This is a tough one, as the written history of this great subject is tainted with much 'coloring', so to speak.

I want to state that I have no predilection of Sweden over Poland/Lithuania, nor do I have an agenda; I just feel that the great Swedish monarch Gustaf II Adolf (Gustavus Adolphus) was one of history's greatest figures. But in this conflict he was not the outright winner, at least militarily. Let us take a look.

"Here strive God and the devil. If you hold with God, come over to me. If you prefer the devil, you will have to fight me first."



Gustavus Adolphus.

We do have a problem, one within the bounds of historical tradition, regarding the wars waged by Gustavus Adolphus (Gustaf II Adolf) against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from 1617-1629: the acute details of this war are indeed very nebulous. History is based on both truth and deception, and certainly colored by nationalism. But I will never believe that events can be thoroughly concocted. The war ended in a Swedish victory, but one of a political and economic nature, not a military one; tactical successes offset one another, and attrition bogged things down miserably. Thus it's easy for both sides to claim and denounce things, as nothing was inexorably decisive.

Sweden indeed had a standing army by the mid 1620s, but its population was possibly a fifth of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Among other things, Gustavus gave war a new look by altering the tactical doctrine of his cavalry. Whether his new cuirassiers galloped or sped at a trot (they perhaps galloped then trotted upon impact, as formation is more easily maintained at a trot), they achieved success when charging home, firing their pistols in a tight formation with cold steel, supported by infantry fire. In essence, they were often an effective battering ram. Swedish discipline became exemplary, religious duties strictly observed, and crime virtually non-existent. Gustavus Adolphus' actions during the Thirty Years War determined the political and religious balance of power in most of Europe at this time.

Before 1626, Gustavus' army was still basically, as he put it,

"My troops are poor Swedish and Finnish peasant followers, it's true, rude and ill-dressed; but they smile hard and they shall soon have better clothes."

Gustavus' army became a paradigm of one element from the classic military Byzantine manual, the Strategikon, written, according to tradition, by the emperor-general Flavius Maurikios Tiberius,

"Constant drill is of the greatest value to the soldier."

Gustavus formed military tactics centered around increased firepower, including mobile field artillery. His army was in peak form by 1631, and his system of cavalry charges, influenced by the Poles, initiated with pistol fire, integrated with infantry (pike and shot) and field artillery, supporting each other in self-sustaining combat groups, was the first time this had ever been seen in modern warfare. Much like Philip II of Macedon and Chinggis Khan in their day, Gustavus was a great forger of an army for his time. But perhaps more than any other great commander of history, his reforms touched on every area of military science, including the administrative and logistic branches.

But a topic of Gustavus' reforms must include the influence impressed upon him by the great Maurice of Nassau: the brilliant Dutch innovator and his staff created a military system of drill to train officers and soldiers, and began to move away from the dense column of the omnipotent tercio, developing a more extended and elastic formation. He equipped his cavalry with pistols and began to concentrate artillery pieces in batteries. Moreover, Maurice put supply, training, and pay on a regular basis. The tercio, an innovation for its time, was restructured to be smaller after the Battle of Rocroi in 1643, in which the stout tercios were blasted away by the maneuverability and superior firepower of Louis II de Bourbon (the Great Conde). But it was Maurice at Nieuwpoort (1600), then Gustavus at Breitenfeld (1631), who presaged that doom. Basically, Gustavus refined what Maurice did to a broader scale.

But things take time, and not without trial and error; Amrogio Spinola, another brilliant leader of this age, reversed this innovative trend for a while against the Dutch, and the Swedes, sans Gustavus, suffered a defeat at Nordlingen in 1634 against an army with the Spanish tercio on hand. But Johan Baner won victories thereafter.

The Swedish disasters at the hands of the Poles/Lithuanians at Kircholm (modern Salaspils, about twelve miles SE of Riga) and Klushino (Kluszyn) were in the past, and Gustavus would not let that happen again; no Swedish force would ever again be fooled by a feint to pull them out of a strong position (at least under him); his earthworks were not to 'hide' behind, in my opinion, but to provide security to fall back on if things went awry. This was sound war-making. It is opined by some that he waltzed into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth while their backs were turned, and easily captured towns to set up his entrenchments. But I am inclined to think the Baltic ports of Pilawa (Pilau) and Konigsberg (modern Kaliningrad) could not have been vulnerable to the degree it was child's play for the Swedes to take them, and there was also much diplomacy involved. They probably were defended by the trace italienne system. The town of Zamosc, for example, though further to the SE, saw the construction of new walls and seven bastions by 1602. But it seems quite accurate the Swedish onslaught in the 1620s initially made good progress because of an overall vulnerable scenario of the enemy. Dr. Geoffrey Parker, an expert on the Thirty Years War, wrote in his The Military Revolution, Pg 37,

"...Several outraged books and pamphlets were promptly written by Polish propagandists, excoriating the invaders for their 'unchivalrous deceit' in raising ramparts around their camps 'as though they needed a grave-digger's courage to conceal themselves', and deploring their painstaking siege techniques as kreta robota ('mole's work)'. But, mole's work or not, Crown Prince Wladislaw was immediately dispatched to the Netherlands to learn about these deceitful tactics at first hand. he was followed by Polish engineers, such as Adam Freitag who, in 1631, published at Leiden an international classic on developments in military fortification..."

This is from Richard Brzezinski, an authority on this chapter of history, who wrote a book on the Polish Hussars (possible red flag: Osprey Publishing),

"...if you take an UNBIASED (as in non-patriotic) view of Polish-Swedish actions from 1622 onwards through to the Great Northern War they are characterised by a consistent reluctance of the Poles to charge when the Swedish cavalry is deployed in formal battle-order backed by their infantry and artillery firepower. Take away the fire support, and the hussars are far less hesistant, and generally victorious..."

That may not be completely true, as some husaria did penetrate Swedish musketry formations at the battle of Mitawa (Mitau, modern Jelgava) in 1622, and again at Gorzno (Gurzno) in 1629 - but only initially; the threats were quickly closed. Excellent details are provided by experts on Zagloba's Tavern. Radoslaw Sikora, who denounces Brzezinski, and is a prime source for this topic, is working to right what he thinks are wrongs etc. He provides figures from the Polish army register, and Daniel Staberg, the Swedish expert, gives figures from some battle draws by Gustavus himself. But Sikora writes something peculiar, on the topic of the Polish husaria fighting Swedish regiments of musketeers,

"...Unfortunately I noticed that this selective and partial treatment of primary sources appear in Richard Brzezinski's work quite often. It is most apparent in the quoted descriptions of the hussaria fighting against the Swedish army (Kokenhausen, Mitawa/Mitau or Tczew/Dirschau). Anyone who knows what truly happened there grabs his head when reading how these battles are used to support false thesis of alleged considerable efficiency of firearms of the Swedish cavalry against the husaria."

What truly happened? Well, I feel one can admire something without it being a vice of 'partiality'. The battle of Mitawa was fought before Gustavus' efficient reforms took significant effect. Poland ultimately lost this war (I would say more on a political than military scale), and the husaria never defeated Gustavus (his tactical rebuff at Trzciana, in which he charged into an unwinnable situation to protect his infantry, notwithstanding). Koknese was a Swedish victory, and Gustavus clearly overcame the husaria at Gniew (Mewe) and Tczew (Dirschau), via method. Sikora's opinion as to why the Sejm (Polish diet) acquiesced to favorable terms for Sweden in 1629, if they were not losing the military aspect of this war (as some Polish apologists believe) - one in which he compares the feeling of the people of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to that of the American people in regards to Vietnam (late 1960s/early 1970s) is incredulous. Perhaps I am misconstruing him, but Polish soldiers were fighting in their own land against an invader. I am the last poster who wishes to insult people, and Mr. Sikora, clearly a civil and intelligent man, is invaluable for providing much trivia for this period.

From a political standpoint, the death of Gustavus amid the fog at Lutzen, a month before his 38th birthday, was a disaster. Looking back, perhaps we can blame him for that element of his leadership of heroic self-indulgence. But his death removed the one man who seemingly was capable of imposing an end to the fighting. Instead, the Thirty Years War dragged on for sixteen more years, witnessing hellish circumstances of disorganized and impoverished conditions. As the Dutch philosopher Hugo Grotius, who paid much attention to the concept of 'humane' warfare, tells us,

"...I saw prevailing throughout Europe a licence in making war of which even barbarous nations would have been ashamed..."

Gustavus Adolphus' War in Livonia and Polish Prussia 1617-1629

I have done the best I can to present a balanced view of this conflict (I am still a student with opinions); modern works which are very helpful are from Michael Roberts, Robert I. Frost, Ulf Sundberg, Richard Brzezinski, Radoslaw Sikora and Daniel Staberg. This site is invaluable for our topic:

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/zaglobastavern/messages/1

The correspondence between Sikora and Staberg is exemplary, both for scholarship and amicableness.

Many of Gustavus' detractors (or some who are simply indifferent), perhaps mostly German and Polish Catholics etc., have the right to view him as a master propogandist. But in his mind he justified himself in terms of contemporary ideals, and plotted each move with the care of a diamond cutter. He was a champion of his cause, but dobtless a Realpolitiker as well. They all are!

The campaigns fought by Gustavus in Livonia and Polish Prussia between 1617 and 1629 receive comparitively little attention. This disappoints me, as the substantial military reforms of Gustavus were surely influenced by the fact that the superior Polish-Lithuanian cavalry, most notably the vaunted husaria (plural for hussar, or husarz), the crack heavy Polish cavalry, fighting with support from the medium/light cavalry, the Cossack (kozacy) horsemen (this name would be later changed to pancerni in 1648, to distinguish them from rebellious ethnic Cossacks), could not be beaten at this time in the early 17th century, at least in an open area, without utilizing combined arms and terrain not conducive to their style, which would diminish their ability to fight to the degree that ensured them victory. These great Polish cavalrymen were as light as most classified 'light' cavalrymen, but could strike in concentration with their 15 ft.+ lances at the gallop (perhaps longer, to outreach enemy pikes)! They could carry their charge through the enemy ranks. This tactical asset was one result of the organizing skills of Stefan Batory (d. 1586).

Gustavus never tactically overwhelmed the Poles, but he certainly got the better of them, except for one substantial time - when he was caught in a manner he painstakingly tried to avoid. It is not accurate, from my view, when claimed by some that he was 'crushed' by the Poles. But minor defeats of his cavalry, particularly units caught out in the open, by Polish cavalry are what affected some of his theories, reforms, and practices, which were realized throughout his later, more famous campaign.

Gustavus' father, duke Karl (Charles) IX of Sweden (king as of 1604), ousted Catholic officials, and repulsed an incursion into Sweden by Sigismund (Zygmunt) III at Stangebro (near modern Linkoping) in 1598. Sigismund III, officially crowned as the Swedish king in 1594, but reluctant to accept Protestantism as the state religion, desired to establish a permanent union between Sweden and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but instead created hostilities which led to intermittent war between the two nations lasting until 1721 (if we include up to the fall of Karl (Charles) XII). Charles was, however, unsuccessful when he invaded Livonia in 1600; his army was smashed by Jan Chodkiewicz's cavalry, of which about a third was the husaria, at Kircholm in 1605. Another army of 30,000 Muscovites under Dmitry Shuisky, supported by approx. 5,000 Swedish mercenaries (probably more so Scottish and German) under Jakob De la Gardie, was defeated five years later at Klushino by a much smaller Polish army, again with the ferocious husaria proving to be too strong. But Sweden's power was rising in the Baltic, as her fleet appeared outside Danzig (modern Gdansk) and Riga, capturing and searching ships trading with these prominent ports. Due to Danzig's neutral status at this time, the Swedes were able to provision their troops in Livonia from there. Aging and overwrought, Karl IX died in October, 1611, while war with Christian IV of Denmark, known as the Kalmar War, which broke out the previous April, was looking bad for Sweden. As a ruler, Karl IX, basically a practical man, was the link between his great father Gustavus Vasa and his even greater son. The Vasa kings in the 16th century laid the foundation of a national regular army. Gustavus perfected it.

At sixteen years of age, Gustavus Adolphus inherited the wars his father began, and only by exerting himself to the utmost was he able to achieve peaceful settlements with Denmark (Treaty of Knarod, January, 1613) and Russia (Treaty of Stolbova, February, 1617). He had to restrict himself due to the terms involving indemnity with Denmark, but his treaty with Russia altogether shut out Muscovy from the Baltic, and its trade became dependent on Sweden. It was clear that Gustavus would resolve to take up the struggle with the Poles in Livonia if necessary. The Sveriges Riksdag (Swedish parliament) consented to this in spite of financial concerns.

Hostilies had already begun in 1617, though a truce had been formally agreed upon in 1613 and prolonged for two years the following year. The king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Sigismund III, whose unwavering claims to the throne of Sweden (by birth he was united along the royal lines of the Vasa and Jagiello) would involve Poland in a whole series of unprofitable wars with Sweden spanning 6 decades, instructed his government to not renew the truce. The Swedes captured Pernau (modern Parnu), and by the autumn of 1618 Gustavus was willing to arrange an armistice, but Sigismund III rejected every proposal in that course, keeping unflinchingly to his claim to be acknowledged King of Sweden. Finally a truce was arranged on September 23, 1618, and Jan Chodkiewicz, who had conducted himself with such esteem on the Livonian front, was sent against the Ottoman threat from the south. The great Polish hetman died in September of 1621, amid his successful entrenched defense against the sultan Osman II's huge invading army, perhaps numbering 100,000, at Khotyn (Chocim), in the Ukraine. During this time the rivalry between Gustavus and Sigismund III transposed into a very different and higher plane.

Another blow for the Poles was the death of Jan Zamoyski in 1605. It had been the firm conviction of this great szlachcic and magnate that Poland could not achieve any long term success against Sweden without a navy. But his efforts to prevail upon Danzig (modern Gdansk) to produce a fleet were in vain, as the neutral city didn't want to displease the Swedish sovereign at the time (among other reasons).

