Reasons for joining

[Didz]

British army were all volenteers?

When did the medieval style of forcing people into the ranks stop?

(plz dont say it went out with the medieval period, explanation or a least a little plz ...)

I think others have already answered this question in part, but to be more specific. I would say that the biggest two events which changed the relationship in England between the people who raised the armies and those who were needed to fight in them were:

a) The Black Death (1347)
and
b) The Peasant Revolt (1381)

Although both were linked, in that the later was caused primarily by the attempts of the English nobility to retain (or reinstate) the concepts of feudal servitude that which had been rendered unworkable by the losses suffered during the former.

Prior to these events peasant labour was largely tied to the land owned by a specific noble, who in turn could demand military service from you when required. This could still be considered a form of contractual volunteering, in that the peasant knew the score when he accepted the land, but it did not require persuasion to obtain his service, and he could be punished for not complying.

This system was still in use in Scotland at the time of the 1745 rebellion as part of clan hierarchy and presumably died when the clans were subjugated. Not sure when it ended in Ireland, probably after Cromwell's invasion in the 17th Century.

After the Black Death and the peasant revolt labour in England became far more mobile and based upon wages and benefits rather than land allocations. Therefore, those raising armies found it difficult, if not impossible to insist on military service as a consequence of providing land, and the need to attract volunteers by propaganda and financial incentive became a necessary process.

I would have thought that similar changes occurred right across Europe at this time as most trading countries were affected in the same way.

[Furious Mental]

Those who owed military obligations based on land tenure- knights and sergeants- were not serfs. That system of military obligations- feudalism- was on the way out when the Black Death happened because it was already well known to be unworkable by that stage, and far inferior to using contracts of indenture.

What the Black Death really spelled the end for was manorialism, and the Peasant Revolt was one event in the long process by which it decayed.

[Didz]

@Furious Metal
Well you obviously know more about it than I do, but hopefully we have given K Cossack an answer to his question.

[Boyar Son]

[QUOTE=Furious Mental]Those who owed military obligations based on land tenure- knights and sergeants- were not serfs. QUOTE]

Thank you both for answering, knights owed the obligation, but I think the sergeant were the sign up soldiers, like todays style of wanting a soldier career.

[Furious Mental]

I don't know much about military obligation in countries other than England. But in the context of English history a sergeantry is a military obligation related to land tenure, like a knighthood but with a lesser property interest and consequently less onerous obligations (i.e. sergeants were not as well off and didn't have to serve as fully equipped mounted men-at-arms). Someone who lived solely off fighting wars and had no other source of income (knights and sergeants had land or a financial interest in land like a money fief) was a mercenary. Some people also took time out of their normal occupation to fight in wars voluntarily especially in the later Middle Ages but they are generally referred to as contract soldiers or indentured retainers.

[Didz]

I believe there was a class of Knight which had no land and who lived entirely off of the proceeds of his martial skills. I think they were dubbed Knight-Errant, and frequently served a Landed-Knight as a sort of goffer, or champion in return for bed and board.

[Boyar Son]

I believe there was a class of Knight which had no land and who lived entirely off of the proceeds of his martial skills. I think they were dubbed Knight-Errant, and frequently served a Landed-Knight as a sort of goffer, or champion in return for bed and board.

Complicated eh?

why'd they move to armies that they know would be dominated by heavy cav (nobles, not to mention killing them off) instead of following Romes example.

Jeez poorly trained militia armies are overrated and they shouldve known this, and tried to train their troops to become professionals, like Romans.

the nobles can read, they can read history.....

[Furious Mental]

Money and power in medieval Europe was concentrated in the feudal military class. There was generally no government large and organised enough to maintain an army of professional foot soldiers like Rome's.

[Didz]

And that money and power was essentially dependant upon ownership of land. The more land you owned the more money you could make, the more men you had dependant upon you and so the more power you had. Therefore, the main focus was on the protection and working of your personal estates and on the acquisition of more of the overall pie. Spending money on maintaining a large standing army was a waste of money unless you were actually fighting a war in which case the best source of trained and battle hardened troops was always going to be the professional mercenary companies that sold their services to the highest bidder.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Some good points made above.

The English armies recruited fairly well among the Irish and Scots. Small plots of land, little opportunity, being the 3rd or 4th son and likely to inherit only a kind blessing could all make the army a financially attractive alternative. "Married to Brown Bess" was thought to be better than no money (and hence no hope of marriage, little hope of conjugal experience, no chance to "get ahead" etc.).

