Is there any way to make battles more strategically decisive?

[grudzio]

In my opinion, Antiochos was probably tired. He was quite old by now and had been campaigning constantly since he ascended to the Seleukid throne. Only two people come even close to this: Alexander, who didn't live very long, and Caesar who took many months on a vacation sailing on the Nile with Kleopatra probably due to exhaustion. Antiochos was also aware of the what damage the four years of fighting with Achaios had caused to the region. In the end, he went with the Treaty of Apameia, which had its pros and cons for both sides and was a far more peaceful solution.

I think that Antiochos must have had serious financial problems. War wasn't cheap even for Seleucids. AFAIK when two ancient empires fought each other the first major battle was decisive because army upkeep was so high. One had to win and plunder enemy camp to pay the army. Looser was broke and had to sue for peace.

The Romans are another matter. They didn't pay for solders equipment (until Marian reforms of course) paid much less their soldiers so money wasn't that big problem for them as for other countries.

What is more Magnesia wasn't first defeat of Antiochos. He lost one or two battles trying to stop Romans in main Greece. So after Magnesia his army had very low morale, he had no money, as Abou says was tired and probably
he was afraid that after defeat at Magnesia some more energetic governors could think it is a good time to become independent. Unfortunatelly Seleucids Empire wasn't very stable.

[O'ETAIPOS]

The losses at Magnesia were several times less than what Livy wrote. The Roman army was of a much larger size than what Livy stated and their losses much, much more than what Livy wrote. By all means, Antiochos could have continued the fighting and won (he never made the same mistake twice, btw, and Rome was full of terrible generals.). Rome was quite over extended too with fighting all over the Mediterranean. To add to this, Antiochos still had an alliance with the Galatians and Kappadokians - regions which Rome attacked in a dick move, and could have then only spurred them on to fight more against the invaders. As to why Antiochos didn't...

I can easily believe that roman loses were much bigger, but what reason is there to claim that losses of Antiochos were small?

Antiochos's army had only 19000 foot troops worth mentioning (phalangitai and galatians) and possibly up to 10000 silvershields (Bar-Kohwa's opinion)
The rest was composed of light armed levees, mostly useless as it was raining (the worst weather for composite bows).

Romans on the other hand had around 20000 heavy infantry, quite probably veterans of II Punic and II Macedonian wars.

If we add to this that Antiochos left wing was broken minutes after the battle started (own chariots and Roman/Pergamene cavalry charge) we see that the situation was not very good for Antiochos.

Phalanx and galatians were surounded by romans, inf and cav, and was massacred so we can assume 70% dead here. Another massacre was done in the camp, so I think we can easily assume 25000 dead plus 5000 trampled by elephants and people in retreat. Some were also taken prisoner.

[Intranetusa]

"Looser was broke and had to sue for peace. "

Didn't Carthage sue for peace even though they had a vast amount of money left, enough money to hire many more mercenaries and enough money to pay the Romans a huge tribute for peace.

Carthaginian leaders = crap

[abou]

I can easily believe that roman loses were much bigger, but what reason is there to claim that losses of Antiochos were small?

Antiochos's army had only 19000 foot troops worth mentioning (phalangitai and galatians) and possibly up to 10000 silvershields (Bar-Kohwa's opinion)
The rest was composed of light armed levees, mostly useless as it was raining (the worst weather for composite bows).

Hopefully my explanation will be convincing. I'm pretty sure though that Livy mentions the Argyraspidai on the extreme right.

Romans on the other hand had around 20000 heavy infantry, quite probably veterans of II Punic and II Macedonian wars.

Recently the concession seems to be that they had more. Possibly upwards of 50,000 total minus sick and wounded. It comes from careful reading of Livy and his mentions of troops that have been stationed throughout Italy and Greece - troops which would have been brought over to Asia Minor to fight Antiochos. I have it posted in EBH if you're curious.

