issus vs gaugamela

[anubis88]

Hi! I question for all fellow historians... I've been randomly looking through my history books , that don't cover alexander very deeply, and i've seen that some of them only mention the battle of issus, while forgeting gaugamela completly. One describes thouroghly the battle of issus and just mentions gaugamela like a minor battle. I've also seen this in my school books, where they describe the battle of issus as the most crucial battle in the war between Alexander and Persia.

I always thought that the battle of Gaugamela was much more important and decisive than issus... Or am i missing something? the strenght of the army seems preety much the same... Did Darius had a more elite army fighting at issus? Or is there something else? like drunk profesors writing the books? Or is this just the way my countrymen think?

if anyone knows why this is so, please share your information.

[tapanojum]

"The Battle of Issus was a decisive Macedonian victory and it marked the beginning of the end of Persian power. It was the first time the Persian army had been defeated with the King (Darius III at the time) present."

An entry in Wikipedia. Could be a good point, but then again...its Wikipedia.

[TWFanatic]

Textbooks are extremely brief, and from my experience they like to be particularly brief when covering the more interesting parts of history.

[konny]

Did Darius had a more elite army fighting at issus?

The "Greek Mercenaries" (Iphikratians?) were the backbone of Darius army and that corps was more or less destroyed at Issus. We don't know how large the Persian armies in that time really were, if you don't take the Greek reports of the Persian mass armies with several 100,000 men for granted.

It is a tradition to regard Issus as more decisive and Gaugamela more as an afternath. That would make sense, when we assume that at Issus the "Royal Persian Army" was destroyed and could not be replaced, while at Gaugamela the Persians did not field much more than local militia from Mesopotamia and only a handfull of Persian core troops from the Iranian highlands.

[TWFanatic]

I've always wondered where the Immortals were. You never here about them in Alexander's conquests. Had they been disbanded?

[konny]

Good question. I can't recall to have heard of them after Xerxes, too.

[The Persian Cataphract]

Issus is regarded as the phase where Alexandros no longer needed to gamble; It ensured the conquest of Asia Minor and Egypt, which went relatively unopposed. That the battle of Issus additionally featured the Achaemenid emperor personally leading his army to defeat, and how this inspired portrayals such as the famed Alexander mosaic, is of course another factor. Gaugamela however is not a less known battle, and foremostly emphasizes Alexander's boldness and a very fine tactic; The giant wedge smashing right into the front. Issus was not a battle where Darius III Codomannus could have stopped Alexander; At Gaugamela, he was fully capable of doing it, but with the wing of Bessus prematurely retreating, Alexander is not only successful in showcasing the excellent central flexibility in the Macedonian infantry (It bends, it bends, it beeeeeeeeeeeeends, but thanks to the small plates between the regiments, it never breaks... When Mazaeus puts Parmenion to test, the entire line gradually arches itself to screen against the cavalry). This is remarkable, because Darius knew exactly what was needed to defeat the Macedonians; He did not only bring more manpower, or more shock elements, but he overlapped Alexander by quite some distance, which certainly would have made the task of flanking much more difficult for Alexander and his Companion cavalry.

As for the Immortals, in Arrian's account, he calls them the "Apple-bearers", hinting at the silver, or golden counter-weight on their spears. We don't hear that much about them at Issus, because the account rather focuses on the Persian-style hoplite, the Cardaces, that rather flopped in the battle, though the Immortals would always be present around the area of the King of Kings. However by this time, Darius' army was quite reformed and included several other regal elements, such as the heavily armed and armoured bodyguard cavalry, the Hûvakâ, which was later armed with the xyston-style lance as a reform past the battle of Issus. Thus we have, like in the early Imperial days something of an elite foot and cavalry unit, only following different organization. What I'm not quite sure of is if the 10,000 strong corps still included the 2,000 elite dé elite Ârshtîbarâ.

[Menander of India]

Well, as far as I know the name 'Immortals' was never used by the Persians themselves. These must have been the only pure Persian infantry force as Persians switched to horses once they established their dominance in the Iranian plateau. As it was the personal foot bodyguard of the Great King it is possible to have had a fixed strength (10,000 why not?Not all of them participated in opperations...)

And yes, after the Persian Wars they seem to disappear from the scene until Alexander the Great came into play, and particularly in Gaugamela. There, they appear close to the king. The 'units' 'King's relatives' and 'Apple bearers' most probably refer to this elite bodyguard.





