Schiltrom

[Didz]

The British troops did prefer a shattering close quarter volley, that is probably whilst they held fire. A close range volley into cavalry would be devestating.

That only seems to be true when they were fighting in Line, and strictly speaking it would not have been a single volley.

The standard British drill would have been to fire by platoons and so what would have happened was a rolling series of volleys each of platoon strength. This actually made the effect even worse on the enemy as it would have been similar to a rapid sweep of close range machine gun fire back and forth across their front, whereas a single battalion volley would have wasted a lot of shot by hitting the same men in front rank of the enemy formation several times.

The British line would continue to pour a rolling volley into the enemy formation until the battalion commander decided that the enemy were about to rout. At which point the order was given to charge and the enemy were driven off with the bayonet.

[According to Sharpe this usually required 3 rounds and would have taken one minute to complete (e.g. about 1,200 shot from a 400 strong battalion, into a column about 80/100 men wide). However, for this to be correct, one would first have to accept that French columns were not intended to close with the bayonet but halted when they came under fire.]

Net result, the square has only one shot, so it had better make it count.

Yes possibly, although that doesn't really explain the incident with the lancers and I found it hard to justify the continued willingness to hold fire even when under close range cannister fire. Personally, I would have thought a few volley's into the gunners would have been sensible unless there was a more compelling reason for not firing. Nevertheless, the anecdotal evidence seems pretty solid and the Waterloo film shots whilst impressive aren't an accurate depiction of the situation as I understand it.

http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=je-c81wwrpA

Nice video clip, though not very accurate historically. What film is it from?

[pike master]

that event in waterloo was a result of hasty and rushed decisions culminating from napoleons detachment to pursue the prussians getting lost.

the battle was going quite well for napoleon up to that point. it was considered the greatest blunder of the entire battle. one of napoleons best generals getting lost after taking directions from the the greatest map navigator (napoleon) of that day.

napoleon didnt have a clue what had happened until the prussians were within a mere few miles of the battle.

so basically going from a situation where napoleon felt he had control of time and space to execute his plan he now found in short order the prussians bearing down on him and roughly a third of his army lost and out of the battle for the remainder of it.

the later problems such as that fatal cavalry charge and the british using a reversed slope ambush would most likely never have taken place.

[Didz]

Umm! not quite...although I accept that what you are quoting is correct according to the accepted British propaganda version of the battle, But even Wellington admitted that if this was true then he obviously hadn't been at the battle.

that event in waterloo was a result of hasty and rushed decisions culminating from napoleons detachment to pursue the prussians getting lost.

Grouchy (who commanded the detachment shadowing the Prussians did not get lost, he remained in contact with the Prussians throughout the period of the battle and actually performed a very effective withdrawal from Belgium once he realised that the main battle had been lost). What actually happened was that Blucher and more probably Zieten performed an excellent reaguard action that allowed a large portion of the Prussian army to move between Gouchy and the main army effectively preventing the Gouchy marching to Waterloo (not that he was expected or ordered to) whilst allowing them to detach two whole Corps to Wellingtons aid.

the battle was going quite well for napoleon up to that point. it was considered the greatest blunder of the entire battle. one of napoleons best generals getting lost after taking directions from the the greatest map navigator (napoleon) of that day.

The British centre was actually on the point of collapse when the Prussians arrived (or more accurately decided to commence their attack). The French had captured La Haye Sainte (the central farm) and had seized the top of the ridge with their cavalry and artillery forcing the weakened allied troops to form square and effectively splitting the Allied army in two. Allied fugitives were already flooding down the road towards Brussels and most British regiments had sent their colours to the rear to avoid them falling into French hands. The arrival of the first Prussian divisions distracted French reserves away from explioting this breach in the British line, whilst freeing up Allied units (particularly cavalry) from the Allied left flank allowing the centre to be stabalised and saving the day.

napoleon didnt have a clue what had happened until the prussians were within a mere few miles of the battle.