If we add to this that Antiochos left wing was broken minutes after the battle started (own chariots and Roman/Pergamene cavalry charge) we see that the situation was not very good for Antiochos.

Phalanx and galatians were surounded by romans, inf and cav, and was massacred so we can assume 70% dead here. Another massacre was done in the camp, so I think we can easily assume 25000 dead plus 5000 trampled by elephants and people in retreat. Some were also taken prisoner.

Right, but not of the cavalry is going to wait around and be killed. Considering how much cavalry was on the Seleukid left I wouldn't be surprised if more than half got away. Seleukos IV was in command of that cavarly - how did he get away then?

The phalanx that had formed the square was holding back the Romans quite well. That is, until the elephants rampaged. 5,000 is a bit high though - I would have put it at less than that. Plus, once the elephants did rampage, it probably scared off the Roman soldiers and allowed the phalanx troops to break and flee.

I imagine that the 4,700 light infantry stationed to the left of the phalanx probably broke and ran after having seen the cataphracts collapse due to the chariots. Same with the other cavalry in that area like the "Tarentines". The heavy fighting described by Livy at the camp afterwards was probably due to the light troops put there to guard the camp. I don't even think there is enough frontage to put the several thousands that Livy describes anywhere on the battlefield other than at the camp - which would explain why the phalanx, so easy to break at Thermopylai when troops appeared at their rear, held almost indefinitely at Magnesia. That is the one place were casualties would be incredibly high, but I have a feeling that if Livy's number of 35,000 is anywhere accurate that might be because it includes dependents and slaves which were at the camp (a bad Hellenic practice).

Finally, after the battle Seleukos is at the Antiocheia of the region, which is due west of Magnesia, with a sizable army. Where did this army come from if not from Magnesian survivors? It was apparently large enough of an army that Rome avoided it entirely. If you have a drastically reduced phalanx and troops of other contingents then you have nothing suitable to defend the city.

[grudzio]

"Looser was broke and had to sue for peace. "

Didn't Carthage sue for peace even though they had a vast amount of money left, enough money to hire many more mercenaries and enough money to pay the Romans a huge tribute for peace.

Carthaginian leaders = crap

And when was that? After the first punic war Carthage didnt have money to pay their mercenaries. This started "the merciless war" which Carthage barely survived. After the second punic war Carthage lost Iberia. And no Iberia = no money. And after the third war Carthage was no more. As for tribute, it wasn't paid all sum at once but in rates.

[abou]

Yes, but Carthage was apparently capable of paying the indemnity of the 2nd Punic War in a fraction of the time, but Rome refused the offer. Carthage was soon very prosperous, which of course made Cato anxious.

Cato was an asshole anyway. The sacking of Carthage was entirely unnecessary.

As to the Seleukids, they certainly weren't bankrupt. It was the indemnity which was the bigger problem.

[NeoSpartan]

u guys are making me want to play with the Seleucids.....

[grudzio]

Yes, but Carthage was apparently capable of paying the indemnity of the 2nd Punic War in a fraction of the time, but Rome refused the offer. Carthage was soon very prosperous, which of course made Cato anxious.

Well, with allmost no army and navy they had low upkeep costs.

Cato was an asshole anyway. The sacking of Carthage was entirely unnecessary.

IMHO Cato or no Cato, Romans would destroy Carthage anyway. Carthage put the strongest resilience to the Romans. No Roman senator would sleep well knowing that someday a new Hannibal Barcas could be born.

And yes, Cato was an asshole

As to the Seleukids, they certainly weren't bankrupt. It was the indemnity which was the bigger problem.

All right, I take Your word for it. But if I remember correctly was one of the descendents of Antiochos III (Antiochos IV?) killed while robbing some temple?

[oudysseos]

Back to the topic for just a second:

What if there was a trait, "Losing the War" that all family members of faction x get if they lose 3 or 4 large battles in a row, with massive negative affects for moral, tax income, bribability etc. For balance there'd have to be some way to reverse fortune, I suppose.

