral imperatives, couldn't I argue that the detention of somebody and depriving him of his liberty without offering proof as to the danger he poses a very un-Christian thing to do? Unlike St. Paul, who I'll grant you seems to endorse better treatment towards Christian brothers than the world at large, Christ Himself actually argues that we are under moral compunction to treat all in the best fashion possible, Christian and non-Christian alike. There is no exception for the 'other'.

Only if you're going to claim that it's "un-Christian" to hold POWs, Don.

[Don Corleone]

Alright, fine, perhaps Hobbes was a bad example. What about Immanuel Kant and the Categorical Imperative. Surely you'd agree that's a Natural Law argument, yet he does not rely on the existence of a presupposer that imbued actions with their morality. That was his whole point, some actions are good and morally required just because they are.

I didn't say Pindar said a belief in a higher power was required. I said he implied it. I had not thought of the extension you make of a metaphysical reality, the Just Law, in the absence of human positive action, and you are right, that would satisfy the requirement he issued.

At the end of the day, I don't know how you would describe it in legal circles, or philosophy of law circles. I call it the sniff test. Some things you just don't do, they strike you as wrong even when they may technically permissable. It's not illegal to foreclose on a young widow who just lost her husband in Iraq and has 3 kids. A banker would be well within his rights. But would you want to have a guy like that for a friend?

[Don Corleone]

Only if you're going to claim that it's "un-Christian" to hold POWs, Don.

No, because in the case of POW's, two statements below are true that are not true with the detainees:

1) POWs are allowed contact with the outside world.
2) POWs know at what point they may be released, the cessation of hostilities. Detaining somebody for 3 years is much different than detaining somebody until I get tired of doing so.

I'm not arguing that holding the detainees is immoral. I'm arguing the way we've done it is.

[Xiahou]

No, because in the case of POW's, two statements below are true that are not true with the detainees:

1) POWs are allowed contact with the outside world.
2) POWs know at what point they may be released, the cessation of hostilities. Detaining somebody for 3 years is much different than detaining somebody until I get tired of doing so.

1) As I've already said, they have contact with the Red Cross, who acts as intermediaries with family members, including the sending of letters.
2) Do you know at the outset of a conflict when or if it's going to end? Or are you saying the conflict in Afghanistan is over and the Taliban has ceased hostilities?

I'm not arguing that holding the detainees is immoral. I'm arguing the way we've done it is.

I'm afraid you're drinking too much of the Democrat kool-aid when it comes to how it's been done. Specific examples don't speak for the whole. The detainees have been vetted over and over. Is it possible that some non-combatants are still being held? Yes, it's possible. Have some still-dangerous combatants mistakenly been released? Definitely.

To me at least, it seems like you're conflating issues that have happened outside of Gitmo with Gitmo itself. I'm not comfortable with everything the administration has done- but I don't have a big problem with our government detaining combatants at gitmo or elsewhere.

[Don Corleone]

I see. So its your contention that each of the detainees at Guantonomo received a fair hearing at the time of your detention. Each of them was given a list of the charges against them and was made aware of the evidence against them so that they could offer rebuttal. Each and every one of them either failed to make a convincing case that they had been inappropriately identified as combatants, or that they chose not to do so in the first place. And finally, with the appropriate measures taken for the passing of classified data, an autonomous review panel has found that the hearings held above were done in accordance with the spirit of American law, and that basically, there's a massive conspiracy afoot to hide the fact that all these detainees actually had these hearings? If you're right about all of this, than I apologize. But I don't think you are. Do you know when the first military tribunal was held? I'll give you a hint, it wasn't even close to when the detainees got picked up in the first place.

[Don Corleone]

1) As I've already said, they have contact with the Red Cross, who acts as intermediaries with family members, including the sending of letters.
2) Do you know at the outset of a conflict when or if it's going to end? Or are you saying the conflict in Afghanistan is over and the Taliban has ceased hostilities?

1) I don't think this is correct. The Red Cross has been allowed to tour the camps. I don't think they're allowed to visit all the detainees, and I'm pretty darned sure they're not allowed to carry mail back and forth.

2) I didn't say you'd know exactly what date, but at least there's some finite timeline. What's to keep us from holding the detainees for the rest of their natural lives?

[Pindar]

You still haven't stated whether you support it or not, nor whether you believe it to be good or not. However, I still have the feeling that you do not, so I'll continue being astonished until you correct me.

I'm getting the impression you don't actually read my posts. Reread post: 111 and/or English assassin's post: 134.

[Pindar]

I had never heard of him before. A quick google led me to this article with Hittinger. Is there any work of his, any online essays, that you'd recommend in particular?