PS; I think the 'apple bearers' appeared at Issus too, not sure though...

[CirdanDharix]

Weren't Arstibara (a.k.a Armtaka, "apple-bearers") separate from the Anusiya (which the Greeks mis-translated to Athanatoi, "Immortals"), with one of the best-documentated differences being in the shape of the counter-weights on their spears--pomegranates for the Anusiya, apples for the Arstibara?

[Menander of India]

Oooooops! Persian Cataphract you posted while I was typing!

Neat

[The Persian Cataphract]

It is true that the name "Immortals" was never in use by the Achaemenids themselves; Ironically, the designation given to the corps of 10,000 was "Companions" or "Ânûshiyâ".

Errata: I previously mentioned a 2,000 strong elite dé elite unit of spear-bearers, however for historicity, I must correct this figure: The most attested figure appears to be a highly disciplined and decorated unit of 1,000 men, surrounded by 9,000 Companions. However the point on whether this household organization remained intact until the Macedonian invasions is still valid.

[The Persian Cataphract]

Weren't Arstibara (a.k.a Armtaka, "apple-bearers") separate from the Anusiya (which the Greeks mis-translated to Athanatoi, "Immortals"), with one of the best-documentated differences being in the shape of the counter-weights on their spears--pomegranates for the Anusiya, apples for the Arstibara?

Hmmm, I've seen this word "Amrtakâ" float about a few times, and it reminds me of Nick Sekunda. I'm not going to shrug away his authority, but the questioning on the reliability of his scholastics are quite wide-spread, and puts him quite close to other scholars, such as David Nicolle; They know something about a lot stuff, but on the other hand, neither of them are specialists. One difference was of course the difference of spear-pomegranates or rounded butts (Or whatever one would like to call it), but there are theories on uniforms as well. Nick Sekunda isn't alone in this case, Amrtakâ may have been used as a titular prefix designating a unit of "Immortals"; Which in later times organization were split up in certain ranks and regiments; This is of course a reformed unit, which begs to differ from the Immortals of the early Imperial days; This is where we begin to see a unit originally wearing kidaris, flowing robes, fillets, long tunics, old-school scale armour turning into the soft tiara and kyrbasia wearing soldiers uniformed accordingly to the colour of their regiments, and adopt a more practical dress-code.

This may be accorded to the reforms of Artabazus and Datames. They were also responsible for rigorous upgrade in equipment for the heavy cavalry, where many conventions, lauded by Xenophon in his manuals on horsemanship, would on its own right revolutionize usage of cavalry, and ease the transition between a screening unit into a more melee-inspired role.

[mrtwisties]

Strategically, they're both overrated.

At Issus, Darius led an army that had taken him mere months to assemble. Although they lost, the Persians retreated with the bulk of their better forces (cavalry, immortals, greek mercenaries) intact.

After Issus, while Alexander besieged Tyre and Gaza, the Persians (and their allies) counter-attacked on multiple fronts in the Peloponnese, Lydia, the Hellespont and the Aegean. Hardly the actions of an empire on the ropes.
(By sheer bad luck, all of these counter-attacks were defeated).

At Gaugamela, the Persians had a better prepared army. They again lost, perhaps more emphatically this time, but they again retreated with a fair number of their better forces intact.

After Gaugamela, Darius' resources were certainly more strained than they had been before. But the Persians were still able to fight a decent defensive war, buying time as Darius assembled a new force at Ecbatana. I think it took something like 30 days for Alexander to force his way through the Persian Gates, for example. Obviously, it wasn't exactly ideal having a conqueror traipsing through the heartland of the Persian Empire - but there's every indication that Darius was starting to assemble a decent-sized force at Ecbatana when he was betrayed by Bessus.

It was Bessus' betrayal that really put an end to Persian opposition. Remember, the Persian Empire had been roiled by in-fighting and secession before Darius took over as Great King just a few months before Alexander became King of Macedon. It was actually pretty impressive of Darius to hold the empire together the way he did, and it seems he was able to draw on a fair bit of charisma and energy to do so.

When he was betrayed and imprisoned, the intriguing factions were presented with a choice - either ally themselves with Bessus the usurper, or with Alexander the successful chap who had a track record of treating Persian nobles decently. It was at that point that the empire unravelled.