Yes, some recruiters took advantage of their potential recruits up to the level of what would, today, be labeled as fraud. Desertion wasn't much of a problem for the real thieves, however, since they simply failed to report the absence and pocketed the pay for that soldier. Some countries, for example the Republic of Venice, had entire regiments that existed only on a pay chart.

Another component was the desire to "see the elephant." A person who stayed in the village could expect to live the entirety of their lives in one 15 mile circle. Most of their days would be filled with hard work. EVERY year could be expected to follow virtually the same pattern as the last with only personal tragedies and natural disasters to "enliven" things. Add in being a teenager and how likely is "staying" to be the popular option?

"Seeing the elephant" also involved a quest to see if you could measure up. That part of the recruiter's appeal is still a primary psychological component of recruiting today.

[TinCow]

Another component was the desire to "see the elephant." A person who stayed in the village could expect to live the entirety of their lives in one 15 mile circle. Most of their days would be filled with hard work. EVERY year could be expected to follow virtually the same pattern as the last with only personal tragedies and natural disasters to "enliven" things. Add in being a teenager and how likely is "staying" to be the popular option?

"Seeing the elephant" also involved a quest to see if you could measure up. That part of the recruiter's appeal is still a primary psychological component of recruiting today.

If I remember correctly, there is a relatively decent portrayal of exactly this thing in Barry Lyndon (Kubrick film, not the book). Offer the local peasant boys a few coins that amount to more money than they'd normally see in a year, tack on some quips about seeing the world, and do it all while looking grand in a full dress uniform. They sign on the dotted line and only discover the less pleasant reality when it's too late.

[Watchman]

As an aside, militias actually work pretty well if they're well-trained and motivated. Just ask the Northern Italian communes or the Scandinavians, who both waged their Medieval wars to a large degree with infantry militias (if only because neither had much of a feudal warrior aristocracy to draw on). Or the urbanized Low Countries or the Swiss Cantons, whose militia armies shattered feudal war-hosts often enough. (That this also created a demand for them as mercenaries, ie. professional soldiers, abroad is besides the point; younger sons of the nobility, who didn't inherit estates, similarly tended to go around in search of a war to earn a living with their skills with.)

Given the general poverty of the common populace, nevermind now random disasters like crop failures, wars, bandits and any number of other calamities (not to forget any personal issues, such as legal difficulties, forcing an individual to leave their homes), joining an army in return of a reasonably regular pay and meals also had its attractions. Indeed in regions where military service was an obligation it was pretty much the norm for a paid substitute to be a perfectly acceptable replacement - after all, the important thing was getting an able-bodied man in the ranks, not his specific identity.

Heck, in the 1745 Scottish uprising hired substitutes were common enough in the rebel army that the British authorities treated them as a distinct group after the fact (the other two being people pressed to service under duress, typically by clan headmen, and genuine rebels).

And in a war zone people often joined armies in some capacity simply because it tended to be far safer to be in one, where you were surrounded by a lot of basically friendly armed people, than be outside one, at the mercy of the blasted ironclad locust hordes ravaging the countryside.

All in all, most folks volunteered into the ranks simply as a means of making a living. You more likely than not did not live to an old age obviously (which rather contributed to the general rapaciousness of soldiery - they were quite literally living like each day might be their last), but starving to death kinda sucked too. And if you were talented and lucky, you might actually manage to pull off a major social rise through the career - some quite low-born men ended up created nobility that way, and bona fide aristocrats sometimes came out with considerable additions to their personal fortunes and/or estates.

And of course many simply did not have a choice, save for running off into the wilderness to avoid the authorities or finding someone else to go in their stead - many Early Modern states realized right quick drafted conscripts worked well enough in armies based on linear tactics and firepower, and proceeded to create thorough and efficient bureaucracies to be able to tap that manpower pool. Much of the basis of modern "Westphalian" state systems was originally created to meet the resource needs of the Thirty Years' War participants, particularly the poorer ones like Sweden (Brandenburg, later better known as Prussia, would soon after start seriously pushing the envelope in this regard), which had to make the utmost of what little they had if they were to get something done. Others, like Russia, pretty much just handed their feudal landowners manpower quotas - unsurprisingly the lords then sent the crap bottom of their serfs, the men they could easiest afford to lose (the families of the conscripts in fact held funeral rites for them and in most respects regarded them as already dead - few ever came home alive from the twenty-plus year stint in the Early Modern Czarist Russian military).

[Boyar Son]

Watchman your back.