I haven't read his most recent work: First Grace: Rediscovering Natural Law in a Post-Christian world. This collection of essays: The Tradition of Natural Law: A Philosopher's Reflections is good. I didn't see on Amazon another essay collection: "Natural Law Theory" where Hittinger has some good work. I would be surprised if its gone out of print. I've read several journal pieces from him. I think I still have notes from some symposia I attended with him back in the day.

Also, strangely enough, I would say that natural law is one of the areas where secular and religious metaphysics can be reconciled. An American Catholic theocon and a secular Euro liberal could find agreement.

Maybe, but that concord is not apparent.

Here's a very interesting article.

Thank you. I liked the article.

[Pindar]

I struggle with the idea of natural law, qua law. Obviously it may be said to be a natural law that parents love (should love) their children, but in the context of what we would understand by a law, it is a dangerous concept IMHO. Again with apologies for being a tiresome functionalist, for a law to be a law it must in the final degree be enforceable in a court and give rise to real consequences. Otherwise it is comething else, a "nice idea" or an "interesting theory" maybe. Natural law cannot exist in a state of nature, it can exist only in the context of a legal system.

And, as I understand natural law, how does one examine the courts claim to have the right to enforce this law? At least in the UK parliament can legislate to reverse a decision if need be, or to reformulate a whole area if the courts have got in a tangle. What would one do if the courts idea of natural law differed from the people?

Really, other than your faith that the judges would behave wisely, how does this differ from the Stuart claim to rule above the law?*

(*other than the courts having only judicial functions of course)

Quite so. Law void of function and legislation is problematic if not the seeds of despotism.

[Pindar]

Pindar,
I disagree with your hinting that an appeal to Natural Law presupposes a higher power. Hobbes talked about Natural Law as that which went against man's nature and proscribing those acts which by their commitment, man would be destroying his inner self (actually rather apropos here). Similarly, nothing in Locke's writings requires a divine being as the guaranteer (sp?) of those inalienable rights. I happen to agree with you that God ulitmately is, but nothing requires a belief in God to accept the existence of inalienable rights and the fundamental nature of man.

Soulforged has answered already. Hobbesian natural law is quite different and has nothing to do with our concern. Locke's view of Natural Law depends on Deity and fits into the larger Christian notion from the Medievals. You mentioned Kant in a separate post so I'll throw that in here. Kant's Categorical Imperative is not natural law. It does not have content, only form. Moreover, it only speaks to the possible coherence of the good will, but remains distinct from the good will. If this isn't clear I can give you counter examples that will demonstrate the point.

To clarify the issue: natural law claims cannot exist in a vacuum. If one says: there is natural law X they need to justify the claim. For example, if I claim a natural law guaranteeing I can listen to disco the wherefore of the claim is before me. Any metaphysical posture that is appealed to runs into the problems inherent with any such appeal. Moreover, a secular polity operates without any necessary grounding metaphysic. This creates a further issue.

As long as we're talking about moral imperatives, couldn't I argue that the detention of somebody and depriving him of his liberty without offering proof as to the danger he poses a very un-Christian thing to do?

You could, but Christian ethics do not determine U.S. policy.

[Xiahou]

1) I don't think this is correct. The Red Cross has been allowed to tour the camps. I don't think they're allowed to visit all the detainees, and I'm pretty darned sure they're not allowed to carry mail back and forth.

Well, it is correct-They can meet with all detainees including KSM after he was transferred to Gitmo. Usually they're even allowed confidential meetings. They regularly visit Gitmo and they do carry mail.

The Red Cross also can take messages the detainees write, subject to military censorship, for delivery to their family members, he said.

linky

2) I didn't say you'd know exactly what date, but at least there's some finite timeline. What's to keep us from holding the detainees for the rest of their natural lives?

Once Afghanistan is settled, one way or the other, I expect our government to resolve the situation at Gitmo- either prosecute who's still there or release them to their government. If it is settled and we still want to inter them at Gitmo indefinitely and with out charge, come talk to me and I'll be on your side. Since the Taliban and Al Qaeda are very much alive and kicking in Afghanistan, I think we're justified in holding combatants.

[KafirChobee]

Well, it is correct-They can meet with all detainees including KSM after he was transferred to Gitmo. Usually they're even allowed confidential meetings. They regularly visit Gitmo and they do carry mail.linky


Once Afghanistan is settled, one way or the other, I expect our government to resolve the situation at Gitmo- either prosecute who's still there or release them to their government. If it is settled and we still want to inter them at Gitmo indefinitely and with out charge, come talk to me and I'll be on your side. Since the Taliban and Al Qaeda are very much alive and kicking in Afghanistan, I think we're justified in holding combatants.

Errrrrrrrr? Do you actually read your own links?