[This section has been edited to correct my earlier statement having checked my sources]
I just double checked this and it seems that Grouchy's communications with Napoleon were probably interdicted by Prussian cavalry patrols very ealry on the morning of the 18th. The first patrol of Prussian Cavalry arrived on the battlefield of Waterloo at sometime between 9am and 10am on the morning of the battle before it had actually started and met with a patrol of the 10th Hussars commanded by Captain Taylor. He immediately sent Lieutenant Lindsay to Wellingtons headquarters to confirm that Bulow's Corps was at St. Lambert about 4 miles from the battlefield and advancing to join them. By this time the Prussians had established a heavy cavarly screen between Wavre and Waterloo through which Grouchy would have been pretty much unable to get messages. Several French patrols had already been interdicted and driven off or captured, including several from Grouchy's Corps.

However, at 1pm even before the main attacks began Napoleon spotted Bulow's column at St Lambert and immediately wrote to Grouchy ordering him to move his Corps closer in order to prevent the Prussians getting between them and forcing their two formations apart. Before this note could be sent a captured Prussian Hussar carrying a dispatch from Bulow to Muffling was brought into Napoleon's headquarters. The dispatch described in detail Bulow's intentions and Soult added this information as a postscript to the message sent to Grouchy. At this point the battle was in its early stages, Hougoumont had been under attack for a couple of hours, Durette's Division had been attacking Papelotte since 12 noon but De'Erlons main assault on the Allied centre had still not commenced and would not do so for another half and hour or so.

Therefore, at the point when the first main attack commenced both Napoleon and Wellington knew that the Prussians were coming.

so basically going from a situation where napoleon felt he had control of time and space to execute his plan he now found in short order the prussians bearing down on him and roughly a third of his army lost and out of the battle for the remainder of it.

What historians often choose to ignore is that what Napoleon was doing at Waterloo was conducting one of his classic strategic manouvres, 'Penetrating between the divided parts of the enemies strategic front'. In fact, this was his second iteration of this strategy during the campaign. The first had been successfully completed on the 15th June when Ney's containing force had kept the Allied army occupied at Quatre Bras whilst the main French Army defeated the Prussian's at Ligny. The second reached a climax on the 18th June when the main French Army turned on the remnants of the Allied Army whilst Grouchy kept the Prussians occupied.

What went wrong on the 18th was not that Napoleon lost the plot, but that he had underestimated both the resilience of the new Prussian Army and the quality of its general staff. If Blucher had done what Gneisenau advised and concentrated his full strength against Grouchy then Napoleon would have won the campaign. Instead Blucher ordered him to disengage most of the remaining battle ready divisions of the Prussian Army from the battle with Grouchy and march them to join Wellington. This move effectively undermined Napoleons strategy and saved the day, but it was a huge gamble on the part of the Prussians.

If the Allied army had broken before they arrived then Bluchers Prussian army would have been left divided, exposed and sandwiched between Grouchy and Napoleon and found it virtually impossible to escape destruction. That in turn would have left Prussia dangerously exposed having lost its main combat army and Napoleon would probably have regained not only The Netherlands, but Prussia and the German states too.

Blucher therefore, took a big risk, against the advice of his Chief of Staff and was fortunate that it actually paid off.

the later problems such as that fatal cavalry charge and the british using a reversed slope ambush would most likely never have taken place.

The Allies (with the exception of Bijlandts Dutch Brigade) had been deployed on the reverse slope of the ridge all day, and the French Cavalry assault on the ridge far from being fatal almost secured the French victory late in the afternoon. Contrary to British propaganda the French cavalry were supported by both infantry and artillery and placed the Allied position in real danger mainly due to the squandering of the British cavalry during the morning and the command and control confusion over that commanded by the Dutch-Belgians. The myth that the French cavalry attacked unsupported, is part of the British spin introduced after the battle to malign the French and avoid criticism of Wellington over the poor handling of his own cavalry. Eyewitness accounts from this period of the battle include clear references to both artillery and infantry being brought forward to fire into their squares at close range, once the Allied line had been forced into square and its cavalry driven off.

It was only on the right, behind Hougoumont, where this was never fully acheived and even here Mercer recounts the appearance of French skirmishers who spent some time trying to shoot his gunners, forcing him to parade back and forth along the raised track in front of his guns to demonstrate what poor shots the French were. It should also be noted that throughout this period Mercer claims that the square of Brunswickers to his rear was taking casualties, which its NCO's had to fill by thumping the young boys into the gaps. That was why he did not withdraw into the square as ordered, but it also confirms that something was firing into that square during intervals between the cavalry attacks, probably the same skirmishers who were shooting at his gunners, and as skirmishers never operated alone it also follows that there must therefore have been French infantry units on hand somewhere nearby from which these skirmishers were drawn.

