Round 3-Napoleonic Bracket

[Rodion Romanovich]

IMO, Kutuzov is the most skilled general of the era, with Wellington coming second, and Napoleon coming third. I'm surprised that Kutuzov didn't reach the finals. Although his record isn't full of as many spectacular battle victories as Napeoleon's, he knew his strengths, as well as his limitations when it came to troop quality, and always used his full potential. Above all, he was a sound strategist more than a tactician without strategical skills, as a certain other general of the era.

At Austerlitz, Kutuzov's defeat can be fully blamed on the Russian Tsar and nobility, who explicitly ordered attack instead of letting Kutuzov remain defensive (if he had remained defensive, he could no doubt have forced the French to attack, because the French supply lines were already stretched and they were forced to either win the battle quickly or retreat). Additionally to being forced to attack, Kutuzov's side had the problem of fighting as two separate armies (Russian and Austrian) with communication problems, as well as inferior artillery and troop quality.

In the Russian campaign, Kutuzov showed his true skills, striking a perfect balance between avoiding battle (to keep the army intact), and fighting delaying battles to worsen Napoleon's supply and logistics situation. During most of the campaign, he had significantly inferior numbers to Napoleon's 500,000 men, and additionally, while Napoleon was leading hardened veterans, Kutuzov was almost exclusively commanding untrained militia. The battle of Borodino demonstrates Kutuzov's tactical skills well: with only about 80% of Napoleon's numbers and much worse troop quality, he held the line while inflicting nearly as many losses on the French as he suffered himself. His decision to retreat and give up Moscow instead of continuing to fight, was one of the most clever strategical moves of the entire Napoleonic period. Meanwhile, the French, with logistical difficulties (due to the many wounded from Borodino) and supply problems, continued to Moscow which was emptied of all supply. Kutuzov showed with his performance at Borodino and elsewhere that he knew that in the delaying actions, a battle would be victorious even if he only were to inflict half as many casualties as suffered, as the French logistical problems following upon delayed advance and a great number of wounded troops would multiply when combined with the already problematic supply. After Borodino and the loss of Moscow, Kutuzov simultaneously had the armies guarding the northern flank easily push back the Prussians at Riga (knowing that these were allies of Napoleon only through threat and not through want) and defeat the garrison Napoleon had left to secure his northern flank, thus eliminating Napoleon's supply route completely, allowing Kutuzov to pursue the Grande Armee, now reduced to less than half of its original strength. Still careful, he avoided another open full scale battle with Napoleon, and instead used his forces to (in a series of victorious battles) protect the southern roads so Napoleon was forced to retreat along the already pillaged roads he had used in his prior advance, wearing down the Grande Armee enough to expose it to a new series of battles, culminating in the battle of Berezina, in which Kutuzov was able to reduce the remnants of the Grande Armee to less than 20,000. Total result of the campaign: 400,000 Russian forces, mostly militia, defeat 800,000 hardened veterans led by Napoleon while suffering less than half the number of casualties taken by the French.

Wellington I put second because he showed decent capabilities in all fields, without any particular weakness.

Napoleon I place third, because of his spectacular tactical victories, and his energy and creativity. He made some strategical level moves that would normally be considered impossible, so that he (early in the period) could sometimes make up for his lack of strategical skills. Most notably, this showed itself in his capability to surprise his opponents by quick forced marches that allowed him to engage an opponent in battle before reinforcements from allied armies could arrive. However, his lack of strategical skills (mainly displayed in his constantly relying on near impossible moves to succeed - eventually, when they became known, they didn't succeed any more) and knowing his limitations hint of his serious shortcomings as a general. One disaster in Egypt, another in Russia, and in total he led millions of men on his side to their deaths, something that greatly overshadows his triumphs. Moreover, most of these triumphs are highly overrated: most of the battles were actually against inferior opposition (either due to inferior military technology, or due to being the armies of two or more different nations having difficulties in communication), and he had a much stronger troop recruitment and economical resources than any of his opponents for most of the period.