He did, actually.You still haven't stated whether you support it or not, nor whether you believe it to be good or not. However, I still have the feeling that you do not, so I'll continue being astonished until you correct me
.As to the content of the DHR: by and large I think its good stuff
Well, if a lawyer is not allowed to have a legalistic view of the law, who can?No, what struck me was the ease with which ...Pindar brushed aside the universality of certain human rights, the very concept of it, and your legalistic view of the law.
I struggle with the idea of natural law, qua law. Obviously it may be said to be a natural law that parents love (should love) their children, but in the context of what we would understand by a law, it is a dangerous concept IMHO. Again with apologies for being a tiresome functionalist, for a law to be a law it must in the final degree be enforceable in a court and give rise to real consequences. Otherwise it is comething else, a "nice idea" or an "interesting theory" maybe. Natural law cannot exist in a state of nature, it can exist only in the context of a legal system.
And, as I understand natural law, how does one examine the courts claim to have the right to enforce this law? At least in the UK parliament can legislate to reverse a decision if need be, or to reformulate a whole area if the courts have got in a tangle. What would one do if the courts idea of natural law differed from the people?
Really, other than your faith that the judges would behave wisely, how does this differ from the Stuart claim to rule above the law?*
(*other than the courts having only judicial functions of course)
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