Another tack would be for a faction to have a counterpart to victory conditions, i.e. failure conditions. Let's say for example SPQR is driven out of Rome and/or Italy all together- script gives them x number of turns to get back before killing off all their family members. Something along those lines.

[bovi]

What if there was a trait, "Losing the War" that all family members of faction x get if they lose 3 or 4 large battles in a row, with massive negative affects for moral, tax income, bribability etc. For balance there'd have to be some way to reverse fortune, I suppose.

If there only was a way to make the AI accept and honour peace, war weariness would be a good concept to implement, affected by battles/sieges/war length etc. There isn't .

[O'ETAIPOS]

All right, I take Your word for it. But if I remember correctly was one of the descendents of Antiochos III (Antiochos IV?) killed while robbing some temple?

It was Antioch III himself.

[geala]

Back to off topic for a moment:

Is the result of the war not easier to understand if Magnesia were interpreted as the decisive defeat as what it is described by Livius and Arrian?

Maybe there were more Roman soldiers involved (but mosty all the Greek wars after 200 were fought with the normal two legion consular armies) and their losses higher. And I'm with you that the Seleucid casualties may be exaggerated.

But after the phalanx was broken by the own elephants and the Roman attack against the already scattered formation a general pursuit of the fleeing soldiers took place. Such routs normally result in a great number of casualties. So a great loss of phalangite core troops is entirely possible.

The break of the Roman left wing and the flight towards the Roman camp was different. The Roman army was not decisively scattered and the cataphracts had to remain carefully in a kind of order, otherwise the pursuit could have resulted in disaster. When they were stopped by the Greeks who guarded the Roman camp, the cavalry were not beaten or dispersed but remained as a force which later repulsed a Roman cavalry charge: for me the argument that they were still in formation. Being in formation however is a bad premise to kill fleeing soldiers.

The following peace treaty was rather bad for AS. Loss of the western provinces, restrictions of sovereignty in warfare, delivery of nearly all warships and all war elephants and reparations of about 15000 talents are not nice conditions. Maybe the death of Antiochos is directly related to the enormous sum the AS had to pay. Such a peace is not the result of nothing, although the Hellenistic states had another relation to the end of wars than the mad Romans.

The Roman army on the other hand after Magnesia soon marched against the fortresses of the Galatians and won again great victories. That would not have been possible if the army had been weakened by great losses in the war against Antiochos.

The general problem of the Hellenistic kingdoms after 200 was that they faced first the battle hardened Roman soldiers of the last years of the Punic war together with extremely experienced officers and later the growing paranoia of the Roman state who saw menaces all around which did not exist.

[grudzio]

It was Antioch III himself.

So, at some point he was broke. And thanks for the information.

[abou]

Back to off topic for a moment:

Is the result of the war not easier to understand if Magnesia were interpreted as the decisive defeat as what it is described by Livius and Arrian?

Easier, but not true. I could say the sun rises because some guy in a chariot rides across the sky every day... that's what certain myths tell us. Doesn't mean it's true.

Hint: you should take this as an indication of what I think about at least Livy.*

Maybe there were more Roman soldiers involved (but mosty all the Greek wars after 200 were fought with the normal two legion consular armies) and their losses higher. And I'm with you that the Seleucid casualties may be exaggerated.

Normal Consular armies were four legions: two Roman legions and two allied legions.

But after the phalanx was broken by the own elephants and the Roman attack against the already scattered formation a general pursuit of the fleeing soldiers took place. Such routs normally result in a great number of casualties. So a great loss of phalangite core troops is entirely possible.

Sure, but you don't chase routing infantry with heavy infantry. You also underestimate the scare factor of elephants and the lightness of the phalangite equipment; especially so once the sarissa is dropped. If you are running with just a helmet, linothorax, small shield, and a sheathed sword you can be quite adroit.