A Protestant coalition, including the Dutch Republic, Lubeck (the anchor of the Hansaetic League), and Sweden, was formed amongst the Northern countries, while Sigismund III fixed his attention on the Hapsburg monarchy, a land power firmly Catholic in its policy. An 'eternal' alliance, very vague in principle, was concluded. Sigismund III now geared his thoughts to far-reaching plans for winning Sweden back (he always believed Sweden was rightly his). Attacking Gustavus by propaganda in his own kingdom, he endeavored, with the help of Spain and other external enemies of Sweden, to create a constant menace to his adversary. Gustavus proposed peace, including the right for Sigismund III to use the title 'King of Sweden', but this was rejected. Gustavus then obtained from the Sveriges Riksdag the funds for renewing the war.

Essentially, Gustavus' war against Poland was for control of the Baltic coast. He viewed Catholic Poland as a threat to Protestantism - a threat that perhaps barely existed, but one he thought existed, and the Scandinavian monarchies certainly symbolized the pillars of Protestantism. It was very prudent on the part of Gustavus to form an alliance with Denmark in 1628 to defend Stralsund (NE Germany), as a divided Protestant Scandinavia would result in their defeat by the Catholic states. Like Danzig (modern Gdansk), Stralsund was a principal strategic base on the Baltic. Sigismund III, the son of the Swedish king John III (d. 1592) and Catherine Jagiellon (Katarzyna Jagiellonka, d. 1583), lost his title as the official Swedish king in 1599, deposed by the Sveriges Riksdag. His politics of support for Catholic Reformation (counterreformation) and personal ambition were among the reasons for the wars to come. This, of course, can be viewed in other ways by his apologists, which is totally understandable.

In 1617, Gustavus indeed took advantage of Poland's involvement with the Muscovites and Ottomans, gaining hegemony on the eastern Baltic in Livonia, compelling the Poles under Prince Krzysztof Radziwill to conclude an armistice until 1620. The Thirty Years War had begun two years earlier, and Gustavus clearly saw Sweden would be drawn into the vortex. He vainly tried to renew the truce with Poland, as Sigismund III, influenced by the Jesuits and feeling safe from the central and north-east with a newly agreed truce with Russia, could not be influenced. After thorough preparations, Gustavus sailed for the mouth of the Dvina (Duna) in July, 1621 with about 18,000 men aboard 76 ships. The fort commanding the mouth of the Dvina, Dynemunt (Dunamunde), was taken, and the siege of Riga began on August 13. Terms were refused by the garrison, which numbered 300 and supported by a citizen militia of 3,700. Gustavus was thus compelled to open a bombardment. On August 30, a small relief force under Radziwill, perhaps just 1,500 men, was beaten back; Swedish entrenchments were too firm and gunfire too solid to overcome, and Radziwill withdrew by August 31. After mining was resorted to, in which Gustavus threatened to explode all the mines at once, Riga surrendered on September 25, 1621. To isolate Poland even more from the sea, he marched south across the Dvina, took Mitawa (Mitau, modern Jelgava), and, leaving ravaged Livonia to its fate, stationed his troops in Courland. The conquest of Riga meant there was no longer any possibility for Poland to establish herself as a Baltic power. Through Riga passed a third of her exports. With it Gustavus gained political and strategic advantages and a base for equipping his fleet. At the same time, the Poles and Ottomans opened talks, and a mutual peace was agreed upon (for now).

The east part of Livonia and the important town of Dorpat remained, however, in Polish hands. In the autumn of 1622 both sides were again ready to accept an armistice. Gustavus was too eager for a truce to grudge Sigismund III the kingship of Sweden, so long as he did not call himself Hereditary King. Krzysztof Radziwill had advised Sigismund III to ask for an armistice, but, as usual, he hesitated to the very last. This gave Sweden's Chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna, an opportunity to seperate the interests of Poland and Lithuania, and to offer the latter peace and neutrality in the struggle between Sweden and Poland. This was the first Swedish attempt to drive a wedge between the two halves of the Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy. But the plan did not succeed, and Gustavus personally conducted the campaign in the summer of 1622. Radziwill retook Mitawa, and a battle was fought on August 3, 1622. Initially, it seems Swedish infantrymen, positioned in thickets with swampy ground between them and the Lithuanians, fired upon the enemy, refusing to come out in the open, a condition which Radziwill proposed. The Swedes overwhelmed the outnumbered haiduks (mercenary foot-soldiers of mostly Magyar stock from Hungary) in an infantry clash. Some companies of husaria then displayed some recalcitrance, as there existed serious financial problems with the Lithuanian forces, which was more a private army than a state one at this time, which led to a lack of loyalty and morale amongst many. But two banners, perhaps about 400 husaria (numbers for these banners, more properly known as Choragiews, vary) did intrepidly charge into the Swedish ranks and, despite unfavorable ground, penetrated through with minimal loss (the Swedish army was not yet the drilled, disciplined force of a few years away, but vastly improving). The Swedes reinforced their positions which precluded the husaria from turning around (there was also no support for the husaria either). Radziwill built solid fortifications around Mitawa (Mitau) which precluded a resolved effort by the Swedes to recapture it by military means. But Radziwill was again forced to conclude an armistice, as adequate forces could not be sent to stop Gustavus from continuing his conquest, as the serious war with the Ottomans was too recent to not keep forces on the lookout further south. From a Swedish viewpoint, this establishment by Gustavus wiped away much of the shame caused by the disaster of the Battle of Kircholm sixteen years earlier, and Mitawa (Mitau) was occupied on October 3, 1622 by Gustavus. But so severe was the sickness which afflicted the Swedish forces that some 10,000 reinforcements had to be called. Renewed in November, 1622, the truce was prolonged year after year until 1625, though the sole object of each side was to gain time to prepare for more impending war.

A few years earlier Gustavus had found support in Brandenburg-Prussia, which might, under favorable conditions, become very useful. East Prussia had been inherited in 1619 by the Elector of Brandenburg, and his sister, Hedvig Eleonora, had married Gustavus in 1620. But the Elector Georg Wilhelm was himself afraid of Poland and not yet willing to comply immediately with the demands made by Gustavus, now his brother-in-law. Inactive and not willing to be decisive, Georg Wilhelm tried to avoid difficulties and therefore added an element of uncertainty to the political situation amongst the Northern countries. Sigismund III's phlegmatic temperamant had a similar effect, who carried a fear of losing the leading elements of Prussia into the arms of Sweden. For Gustavus, it was very important that Sigismund III didn't gain a firm footing in Ducal (East) Prussia.

When Gustavus renewed hostilities against Poland, it was partly for national reasons and partly to assist the German Protestants. During the preceding years, Sigismund III had constantly showed a desire to attack Sweden on a large scale, although the Polish Sejm at this time expressed no desire to support him and the funds at his disposal were insufficient. Two factors important for Gustavus were the change of James I of England's policy and his desire to arrange, with the help of Cardinal Richelieu of France, a coalition of Protestant powers against the Hapsburgs and their Catholic allies. Christian IV of Denmark, whose relations with Sweden had again, in the fall of 1623, been strained to the utmost, and with the support of England and the Dutch Republic, he led Protestant action against the Hapsburg coalition in Germany, and this at last made Gustavus feel safe with regard to Denmark. He would have preferred to land in Polish Prussia, but probably out of consideration for his brother-in-law and the Dutch, who grudged him Danzig (modern Gdansk), he resumed the struggle in Livonia. Gustavus' earlier strategic successes in 1621-1622 marked a shift in the balance of forces within the Baltic, and denied Sigismund III a port from which he could launch a legitimist invasion of Sweden, though he was fortunate he was able to establish this valuable footing here in Livonia and Courland scarcely opposed. But he did beat back the small relief force at Riga; he wouldn't have been able to take the city if he hadn't overcome this force, perhaps just 1,500 men; the garrison of Riga was very valiant in its defense, spurred by the hope for Radziwill to make some headway. Polish apologists stress the Ottoman threat as being more serious. While this is true for before the autumn of 1621, the Ottomans were repulsed (as I already mentioned) with great loss by Jan Chodkiewicz in September-October, 1621, at the fortress of Khotyn (Chocim), and internal strife soon broke amongst the janissaries, during which the sultan Osman II was murdered. A peace was agreed upon and the Polish/Lithuanian-Ottoman border would be fairly quiet until 1633. Gustavus was now seemingly the threat to be dealt with. But Stanislaw Koniecpolski, a superb commander, was busy dealing with the Tartars from 1624-1626, to the east.

A permanent peace could not be reached between Gustavus and Sigismund III to replace the existing truce, so Gustavus again arrived with his army at the mouth of the Dvina in May of 1625 with some 20,000 men aboard 148 ships, his army now in a rapidly-advancing phase of a newly forged instrument of war. His forces attacked at three points - (1) Courland, on the Baltic shore, taking the ports of Ventspils (Windau) and Liepaja (Libau), (2) Koknese (Kokenhausen), further inland, and (3) Dorpat (modern Tartu), to the north. No major field engagements occured, but Koknese was taken on July 15, 1625, followed by the castle of Birze (modern Birzai) a month later, after a valiant defense by the garrison. The attempt of a Polish colonel to retake Riga with 2,000 men was repulsed, and a second attempt by the Chancellor of Lithunia, Jan Stanislaw Sapieha, with 3,000 men (these figures are not confirmed) was driven off with a loss of all their guns. Around the same time, Dorpat was taken by Jakob De la Gardie, and in late September Mitawa was taken by Swedish forces. But Polish forces prevented Gusav Horn from capturing Dunaberg (modern Daugavpils). Gustavus would now resolve to take the initiative against enemy ground forces, concentrated to his south.

In 1624, Gustavus decreed a lighter design to replace the matchlock musket for standard issue - the wheel-lock pistol and musket, reputedly invented in 1517 by one Johann Kiefuss, a German gun maker from Nuremburg. These firearms did not entail a smoldering match, thus there would be no more stressing about it going out when precipitation rolls in, or the danger of handling gunpowder around the match. The idea of this mechanism is simple; think of a modern lighter which has a flint pressed up against a roughened little metal wheel - when the wheel is spun with your finger, the flint pressed against its surface throws off sparks. The same system was used in these firearms to create sparks as needed to ignite the gunpowder to fire the gun. It's all evolutionary. But it was more expensive: surely not everyone received the better design (dragoons must have been given priority, as they carried their muskets across the back in a leather strap. But even those of Gustavus' men retained the matchlock, they increasingly received lighter ones. By 1626, reloading speeds in Gustavus' army were improved to the point where three ranks of musketeers, reduced from six when all loaded, could simultaneously maintain a continuous barrage; his musketeers were trained to fire by salvo - the discharge of an entire unit's supply in one or two volleys to produce a wall of bullets, and they waited until their enemy was not more than a distance of 35-70 yards. Firepower was greatly increased by the addition of copiuos field artillery pieces. In 1626, the 3 lb. leather guns were introduced, the first regimental guns to fire fixed ammunition with wooden cases, and they could fire at a rate not much slower than a musketeer. It was named the 'leather gun' because the external casing (frame) of the barrel was made of leather. The bore (tube) of the gun was made of copper. Every effort was made to curtail weight, and without its comparitively light carriage, and the gun weighed 90 lbs. (about 400 lbs. including the carriage). The 'leather gun' could easily be manuevered on the battlefield by two men and one horse. It possessed the asset of mobility to the highest degree, and albeit it was a major technological development, it turned out to have a major drawback: the gun sacrificed too much to lightness and mobility, and upon repeated fire it became so hot that a new charge would often ignite spontaneously, which could lead to disaster amongst its crew, who could still be in the recoil path. Ultimately, the 'leather gun' was a failure as a regimental field piece, but certainly the advent of light mobile artillery in the field. Once Gustavus entered Germany in 1630, the 'leather gun' had been replaced by the 4 lb. Piece Suedoise, made of heavier substance, if slightly less mobile; a third man was required, along with two horses to handle it. This regimental gun was supreme, and could fire eight rounds of grapeshot to every six shots by a musketeer. This was possible because its design involved a new artillery cartridge, in which the shot and repellant charge were wired together to expedite holding. Moreover, a 9 lb. demiculverin, produced by Gustavus' bright young artillery chief, Lennart Torstensson, was introduced. This weapon was classed as the feildpeece - par excellence. The science of mobile field artillery (ie, movable amid battle) may be arguably said to have been first utilized substantially by Gustavus and his engineers. But we can always find precedents; in this case, Babur and Charles V of Spain identified the value of field guns.

The 4 lb. cast-iron regimental gun

In late 1625, Gustavus could be fairly sure of his ground. Sweden was more prepared for war than ever; the unity of king, ministry, noble class, and people was in marked contrast to the condition of any other European state. The ordinary soldiers were given a personal stake in their country, as Gustavus provided land as compensation for service, and for the officers, usually farms on crown lands, form which they collected rent from the tenant-farmer. When not on campaign, the soldier worked on these farms in exchange for board and lodging. I'll spare these details, but basically the soldiers of Sweden under Gustavus' reign became bound to the land, assisiting with its maintenance. Thus the civilian population was involved with the army and its support, and Gustavus was supported to utilize Swedish commerce and industry to fully subsidize the wars he would fight. Moreover, a system of regulated conscription and administration was established, in which each province raised regiments which were supported by local taxes. These provincial regiments would remain permanent. Also by 1625, the Sveriges Riksdag was operating on a regular annual budget with a reformed fiscal system. Drafts to supply men to the regular army were drawn from the militia, which was the home-defence force in which all able-bodied men over the age of fifteen were liable to serve. However, the population of Sweden was too small to provide all the soldiers Gustavus needed, once war thinned his ranks; after all, he would be fighting countries vastly outnumbering Sweden in population. This void was filled by soldiers of fortune (mercenaries), but not the cut-throat bands which ravaged central Europe; the professional mercenaries who fought for Gustavus accepted the stern discipline in return for treatment as good as that received by native Swedes. The Green Brigade (brigades in Gustavus' army were named after the color of their flags), composed mostly of Scottish soldiers, was among the finest units of the Thirty Years' War, and led by the likes of Robert Munro, John Hepburn, Alexander Leslie, and Donald Mackay.

