Chapter II- War in Sicily, Part I

Following the success in southern Italy, the legions were sent back north and were deactivated for rest and recovery. The II Legion was deactivated in 245 and stationed south of Capua. The I Legion was deactivated the following year and stationed south of Rome. Peace reigned again and the Senate was content to watch developments abroad. The Ptolemy’s were successfully waging war against the Seleucid dynasty, even gaining control of Antioch. The mainland Greeks, led by Sparta, Athens, and Rhodes were gradually gaining domination over the Macedonians. The Greeks even extended east towards Byzantion and then northward along the Black Sea. The western Mediterranean remained relatively quiet until 243 when a Punic force crossed the straights of Messana and laid siege to Rhegion. Manius Aegidius Agrippa, a veteran leader, was given command of the II Legion and ordered south to aide the Italians in Rhegion. Punic influence in Italy was unacceptable. In 241 the I Legion was activated under the command of Cnaeus Faustus Asina, one of the victors at Taras, and was sent south to aide the II Legion. Rhegion surrendered in the fall of 241 and the Senate ordered the two legions to cross the straights and capture Messana so as to secure the straights. The Carthaginians did not sit idly by as the Romans approached and ordered their main army in Sicily east towards Messana under the command of Yahewweilon, an anti-Barcid who supported expansion into mainland Italy.

The opposing forces met at Abaecanum in spring of 240. The Roman legions approached from the south and deployed as they neared the Carthaginian force. The morning before the coming battle the two legionary commanders began to discuss strategy and whether or not one of them should take joint command over the army. Both men were successful commanders and well-respected by the troops, but Cnaeus Faustus Asina was clearly the more decorated of the two commanders in light of his success in leading the II Legion at Taras. The commanders decided to the Cnaeus Asina should take joint command of the army but sent a dispatch to Rome asking for clarity of the matter. With their battle plans settled, the armies settled down for the evening and prepared for the coming battle.

The following morning; the legions deployed in full battle dress. The I Legion took the right, being the more experienced of the legions. The II Legion formed the left of the line. The Roman battle line was situated along the top of a long rolling ridge that descended northward to the Punic camp. Along the slopes where gorgeous fields of freshly planted grain; providing a degree of cover for the Punic forces. Both legion commanders deployed their slingers forward, followed by the five cohorts of legionnaires along the crest of the ridge, with the light infantry maniple in reserve towards the exposed flank of each legion. The cavalry of both legions was deployed to the right of the entire line to serve as a combined force. Seeing that their lines were properly dressed and organized, the commanders of each legion stepped forward and addressed their respective troops, exhorting them to great deeds against the Punic forces. The commanders then withdrew to positions behind the legions, close enough to support each legion with their heavy cavalry. The combined might of legions fielded over 3,000 men.

The Punic army was deployed at the base of the ridge in a long, thin line. The Punic medium infantry held the center of the line with one dozen elephants deployed to the front. The Carthaginian left flank was covered by Iberian light cavalry and the right flank was supported by three units of Punic heavy cavalry. The main army could put nearly 2,300 men into the field.

The battle was initiated by the sudden arrival of the Punic garrison from Messana, led by Hamalcar the Elder, and several hundred skirmishers. The Punic force arrived on the battle field beyond the right flank of the Roman forces and posed an immediate threat to the integrity of the entire battle line. Cnaeus Asina reacted quickly and wheeled around the heavy cavalry squadrons, along with the I Legion’s light infantry maniple and his personal guard to counter the new threat. The cavalry forces clashed and the casualties were heavy. The Punic heavy cavalry appeared to gain the upper-hand until the arrival of Manius Agrippa and his guard. Hamalcar was able to escape but not before inflicting grievous casualties upon the Praetoria squadrons.

Meanwhile, the main Punic battle line closed within range of the legion’s slingers. The legions held firm while the slingers began to pelt the Punic army with a hail of stone. The I Legion’s slingers cut down the light cavalry positioned on the Punic right. The II Legion’s slingers concentrated on the heavy cavalry supporting the Punic left. The Punic heavy cavalry then swung around the Roman left and attempted to flank the II Legion. The centurion of the II Legion’s light maniple shifted his command to counter the threat and the Punic cavalry was stopped dead in its tracks. The left-most cohort soon joined in the assault and the majority of the Punic cavalry was defeated.

As the left was secured, the elephants moved within range of the I Legion’s slingers. The slingers laid down such a barrage that the elephant force was cut down after just a few volleys. The cavalry guard of the Punic commander attempted to cross the front of the Roman army only to be cut down as well. Finally, the left flank of the Punic army, lead by a large phalanx of Greek mercenaries, engaged the I Legion. The heavy pilum of the legionnaires made quick work of the lightly armed Punic forces and soon the left flank of the Punic army began to disintegrate. At this moment the four unengaged cohorts of the II Legion marched obliquely to the right and smashed through the thin center of the Punic line. The Punic army now completely collapsed as the Punic commander led an organized retreat of a full third of the army back to Messana. The survivors where cut down as the Roman heavy cavalry returned to the battle field and delivered the final blow to any surviving pockets of resistance.

The Punic army was shattered and the survivors, led by their disgraced general fled to Messana. They left over 1,600 dead on the field while the legions lost only 200 men, mostly in the cavalry squadrons. Hamalcar escaped the disastrous battle as well with just a handful of his cavalry guard. The legions immediately followed up their victory at Abaecanum by besieging the dispirited survivors at Messana. The defenders of Messana still had a significant force of men and the Roman commanders decided to wait out the siege. Far better to keep the legions intact in order to continue the campaign onto Lilibeo unimpeded then to risk heavy losses storming the walls of Messana.

Messana would be captured in the winter of 239. The victorious legions marched through the gates of the city, putting to death the Punic garrison and enslaving those that they considered loyal to the Carthaginian war effort. Hamalcar the Elder had died during the siege, but the disgraced Yahewweilon was captured and crucified in front of the entire population of Messana. At this point in the campaign a decision had to be made immediately. The island was clear of any Punic field armies. The Greeks at Syracuse showed no signs of putting their forces into the field to challenge the Romans. Yet, the city of Lilibeo was slowly building a force as reinforcements began to trickle in from Carthage. The legion commanders met and began to discuss their next step and unfortunately could not reach a unified decision. Cnaeus Asina, fresh off his second major victory, wanted to make a dash for Lilybaeum, arguing that the combined might of the two Roman legions, flush with confidence, and holding the initiative, could easily secure nearly the entire island for the Roman Empire. The glory would be boundless and the Senate may even award them a triumph. Manius Agrippa argued for caution. He looked south towards Syracuse and saw a powerful army that could potentially undo all the valour and courage the legionnaires had displayed in defeating the main Punic army. He asked that they wait for orders from the Senate. Cnaeus Asina was furious, his fellow legion commander was not as experienced, nor as accomplished, and Asina believed that Agrippa was trying to stall and derail any greater glory he may receive by quickly taking Lilibeo. During the night, he marched the I Legion out of Messana and by the spring of 238 he laid siege to Lilybaeum, alone and unsupported. The II Legion remained in Messana and oversaw the arrival of a garrison force and began to Romanize the new province. The Senate took notice of the divisive situation and began to rethink the command structure of their young army. As soon as possible, they would have to address the issue of leadership of their armies lest a disaster occur.