The break of the Roman left wing and the flight towards the Roman camp was different. The Roman army was not decisively scattered and the cataphracts had to remain carefully in a kind of order, otherwise the pursuit could have resulted in disaster.

Not decisively scattered? The whole legion (possibly two) routed immediately after or slightly before the charge hit. The Principes and Triarii ran without even being touched.

The Roman army on the other hand after Magnesia soon marched against the fortresses of the Galatians and won again great victories. That would not have been possible if the army had been weakened by great losses in the war against Antiochos.

Well, they did take a very roundabout way around that nice fortress with that garrison I mentioned in an earlier post so as to invade Galatia, which never had a very large population. Maybe Anthony could provide evidence to the contrary, but they never seemed to me to be very large.

Livy only mention 200 casualties for the Roman - preposterous! The routed legion alone would have accounted for way more than that.

The general problem of the Hellenistic kingdoms after 200 was that they faced first the battle hardened Roman soldiers of the last years of the Punic war together with extremely experienced officers and later the growing paranoia of the Roman state who saw menaces all around which did not exist.

Many of the legions sent to fight Antiochos would have been freshly recruited. In fact, we are told so by Livy in earlier sections of many legions being newly raised for various reasons - legions that would have gone to Greece and Asia Minor. Also, I think you are totally discounting the military of Antiochos. Although not all of them were constantly deployed, we are talking about a military that Antiochos had been using for over thirty years - a fair amount of which were full-time, professional soldiers. If any army could be counted as the best trained and maintained military of the Mediterranean (if not the world) it was the Seleukid military.


* The thing with Livy is that he can tell if an event happened, but if he starts describing events, thoughts, actions, etc he is full of it. For example, he can tell you where a new army was raised, but sometimes completely makes up the reason for it (e.g. he will say an army was raised to protect Italy from invasion via Greece, but the army will be deployed on the wrong side of Italy). He can tell you a meeting took place, but will make up entirely what was said, which often contradicts events before and after. He can tell you where and when a battle took place and who was fighting against whom, but he will butcher the numbers. Livy was concerned with writing a romantic and patriotic account of Rome, not a solid, historically accurate picture of events. I know I haven't really addressed what Arrian says, but I believe he based his account off of Livy and Polybios, which only goes so far. Besides, I'm angrier at Livy... man I hate reading him; especially in Latin. Milky richness my ass.

So, at some point he was broke. And thanks for the information.

Not necessarily. After Magnesia he continued to fund Aitolia in its fight against Rome. Between that and the indemnity he may have felt a little crunch, but nothing so constricting as bankruptcy. The reason for his looting of the temple in Susa was probably to fund a new eastern campaign against Parthia and Baktria after they revolted upon hearing the news of Magnesia.

[geala]

Hmm, unfortunately I'm not able to take parts of posts and commend it (how is it done?). So I have to answer in this way:

1. Livius may be a problematic source (fortunately I never had to read him in Latin ), but some facts, esp. the peace treaty, restricts me to dismiss him totally in this case.

2. That information about the consular army is new to me. I thought it consisted of two legions, four legions only in special circumstances. A Roman legion always means the legion and the associated ala of allies. So a two legion army consisted normally of two legions of Romans and two alae of Italian allies, resulting in about 20000 soldiers. What are the legions of the allies composed of? Or do you mean the alae?

L. Scipio had also allies from Pergamon and Makedonia with him, so his army was of course more than 20000.

3. The pursuit of the phalangites was of course not only done by the heavy infantry. The Romans had a lot light troops nearby which did not hide behind the heavy infantry like their Greek counterparts, but bombed the elephants into rout and harrassed the phalanx. There was also cavalry left, I think.

4. The left wing of the Romans was broken (partly reformed at the camp) but the whole army was not decisively scattered. This is the difference to the situation of the Seleucid army: resistance was not to be expected any longer after the phalanx broke.