To reiterate, Gustavus integrated the activity of lighter mobile artillery, cavalry, and infantry to a science which produced a radically different, balanced, and superior army than any other in Europe (probably anywhere at the time). Artillery was no longer an insitutional appendage, but a regimental branch of his balanced army. The Battle of Breitenfeld, fought on September 17, 1631, against the able Johann Tserclaes von Tilly, brilliantly realized the basic military theory of Gustavus - the superiority of mobility over weight (and combined arms), something the likes of Alexander and Hannibal showcased amid their triumphs from two millennia earlier. But now Gustavus applied the concept with the technology of his day. It took some time, and not without trial and error (he didn't turn field artillery into a battle-deciding arm, but a significant support to his cavalry and infantry in the field). But the heroic example of Gustavus' Alexandrian style of leadership would later cost him his life. Some may say he was too rash, but leading by personal example will do wonders for the moral of one's troops.

But the supreme army it became we was still in its developing stages in late 1625, where we left off the chronoligical narrative.

The Polish forces in the region of Wallmoja (Wallhof) probably numbered some 6-7,000 men, between Jan Sapieha (the son of the Lithuanian chancellor), Radziwill, and Aleksander Gosiewski. Marching swiftly SW from Koknese (Kokenhausen) to the region around Wallmoja (Wallhof), near Birze (modern Birzai), in a forced march with perhaps 3,000 picked men (2,000 Finnish Hakkapeliitat, plural for a Hakkapeliita, and about 1,000 musketeers), of over 30 miles in 36 hours in difficult terrain, Gustavus swiftly fell upon the larger force of about 4,000 (at most) under Sapieha and routed them in what B.H. Liddell Hart describes as perhaps the earliest example in modern military history of the principles of concentration, both strategical and tactical, and of the combination of fire and movement, which forms the burden of every military manual nowadays (Hart wrote this in 1927). Basically, he surprised the Polish-Lithuanian force in wooded terrain, which precluded them from outflanking his dispositions - a condition he effectuated, using his infantry in the woods to effect enfilading fire upon them. Now with complete control of Livonia, and the fortified line south of the Dvina no longer threatened, Gustavus wanted to make peace (albeit favorable to his position), and sent an embassy to Warsaw. But part of it was seized, and due to the difficulty to procure their release, peace was not in the cards. Jakob De la Gardie, who would later advocate peace with Poland, was left in Livonia to secure the Swedish position, and Gustavus returned to Stockholm.

Important note: Polish accounts claim Jan Sapieha's army was surprised in a non-fortified position with merely 1,500-2,000 men, and that the total troop strength numbered merely 5,000. But that 1st figure is more likely the casualties he suffered. Sapieha fled, understandably, from the field (the victorious cavalry charge was enormously effective), and the Swedish hold on Birze (modern Birzai) was never compromised (unless I am mistaken). Shame can lead a man to downplay his infamy (I would). Radoslow Sikora, the current Polish historian, provides Polish army records which state that it was possibly a higher number than Sapieha claimed - 2,000, but no higher. Well, it could very well have been higher, and Sapieha clearly didn't give an accurate count - a count smaller than the probable amount from the Polish view. There were no longer some 45,000 Poles/Lithuanians fighting the Ottomans to the south, and the truce agreed in late 1622 was in probably to gain time to prepare for assured upcoming hostilities; this comes from one from F. Nowak in his contribution to the Cambridge History of Poland to 1696, Pg. 480,

"...summer of 1622, a preliminary agreement was concluded in August. Renewed in November, the truce was prolonged year after year until 1625, though the sole object of each side was to gain time for war preparations."

Thus, unless one chooses to disbelieve professor Nowak, Krzysztof Radziwill and Sapieha would surely not have divided their forces (unless they were mobilizing them for the 1st time) after Gustavus' invasion with such miniscule numbers. After all, not more than 20 miles seperated them (one force is claimed to have been six miles away from Sapieha), and if we are to believe the scenario that Gustavus destroyed a force of merely 2,000 at most, what became of the other forces in the region, numbering another 3,000 (according to them)? There is no explanation that I can find. Why would Gustavus be compelled to force-march and ambush a force about two thirds of his size? He constantly tried to achieve truces. I believe his force was about 2,000 cavalry, including the terrific, light Finnish Hakkapeliitat and 1,000+ musketeers. From some accounts I have studied, the Poles and Lithuanians numbered about 2,600 cavalry and about 1,300 infantry. I have read some accounts claiming their infantry alone numbered more than 3,400, but this is perhaps an elaboration to sweeten Gustavus' victory. One account states that Jan Sapieha's army was deployed on a ridge with the expectation the Swedes would would emerge in march formation. But Gustavus appeared in battle formation, with the infantry in the center and cavalry on the flanks. The Poles were scattered from Gustavus' amalgam of cavalry charges supported by musket fire. The Poles/Lithuanians were indeed surprised by Gustavus' formation, and he exploited some disorder in their ranks, but I don't believe they were totally surprised in a non-fortified position, with only 1,500-2,000 men. To believe this would be to believe they were incredibly stupid, knowing an invader had recently come, even though it was the winter. The other commanders in the area were Radziwill and one Aleksander Gosiewski, who commanded smaller forces of perhaps 1,000+ each. I do believe the figure of 6-7,000 attributed to Jan Sapieha's force by some accounts is perhaps the number for all three combined, and they were divided, but close to each other; Sapieha's defeated army at Wallhof probably numbered no more than 4,000. Thus it was Gustavus who was outnumbered, and he achieved the decisive victory after a forced march of over 30 miles in 36 hours in difficult wintry conditions; the other Polish/Lithuanian forces, comparitively small, must have withdrew or surrendered. The Ottoman threat was now subordinate to Gustavus' presence, and to leave such a scant amount of troops in the wake of Gustavus' invasion was manifestly inviting disaster. Gustavus' army was swiftly becoming a disciplined, balanced force, in which morale was increasing. He took acute measures to properly plan for transport and supply; the fact Gustavus was better equipped to conduct a winter campaign than his enemy, in their own territory no less, illustrates his strategic and logistic sagacity. During the siege of Riga in 1621, he enthusiastically dug the trenches with his men. True, Gustavus established his position in Livonia and Polish Prussia by attacking while the Polish/Lithuanian forces were dealing with Ottomon (until 1621) and Tatar (Tartar) threats. Koniecpolski didn't arrive on the scene against Gustavus until November of 1626, due to his fighting with the Tartars, whom he crushed. Though Gustavus' entrenched positions in Polish Prussia wavered back and forth, his grip was never completely lost.

Furthermore, the Poles and Lithuanians knew Gustavus had just taken the towns of Mitawa (Mitau, modern Jelgava)) and Bauske (modern Bauska). They must have been in a 'time of war' frame of mind, regardless of the winter conditions. However, claims that Gustavus lost not one man is untenable. But it suggests that, if he was barely scathed, he did indeed surprise them.

When the way was clear for a new theater of operations for Gustavus in Polish Prussia, he resolved to secure control of the Vistula, as he had already secured the Dvina. The mouth of the Vistula poured into the Baltic at Danzig (modern Gdansk), and was the vital artery of Poland's economy. With the Vistual blocked, and Danzig captured or neutralized, the Polish magnates would certainly compel Sigismund III to make peace. This campaign would also relieve much stress, hopefully, on the Protestants in Germany, as Imperialists would come to the aid of Sigismund III. Gustavus landed near Pillau (modern Baltiysk) on the Vistula Lagoon (the Zalew Wislany, or Frisches Haff)) on June 25, 1626 with 12,709 men (1,209 cavalry), and 64 guns, disembarking from some 150 ships. He took Pillau after negotiations failed with his brother-in-law, Georg Wilhelm, the Elector of Brandenburg. This action threatening Poland's access to the Baltic. He discerned that he needed to occupy as much of the Baltic coast as he could before joining the struggle in Germany, and do it quickly; the Poles had been lax in concentrating forces to deal with him, and this he would take full advantage of. After the fall or surrender of Braniewo (Braunsberg), Elblag (Elbing), Frombork (Frauenburg), Orneta (Wormditt), Tolkmicko (Tolkemit), and Malbork (Marienburg) by early July, 1626, he was in possession of the fertile and defensible delta of the Vistula in Prussia, which he viewed as a permanent conquest. Axel Oxenstierna was commissioned as the region's first governor-general. Communications between Danzig (modern Gdansk), which was his hope for a valuable base and depot, and the Polish interior were cut off by the erection of the first of Gustavus' famous entrenched camps around Tczew (Dirschau). Putzig (modern Puck), NW of Danzig was captured, and by storming Gniew (Mewe) on July 12, 1626, the Poles were further threatened with losing access to Danzig from the interior. Again, the terrific Koniecpolski was at this time fighting the Tartars in the Ukraine, and Zygmunt (Sigismund) III was slow (such criticism is in hindsight, of course) to mobilize against Gustavus' landing on June 25, 1626 at Pilawa (Pillau, modern Baltiysk).

Gustavus never attempted a major storm or siege of Danzig, but remained content to try to blockade the great port, which clearly was viable, being he cut its communications from both sides. But he could never completely prevent it being provisioned by the sea, and the city's ability to hold out practically neutralized Gustavus' successes throughout the four year campaign. Due to the impracticability that the city could be reduced to straits, he sought to secure its neutrality. This is where he might have been a little rash and lost patience; he was already eyeing the situation in Germany nad might have been hoping to bring the Polish war to a speedy end, which depended on the submission or neutrality of Danzig. A less hectoring style of diplomacy might have procured Danzig's neutrality. It is indeed mentioned in one of my sources that he reconnoitred the fortress of Wisloujscie (Weichselmunde), and he began recruiting from his newly acquired territories, including the procurement of valuable, indigenous horses.

In late August of 1626, 2,650 Finns arrived to reinforce Gustavus, of which 650 were cavalry.

At the battle of Gniew (Mewe), fought in September, 1626, Gustavus and his officers, most notably Heinrich Matthias von Thurn and John Hepburn, won an impressive but not overwhelming victory. The wooded terrain around Gniew was utilized by Gustavus to neutralize any devastating effect the Polish cavalry could usually rely upon. It was in late September, 1626 when Sigismund III finally arrived upon the theater of operations, now commanding a field army in the vicinity of Grudziadz (Graudenz). After conscriptions were carried out from Grudziadz and Torun (Thorn), his force in the field totalled 11,940 men; over 10,000 were cavalry - 3,980 husaria, 5,050 kozacy, and about 800 reiters, and some dragoons. The infantry force numbered perhaps over 5,000 Polish, German, and Hungarian footmen (doubtless many of whom were haiduks). Torun lies on the Vistula a little over thirty miles south of Grudziadz. Sigismund III wanted to blockade Gniew, with the intention of drawing Gustavus further south, away from his base at Tczew and the vicinity around the Danzig perimeter. The Poles had recently retaken the fortress of Orneta (Wormditt), perhaps proving other fortresses Gustavus had easily taken earlier could not serve as a permanent defenses. Thus he had to march out against Sigismund III. Led by Sigismund III and his son Wladyslaw, the Poles advanced towards Malbork; on meeting the Swedes, whom they outnumbered, some skirmishes broke out, and the Poles withdrew south, crossed the Vistula at Nowe (Neuenburg), and began to siege Gniew from the town's south side. Though Sigismund III established himself on high ground to the west. Though a strong position, Gustavus set himself up at no disadvantage: he assembled a picked force of 3,500 men (500 horse), drawn from the vicinity of Tczew (Dirschau). His troop strength in the fiel in the vicinity of Tczew numbered 7,661, of which nearly 1,274 were cavalry. He headed for threatened Gniew, and to challenge Sigismund III's position, he both disposed his men in wooded terrain along the Vistula and behind an anti-flood embankment, good for a reconnoitring position, as well as a good and defense against enemy cavalry. The relief of Gniew was a necessity for carrying out the campaign he intended, so he devised a tactic to effectuate its relief. With some light horse and artillery, the Poles had occupied a position athwart his path. Gustavus resorted to a ruse, making his movements appear as a reconnaisance, and proceeded to withdraw. After this clever disposition apparently deceiving the Poles, he then ordered Thurn and John Hepburn to create another diversion and cut a passage over a strongly fortified hill defended by the Poles, who vastly outnumbered them. Thurn and his cavalry diverted the Poles' attention by demonstrative actions, and held up in some serious skirmishing with the lighter kozacy. The Poles were given the impression the Swedish garrison was going to be drawn from within Gniew, and that the place would fall to them in any event, so they made no immediate advance, but failed in a cavalry charge against Gustavus' carefully prepared infantry positions, whose firepower was too strong; though loss of Polish life was apparently minimal, the Swedes were trained to fire more at horses, thus many more were dismounted. Perhaps they should have attacked sharply in significant numbers and closely observe the region to ascertain Gustavus' real intentions. If they had, perhaps the campaign for Gustavus might have ended here for good. But that's 20/20 hindsight.

Simultaneous with Thurn's diversionary activity, the infantry column commanded by Hepburn, which had started at dusk and unseen by Sigismund III's men, approached the enemy position by working around it and ascending the hill by a narrow and winding path, which was encumbered by difficult terrain. Weighed down with muskets, cartridges, breastplates, helmets, and defense obstacles (I'll explain in a bit), they made their way up through the enemy's outposts unobserved, and reached the summit, where the ground was smooth and level. By tactical surprise, here they fell at once upon the Poles, who were busy arranging their trenches. For a time, Hepburn and his men gained a footing here; but a deadly fire, mostly musketry, opened upon them from all points, compelling them the to fall back from the trenches. But they now found themselves charged upon by armored husaria under Tomas Zamoyski, thus they certainly would have been soon repulsed. Hepburn drew off his men till they reached a rock on the plateau, and here they made their stand, the musketeers occupying the rock, the pikemen forming in a wall around it.