Also, those troops you mentioned, viking fighting wars were practicaly part of their religion. as for Italian states I dont know why exactly why their militias were renowned for their skills.

And swiss militia armies trained to serve in pike formations( which did require training), a tactic not yet fully used in europe for a while, thus other poorly trained militia not knowing how to beat them.

[Watchman]

Religion my foot. It was loot and fame the Vikings were after (the term specifically refers to raiding and piracy after all). Some of the earlier German peoples in Germany proper had apparently had funny laws about men not being regarded as full adults before they had slain an enemy in battle - pugnacious tribal peoples everywhere have often had such ideas AFAIK - but the Viking Age Scandinavians were a bit more sophisticated.

I don't really see what prehistoric tribal warrior societies have to do with the topic at hand though - in those the norm was that every free man doubled as a warrior period, if he was to remain a respected and full-fledged member of the community.

as for Italian states I dont know why exactly why their militias were renowned for their skills.

Regular training, good espirit de corps (hailing from the same city, if not quarter, helped) and confidence, simple but well-thought tactics; those go a long way to making an effective battle formation. IIRC most of the time the system ran on the standard militia pattern - citizens were expected to serve in military functions according to their means, or pay for a comparably equipped able-bodied man to go in their stead. Not actually too different from the feudal call-ups (as you were fined if your gear did not pass the muster - royal decrees could go into quite exacting levels of detail regarding the equipement and other requirements of the feudal levies) actually; one main difference was just that the Italian communal troops drilled regularly.

And swiss militia armies trained to serve in pike formations( which did require training), a tactic not yet fully used in europe for a while, thus other poorly trained militia not knowing how to beat them.

"Poorly trained militia" ? Where ? The Swiss started out gutting the feudal chivalry of Austria and went on to demolish the Burgundian army, one of the finest, best organized and most professional in Europe, beyond recovery. Around that time the uselessness of ill-trained levies was generally recognized, and armies used more-or-less permanently employed mercenaries and well-trained levies and feudal troops - on the whole they were rather organized and professional outfits, not in the least because any that weren't had a tendency to get trod on by their neighbours.

[Boyar Son]

But you do know vikings "militia" were warriors through and through?

Pooly trained militia? why the one most of europe has.

The Swiss started out gutting the feudal chivalry of Austria and went on to demolish the Burgundian army, one of the finest, best organized and most professional in Europe, beyond recovery

well-trained levies and feudal troops - on the whole they were rather organized and professional outfits, not in the least because any that weren't had a tendency to get trod on by their neighbours.

Finest and organized Burgundian armies were known for orginization and "look professional" type soldiers. I'm sure the swiss beat these "tendency to get trod on by their neighbours" troops. Face it they were militia according to your post.

[Watchman]

...do you guys actually know anything about this stuff, I wonder ?

The Vikings were using an essentially unchanged descendant of the old Germanic tribal-warfare system. They had a bunch of nobles and chieftains who diverted part of their wealth and income to maintain a cadre of full-time household troops/armed retainers, which formed the hard core for the main body of the freeman levy. It was the right and obligation of every able-bodied man of any means to own a basic set of weapons and be skilled in their use - indeed, anyone who failed to do so probably lost his right to speak up and vote in the communal gatherings and generally suffered a loss of status in the eyes of his peers, nevermind now being obviously quite vulnerable given the amount of small-scale raiding and internal squabbling the society was rife with.

Typically of such military-backbone levies, they also drilled unit tactics (chiefly the shieldwall with its varioous permutations) to improve their battlefield effectiveness and survivability; this apparently in fact persisted long into the Middle Ages, for the simple reason the poor and forested Scandinavian countries could not support great numbers of the rather expensive feudal troops. This forced the armies to rely fairly heavily on the mass of the peasant levy, and thus the authorities did their best to ensure it would be decently trained and equipped. They had to, if they were to have a fighting force worth speaking of.

Side effects of this included the utter absence of serfdom in the region and the relatively high political influence of the peasantry, due to their military importance and the implicit threat their comparatively high battlefield competence added to the prospect of an uprising. Indeed the closest Sweden came to introducing serfdom was in the late 1600s, as a late example of the wave of so-called "neo-feudalization" sweeping over Europe - although in the end the peasants' petition to the King "to not reduce them to thralldom" won.