But if Darius had not been betrayed, the Persian Empire could have fought on. Perhaps they would still have lost. The Macedonian war machine was pretty impressive, and their generals were both talented and experienced.

But it wouldn't necessarily have turned out that way. Many times in history, Iranian empires have "pulled a Russia" on western land armies. Earlier in the campaign, before Granicus, Memnon had advocated doing just that. If Darius had remained in charge and retained the loyalty of the populace, Alexander's supply lines would have been far less secure. How far east could he realistically have marched? Who knows how things could have turned out?

So I don't think Issus and Gaugamela were as significant as most textbooks seem to think they are. Great battles, certainly, but they didn't bring about the downfall of the Persian Empire.

[J.Alco]

I have to say, that's a pretty refreshing outlook on the history of Alexander's invasion of the Persian Empire. Most history books tend to present it as a non-stop parade of flawless successes from the genius Alexander who toppled without any real problems a massive empire. Those stories also tend to portray Darius as a rather weak and ineffectual emperor who was also a coward who didn't dare fight Alexander personally at any of the battles where he was present.

An interpretatio Graeca (not sure if that's how you spell it) of history, anyone?

[O'ETAIPOS]

Strategically, they're both overrated.

At Issus, Darius led an army that had taken him mere months to assemble. Although they lost, the Persians retreated with the bulk of their better forces (cavalry, immortals, greek mercenaries) intact.

After Issus, while Alexander besieged Tyre and Gaza, the Persians (and their allies) counter-attacked on multiple fronts in the Peloponnese, Lydia, the Hellespont and the Aegean. Hardly the actions of an empire on the ropes.
(By sheer bad luck, all of these counter-attacks were defeated).

At Gaugamela, the Persians had a better prepared army. They again lost, perhaps more emphatically this time, but they again retreated with a fair number of their better forces intact.

After Gaugamela, Darius' resources were certainly more strained than they had been before. But the Persians were still able to fight a decent defensive war, buying time as Darius assembled a new force at Ecbatana. I think it took something like 30 days for Alexander to force his way through the Persian Gates, for example. Obviously, it wasn't exactly ideal having a conqueror traipsing through the heartland of the Persian Empire - but there's every indication that Darius was starting to assemble a decent-sized force at Ecbatana when he was betrayed by Bessus.

It was Bessus' betrayal that really put an end to Persian opposition. Remember, the Persian Empire had been roiled by in-fighting and secession before Darius took over as Great King just a few months before Alexander became King of Macedon. It was actually pretty impressive of Darius to hold the empire together the way he did, and it seems he was able to draw on a fair bit of charisma and energy to do so.

When he was betrayed and imprisoned, the intriguing factions were presented with a choice - either ally themselves with Bessus the usurper, or with Alexander the successful chap who had a track record of treating Persian nobles decently. It was at that point that the empire unravelled.

But if Darius had not been betrayed, the Persian Empire could have fought on. Perhaps they would still have lost. The Macedonian war machine was pretty impressive, and their generals were both talented and experienced.

But it wouldn't necessarily have turned out that way. Many times in history, Iranian empires have "pulled a Russia" on western land armies. Earlier in the campaign, before Granicus, Memnon had advocated doing just that. If Darius had remained in charge and retained the loyalty of the populace, Alexander's supply lines would have been far less secure. How far east could he realistically have marched? Who knows how things could have turned out?

So I don't think Issus and Gaugamela were as significant as most textbooks seem to think they are. Great battles, certainly, but they didn't bring about the downfall of the Persian Empire.

I will comment on many of this informations tommorow. Quite a few are not true or present facts from perspective of our XX c AD image of war.

[TWFanatic]

Strategically, they're both overrated.

At Issus, Darius led an army that had taken him mere months to assemble. Although they lost, the Persians retreated with the bulk of their better forces (cavalry, immortals, greek mercenaries) intact.

After Issus, while Alexander besieged Tyre and Gaza, the Persians (and their allies) counter-attacked on multiple fronts in the Peloponnese, Lydia, the Hellespont and the Aegean. Hardly the actions of an empire on the ropes.
(By sheer bad luck, all of these counter-attacks were defeated).