5. Of course there were many new recruits in the legions. A hastatus of 202 may have fought as a princeps or triarius in 190, but many were not the same than in the Punic war. But a lot of experienced officers came from the last great war. And as someone has said, there are no bad soldiers, only bad officers.

I'm not at all a fan of the Romans. But it is a fact that the Roman militia armies beat the regular armies of the Hellenistic states. And that is not only due to more manpower or better economics. Compared to the Second Punic War it was low scale warfare for the Romans. Unfortunately the Hellenistic states were more busy to fight inner wars than to stop the Romans. They don't have the tradition of the Romans that a war could only be ended with being the sole victor and power left. So some unlucky battles (Kynoskephalai, Magnesia, Pydna) were enough. A great difference to Mithridates VI. btw.

6. You said some interesting things about the equipment of the phalangites. So you don't assist the opinion that the phalangites of the 3rd/ 2nd c. were more heavily armoured than their predecessors? Some argue that the phalanx was more clumsy than before. At Gaugamela the Pezhetairoi were able to wheel around partly and face a threat to their rear. The later phalanxes seem to be more fixed to one direction, being unable at Kynoskephalai to deal with the rear attack of some maniples. It is of course very problematic to make hypotheses based on single events.

[bovi]

You copy the text in question, paste it where you want, mark it and click the quote-button in the toolbar, it's right next to the picture button. If you want to have the name of the poster, change the beginning tag to [quote=postername].

[grudzio]

Not necessarily. After Magnesia he continued to fund Aitolia in its fight against Rome. Between that and the indemnity he may have felt a little crunch, but nothing so constricting as bankruptcy.

Ok. I change "was broke" to "had financial problems". I will try to be more precise in the future.

The reason for his looting of the temple in Susa was probably to fund a new eastern campaign against Parthia and Baktria after they revolted upon hearing the news of Magnesia.

Sad thing that such a great king had such an ending - died while looting a temple.

[larsbecks]

Has anyone tried playing with two turn build times for units? I'm trying that right now along with very expensive merc units.

[econ21]

If you want battles to be more decisive, you can try the unofficial money/merc modifications, a lot of people are very satisfied with those.

Does anyone have a link to these?

[Tellos Athenaios]

You'll find plenty of 'em in the EB unofficial mods subforum. After all, they are...

[Tellos Athenaios]

Has anyone tried playing with two turn build times for units? I'm trying that right now along with very expensive merc units.

You know, on older versions of EB that sort of thing (multi-turn recruitment in general) actually existed for elites. Only the Elephants & ships retained it, AFAIK. Can't say I miss it with other units very much...

[Beefy187]

if your sick of war, try use force deplomacy and make them protectorate. I used it in my pontus campeign against the seleucids and we had a peace for about 2 years. If your powerful the peace should last longer.

[Pius Curus]

to Bovi

Where can I find this mod as you write?

"If you want battles to be more decisive, you can try the unofficial money/merc modifications, a lot of people are very satisfied with those."

Could you send me the prolink to this mod?

[bovi]

Take a look at the unofficial mods subforum. You won't have to search very long.

Edit: What's a prolink?

[Tellos Athenaios]

I suspect a "Prolink" should be read as "hyperlink" - "proxy" seems somewhat unlikely.

Apart from that: funny thing, reading. Really is.

[helenos aiakides]

I wqs going to chip in this thread but I would be way out of my depth

[abou]

What are the legions of the allies composed of? Or do you mean the alae?

You wouldn't think it, but mostly they are equipped the same as the native Roman legions. A certain percentage though are equipped as Extraordinarii. Can't remember off hand, but I'm sure if one of the Roman guys showed up they could tell you.

3. The pursuit of the phalangites was of course not only done by the heavy infantry. The Romans had a lot light troops nearby which did not hide behind the heavy infantry like their Greek counterparts, but bombed the elephants into rout and harrassed the phalanx. There was also cavalry left, I think.