[Hrafn]

Nice video clip, though not very accurate historically. What film is it from?

It seems to be from a spanish film about a mercenary called Captain Alatriste:
more on imdb.com/title/tt0395119/maindetails (since its my first post i cant make the link)

[Didz]

It seems to be from a spanish film about a mercenary called Captain Alatriste:
more on imdb.com/title/tt0395119/maindetails (since its my first post I can't make the link)

Thanks....

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0395119/

I'm surprised, its quite a modern movie, looking at the clip I thought that it was one of the classic's. It gets good reviews anyway.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alatriste

I shall have to see if I can find an English version.

[pike master]

he got lost.

and the napoleon did in fact use divide and conquer as you have said and i never contended against. this is why he sent a detachment to keep on the prussians heels after he defeated them after isolating them from the allied contingent.

and evidence in my opinion that he got lost is that the prussians regrouped. if he had remained hard on their heels this would not have happened.

note lost being he did not follow on the prussians as had been planned and ended up off track to the south of them following what he thought was the prussian main body.

grouchy did in fact finally realize his mistake but by then the prussians had bypassed him.

and just hours before the battle ended is a shocker. also i said that the prussians got within a few miles before they were spotted which would still coincide with your record of the battle.

[Didz]

note lost being he did not follow on the prussians as had been planned and ended up off track to the south of them following what he thought was the prussian main body.

Apologies...I thought you meant literally Lost, as in he took the wrong road and didn't know where he was.

Nevertheless, I think the traditional finger-pointing at Grouchy by most school-boy history books is a little misleading and unfair. If one actually looks at the facts its clear that if anyone is to blame for the delay in the pursuit of the Prussians it was Napoleon. The final shots of the battle of Ligny were fired at between 8pm and 8:30pm on the evening of the 16th June, and the last Prussian troops had quit the field of battle by about 2am.

Napoleon actually issued no orders to pursue the Prussians until noon on the 17th, the net result being that the Prussians were given 10 to 14 hours of freedom to escape the battle of Ligny and regroup before Grouchy was even given the task of pursuing them.

Not only that but during this period the French had effectively lost track of the entire Prussian army other than Theilmanns III Corps and its deserters and so Grouchy was actually ordered to march towards Namur, effectively in the wrong direction.

That afternoon, Excelman reported that he had followed the Prussians he saw on the banks of the river Orneau earlier and that the Prussian army was now massing at Gembloux. Grouchy immediately directed his troops in this direction and Vandamme's Corps arrived at the Gembloux at around 7pm. However, Theilmanns III Corps had marched 5 hours earlier having successfully regrouped in the town and they were already marching north towards Wavre together with Bulow's IV Corps.

Excelman had already noticed that they had gone and was conducting a wide search of the roads and villages north of Gembloux to try and find them again. He found them moving north through the villages to the right of the Gembloux to Wavre road and after watching them for an hour reported back to Grouchy in Gembloux who immediately sent an update report to Napoleon. This is the first report that suggests the objective of the Prussian retreat might be Wavre, though it still clings to the idea that a substantial portion of the Prussian army was still retreating on Leige and Namur.

By now it was dark and Grouchys Corps spent the night in and around Gembloux before marching north towards Wavre at 4am the next morning.

So, basically as I see it Napoleon wasted 14 hours after the battle of Ligny during which the French could have been pursuing the Prussians, and in doing so lost at least half the Prussian army. Grouchy assumed responsibility for the pursuit at about noon on the 17th and within 2 hours had correctly located Thielmans Corps at Gembloux and by nighfall had correctly concluded that the Prussians were actually moving North towards Wavre, and yet Grouchy seems to get the full blame for the escape of the Prussian Army.

Quite unfairly in my opinon.

PS: If anyone has access to a decent historical map of the area around Gembloux I would like some help. Excelman mentions sighting Prussian troops on the left bank of the Orneau river, with one battalion stationed on the right bank before Basse Baudecet (which I think must have been a farm). However, I cannot find it on my maps and I want to know if it is on the Sombreffe/Leige or the Sombreffe/Namur Road.