You, sir, contribute quite a bit to luck. Forgive me for speaking plainly but you blatantly disregarded the greatness of Alexander and the superiority of his system of warfare to all others that he encountered. I suppose it would be more correct to say his father Phillip II's system of warfare, but that's beside the point (just had to appease the detail nitpickers). You simply cannot deny that the Macedonians were superior militarily to the Persians and the entire near east, and that Alexander and Phillip were (and still are) two of the greatest military leaders and reformers ever.

[Centurio Nixalsverdrus]

At Issus, Darius led an army that had taken him mere months to assemble. Although they lost, the Persians retreated with the bulk of their better forces (cavalry, immortals, greek mercenaries) intact.

Afaik they lost all their remaining greek troops, correct me if I'm wrong.

After Issus, while Alexander besieged Tyre and Gaza, the Persians (and their allies) counter-attacked on multiple fronts in the Peloponnese, Lydia, the Hellespont and the Aegean. Hardly the actions of an empire on the ropes.
(By sheer bad luck, all of these counter-attacks were defeated).

The actions in the Aegean, and so on the Peloponnesos and the Hellespont were undertaken by the Persian fleet, which was 1) out of supply because of Alexander's strategy of occupying the ports along the Levante, 2) running out of men and ships because the Cyprian / Phoenician contigents sided with Alexander after he had made the local rulers of the area petty kings, 3) without an able leader because Memnon had died. They managed to capture an Aegean city nevertheless.

What was left was the city of Halikarnassos, under Makedonian siege, and uprisings / vain attempts of remaining Persian forces in the more central parts of Asia Minor which have never been under any firm control of the Persians. These attempt can hardly be called ridiculous, but they weren't a big threat either, and were eventually beaten back.

At Gaugamela, the Persians had a better prepared army. They again lost, perhaps more emphatically this time, but they again retreated with a fair number of their better forces intact.

Not only were they perfectly prepared, but even had they prepared the battlefield prior, evening it out for getting the maximum use out of their chariots. But even the best plan never survives the first enemy encounter, and this eventually led to their defeat: they haven't been able to react properly on Alexander's tactical maneuvers. The chariots, for example, resulted mere useless because they were treated by the Makedones much like Carthaginian elephants by Scipio Africanus. Communication lines in the Persian army were not fast enough. Persian troops were (almost) generally inferior to the Makedonians', consisting of general imperial levy, not used to fight on the battlefield as the Makedones were.

After Gaugamela, Darius' resources were certainly more strained than they had been before. But the Persians were still able to fight a decent defensive war, buying time as Darius assembled a new force at Ecbatana. I think it took something like 30 days for Alexander to force his way through the Persian Gates, for example. Obviously, it wasn't exactly ideal having a conqueror traipsing through the heartland of the Persian Empire - but there's every indication that Darius was starting to assemble a decent-sized force at Ecbatana when he was betrayed by Bessus.

Had they listened to Memnon, they would've done exactly this - letting Alexander wander around until he would have to retreat. It didn't correspond to the honour codex of the Achaemenids to do so though, and so Dareius decided to confront the agressor. He lost and fled two times the battlefield (prematurely perhaps). What's a king worth who's on the flight through his empire? I would say that he knew it was over in the moment he fled from Gaugamela.

But if Darius had not been betrayed, the Persian Empire could have fought on. Perhaps they would still have lost. The Macedonian war machine was pretty impressive, and their generals were both talented and experienced.

It wasn't easy to take the rest of the empire after Gaugamela, and I would go as far as to say that it was the most difficult part of the conquest.

So I don't think Issus and Gaugamela were as significant as most textbooks seem to think they are. Great battles, certainly, but they didn't bring about the downfall of the Persian Empire.

I think you are right on the most part, although I'm not so optimistic towards the Persian resistance (and resilience), and especially you neglect a bit the military ability of Alexander the Great and his generals imho.

[The Persian Cataphract]

You, sir, contribute quite a bit to luck. Forgive me for speaking plainly but you blatantly disregarded the greatness of Alexander and the superiority of his system of warfare to all others that he encountered. I suppose it would be more correct to say his father Phillip II's system of warfare, but that's beside the point (just had to appease the detail nitpickers). You simply cannot deny that the Macedonians were superior militarily to the Persians and the entire near east, and that Alexander and Phillip were (and still are) two of the greatest military leaders and reformers ever.