Gustavus had provided them with valuable defense items, which were utilized effectively here on this emminenece held by the Poles - a portable Cheval de Frise (French for 'Frisian horses'), and the Scweinfedder (the 'Swedish feather', or 'Swine feather'). The bayonet was not yet in use, and musketeers often adopted defensive weapons to protect themselves from cavalry. This small version of the Cheval de Frise consisted of a portable frame, probably a simple log, with many long iron spikes protruding from it. It was erected more in camp and principally intended to stop cavalry dead in its tracks, but was not a serious obstacle to the passage of mobile infantry. But here Hepburn was using smaller versions. The Scweinfedder was a pointed stake (a half-pike about seven feet long) and musket-rest combination, which had replaced the more cumbersome fork-firing rest. The stake was planted pointing toward the enemy cavalry (the musket rested upon a loop) to act as a defensive obstacle, particularly against shock cavalry. Gustavus' Swedish army used the Scweinfedder in the Polish campaign more so than against their enemies in Germany later probably because the terrain offered better cover against cavalry, and there was less cavalry in Germany than Poland. They quickly placed these obstacles along their front (remember, they were portable), and it aided the pikemen greatly in resisting the desperate charges of the Polish horsemen. Their German allies, armed with muskets, aided immeasurably in the effectuated defensive. Hepburn and his force withstood the Polish army for two days. Soon, however, as I stated, they would certainly be overcome by an amalgam of fire and shock from a preponderance of enemy forces (the time between reloading rendered them extremely vulnerable), so they withdrew, both sides being proportionately scathed very little.

While this desperate action was taking place, and the attention of the Poles entirely occupied on Hepburn, Gustavus himself managed to pass a strong force of men and a store of ammunition into the town from the north side, and then turned to protect Thurn's withdrawal, at which point the husaria could make no headway before Gustavus' triple-lined infantry firepower - the Swedish Salvee; two husaria charges were unsuccessful. Sigismund III, seeing that Gustavus had achieved his purpose of relieving Gniew, retired with the loss of some 500 men. It is quite possible that Sigismund III could have thought Gustavus was in force the entire time, and with his artillery, thus they may have thought he was trying to draw them from their good position. The Swedes did not outright beat the Poles and compel them to flee scatteringly, but the town of Gniew was re-victualed and the garrison substantially strengthened by Gustavus. Moreover, the terrain around Gniew would surely be utilized by Gustavus to neutralize any devastating effect the Polish cavalry could usually rely upon. Nevertheless, it was a superbly handled operation on the part of Gustavus. The Polish historian Jerzy Teodorczyk calls this battle the first defeat of the husaria, but I think it should more appropriately be called the first prevention of a defeat at the hands of the husaria. More reinforcements arrived in mid-September for Gustavus.

Though Gustavus would begin to endure some severe harassing from better-led enemy forces, with the terrific Stanislaw Koniecpolski coming onto the scene in November of 1626, the object of his campaign so far a success (albeit he was barely challenged militarily, and he wasn't gaining what he wanted with his prime object, Danzig) - to secure a base of operations encircling Danzig; the Swedes' main holdings were Putzig (modern Puck), Tczew (Dirschau), Gniew (Mewe), Elbing (modern Elblag), Brunsberga (Braunsberg, modern Braniewo), and Pillau (modern Baltiysk). Oxenstierna was placed in overall command in October, as Gustavus returned to Sweden to organize reinforcements. It seems Sigismund III overtured peace, but the ministry and people of Sweden supported Gustavus' refusal to what he deemed were unacceptable conditions, which included the kingship be returned to Sigismund III.

At the end of 1626, probably in November, Koniecpolski, who had arrived with great celerity from the east with a little over 6,000 men, began a counter-offensive to reopen the Vistula and relieve the blockade of Danzig. Now, the Swedes would be up against a superb commander, commanding the vaunted husaria. Cavalry action took place around Neuteich (modern Nowy Staw) on January 7-17 of 1627, resulting in Swedish reiters heavily scattering Polish foragers. But Koniecpolski swiflty retook Putzig and captured Gniew by stout diversionary moves, and entrenched his forces. He had quickly captured Putzig in early April, 1627, which reopened Danzig's communications with Germany. But the Swedes' lines to Pillau remained intact. Moreover, the Swedes defeated a Lithuanian force near Koknese (Kokenhausen) in December, 1626, detracting a threat to their position there. On April 13, 1627, Stanislaw Koniecpolski decisively intercepted a force of about 2,500-4,000 recruited from Germany, marching east from Hammerstein (modern Czarne) through Pomerania for Gustavus, and drove them back to Hammerstein, which he forced two days later into capitulation. Earlier sources state this force numbering 8,000, but this is certainly a magnification. I have recently read it was 4,000, and some say the figure of 2,500 was the total number, others say 2,500 was the casualty figure. Radoslaw Sikora says Koniecpolski's force outnumbered the force coming from Germany by very little, thus, if we sustain Sikora's information, 8,000 is certainly incorrect. Whatever the actual number, few Swedes, if any, took place in the battle, and the captured infantry were incorporated into the Polish army. Much of the surviving cavalry rode back to Germany. As it turned out, the Swedes' plans to strike at Koniecpolski from the other direction was foiled by the flooding of the Vistula.

Gustavus returned to Poland, landing at Pilawa (Pillau, modern Baltiysk) on May 8, 1627 with about 7,000 infantry, followed a month later by 1,700 cavalry. When he reached the army entrenched around Tczew (Dirschau), he found his total troop strength in Poland had increased to roughly 22,000 men, due to much recruitment; 11,150 foot and 1,400 cavalry were in the field, and 8,540 were stationed in garrisons (1,090 cavalry, of which 200 were dragoons), and Koniecpolski could move freely. Georg Wilhelm, the Elector of Brandenburg, now took up arms against Gustavus, but Gustavus made short diplomatic work of the small force of about 2,000 men, positioned near Mohrungen (modern Morag). He enlisted them under his own standard. Wilhelm would thereafter remain neutral. After some cavalry skirmishing in early May, in which Gustavus was nearly cut down, he began to reconnoitre the redoubts around the western mouth of the Vistula, a strip of land held by the citizens of Danzig. Viewing the works from a boat, he was shot in the hip on the 25 of May, 1627. This laid him up, delaying operatons, and the Poles began to concentrate their forces. Sigismund III threatened Jakob De la Gardie's position in Livonia, and Gustaf Horn was sent with men to ready themselves for any contingencies. The Swedish operational goal now was seemingly to buttress the region of the eastern side of the Vistula they held, and to defend their hold on Tczew (Dirschau). Danzig (modern Gdansk) now could only be threatened from the east, as Putzig was in Polish hands. Koniecpolski didn't possess enough infantry and artillery to threaten Tczew (Dirschau) itself, so his operational aim was to deny the Swedes access to the eastern routes to Danzig, and lure Gustavus into the open field quick enough to do battle before Swedish artillery could be effected, a situation which would certainly favor his husaria. However, Koniecpolski did seize Gniew (Mewe) in July of 1627, with it procuring a vital crossing-point on the Vistula. He then began reconnoitring the Swedish works around Tczew (Dirschau) in early August with about 7,700 men, of which nearly 4,500 were cavalry. Gustavus' army was slightly over 10,000, of which over 4,000 were cavalry. He possessed maybe twenty guns at most. The Swedes crossed over the Vistula River and garrisoned Tczew (Dirschau) with about 1,600 men. Knowing that the Polish cavalry was virtually impossible to beat on open ground, the Swedes expanded their bridgehead with a longline of fortifications. The route west of Tczew (Dirschau) ran through the defile of the marshy Motlawa river. The Polish moved to block the Swedes from advancing beyond this point, encamping on the western side of the river, but Gustavus knew that the Poles didn't have enough infantry to storm his fortifications, thus he didn't need to 'breakout'. But he also was keenly aware that his cavalry was vulnerable. He had to be careful. He had some success against the Poles by using fortifications, artillery, and defiles to prevent the Poles from using their cavalry to its full potential, but he had to be cautious. Koniecpolski was a very experienced soldier and despite his limited resources he had put the Swedes on guard. His army was faster on the march and had shown remarkable ability to outmaneuver the Swedes in the open. The Poles fortified their encampment, so it was a standoff with both armies fortified on either side of the river. Both generals knew that an all-out attack by either side would be a disaster; the answer was to probe and hopefully draw the other side out, of force them to withdraw. The Battle of Tczew (Dirschau) was set to be fought, beginning on August 7, 1627.

The Poles deployed pickets as Dutch negotiators were in Koniecpolski's camp. These negotiations were not bilateral, as the Dutch were mostly in disfavor of Gustavus' campaigning in Poland because it disturbed their trade with Danzig, and Albrecht von Wallenstein's, successfull in Germany at this time, promised Sigismund III assistance. The Poles left themselved vulnerable, a situation any good commander will exploit - to strike at one's Achilles Heel, particularly when the enemy will destroy you with their vaunted weapon if fought under conditions viable for the utilization of that weapon. In this case with the husaria, an open field. Gustavus' concern of the hussars was genuine, and that fear fear of them understandably influenced his operational strategy. As devastating and impressive the Battle of Kircholm in 1605 was a display of the husaria formidability and prowess in the open field when drawing an impetuous opponent (Karl (Charles) IX) into their favorable conditions and off their high ground (Karl thought they were retreating), it induced a false sense of security. When Gustavus invaded in 1621, many fortresses throughout Livonia and Ducal Prussia on the Baltic were not defended adequately. Gustavus took advantage of this situation very smartly, and coupled with his army revisions, he would never again allow, to reiterate, a defeat like Kircholm to afflict his army.

Gustavus attacked the Polish picket lines, and retired into his entrenchments when Koniecpolski counter-attacked in force with much of his cavalry. Gusatvus refused to be lured out, and Koniecpolski refused to be lured in, as Sigismund III had at Gniew the previous year. But Gustavus did attack the husaria here at Tczew - simply not when Koniecpolski wanted, or expected, him to; the remaining six Choragiews withdrew west along the marshy causeway, and Gustavus fell upon them swiftly with his cavalry, catching them off-guard. Here at this point of Battle of Tczew (Dirschau), Gustavus' unit of cavalry under Henry Matthias Thurn attacked six Choragiews (Banners) of Polish cavalrmen, after Koniecpolski left with the bulk of his horsemen when it reached a point Gustavus seemingly wouldn't come out to fight. But the stout Polish counter-attack, which included the arrival and attack of a unit under Marcin Kazanowski, would have most likely beaten them, as Thurn's right wing was seriously threatened. But such a contingency Gustavus was prepared for, as he held a reserve unit under Erik Soop on hand, and came in and, combined with Thurn's stabilizing of his own unit, sent the husaria (and two Choragiew of lighter cavalry) into flight. The husaria were the most formidable heavy cavalry (though 'heavy', they could move darn fast!) of their day, but Gustavus' reformed cavalry was hardly three times worse than the husaria; if the Poles had been outnumbered by such vast odds (three to one), as they claim, they would have been crushed. As it happened, they were thrown back, but not scattered terribly. By whatever they were outnumbered upon Gustavus' surprise salvo, the arrival of Kazanowski closed that gap, and they still were repulsed. A Choragiew numbers about 200 men, but the numbers vary. Thus, I think it is possible 1,800 Swedes defeated 1,200 Poles that first day around Tczew (Dirschau). The Poles' counter-attack would have seemingly handled the first wave, but Gustavus was prepared. Also, I have read from one account that the Poles retreated because all their lances broke. With respect to who wrote that, this is not credible. All their lances (kopias)? Every one of them? If this was true, could they not fight the Swedes with their sabres (szablas)? True, a hussar's kopia was constructed with its center bored out to lighten it, and its length, over 15 ft. (5+ meters), made it pliable to the point it would often break. Moreover, it was considered a dishonor for a hussar to return from combat with an intact kopia. But a broken kopia can still be 10 ft., certainly still useful, and a hussar carried more than one into battle. I realize this is all rationalization, though.

Gustavus was merely exercising more patience then they were. Sure he wanted to leave his camp, but, again, not under their expectations or terms. For all he knew (again), they were trying to draw him out, feign a calculated retreat, and attack him in the manner that befell his father 22 years earlier. The Poles claimed six banners were 600 men in this battle. From what I have read, a banner, or Choragiew, contains around 200 horsemen (sometimes 240). This is from Radoslaw Sikora, amid his article on the Hussars' tactics,

"...A banner with 200 Hussars attacks a regiment of infantry with 600 men (400 musket and 200 pike)...",

This is comes from one Marciej Rymarz's description of the Polish/Lithuanian attack on Swedish-held Warsaw in 1656,

"...The Hussars totaled approximately 1,000-1,100 men, in eight banners (six Crown and two Lithuanian), so were quite few in number especially compared to the force that might have been raised in earlier years..."

Well, I'm guilty of over-rationalization, as I should consider there was no fixed number for a Choragiew; it seems they could be as low as 60.