That's great except that there would only be a fraction of Velites compared to the phalanx and the cavalry would be frightened by the elephants. Plus, I think you're overestimating the frequency of a victorious army to slaughter a fleeing enemy. It really didn't happen all that much in large, massive battles. And by all indications of the Roman army actions afterward and further reading of the ancient authors it didn't really seem like there was this great slaughter that Livy wrote about.

But man, I feel like the Professor in that episode of Futurama: "Professor. Lava. Hot!"

Seleukos. Fortress. Garrison!

I'm not at all a fan of the Romans. But it is a fact that the Roman militia armies beat the regular armies of the Hellenistic states.

A fact yes, but it wouldn't exactly be fair to say that without detailed study of those battles.

6. You said some interesting things about the equipment of the phalangites. So you don't assist the opinion that the phalangites of the 3rd/ 2nd c. were more heavily armoured than their predecessors? Some argue that the phalanx was more clumsy than before. At Gaugamela the Pezhetairoi were able to wheel around partly and face a threat to their rear. The later phalanxes seem to be more fixed to one direction, being unable at Kynoskephalai to deal with the rear attack of some maniples. It is of course very problematic to make hypotheses based on single events.

I was actually talking about this a while ago with Paullus and Krusader and we're both agreed that if anything the phalanx increased in skill (at least for a short time in the Makedonian and Ptolemaic army although that is complicated). Even as late as the Jewish rebellions the Seleukid phalanx is performing complex maneuvers that we didn't see during Alexander. As far as equipment goes that is hard to say. I would let one of our equipment experts talk about that.

[Shigawire]

Perhaps this thread has been derailed from its intended topic?

There's a lot of historical analysis of the tiny minutiae of the battles of the Seleukid empire, but little discussion about how battles could be made more decisive in the game. If indeed this would be a valid thing to do. Etc.

[MarcusAureliusAntoninus]

I've found that if you attack the enemy before they attack you, take just one or two cities and kill the majority of their army in the region, they will come to you wanting a ceise-fire. If you accept (even though you will usually have to give up on taking one of their cities, mid-siege), their 'hate-gadge' will reset to zero. Then when you start the war again, you can do the same and fight your wars in stages. Of course, this doesn't work if they attacked you or they have no other enemies. Battles seem more desicive this way.

[Morte66]

Perhaps this thread has been derailed from its intended topic?

There's a lot of historical analysis of the tiny minutiae of the battles of the Seleukid empire, but little discussion about how battles could be made more decisive in the game. If indeed this would be a valid thing to do. Etc.

I think it's about money. The AI factions approach unlimited money for practical purposes, i.e their unit building is limited by how many barracks they have not by what they can pay for. Once you get into a real war with them, they can and frequently will build one unit per city per turn in the war zone. Oh, and they'll hire mercs too. If you conquer Rome over ten years, you'll fight more troops than their entire starting population whilst thinking "this is silly" every half an hour.

So the sensible thing to do is to conquer them quickly, giving them the minimum time to build units. You want to go from not fighting Rome at all to a massive invasion and conquest of Rome at breakneck speed. Then ideally you take several years to thoroughly consolidate your new lands, freeing up your field/siege armies from population control. Then do it all to again to somebody else several years later. So you advance across the map in spurts, not a steady trickle.

Of course this is not always possible in practice, but the closer you can get the better. You can sometimes get clever about it. E.g. the AI basically won't make peace when it has a land frontier; so if your land frontier is one province that's hard to hold, sell it to the Ptolemies then send your best diplomat up to a lowly Roman captain asking for a ceasefire. At least find defensible chokepoints on the map and conquer up to those, giving you a chance to consolidate behind them.

So, I don't think you can make individual battles more decisive, RTW diplomacy and EB finances/recruiting don't work that way. But there is some hope of making your wars more decisive. Try to only start wars you can finish. Try to avoid others starting wars by not putting weak armies/garrisons near their strong ones (the AI can't resist).