In most other parts of Europe the aftermath of the collapse of the Carolingian system and the triple threat of mobile infidel raiders (Vikings along the coasts and rivers, Hungarians in Central Europe and Germany, Moors and Arabs in the south) conversely led to the developement of the decentralized "low" feudalism characteristic of much of the Middle Ages, where the local barons were given high degree of autonomy in return of developing and maintaining networks of fortifications for territorial control and defense on one side and squadrons of mobile strike forces (ie. heavy cavalry) to contain and deal with the raiders, and for that matter any other aggressors. This obviously made them minor kings in all but name only, and more often than not their nominal feudal superiors found them utterly intractable if they felt like it - the kings would spend a few centuries trying to re-establish central authority over these autonomous warlords, in some cases never succeeding.

In any case this led to a general decline in the quality of the commoner infantry levy which had formed the hard core of Carolingian armies, in favour of the mobile and hard-hitting but expensive and politically problematic feudal heavy cavalry, which in turn led to the great dominance of the cavalry on the battlefield in much of Europe for the Early and High Middle Ages. On the other hand where the feudal arrangement could not for one reason or another become the forefront system of raising armies the commoner levy tended to remain quite capable out of necessity, to the degree where it became sought after as mercenaries in the more feudalized parts which still needed dependable infantry for various purposes but could not raise it domestically. The feudal chivalry, used to low-quality infantry, also often received some rather rude and bloody surprises when it went against the tougher footsloggers of such regions.

The feudal war-hosts had some rather acute shortcomings in the command-and-control and professionalism departements, painfully well illustrated by the famous French defeats in the Hundred Years' War. This and the general trend towards increasingly capable infantry and the use of professional mercenaries (eg. the condottieri in Italy) was one major reason to the alterations effected to the feudal military system, such as the French Ordonnances which re-established the man-at-arms as one of the decisive battlefield weapons of the age. Long story short these revolved around organizing the feudal and mercenary chivalry and their assorted tactical auxiliaries into relatively permanent, salaried formations which underwent regular drill and practice to forge them into cohesive combat units. Even above and beyond the reformed French royal army the Burgundians under Charles the Bold became masters of this next-generation Medieval warfare; this did not keep the Swiss from obliterating the Burgundian army and slaying the Duke himself at Nancy in 1477 though, but then again their reputation as (some of) the best infantry in Europe was quite well deserved.

[Boyar Son]

Um...thanks.

Question:

were the french in control of burgundy when they made their reforms.

Did you understand what I typed in bold? I meant: you said burgundy was well organized, but it did not matter that they were still "trodded" on for their lack of skill. Just wanted to point that out as I found it difficult to put it into words.

In yur posts, these "militia" were skilled and had to be skilled in warfare, so much so that they can be equal to proffesionals in the art of combat.

[Watchman]

...what you typed in bold there sort of seems like a direct quote of my earlier post you know... I certainly understood that, but I will freely admit I had great difficulties understanding the rest.

Anyway.

There's a difference between professionalism and a professional. Any mercenary was certainly a professional soldier, but that didn't by itself mean a bunch of them would automatically display great professionalism - if you see what I mean.

Well-trained and motivated militias using sound tactics were, in any case, long easily enough the match for even the best full-time soldiery, nevermind now the often somewhat amateurish feudal warrior aristocracy (the often quite fearsome individual combat skill of the latter nonwithstanding).

Burgundy was one of those aforementioned feudal barony thingies (duchy more specifically); the Duke was probably theoretically a vassal of the French king (or the Holy Roman Emperor), but frankly I haven't dwelt too much into the early history of the place. Seems to have been typically complicated. Anyway, it was very much an independent statelet when its army underwent the reforms - and indeed France was one of its major opponents.

[Boyar Son]

Also you said European nations would hire mercanaries in their army. Is it implied that there a great number of mercanary troops?

Like, of an army of 15,000, the general would hire 5,000+ troops. Almost like carthage.

[Watchman]

During the heyday of the condottieri many Italian powers did their wars more or less entirely through mercenaries. And armies of out-of-work mercs were a severe problem for law, order and pretty much everything else in northern France during the lulls of the Hundred Years' War - some of them went to Italy or other places to find work, others just turned to banditry. At worst cases there were veritable armies of such marauders making life miserable for everyone and requiring full-blown military campaigns to get rid of.

As a rule of thumb, everyone who could afford it augmented his other forces with as many mercenaries as he could afford, especially if they had competences the local troops were deficient in. You can't have too many advantages in a war after all. In other locales the kings and generals by and large had to do without, simply because they lacked the solvency to hire outsiders to take part in their wars - although you could also try to make like William the Conqueror and offer the hired warriors estates in the lands to be conquered (which also did wonders to their motivation), if your planned campaign was like that.