We are indeed talking about the 'earlier years', specifically here at Tczew (Dirschau), thus it is more likely the 1,800 horsemen under Henry Matthias Thurn and Erik Soop faced 1,200 or so husaria (maybe more, with Kazanowski coming onto the scene, if he wasn't counted in the enumerations), who were left behind after Koniecpolski thought they weren't coming out of their camp. Maybe some Choragiews numbered 100 or less at other times, but in this case, 600 husaria against three times their number of Swedish cavalry, now only slightly less formidable per se, would have been crushed at a much quicker level than what happened. Koniecpolski's quickly administered counter-attack indeed would have seemingly overwhelmed Thurn, but Soop was placed to stabilize such a contingency, which he did. This 1.5:1 (or a little less) ratio was enough for Gustavus' reformed cavalry,and supporting musketeers, to repulse them. They pursued them until the Irishman Jakob Butler's (or Walter Butler's?) musketeers, well placed, prevented any overwhelming rout of the withdrawing husaria. What a novelty for the Swedes to witness: the husaria withdrawing after a fight with their own horsemen, even if not a scattered and wildly broken retreat. In another clash of horsemen, Herman Wrangel, positioned with conduciveness, held up against the counter-attack by Kazanowski. But this also halted any Swedish futher advance. If not thoroughly beaten back, the fact Kazanowski withdrew and Wrangel did not clearly indicates the Poles conceded. Both sides may have been in the same position when they started, but the first day was a tactical success for the Swedes; it was the Poles who withdrew and returned to their camp, not a mutual scenario. Radoslaw Sikora's implication that because the Poles weren't destroyed means they didn't lose that first day (he thinks the battle was a draw) is not tenable, in my opinion. Why must one destroy the enemy to qualify as a defeat of that enemy? How many victories akin to Cannae and Mohi have occured throughout military history?

With all that opined, though, one thing is certain: the Polish husaria were too strong for Gustavus on their terms. He could only beat them with a method of supporting firepower for his cavalry, and entrenchments with his infantry, as well as careful maneuvering, including catching them unawares with his cavalry. The claim that Gustavus' reformed cavalry could match the Poles on equal terms is, in my opinion, quite superficial. But his mounted arm was improving by the year.

The Battle of Tczew (Dirschau) commenced on a second day, and despite the descriptions I have read that the Polish guns were in a better position, and this position well protected, they never did inflict upon the Swedes with any significant battering, and Gustavus' leather guns and other cannons could have probably, with a little time, circumvented any defilades around the Polish camp (assuming the guns would not have high proportional problems of premature igniting, as was often the case). But a serious wound to Gustavus occured, in which a bullet hit his shoulder and then lodged into his throat, and another suffered by Johan Baner, who was in command of the important bombardment, precluded a thorough Swedish victory. Following his serious injury, Gustavus placed Herman Wrangel in overall command, and for some reason Wrangel, reputed to have been a more cautious commander than Johan Baner, halted the Swedish attack and ordered the Swedish troops to hold their postions in the Motlawa Valley. Once darkness approached, the Swedish army returned to it's fortifications at Tczew (Dirschau). But why did the attack stop, as victory seemed imminent? It has been theorized that Gustavus believed his wound was mortal; he had been shot in the shoulder with a 14-15 mm ball, which permanently dislodged into his neck, causing pain for the rest of his life. He perhaps didn't want to risk the loss of his army on this day of his death.

Theodore Dodge's description of the Battle of Tczew (Dirschau to Dodge, as he used German-language sources) is brief. He tells us the Polish cavalry was beaten back through the village of Rokitken (modern Rokitki). The Swedes cleared Polish pickets, much like the day before with their Finnish allies. They also seemingly cleared Rokitken of enemy troops, or, as other accounts say, perhaps the village of Lunau (Lunowo). Whichever village, a little to the west of Tczew (Dirschau), it was set ablaze. The smoke from the village provided a useful screen for Gustavus to advance his guns. The husaria were reluctant to move. Some Swedish apologists may say because they were worried about Gustavus' potential with tactics of firepower; Polish sources may state they hesitated due to the loss of all their kopias (lances). The consensus holds that there was concern among them that their German infantry allies were on the verge of defecting. If so, one can assume that they were in an inauspicious situation in this battle against Gustavus. The Swedes moved their guns forward to bombard the Polish camp while the infantry of both sides skirmished along the river. The Polish camp was in defilade from the Swedish guns, so the initial Swedish bombardment had little effect. But that wouldn't have lasted with the maneuverability of Gustavus' artillery units, and combined with the distrust of the German troops, the Polish troops came very close to mass panic. Koniecpolski held cohesion intact, and it was the Swedes who actually withdrew, following the injuries to their top two commanders.

This is from Franklin D. Scott's Sweden: the Nation's History, Pg. 172,

"...Gustav Adolf's leather-wrapped guns worked effectively, and the Battle of Dirschau (Tczew) showed the Swedes had finally learned the lesson of their humiliating defeat at Kircholm in 1605; now their cavalry bested the Polish - reputedly the best in Europe. However, the outcome of the 1627 season still failed to convince the Poles they were beaten; and they took heart from the prospect of imperial support..."

I think the Swedes had indeed learned their lesson from Kircholm, but it didn't reach a point where the leather guns worked effectively to win the battle completely, due mostly to the injuries to Gustavus and Baner. It was not a complete victory.

From Michael Robert's Gustavus Adolphus, Pg. 55,

"...Polish resisitence in 1627 began to organize itself, and proved tougher than had been expected. The run of fighting was indeed in Sweden's favour: a victory at Mewe in 1626 and one at Dirschau in 1627 (Gustavus was seriously wounded in the second of them); but nothing like a Polish collapse, either military or economic..."

This is from Brent Hull, who put together the wargames for Gustavus' battles, apparently consulting Radoslaw Sikora (my source is Sikora, not a 'board game'),

"...In a tactical sense the Swedes had been victorious on the first day of the battle, and had it not been the King being seriously wounded the second day may have ended differently. The choice of ground, fortifications, and implemented combined arms had allowed the Swedes to successfully fight the vaunted Polish cavalry. Pulling these factors together required great caution and made decisive action unlikely. In a larger sense the outcome was a major strategic success for the Poles. Koniecpolski had prevented a Swedish breakout, thus securing the overland routes to Gdansk. Within weeks the construction of the eastern fortifications of Gdansk were completed and the window of vulnerability closed."

I somewhat disagree with what is assessed concerning 'the larger sense', but Hull (or Sikora) perhaps has a point worth considering, in terms of the immediate result. Koniecpolski did not prevent a Swedish breakout (Gustavus wasn't trying to conquer further into the interior), in the sense the Swedes were trapped within their works, thus trying to escape, and if the overland routes to Danzig were secured by the Poles, this situation hardly lasted. Gustavus convalesced for a few months, and the blockading of Danzig (Gdansk) continued by his fleet under Nils Stiernskold. When Gustavus was healthy enough to return to field duty, Putzig (Puck) was recaptured (unless my source is wrong), cutting communications with Germany again. His fleet did suffer defeat on November 28 off Oliwa from the Polish under Arend Dickman and the Scotsman James Murray. The Poles had ten ships total against the Swedes' six, but only four galleons against the Swedes' five. Dickman and Stiernskold both perished. Though a compliment to the prowess of these privateers organized by Sigismund III, it was an empty naval victory, in a strategic sense; a stronger Swedish fleet was brought up, and Gustavus drew his lines closer to the city. He achieved this by expanding his base of operations towards the south-east by recapturing Orneta (Wormditt), and Guttstadt (modern Dobre Miasto) was captured by Ake (Achatius) Tott before the winter set in. The former was stormed, the latter surrendered. From my view, the main thing Koniecpolski accomplished from the battle fought around Tczew (Dirschau) was to prevent the destruction of his smaller army by superb maneuvering and handling of his troops, when morale dropped. By December, 1627, Gustavus was back in Stockholm, mainly for the benefit of his health. I think his grand strategy against the Polish-Lithuanian was about controlling the Baltic, particularly blocking the Vistula, not significantly breaking out of his quadrilateral in Ducal Prussia, as claimed by some. He did control area as far south as Brodnica (Strasburg).

Danzig's trade reached a point of becoming paralyzed, and the Polish nobility was suffering financially by having to store crops of corn one after the other while waiting to export it. Though Gustavus became more and more filled with anxiety by the actions of the Imperialists under Wallenstein in Germany, his commanders in Livonia were holding up against the enemy. This enabled Gustavus to feel confident to resume the offensive into Polish Prussia in the summer of 1628. But Sigismund III felt brighter hopes were on the horizon with the developments to the west favoring the Catholics. The Protestant were supplicating to Gustavus, and he could afford just 1,100 men, in two detachments, and some munitions for the defense of Stralsund. Gustavus didn't want to risk an attack upon Koniecpolski unless favorable to do so, with Koniecpolski thinking likewise, and the war became one of maneuver, with neither side willing to face each other without advantages of terrain or fortifications. More often than not outnumbered, the Poles began pillaging their own land to impede the Swedish source of supply. On July 15, upon moving towards Danzig, Gustavus sank a few ships of Danzig's fleet with his leather guns, including the flagship. Danzig could possibly have been reduced by hunger, but again the floods came, which forced the Swedes out of their positions along the Vistula. Gustavus was thus compelled to lift the land blockade of Danzig completely.

In the late summer of 1628, around the vicinity of Grudziadz (Graudenz), the armies of Gustavus and Stanislaw Koniecpolski, according to Polish sources, were opposite on another a few times, but with no battles taking place. Koniecpolski's dispatches to his government stated his attempts to provoke Gustavus to come out and fight, with the Swedish king refusing to come out of his earthworks. What Koniecpolski, or the Polish chroniclers didn't mention, or didn't realize, was that the excellence in the Swedish army was largely influenced by the presence of Gustavus himself, their personal commander as well as their king, at least for the Swedes themselves; he led by personal example, with no task too small or menial, even grabbing a spade himself to lessen the feeling of indignation amongst some of his mercenaries about the digging of trenches. Gustavus greatly realized the importance of field fortifications, and soon employed sappers to dig troops entrenchments and cannon positions. Thus he gave battle only when he believed appropriate. Attacking ready husaria in the open was not appropriate, as the only way for an enemy to avoid destruction by the husaria was to keep to terrain in which cavalry formations could not operate fully, evidenced at Gniew (Mewe). But Koniecpolski prudently stayed at a distance out of range of Gustavus' artillery. But the Swedes operated in the open too, though not without risk and loss, and were neither able to force a decision under their terms, and the Polish campaign of harassment throughout 1628, influenced in part by the lack of support form the Sejm for Koniecpolski, cost Gustavus some 5,000 men (some deserted). Of note is that the Swedes and their allies suffered more from pestilence throughout this war than by enemy weaponry. In October of 1628, Gustavus did successfully storm Osterode (modern Ostroda) with a force of 4,000 men, equally divided between musketeers and cavalry.

By this time Gustavus was clearly eyeing the conflict in Germany, as Denmark became his ally, albeit not completely without reservations, and he aided in the successful defense of Stralsund, though much credit goes to the Danes, who saved the port in early July, 1628. This success would soon open for Gustavus an important foothold in Germany, as well as protect his position in the Baltic. The 1,100 men sent by Gustavus to Stralsund under Leslie, of which about 500 first arrived in late June, along with the Danish fleet's destruction of several vessels sent by Sigismund to aid Wallenstein, were instrumental in the defence of the important stronghold; Tilly and Wallenstein, two noteworthy leaders who had run ragged over the Protestants since 1626, appeared to be bringing a certain overall Catholic victory. But the imperial reverse at Stralsund should not militate against Wallenstein's skill; had Gustavus not failed before Danzig?

Theodore Dodge drew on Swedish sources, most notably a German translation of the Svenska folkets historia by Erik Gustav Geijer, and letters from Gustavus himself, which Dodge said were very modestly put. Dodge emphasis the Swedish accounts have many gaps, due mostly to a terrible fire in Stockholm in 1697, which destroyed a huge amount of important documents. He also wrote in a time (1890s) which since has seen superior texts. But he tells us of a battle occuring in 1628 before the serious flooding of Vistula, which compelled Gustavus to lift the blockade (from inland) of Danzig:

Beginning in the late spring or early summer of 1628, Koniecpolski interrupted the Swedish grip around Danzig by assorted diversionary actions, in which he retook Putzig (Puck) again and captured Gniew (Mewe). Ake Tott, the Finnish commander under Gustavus, was ordered to watch these operations with a cavalry force, certainly his reputable Hakkapallites, who were prominent at Gustavus' first field victory at Wallhof over two years earlier. Tott had now been joined by one Torsten Stalhandske, a fine colonel who would figure prominently later in Germany. Tott apparently fell into an ambush west of a town Dodge names as Grebin, which must be modern Grabiny-Zamec (Monchengrebin). Radoslaw Sikora mentions a clash fought around Legowo in July of 1627, which is the same area. Tott broke out though being outnumbered, both capturing some prisoners and procuring valuable news of the Polish force. Koniecpolski was unwilling to attack the Swedish army, which outnumbered him and was well fortified, so he annoyed it materially. Gustavus was resolved to rid himself of this interference, and marched with the bulk of his force on the Polish army, leaving part of them before Danzig. Gustavus attacked the Poles near their camp, as Dodge tells us,

"...- the exact locality, curiously, is not known, - and by his sharp initiative well kept up, the mobility of his foot and his vastly superior artillery, defeated them with a loss of 3,000 men, four guns and fourteen flags, and drove them well up the Vistula. Koniecpolski fell, heavily wounded...Here was a general engagement with a high percentage of loss, and yet even the battlefield is neither named, nor can be identified. This war was the monarch's schooling, as Gaul was Caesar's, or Spain Hannibal's; but we know as much of Hannibal's Iberian, and much more of Caesar's Gallic, battles than we do of these..."

