Thank you Orb and Antiochus III.

Orb, I wanted to be as careful as possible when stating things about Muhammed, mainly for the obvious resaons (the sensitive political climate since the 7th century etc., etc.). I have read conflicting accounts of his rise and goals. Some say he wanted Islam to be cosmopolitan, others say the opposite.

Yes, Ethiopia I think is largely Christian, according to a national census. But Islam is hardly a small minority (perhaps 1/3 of the country?). However, the CIA World Factbook (perhaps a 'loose' proclamation) has Islam as the the most widely practiced religion there.

Anyway, that's just pedantry as far as I am concerned; a lot has happened since the 7th century. But the Negus, one Armah (or Ashama; we just don't know for sure) readily accepted Islam in the late 620s, a decade or so after the faith had been introduced. Now, perhaps the people themselves didn't accept it as much.

http://www.cyberistan.org/islamic/negus.html

...However, I disagree with the statement that Mohammed genuinely united the Arabian tribes or Islamic interest. Islamic cultures are no more exempt to internal war than the rest of men, the Arabians before Mohammed, while significantly smaller, do not seem to have been less stable than the various Islamic caliphates following in Mohammed's wake....
You see, this is the problem we have, one which is sadly an historical tradition: I have read stuff to the contrary - regarding specific points, such as the conquests (of course they are not immune to internecine). It didn't come about immediately, but one of the great glories of Islam was that it dissolved barriers of race and language to a degree no religion or empire had achieved before. The great conquests could not have so astonishingly succeeded if not for a fight for their new faith, no matter how much in decline the proximate empires were.

I don't think Muhammed's call radically changed any moral tradition of the Arabian peoples; what he did was unit them under a single pure faith. Before, they were polytheists who worshipped idols and nature spirits. He viewed this as primative. Now, whether that is better or worse for one's personal values, I have no right to say. But in terms of cohesion, it was monumental. Professor Ira Lapidus tells us,

"...Islam gave traditional virtues and social institutions a new meaning that could command allegiance and elicit participation. By giving old concepts new meaning, it made possible a new religious sensibility and the integration of disparate peoples into a new community. When one looks at Arabiian society before and after Muhammed, the outward movement was small, but the inner journey was immeasurable...To this day, to be a Muslim implies a combination of personal religious belief and membership in the community of fellow believers."


Regarding Julius Caesar's Gallic campaign, of which are major source comes from Caesar's own self-aggrandizing (albeit wonderfully written) Commentaries, I think you are basically correct: Gaul was a divided land. But - and here comes the pedantry - the political order was aristocratic in nature, and the balance of power, at least in the major theater in central-eastern Gaul, was basically divided between two confederations headed by the Aedui tribe (Caesar's most loyal allies in Gaul) and the Sequani. But I don't think we can say they were vulnerable victims awaiting an onslaught by Roman expansionism (see Adrian Goldsworthy's new bio on Caesar, Pg. 204). The Aedui were in the ascendant, and the Sequani (and Arverni) sought help from the Germanic (Seubi) leader Ariovistus. His defeat of the Aedui and subsequent settlement into the modern Alsace region. The Gauls didn't like this, and their differences were set aside to kick Ariovistus out. But he beat them in 60 B.C., compelling them to appeal to Rome for help, who considered then said no due to a revolt among tribes (the Allobroges) further south (ie, closer to Italy). Thus, the Aedui started asking the Helvetii for help (tribe of western Switzerland); they wanted fertile land to settle in. Wishing to not (yet) make an enemy of Ariovistus, the Senate, with Caesar's sanctioning, conferred him 'King and Friend' of the Roman people. This recognition brought some stability to the regions.

As we (should) know, Caesar's primary interest was his own position, and the conquest of Gaul - which was ostensibly called the 'pacification of Gaul' - would provide the monetary and political muscle for him to reign supreme. His entire campaign, at the head of a tremedous force of the best soldiers any commander could hope for, was an outstanding display of speed and logistics. He was always a master at extricating himself from precarious situations he may have impetuously gotten himself into; this was also evident later in the Civil Wars in Greece and Africa.

Anyway, the Gauls did unite, for the most part, under the able leadership of Vercingetorix, whose strong character raised a very solid flag of rebellion. In 52 B.C., he opened the revolt against Rome by summoning other leaders under this just cause, and implemented a good strategy to get rid of Caesar: he would deny the Romans the sustenance required for a campaign in a foreign land. Vercingetorix scorched the earth and stored the vital supplies in defended areas; fields were assiduously cleared of grain and fodder. All villages and farms along Caesar's expected march were destroyed. Vercingetorix, the best he could, disciplined and armed his soldiers at an unprecedented level, and even the Aedui largely broke from Caesar. Vercingetorix wisely avoided open engagements, despite his vast superiority in numbers (of course Caesar's enumerations are ridiculously extravagant). But the incredible speed of Caesar' movement, and the ability at siegecraft of his superbly drilled men, were too much for the valiant Gauls and their good leader in the end: he captured and plundered some towns, giving him valuable supply depots before Vercingetorix could garrison them fully. The successful siege of Alesia nearly defies belief! Stout lines of circumvallation and contravallation (lines of entrenchments to attack both a fortification and defend from a relief army) comprised one of the most elaborate and efficacuious in military history (albeit Caesar risked being besieged himself within his works).

Like him or hate him - are indifferent - Caesar, though probably presented as larger than life by written history down the ages, was a giant: a despot and a champion of the (some) people, he achieved everything politically and militarily, whether in Rome or Asia Minor. It's quite ahuge specualtion regarding his plans for Parthia; the lesson of Carrhae was learnt, and Publius Ventedius, once a subordinate of Caesar's had shown how to best the Parthians. But conquering into their far away territory was another thing. He was too big - as far as Cinna, Cimber, Casca, Cassius, and Brutus were concerned, he had to go.

Thanks, Spartan JKM