In other words, varied like Hell. We're talking about an entire subcontinent of very diverse local conditions here, for a timespan of some five hundred years - hard to say anything too specific about that kind of coverage.

Americans are probably familiar with the somewhat peculiar phenomenom of state mercenaries, regular army soldiery hired out by their ruler - the Hessians of the American Revolution fame were this sort, sent over by the Prince of Hessen due to dynastic ties with the British royalty and good old cash payments. Not a common practice, but that probably wasn't the sole example either.

[AntiochusIII]

K COSSACK: Burgundy was for intents and purposes another state of its own with a very good potential to develop into an early modern "nation" (to use a loose term). That it did not happen was by pure, sad luck :/

The Dukes of Burgundy were technically vassals of both the French King and the Holy Roman Emperor (Feudalism is a complicated thing); but Philip the Good didn't call himself the Grand Duke of the West for no apparent reason. He was the most powerful "Duke" in the whole area almost comparable to any kings and he was building his own power base distinct from his French roots. If one wonders what this man, whose modern fame came mostly from the deposition of Joan of Arc (a minor act he probably didn't care much about anyway), was doing the whole late Hundred Years' War, let's just say he wasn't being a subordinate English ally the whole bloody time. At one point the Burgundians came close to uniting the whole of the Low Countries -- very rich region with a good reservoir of local manpower, as Watchman states -- under their own dynastic holdings. Philip petitioned twice, though not with much expectations, to the Holy Roman Emperor be crowned "King of Lotharingia" (one of the three ancient "states" that followed the fall of the Carolingian Empire, and the first to fall; the other two became France and the Holy Roman Empire respectively) if only to make his de facto freedom from France de jure.

Charles the Bold, his son, went on a rampage when he came to rule. The Swiss, alongside the Holy Roman Empire, France, and everyone who had a reason to fear an expansionist Burgundy, slain him in battle however.

The "Fall" of Burgundy was actually not really a fall as much as that it passed on to the Habsburgs by a fortunate marriage alliance. Charles the Bold's death left his daughter Mary in a very precarious position of controlling a rebellious country (the Low Countries cities weren't very fond of their Dukes -- though ironically they came to be rather fond of Mary after she acceded to their demands; the "poor exploited duchess; she's on our side against the German/French oppressors!" attitude) besieged by France and the Holy Roman Empire. She couldn't survive on her own and needed allies though, so it became a contest of the King and the Emperor to see whose son gets the very impressive dowry of her marriage, though Louis' aggressiveness caused the Habsburgs to win out.

In fact a rather stretched comparison would be to look at the rise of the later Dutch state and the power it reached. Burgundy had the potential for that so to speak. That the Habsburgs instead concentrated on Spain, a world power that also fell into their hands by an equally fortunate marriage alliance, and Germany, and regarded the formerly Burgundian Low Countries as a big freebie to be exploited isn't the fault of the locals really.

Just how far Burgundy came to being a distinct state from France could be shown by the continuous wars between the two; though liege-vassal squabbles are the norm in Medieval Europe the level of warfare between these two are for all intents and purposes wars between two states.

"Poorly trained militia" didn't make for an army of a state which resisted and even aggressively expanded in the face of two hostile major European powers of the time.

On topic:

K COSSACK, don't underestimate late Medieval European military I say! Although about your last question, it really is varied. For example Muscovy as late as the High Renaissances were employing massed German regiments in their armies, and the armies of the various Italian states are very mercenary by nature; but Spain had pretty much comfortably relied on its own manpower to man its mighty Tercio ranks.

[Boyar Son]

Actually I underestimate militia armies of early europe. Foolish kings, the proof lies at the 100 years war.

[AntiochusIII]

Actually I underestimate militia armies of early europe. Foolish kings, the proof lies at the 100 years war.

What do you mean by that?

[Boyar Son]

I mean, militia armies are very foolish to have. In the 100 years war, the English army were more profesional methinks, while the French still had their old militia with knights. France was defeated several times because of this.

[Watchman]

Uh... no. For most of the HYW the French military relied on the feudal levy, primarily the knights and their retainers and tactical auxiliaries with the poor-quality commoners for (questionable) support. That one was very much a case in point of the post-Carolingian decline in the quality of the peasant infantry and the dominance of the feudal cavalryman (and his sub-feoffed auxiliaries).