I believe Dodge read sources claiming this, and it is possible that a reverse upon Koniecpolski took place, but I think the scenario of Tott breaking out of an ambush is credible, being he led fast-moving cavalry, even if he was heavily outnumbered. But a loss of 3,000 Poles in the ensuing clash, in which they suffered a reverse, is almost certainly magnified. But I would hate to think people could completely concoct battles. It makes sense to me: from Dodge's description, Gustavus aggressively attacked by tactical surprise when the situation favored his combined arms. We also know that Koniecpolski withdrew from his positions at Gniew (Mewe) and Grudziadz (Graudenz), while Gustavus occupied Marienwerder (modern Kwidzyn), Brodnica (Strasburg), Nowe (Neuenburg), and Swiecie (Schwetz). Moreover, one cavalry detachment of reiters under one Heinrich von Baudissin undertook a gallant raid to the gates of Warsaw, while Wrangel made a bold foraging expedition inland from Elbing (modern Elblag). But Baudissin was captured and exchanged, and the Poles could manuever and gain, but not to the same degree (in terms of gain), and couldn't follow up small tactical surprises, which were achieved by guerilla-style attacks; they simply didn't possess the quantity of troops, particulalry infantry. But when the winter of 1628 approached the situation was practically unchanged from the previous year, and Gustavus had had serious difficulty in provisioning, a predicament due mostly to Koniecpolski's pillaging of the land. Basically, if we can believe the battle described by Dodge, Gustavus had been skillful in his maneuvering by compelling Koniecpolski to a campaign of harassment, but this in turn gained fruit for Koniecpolski, in that he effectivley began impeding Swedish offensive operations and freedom of movement. But the balance was restored by this aggressive field victory by Gustavus, which I want to believe occured (though no other account I have seen seems to mention it), though not completely what Gustavus had desired for his strategic purpose - the destruction of the Polish army. Sigismund III became more implacable than ever, providing some reinforcements for Koniecpolski's army and refusing Dutch mediations to bring about a peace. With the auspicious conditions of the Catholic situation in Germany, along with their promised aid to him in the form of Imperial auxiliaries, the prospect of Spanish naval presence in the Baltic, extant support from the Sejm, and Danzig's continued holdout against Gustavus, Sigismund III was emboldened to not only drive the Swedes out of Poland and Livonia, but eventually carry the war into Sweden itself, and again attain one of his initial goals, to lay claim (reclaim, technically) to the Swedish throne of his ancestors.

However, the Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand II, educated by the Jesuits and a Catholic zealot, did not monetarily sustain Sigismund III as had been agreed, and the Polish treasury was regressing, thus Gustavus' ability to maintain his footing around Danzig was facilitated, so he resumed the blockade. He was also helped by reinforcements - including about 2,000 reiters from Germany under the Rheingraff (Rhinegrave) Johann Wilhelm, the Count of Ren, who was the son of Herman Wrangel. But Koniecpolski was able to confine himself to guerilla-style operations and occupy strong positions, and Gustavus would not be goaded into fighting the Poles on their terms, in the open field before he could deploy infantry and artillery support, which he did achieve once, if we can believe Dodge, who also tells us Gustavus was,

"...fain to content himself with half measures...".

Basically, neither side could bring about a field engagement on terms one would accept, a sign of two terrific commanders who each identified the strength of the other.

In January of 1629, Gustavus was in Stockholm discussing foreign politics with his council, and Koniecpolski was in Warsaw with the Sejm, probably for similar reasons. It was fully determined in Sweden by this time that Gustavus should at no distant date move in to assist the Protestant cause in Germany. On February 1, 1629 Herman Wrangel, with a force of 5,337 men, of which 3,400 cavalry were cavalry, was determined to relieve pressure on the isolated garrison of Brodnica (Strasburg); he fell upon the threatening Polish army, some 5,000 in number under Stanislaw Potocki, in its winter quarters to the east of the town. A battle was fought near Gorzno (Gurzno), where six Choragiews, composed of husaria and their supporting lighter kozac cavalry, initially made some headway, but the Swedes didn't break, and well-drilled musketeers drove off the enemy horsemen. Potocki had no pikemen to protect his cavalry. Wrangel, not being pulled into a frontal attack wished for by Potocki, boldly outflanked the Poles with his own cavalry. After suffering many losses, Potocki withdrew with the rest of his army (the casualties he suffered amounted to half his force) towards Torun (Thorn), to the south-west. A Swedish pursuit inflicted between 500-2,000 Polish losses (depending on the source), with 30-300 losses suffered by the Swedes (again, depending on the source). Akin to every other battle fought in this war, the clash around Gorzno (Gurzno) is filled with controversial details. What we do know for certain is that it was a Swedish victory, and though it carried little strategic significance; Wrangel was too far south with a relatively small force, thus couldn't take Torun. Wrangel hastily headed back northwards. But Swedish prestige was revived, and Polish confidence began to languish. Many of Polish magnates desired peace, but Sigismund III, under pressure from the Dutch and Brandenburg ministers, was willing to consent to only a tenuous truce, one which could easily be broken. Again, Swedish cavalry, and thier allies, was improving, but it still required advantageous format, numbers, and maneuver to best the Polish cavalry. They were about to learn in the upcoming summer that without this asset, they would get beat.

Gustavus met Christian IV of Denmark in Februaury, 1629, with the meeting achieving nothing, in terms of the Danish king's further involvement in the Protestant cause, as he concluded a peace with Ferdinand II, at Lubeck on May 27; Christian IV was given very permissive terms. Though he was forced to renounce all his territorial ambitions in Germany, he was allowed the recovery, without indemnity, all the territory occupied by the Imperialist armies. Ferdinand II was ensuring that Denmark was now out of the conflict, thus the task of supporting the Protestants of northern Germany and protecting Stralsund now devolved upon Gustavus alone. Not only did the Protestants disdain the settlement between Christian IV and the emperor, but even Pope Urban VIII denounced the act as scandalous. But Gustavus, whose delegates were refused admission at Lubeck, saw it coming, and realized that Christian IV had forfeited all credibility as a champion of Protestantism or a protector of the German princes. If the Edict of Lubeck left Gustavus alone, it also enabled him with his hands free. He was now prepared to let the war in Polish Prussia slowly subside, but Wallenstein, resolving to prevent Gustavus from entering the German theater, changed that for the time being. The Poles had no love for the German Hapsburgs, and had expressed an unwillingness to accept substantial auxilliary forces of Imperialists from the West. But the recent debacle at Gorzno caused them to think better of the Imperialists from Germany; Wallenstein persuaded the Sejm to admit an army of no more than 12,000 men and some artillery under Hans Georg von Arnim to join the Poles. Gustavus, arriving back in Poland in June of 1629, had a total troop strength in Ducal Prussia now numbering some 23,000 men (over 15,000 infantry, over 7,000 cavalry), but they were dispersed throughout many garrisons. Koniecpolski commanded 18,742 men (7,942 cavalry); confident, Koniecpolski arrived back into the field. Gustavus learned of the approaching Arnim and marched south to intercept him with 5,450 horse and 1,900 foot, thus the amount under Arnim was probably the 5,000 figure many sources claim, because Gustavus moves' indicate he could make quick work of them. But Gustavus failed, as Koniecpolski and Arnim junctioned at Grudziadz (Graudenz) on June 25, 1629. They agreed to attack Marienwerder (modern Kwidzyn), some thirty miles north of them, but two days later, Koniecpolski then insisted to immediately go after Gustavus; now vastly outnumbered here in the region, Gustavus had concluded to cut-and-run north to Malbork (Marienburg), and the safety of his forts. He also was now determined to keep his control of the Vistula delta and the coastal areas around the Frishes Haff, which he hoped to achieve by operating from his entrenchments. I have read that Gustavus retired towards Malbork only after a sally of his was repulsed by Polish positions around Grudziadz, but other accounts state this action occured in September, 1628 (unless a different incident).

At this time, Gustavus was at peace with Ferdinand II, which led this action to be seen by the Swedes as a gratuitous act of war and a breach of the comity of nations, to which Gustavus sent a protest to Wallenstein. But it wasn't a breach of any treaty, and the act achieved its purpose - to retard Swedish interference in Germany. Having sent a body of foot and horse to reinforce his garrison at Kwidzyn (Marienwerder), which is some twenty miles directly south of Malbork, Gustavus, on June 27 of 1629, headed north with his 7,350 men, heading through the region of Trzciana (Honigfelde) towards Sztum (Stuhm). His infantry was ahead of his cavalry, which he had march to the SE of the footmen to provide cover. The cavalry were in three groups. Again, Koniecpolski insisted on an immediate attack, and Arnim, wanting to wait for the Polish and Imperial infantry to arrive, assented to this action. A Catholic force of dragoons beat the Swedes to a vital crossing on the River Leba, which runs east-west through Gniew. Koniecpolski and his men led the way, approaching swiftly from the south, with about 2,500 Polish cavalry (1,300 husaria, 1,200 kozacy) and 2,000 reiters and curaissers under Arnim, who were a little behind them. Their object was probably to bear off to Sztum and turn Gustavus' right flank. Upon learning of their position, Gustavus sent the Rheingraff Johann Wilhelm, who had been keeping up the rear, with around 800-2,000 horse (depending on the source) to protect the narrows between the lakes near Sztum; the object was seemingly to head off the Catholic force from the marching column, hopefully forcing them to make a long detour. Wilhelm was supposedly ordered by Gustavus to avoid an engagement, and to simply occupy the enemy's attention within the confined terrain. But Wilhelm either impetuously attacked, in an outflanking attempt, the enemy near Trzciana, or fell into a well-prepared ambuscade (Wilhelm was perhaps fooled into thinking he had an advantage). Whatever the details, Koniecpolski achieved a devastating flank attack on Wilhelm's left, and the Rheingraff was threatened with destruction. The Swedes and their allies counter-attacked, after they had regrouped at Straszewo and were reinforced (perhaps from Wilhelm's remaining reiters); they were showing success against their clash with some kozacy, but withdrew with the arrival of some husaria and their allied reiters. Moreover, Gustavus himself may have just recently received some reinforcements, but if so, it didn't help (other than perhaps the salvation of some of the infantry): in his effort to head back and sustain the Rheingraff and protect his infantry column, who now faced a serious threat from the cavalry of Koniecpolski and Arnim, Gustavus rallied his withdrawing cavalry with fresh men, and led them in to engage the enemy forces. In a bloody cavalry clash, Gustavus was beaten back near Pulkowitz, narrowly escaping death or capture (his hat was lost and became a Catholic prize). Johann Wilhelm perished, and the Swedish king would later remark,

"I have never been in a hotter bath!"

Swedish propaganda has possibly succeeded in downplaying this clear defeat of Gustavus. However, the defile around Sztum was held, and Gustavus and the rest of his army safely reached Malbork. He succeeded in protecting his infantry, of just twelve were lost in the battle. He lost, according to 'friendly' sources, less than 400 cavalrymen and six leather guns. Polish sources state Gustavus lost 1,467 killed (including 30 senior officers), 200 taken prisoner, and ten leather guns, plus five other guns taken from his possession. Polish losses, according to them, were 150 killed and 200 wounded, which is quite tenable. Unlike at Tczew (Dirschau), they were ready this time in force against the Swedes, and, from their view, not fighting these 'moles' when they were entrenched. Contrary to some claims, Gustavus was not 'ambushed'; the Rheingraff got himself into a very precarious situation, and the king went in blazing to salvage what he could. But he fought his way out of there relatively well, and reputedly repulsed further, smaller, attacks once he was entrenched. But the Battle of Trzciana was definitely a tactical victory for Koniecpolski and his allies over him, and they didn't outnumber him in the actual clash itself, albeit Gustavus was not looking for a fiasco. Polish morale now heightened as a result.

But the sharp reverse for Gustavus, whose forts remained strongly held, was partly retrieved: the Poles and their allies advanced a little west to the Nogat River, a part of the Vistula delta. What soon ensued is where the high standards of discipline and morale effected upon his men by Gustavus beared fruit. The Swedes maintained the solid advantage of a united command, and ordered provisioning, which wasn't too difficult, being it was now the summer. Contrarily, dissent and problems with supply were seriously problematic among his Catholic enemies. A pestilence which broke out in the allied camp prevented the country people from bringing in supplies. Gustavus swiftly sallied upon the Polish rear-guard, scattering them and capturing many wagons, including most of their gunpowder supply.

The combination of this last ill-success, the 'barbarous' presence of Arnim's troops, the pestilence amid the army, and Gustavus' unrelenting entrenched holdings, made even Sigismund III more tractable. Negotiations were opened in August, 1629, with mediating envoys from France, England, and Brandenburg finding both Sweden and Poland in favor of negotiation (but they were not neutral, certainly favoring Gustavus). On September 26, 1629, the Treaty of Altmark ended this conflict. Sweden reaped considerable financial profits; save for Danzig, every river-mouth in Polish Prussia was in Gustavus' hands, all from which he would collect customs, which would strengthen his finances for the great upcoming venture. Sweden retained all of Livonia (including Riga) except the south easterly-part, and Courland was restored to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Sweden gained the right to 3.5 % (or 5.5, depending on the source) of the tax of goods that were shipped through Ducal Prussia, as well as two-thirds of the shipping tolls of every port of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Danzig remained neutral, but was induced by a seperate treaty at Tiegenhoff, on February 18, 1630, to pay two-thirds of its shipping tolls to Sweden's treasury. Importantly for the Sejm, Poland retained the valuable grain trade along the Vistula, which greatly gratified the Polish nobility. But it must be noted the Swedes were being drained, too, much by pestilence and the fact the riches of Ducal Prussia (the Danziger Werder, specifically) were not paying for the war (bellum se ipse alet) as much as Gustavus had hoped. This was due in large part to Koniecpolski's strategy of avioding battle when the Swedes wanted it, coupled with cavalry harassment, restricting the Swedes' freedom of movement. The truce came at a good time for both sides, as the country was devastated from by three years of war. Militarily, it was pretty much a stalemate, but Gustavus came out of Ducal Prussia quite favorably.

The Polish War served well for Gustavus to realize his theories of military reform, and thus forge a better army. He also realized that pursuing a defensive strategy could cause his army to melt away. But his success here resulted in the important Prussian ports delivering for Sweden the necessary revenue to march into Germany (a subsidy from France also helped). It seems he gained more than his success would indicate in Polish Prussia, but Gustavus now controlled the main trade routes through the Baltic. On June 24, 1630, he landed at Peenemunde with merely 13,000 men and 800 guns of all calibers, but the quality and balance of his army was unmatched by any other in Europe. True, as with in Livonia and Polish Prussia, his invasion was not met seriously with sufficient forces, due to campaigns elsewhere, but he wasted no time in strategically establishing himself and made many good soldiers of disbanded men hitherto spoiled by fearful indiscipline (the cause of German soldier by this time had become more centered around subsistence). Moreover, the Poles could not levy enough infantry (fighting Sweish 'moles' was not viable with cavalry) due to problems with taxation, which were wrought from recent internal politics (Wladislaw IV and Koniecpolski balanced things soon after Gustavus left). Gustavus' garrison under Alexander Leslie at Stralsund numbered about 6,000. Alexander Leslie had been knighted by Gustavus, and he and his nephew, David Leslie, would later fight for another military leader who believed in the standing army, and one influenced by Gustavus - Oliver Cromwell. Within a few months, 25,000 German Lutherans and mercenaries flocked to Gustavus' banner. The Protestant princes, however, were initially more apathetic to his presence. The armies of Wallenstein and Tilly totalled some 100,000 men, but Gustavus was fortunate that Wallenstein's personal ambitions, which had reached an unsupportable plateau, had recently led to his temporary dismissal by Ferdinand II, and ultimately his murder. But this campaign is another story....

With all that said, however, I must say this treatise was drawn more heavily from accounts which were drawn from Swedish works. I am certain I couldn't have gotten 'it all correct'.

Thanks, Spartan JKM

Reply

First of all: Whoa! What a post Unfortunately, it's way too much for me to read all at once and reply to it in any sensible manner, so right now I'm only commenting (although there isn't much to add) to what I've read this far.



I'm not sure if I'd state that the "Swedish" army of Gustav Adolf was free from crime, nor that discipline was exemplary. If Gustav's army was mostly peasants before 1626, it consisted mostly of German professional soldiers by 1631. During most of the Thity Years' War, only 1/5 of the entire Swedish army was truly Swedish or Finnish - and Swedish and Finnish troops were mostly held as garrison troops in the conquered areas in Pomerania.
The truth (if there is one) is probably that Gustav Adolf's army was as terrible (from a humane aspect) as any other. You might be confusing it with the Carolean army of Karl XII, where religious duties were law, and crime (such as swearing) was punished severely. Of course, even the Caroleans were no superhumans, and as most soldiers during history, they were probably bastards by normal standards. Bastards who stole, rape, gambled, cursed and all that, permitted to do so or not. Such "crimes" were probably too common to even bother with during the 17th and 18th centuries. Of course, there are records of soldiers who got it, but that doesn't mean everyone else behaved; the unaccounted offenses are likely to be endless, and most people probably got away with whatever they did, since the investigation methods of the time weren't exactly refined. "The good soldier" seems to be very much of a 19th century (typically British) phenomenon, when the abilities to keep all the men in check had improved.
I'd be careful with the use of words such as "heroic" to describe a historic person, and to be honest I'm not very sure the war would have ended within his lifetime even if Gustav hadn't died in 1631. The Imperial/Catholic side still had a lot of resources to work with, and without the aid of France, the extent of Swedish success would always be limited.
Other than, I'd just like to make a short comment och Kircholm, a battle which importance shouldn't be neither over- nor underestimated. Keep in mind that the great victory of the winning side always seem less glorifying if you look at what condition the losing side was in. As for Kircholm, about half the Swedish army participated in the battle, those who did were starving and suffered from various diseases. Moreover, they were under the command of the less than capable Karl IX.

PS. The ineffectiveness (is that a word?) of the caracole was proven to the Swedes already at the battle of Axtorna in 1565, when the Swedish cavalry was defeated by the outnumbered Danish cavalry (that fought in close combat). The Swedish army would probably have caught up with the armies of the neighbouring countries if it hadn't been for the early dethroning of the increasingly insane Erik XIV (who did a lot to improve the Swedish army).

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AFAIK the problem of the caracole was that it was a technique originally designed for dealing with pikemen, and the heavy lancers of the mid-late 1500s whom the pistoleers could normally dodge as necessary. Due to the inherent dynamics of cavalry combat a formation employing it was in serious trouble if it ended up against fast shock cavalry - the English demi-lancers were apparently real problem for German mercenary Reiters in the Low Countries in the 1500s, and the even faster Polish husaria pure murder - particularly as the Swedish horse usually didn't for financial reasons have more armour than breastplate and helmet to survive the onslaught with. (I understand the few squadrons of true cuirassieurs they had mostly came from the old Teutonic Order holdings in the Baltics; the three-quarter armour was later abandoned, save for officers, during the TYW anyway.)

As an aside the "fire pistols and charge" attack technique - then termed pistolade - had also been used quite succesfully by the future Henry IV in the French religious wars, so the concept wasn't as such novel.

Anyway, as such the way Gustavus changed his cavalry tactics wasn't really any stroke of genius or anything, but pure necessity. In Poland his army had very little infantry of any consequence but a lot of very nasty and fast-moving cavalry to deal with; ergo, his horse needed to be able to fight the Poles at least reasonably evenly, and given the way cavalry combat works the most readily available method was the pistolade - if nothing else at least the Swedish horse would be counter-charging rather than being hit essentially stationary, which was rarely a good way for horse to receive enemy horse.


And the Swedish army was rarely any more pleasant a guest to civilian than any other in the period. It was partly due to the fact the transportation methods of the time simply didn't allow a large fighting force to be sustained in the field through much anything else than pitilessly robbing the locals blind, although of course sheer venal greed in all ranks also played a part. Although it should also be noted that during the Thirty Years' War this extraction was actually quite well organized and sophisticated, the idea being to draw maximum money and resources from a locale for a long time which would obviously not be possible if you just razed and pillaged everything at first.

When Karl X invade Poland later he actually made a very honest effort at sparing the populace the ravages of war (since they were going to be his new subjects and all); strict discipline was enforced among the troops and looters were summarily hung. But the logistical necessities of maintaining an army and garrisons soon meant he had to start squeezing the locals in the grand old fashion, which naturally didn't exactly make him popular among his new citizenry.

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Spartan JKM

Good work.

Is this the edited version from TWC or did you add anything more ?


Innocentius


About half you say ?

Well if you are saying that about half of the army was engaged in the CRITICAL phase of the fighting, but it doesn equal the whole battle nonetheless.
Karl IX used the formation he used - his problem. Just like the Romans at Kannae were deployed in certain fashion, but if I assume your point of view than INDEED about HALF of Lithuanian army was engaged too - after all light cavalry ( 350 men) fought ONLY during the pursuit and infantry ( 1000 men) fought only in the first phase of the battle - similar with a number of other units.

And hungry and ill ?

Well that was WAR and Livonia was plagued with hunger and disease - it caused most of the losses to the both sides for the entire campaign.

Remember that Karl IX was so sure he would win this time that he even thought he could take less than 50 % of this army leaving the rest to block Riga - foolhardy ? Yes ! But after 4 years of defeats he could learn just like many other commanders throughout history.
He didn't - his fault. He lost with the army three times larger than that of the Commonwealth - even worse, but it doesn't matter that he couldn't win - it would be enough if someone less capable was leading the Lithuanians at Kircholm...


That is interesting. So what saved his army at Mewe ? Dirschau ? and so on.
The infantry was ESSENTIAL to any success he could have - without that the entire war would be reduced to sieges of castles taken by the Swedes.

The inability of the Poles to provide enough infantry to breach defences of fortified camps and strongholds ( purely political and taxation problems) - the field army had its a lot, but 'on the paper' was the primary reason why the war was won by the Swedes and why it was seen in Poland as a HUMILATION causing a sort of Vietnam trauma and thist for revenge.
Why ? Because victory was close, but constant bickering between Sigismund and the oppositions and commanders + his destructive actions in the parliament which stopped proposed taxation reforms earned him a lot of enemies. Good he dies soon afterwards, because this time an assassination attempt could be tried by someone sane and prepared.

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Yo ceg, figured you'd turn up sooner or later.

Now, you might want to read the whole sentence and not just the part you bolded. "In Poland his army had very little infantry of any consequence but a lot of very nasty and fast-moving cavalry to deal with..." As you can see I'm talking about what the Swedes were facing, not what they were using.
Details.

By what I've read of it infantry was always the poor cousin in Commonwealth armies. This isn't really surprising given the fast-paced and far-ranging cavalry-heavy nature of warfare they'd been mostly doing for quite a while, and the internal social and political arrangements of the realm. If there was one thing the szlachta, like any feudal arsitocracy, hated it was strong central regime and taxes (which tend to go hand in hand as they perfectly well understood), and taxes would've been needed to hire mercenaries to furnish the army with real numbers of capable infantry. But as the nobles would pretty much rather have chewed their own sword arms off than given the Crown any rights that could have been used to strenghten the central governement and thus potentially - gasp horror - interfere with their privileges, and were politically perfectly capable of blocking any such attempts, the army just had to try to work around its shortage of foot troops.

Which, of course, the Swedes who had infantry aplenty did their best to make use of, such as with the field fortifications and walled camps which the Poles, unused to such tactics, clearly found frustrating and "unsporting". Nobody in their right minds plays war by their opponent's rules if he can help it after all.

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I have discussed the original thread with Spartan on TWC so it was obvious. ;)


I considered three possibilities.

1. that you are talking about Poles,
2. That you are talking about Swedes in 1626-29
3. That you mixed up the rulers and it is about Swedes during the deluge,

That is why I have chosen the Swedes.

Which is a mistake. Infantry ALWAYS formed 30-40 % of the army.

Few known major exceptions are:

Battle at Klushino in 1610 where detached force ( a mailed fist of the army besieging Smolensk and Biala) had only 200 footmen, but those were ESSENTIAL to the final victory.

Swedish part of the Deluge - at least the first year - year and a half where infantry formed about 8-10 % of the armywhich was still recovering from the defeat at Batoh in 1652 and terribly led Lithuanian campaign of 1654.

Of course there are also smaller clashes where infantry was not present, but in general infantry was ESSENTIAL.

I count dragoons as infantry too - in LIthuanian GD it formed even 40 % of the entire army alone, in the Crown it was less, but pure infantry was more numerous there.



You are wrongly assuming that people are selfish and do not understand the needs of their country - FOR A REASON it was called Noble's Republic and a large part of them UNDERSTOOD IT. Especially medium nobility with their quite impressive insight.
Virtually all reforms were either inspired or conducted by the nobility - kings were pretty inactive, unfortunatelly.

THe frustration of Koniecpolski was a matter of lack of funds which was created by a conflict between the court and the opposition.

Sigismund from the beginning of his long ( and destructive) reign was at political war against Jan Zamoyski and the remnants of the 'execution movement' (reformers). He tried to strenghten his power and started using wealthy nobility , mainly those who were opposing Zamoyski earlier.
As a man who spent some much time in dungeons or imprisoned in other way, or under the threat of death Sigismund was a bit paranoid and acted using illegal means.
Nobility in Poland had much respect for the tradition and LAW and Sigismund behaviour and his conflict with popular Zamoyski created a lot of distruct resulting in later 'inquisitorian sejm' where it was finally discovered that Sigismund tries to trade his crown with the hated (and defeated) Habsburgs.
Form that moment he was constantly under suspicion which has grown in later years.
The worst moments came during the war against Sweden (where conflicts inspired by the king caused much chaos and resulted in the civil war of 1606-7), later we have the illegal support to the Russian impostors and the illegal war started in 1610 by the king wh literally embezzled the money collected for the war against Swedes. The was was incredbly costly and didn't add to the popularity of this man.
Finally in 1619 we have his controversial action where he supported hated Habsburs once more ( battle at Humienne and so called 'first relief of Vienna') which resulted in very costly war against the Ottomans ( over 100 000 men were mobilised at that time) which sucked the funds from other areas so Gustavus took Riga and nobody could stop him... More distrust and anger.
Later he openly disrupted the efforts of Krzysztof Radziwil in Lithuania (whom he hated) which led to the silly defeat at Walhof (if you have two commanders who hate each other and onne is inexperienced you have the result).
Now add to this his contempt to the law of the Republic, his intolerance and a costly support to causes useless to the Republic and you can see the background ogf the situation BEFORE the war.
I will skip another series of failures right to the point.

During the war in 1626-29 Sigismund is DIRECTLY responsible for:

- neutrality of Lithuania which was so pissed off that only a handful of soldiers from LGD were used during the war,
- destroying the reform of taxation proposed on 3rd December 1626 ( Torun's sejm) i.e. the legilation titled 'Deputaci na obmyslenie sposobów nowych subsidiorum) proposed by Krzysztof Zbaraski (opposition) which was supposed to create a budget of 10 040 000 zloty to pay for 27 000 large army (mainly infantry),
- destroying proposed trading embargo which would result in a ban for trade through Riga and other ports for the time of the war against Gustavus (again Zbaraski's project) which was supposed to push the Dutch to act against Sweden. King supported Lithuanian envoys and the project failed.
- stopping or disrupting other proposals in later years.

Because Sigismund acted like a Gustavus' ally his actions were decisive to the conflict.

Basically because it was impossible to collect enough funds to pay even the soldiers ALREADY in action the army was getting smaller and only 'core' forces were ready to fight (even if some were not paid) and despite a number of soldiers 'on paper' each of the following sejms was unable to rise the number of troops to proposed - worse it was CONSTANTLY getting smaller e.g. in the spring of 1628 in theory there should be 16 574 soldiers - in fact there were less than 8 000...

EACH and every single one of the following sejms was granting larger and larger funds, but to the suprise of the parliament the money were usually paid to the people who were no longer fighting or to deal with debts the state owed the army.
Sejm commisions analised the situation, proposed solutions, but every single time it was not enough (because of the earlier debts) or the proposals were stopped somehow - usually by the king who tried to undermine the opposiotion or acted illegally by bending or breaking the rules.