Conversely the English kings waged their continental wars with basically paid armies hired from their domestic feudal warrior aristocracy and the freeholder yeomanry (who supplied the archers); a much better organized and controllable bunch, and rather more professional on the whole.

Both, of course, added as many mercenaries of diverse competences as they could get.

That's a bit oversimplified take of it (for example the English recruitement arrangement was rather more complicated), but covers the basics. The basic amateurism of the feudal war-host was and its resultant tactical clumsiness were a recurring problem for the French - their most famous defeats were more or less directly the result of just that. In smaller engagements, where competent commanders weren't overruled by social superiors and the feudal squadrons were more in their element (they only became unmanageable when large numbers were massed into one army), they actually did fairly well overall.

[AntiochusIII]

I mean, militia armies are very foolish to have. In the 100 years war, the English army were more profesional methinks, while the French still had their old militia with knights. France was defeated several times because of this.

Okay, what?

If the French were as weak as you indicated, and the English as incomparably competent, how is it a Hundred Years' War? It would've been ten years at best and Edward III would be the King from Paris to Toulon.

No, it had many tides and turns and much more than that. We here only hear about the great English victories Sluys, Poitou, and Agincourt. We never hear about the resistance given by Charles V and du Guesclin and the like and the bloody nose they gave the English in their times.

In fact the English yeomanry that made up the "definitive" part of the army could be seen as an expression of an effective militia, whereas France had the advantage of the number of Knights on their side.

The so-called weakness of French infantry, if it existed before, had been essentially countered by Charles VII's Ordinances which reformed the French men-at-arms and laid the foundation of what would later become the most powerful army in Europe.

The Hundred Years' War was not a demonstration of militia losing to whatever the English had, it was a demonstration of knights, heavy armored shock cavalry, losing if not used properly. The limitations of the heavy cavalry -- known since ancient times -- had been ignored by the arrogant French aristocrats. And they paid the price for it.

Moreover there are counter examples aplenty in Medieval Europe and Early Renaissances that demonstrated what good infantry could do in the battlefield -- including militia. The Low Countries for very long resisted the incursions of many an aristocrat and they enjoyed correspondingly much greater freedom than their contemporaries in the serfdom of the French and German countryside. Frederick Barbarossa, one of the most powerful European rulers of his time, had great troubles subduing the Italian city-states of Northern Italy: in fact the Lombard League, an alliance of said cities, which used mainly militia augmented by mercenaries and Papal reinforcements, eventually defeated him in a climactic battle.

Simply put, it really comes down to where your priority is. In Medieval Europe in general the Cavalry dominated because of various factors, and many of them not exactly military; the warrior aristocracy was after all the governing class of most of Europe and disdained the infantry almost by default. In places where there are more cities and/or the aristocracy were not as strong effective militia was often a given as was needed for self-defense.

[Watchman]

Mind you, whenever a town managed to buy itself a Freiburg status from whatever baron it was originally the fief of, the next two things they invariably did were forming a decent militia (if they didn't have one already - towns and such were required to provide troops as a feudal obligation as well, so there usually was that to build on) and build as good walls as they could afford.
Just in the case the baron, or some other baron, or the next town over trying to do something about competition, tried to mess with the arrangement later.

[Boyar Son]

It would've been ten years at best and Edward III would be the King from Paris to Toulon

Why are you arguing with common fact? their own people called it the 100 years war.....c'mon.....

also, knights of france didnt obey their king much during agincourt, and we know what happens next....

it shows no training such as militia are no good. PERIOD.

[Watchman]

"Hundred Years' War" is a rather later term, in the same fashion as the Great War only became the First World War after there had been a Second one. For the contemporaries experiencing it it was just yet another series of dynastic struggles, what now one with some novel elements; it could only be recognized as a distinct watershed period ex post facto.

it shows no training such as militia are no good. PERIOD.

While it is certainly true that "to lead untrained people to war is to throw them away", I fail to see where you get this equation "militia = no training" from. First off the knights and other feudal warriors trained quite expensively; the problem was they did so individually and in small units, not as large formations and armies. Second, good militia troops trained regularly (it often being required by law, on the pain of fines at the least) and could duly put up a solid show in battle - and as they were practically invariably formed on communal basis, the men knew each other and trained together becoming a cohesive combat unit.

[Furious Mental]

In the 14th century most of the "English" soldiers were actually French, in particular Gascon. Only major expeditionary armies raised in England actually consisted chiefly of English soldiers raised by contracts of indenture. Most of the fighting was done by companies and retinues hired (if they were hired at all) on an extremely ad hoc basis.