I ahve one entire 300 pages long work about the taxation, funds, budgets, legislations and proposals during that war - so this is only a very short example...

Sigismund III doesn't even have his street in Warsaw ( even fairy tale characters do) - for some VERY good reasons.
The guy was a disaster and the consequences of his reign were very destructive.

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Personally I think you rate the nobility rather too high (and the way the Polish nobility seem to have mostly behaved during the Deluge AFAIK doesn't exactly suggest much concern beyond their own immediate personal prospects), since in pretty much exactly every single realm where the landed aristocracy was not reined in sooner or later by someone, usually an ambitious monarch, things went to Hell sooner or later and they were still flogging serfs in the 1800s, if a minor hyperbole is allowed to emphasize a point.

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Not at all. The nobility was responsible for a lot of reforms during the etire existence of the 1st Republic. It was in their interest to do so and they were generally aware of it. Only later conflicts with the monarchs and A LOT OF effort from their side (and some wealthiest nobles - magnates - but not all or even majority of them) destroyed the consensus created in the mid XVIth century where kings acted like prime ministers which in the end resulted in the mess during the Great Northern War.


Which is a mistake.

The situation from the BEGINNING of Jan Kazimierz reign was again so similar to Sigismund's III that in 1655 he was so much popular like Charles I of England before his execution and Charles X Gustav was seen as ...a liberator ( aka the Glorious Revolution) - in essence only the incredible unpopularity of Jan Kazimierz gave Charles such opportunities exploited by the propaganda of his supporters such as the infamous Hieronim Radziejowski.

Let's not forget that Jan Kazimierz was just after the disastrous Zwaniec campaign of 1653 and incredibly stupid Lithuanian campaign of 1654 where he disrupted the efforts of Janusz Radziwill (ironically a great friend of his bother Wladyslaw IV) whom he hated to really surreal levels e.g. by withdrawing Cown corps originally sent to help the Lithuanians.

So we have somone so popular like Jacob II ruling already for 7 years - he was blaimed for the defeats where he was guilty or not and Charles X Gustav was seen as a logical choice for the new ruler.

Simply those people didn't see him as enemy to the same level as William of Orange wasn't the enmy to the English. Only later it changed - various factors affected that, mainly Swedish policy, stubborn loyalty of some commanders like Czarniecki and of course Czestochowa.

First 6 months of the Swedish deluge (there were other deluges too) is like 1689 in Britain, from autumn-winter it becomes a real war.
And you see a massive change everywhere.


Of course the famous serfs. Lets not forget that it was little different or worse in autocratic and absolutist Austria and Russia (in Prussia wasn't better either) and actually only about a half of the nobility had any serfs at all.

In the end this selfish nobility led all those movements which were keen on giving the serfs rights and property and formed future revolutionary groups and the core of all democratic movements.

I can say that your imagine of the nobility is simplified and it resembles the vision served in Poland in 1970s which sometimes suggested that Poland-Lithuania was falling since the battle at Tannenberg or indeed since the union of 1385...


Lets keep it at more reasonable level - because it wasn't either a selfish, chaotic rubble nor a host of selfless angels in forms of human beings.
It is always a question of leadership, political and economical conditions, avarage level of education (which contrary to what Englund writes in 'the Invincible' was still pretty high) and other.

Even the best army can be led to a defeat by an arrogant, vain and quarrelsome leader ( Batoh 1652) and it can change ivery quickly if the right leader is found ( Ochmatów 1655).

If we follow simplified vision of historical processes we are nothing more than tabloid journalists.

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As an aside, might I entreat you to elaborate a bit on these "noble reforms" you keep referring to ? 'Cause the overwhelming impression one gets from reading the history of systems involving feudalism in one form or another is that what was in the interests of the nobility was usually not in the interests of about anyone else, and tended to cause problems in the long run.

As for the Swedish Deluge, by what I understand the general unpopularity of Kazimierz did indeed very much play into Karl X's hands and this somewhat unexpected support from the nobility was an important factor in his developing ideas about actually taking over the crown himself (the man was a rather impulsive sort).

But what really turned the nobles against him was above all their realisation that with a Swedish ruler would come the Swedish state apparatus, that all-consuming, all-controlling, efficiently bureaucratic Leviathan which was pretty much exactly what they'd very consistently worked to keep their own weak kings from developing.

Such a system not exactly being in their interests.

The common people just were put off by the blunt fact that even if the King actually wanted to avoid it, the raw necessities of supplying an operational army with the means of the time ultimately and rather shortly boiled down to squeezing the locals dry in the best Thirty Years' War tradition. Which naturally in short order earned the Swedes the unmitigated hatred of the populace, not one bit helped by the inevitable brutality of the counterinsurgency operations.

Yeah, Russian serfs escaping their masters tended to head for the vast emptiness of Siberia for the very simple reason most of the lands to the West would have been no improvement for him.

You may notice those kinda sucked too, except when they managed to create a passably modern and effective form of centralized governement. The Prince of Brandenburg/Prussia managed to cut a deal (not unlike the Swedish crown had done) with his landed aristocracy that allowed him to create such a system without interference from and due compensations for the nobles; it also managed to abolish its serfdom relatively early, although I'm not sure when exactly. Russia was a moribund backwater until Peter the Great rather messily brought it through the wringer to turn it into a passably modern and well-organized state, although the serfs would have to wait for their freedom until the mid-1800s - some analysts argue the country's still paying the price for this retarded abolition of that crappy insitution, as is most of East-Central Europe.
Austria I'm not too knowledgeable about (would have to check my history books to get a better idea of its developements really), but then again it spent a lot of time as a bit of a crumbling wreck late enough to suggest it had some hiccups in this regard.

Be that as it may, the Polish landed noble class was by any measure very large for its kind; most of it was duly rather poor I understand, with most of the wealth, power and land ownership concentrated in the hands of a few great families of grand magnates (who, of course, naturally enough sought to improve their wealth and power by using both to that end). I know for a fact (from Braudel's The Mediterranean) that Poland had a full-blown plantation system of a pattern quite reminiscent of the ancient Roman latifundias (if only because more or less the same pattern developed quite universally for plantations as the most effective method of running them), which for example shipped grain to the Med by the ton for good profit of the magnates owning them.
These apparatuses weren't terribly unusual for the period of course - they sprung up wherever there was suitable land to cultivate within easy reach of waterways for exporting the produce, and the suitable socioeconomic conditions existed for the old feudal Grundsherr to become plantation-magnate Gutsherr. They could be found in Hungary as well, in Ottoman Empire, in Sicily, in parts of Italy... and they seem to very much have been a harbinger of serious problems of ossification and decay for whichever realm hosted them, for they had a built-in habit of severely skewing both the local economy and politics due to the sheer power and wealth they focused in the hands of a very few people. It didn't help one bit these magnates had a bad habit of trying to worm their way out of any and all obligations they might technically owe their monarchs. I'm under the impression the Polish ones at least also tended to maintain veritable private armies, as well as large pools of assorted clients and hanger-ons - many of them nobility, which obviously gave these men quite a bit of voting power in the affairs of the state.

And, yes, the plantations were pretty much invariably worked by serfs. The usual method of improving production was to make these poor buggers work that much harder - the inherent curse of slave economies, which serfdom for most practical purposes is.

I understand this line of developement goes by the name of "neofeudalization" in the relevant jargon (or is regarded as part of that Early Modern phenomenom, not entirely sure which); the Swedish peasantry actually only narrowly escaped being reduced to serfdom during the reign of Karl XI as well.

So, to say that "only about half of the nobility had any serfs at all" means and says very little, as most of the Polish noblemen were (to hyperbole a little) little more than free peasants with a horse, sword, fancy family name and a voice in that... whatever the damn gathering where they were supposed to vote for decisions now was called. The small crust of greater and lesser latifundia magnates could probably by themselves have owned virtually the entire damn peasantry of Poland as serfs no problem.

With a system like that in place during a time when much of the rest of Europe was plunging headfirst towards true state structures and institutions in the modern sense, and no monarch capable of changing things, thanks to the rather Early Medieval style primus inter pares status of the Polish kings, forthcoming, it's really not very difficult to see structural reasons why later Polish history went as it did. It has been argued that East-Central Europe was in essence cursed by its circumstances - the geography and military threats of the region forced the developement of forms of feudalism which proved very durable, and while they fulfilled their original military purposes they all but quaranteed the realms of the region would "fall off the curve" of developements in the Early Modern period and be left as ramshackle, backwards feudal relics while the rest of the world went its own way.

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That is a question of the same kind if absolutistic reforms WERE for the GOOD of the country as well or NOT - after all creation of a machinery which is supposed to feed everlasting wars sucking resources and manpower.

This way you indeed can easily dismiss all the reforms or a majority of those in virtually all countries.

As for the examples - look at ALL changes which EVER happened before some 1880s - from those made by independent Pol-Lit government of course.

The best example would be the 'execution movement' of the XVIth century which implemented changes undermining the ABUSE of law by wealhiest nobles and was behind all those changes from the creation of a new standing army to state tribunals and law codification.


The leviathan didn't see much action BEFORE the illusion about Karl X Gustav was destroyed.




People are not always all-calculating, all-cold logically thinking machines who fight for the rights of their class. It is too much in marxist theme of class struggle - there are many rational and irrational factors to consider.

Karl X was popular ecause of Radziwjowski's propaganda, earlier conflicts with Jan Kazimierz, his numerous failures and flaws and of course Karl's fame as a skilled general who was hoped to deal efficiently with the Russians and Cossacks.

Simply those people belived that a Swedish or a Mongolian king - it doesn't really matter - everyone can be 'civilised' by their influence, just like the 'barbarian' Lithuanian dukes were - for a reason even Ivan the Terrible was proposed during king's election in the past.



Lack of conscription and much smaller taxation meant that a transition from the Commonwealth to any other surrounding state was a shocking experience.

After the Constitution of the 3rd May 1791 it was even more evident - after all ALL the refuges and all soldiers were given freedom after they entered the borders of the Republic or served their ( 7 years in Poland) rather short term in the army.




Latifundia were appearing in Ukraine and were quite common in Lithuania - simply costs of colonisation, defence of the settlements and grain or cattle transport were quite severe there. The bulk of the middle nobility lived in Greater and Lesser Poland after all and lets not forget the town-heavy Royal Prussia.

THat is why the Swedish part of the deluge was so important - the devastation crippled the 'middle class' more than anyone else which undermined their power and added to the power of relatively few, wealthy families and clans.


Correct, to a degree.

The ah so famous private armies were a gigantic show off and during a wartime got under the command of the state authorities and were payed by their budget. There was no question of state loyalty vs obedience to a magnate - army was almost a separate institution with its own political issues which it has proven in most dire and most favourable circumstances - even infamous military confederations were fully legal and had to be registered in local courts of law ( there was a number of legal issues here - to prevent any accidental devastation of the state's or private property ).






And that is where you make A HUGE mistake. There was the 'middle class' - medium nobility which dominated the political landscape to the early XVIIth century and only later, gradually it was wrestled back by magnates who shouldn't be seen as a solid, homogenous class anyway - there were rivaling factions with so called ' people's tribunes' who acted as the leaders of medium nobility.

The part of the noble class was usually politically active to far greater degree than the poor nobility. In addition there was some sort of rivalry between senate (dominated by wealthier nobles) and izba poselska which where questions of equality, magnate danger etc played its very important part.

In fact only the Lithuanian GD and Ukraine seen numerous situations of lesser nobility effictively in magnate 'pocket' - and that wasn't too certain in any case.

But during sejms - which were gathered in the areas dominated by medium nobility magnates seen their influence greatly decreased - exception was when those gathered in Warsaw in poor Mazovia where nobility formed up to 34 % of the population, but lets say it loud and clear POOR NOBILITY was usually NOT interested in country's affairs and to gain influence in the parliament you would need to influence an entire province which was never easy and except Lithania and Ukraine ws rather unlikely to happen at all.

That is where the deluge and the question of king's power appear.

The deluge devastated areas which were politically most healthy and created another mass of poor nobility thus weakening the medium class.

KIngs on the other had were enjoying considerable power and influence and it was their decision whom to support - medium nobility or a selected group of magnates. From the time of Sigismund we see rather stupid and short sighted attempts to use magnates as the power behind the throne.
It is nothing suprising and happened in other states, sure, but in the Commonwealth that WAS suicidal because NONE official (in theory) risked anything if he disobeyed the king who supported him - he could easily turn his back on the monarch and that is all.
Amazingly all the Vasa and the utterly incompetant Michal Korybut Wisniowiecki ALL tried to use the magnates which was rather suicidal for the long term consequences. In the XVIIth century only Jan Sobieski played medium nobility against the magnates, but it brought little consequences - was quite literally 'too little and too late', though at least he pushed the machine of the state to the limits and at least in Lithuania the power of his enemies was broken - unfortunatelly it was after his death already...
Primus inter pares ? Not true.

Kings enjoyed power uncomparable to anyone else + had the respect earned by the Jagiellonian dynasty to support them which was a real political tool is used wisely or used AT ALL (most of the nobility was conservative and legalistic).

Sigismund worked long and hard to undermine the second and for some reasons pushed to demolish the first (though that happned as a consequnce of his attempts to strenghten his inflence).
Simply the way he dealt with the situation might be good in France or England where policy was much simplier and direct - unfortunatelly(or fortunatelly) it wasn't like that in the Commonwealth - just like in the Netherlands, Venice or post-1689 England.

So where you say early medieval I say pre-constitutional monarchy - and it is me who is right.
It was't some loose confederation of warrying warlords ( ) you belive it was - but by forgetting an entire middle class, king's rights and other factors it was easy to make this wrong conclusion. But I am still greatful it was not described as a tribal, cavemen social structure...

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