Unlike Mrtwisties, who merely brought a different, but not outrightly false account, you are committing a great offence to established academical sensibilities, bringing scholarship to the issue back some centuries; Indeed, Classicists of the Victorian age would have been proud to read such a claim. On what grounds was the Macedonian system superior to that of the Persians, and how does this relate to your assertion of correctly appreciating Alexander's reputation as a general? Are you by chance saying that Alexander's basis, which would constitute the backbone of his strategies and his tactics, superior to that of the Persians, facilitiating his victories? Alexander is called the Great, because he wasn't a mediocre general; To somehow ascribe his victories automatically by saying that he had better troops, is to defile what truly revolutionized warfare, effectively bringing it to the Hellenistic age. The Graeco-Macedonians did not have the vast spectra of troops available to that of the Persians; Indeed, they did not even organize themselves accordingly to a decimal system, unlike the Persians who had an almost over-complicated system of ordaining junior and senior officers. It is hard to discard many popularly established idea, but in reality it is absurd to think that once Alexander captured babylon, it was all over; Equally, it is absurd to dismiss the factors that truly contributed to the downfall of the Codomannus.

Using your line of logic, I may as well as ascribe the Parthian army superior to the Seleucid war-machine; Simply because they got defeated by an almost ridiculously simple organization with a main corpus of horse-archers and light horse, with a nucleus of super-heavy cavalry. To ascribe superiority by such a basis is not only risky, but also discouraged; Alexander did for instance meet very harsh resistance from Ariobarzanes, who probably expected to complete the pincer once Darius had arrived with his reinforcements from Ecbatana. Then by what basis do you asribe the Macedonian military machine superior? At Gaugamela, Darius expected to win. Not only did he bring more, and heavier cavalry to the battle, he also brought elephants, shock chariotry and organized his lines accordingly to facilitate flanking.

[The Persian Cataphract]

It didn't correspond to the honour codex of the Achaemenids to do so though, and so Dareius decided to confront the agressor. He lost and fled two times the battlefield (prematurely perhaps). What's a king worth who's on the flight through his empire? I would say that he knew it was over in the moment he fled from Gaugamela.

Unless you have read the contemporary Chaldaean astrological tablets, that is. They provide a vastly different account on the events. Naturally, I'm inclined to take this more contemporary, and non-Western source more seriously than the inflated stock provided by Graeco-Roman sources and recensions of sources. Second of all, when a sovereign so great and with such a land-mass is merely labelled "king", it furthers the malicious eurocentric point of view. The formal title for the Persian King of Kings, or emperors if you will, as aptly as they describe the geographic possession otherwise known as an empire, is xšāyaθiya xšāyaθiyānām, later šāhān šāh, or in its Greek translation βασιλεύς τῶν βασιλέων (basileus tōn basiléōn).

The same goes for the Parthian empire. It wasn't a "kingdom". The Romans may have called this area either Regnum parthorum or Regnum Sassanidorum, but then again, with a country so extensive of foreigners doing a sloppy job at correctly designating stuff... Heh... Do I even need to clarify myself?

[Watchman]

By what I've read on it (in the Osprey "Essential Histories" book on Alex's campaigns mind you) Alex only finally got rid of the last of the Persians' Greek mercs after Gaugamela and Bessus' coup, when he managed to corner them in Hyrkania and force their surrender. The Central Asian satrapies apparently largely sided with Bessus (who did have a passably legitimate claim to kingship after all) who kept giving Alex trouble for a while with a hit-and-run rearguard campaign, and after he was finally run down and disposed of some Baktrian nobleman took up the reins and kept up the same for a few years (IIRC what I read about it he was eventually betrayed and killed by his Saka allies, who'd had enough of the whole thing and presented his head to Alex to open negotiations). Besides which Alex and his diverse deputies no doubt had to deal with any number of minor uprisings, troublesome stragglers, ever-troublesome mountain tribes and all the other crap that had plagued the Achaemenids and would keep the Seleukids somewhat busy.

You, sir, contribute quite a bit to luck. Forgive me for speaking plainly but you blatantly disregarded the greatness of Alexander and the superiority of his system of warfare to all others that he encountered. I suppose it would be more correct to say his father Phillip II's system of warfare, but that's beside the point (just had to appease the detail nitpickers). You simply cannot deny that the Macedonians were superior militarily to the Persians and the entire near east, and that Alexander and Phillip were (and still are) two of the greatest military leaders and reformers ever.

And you, sir, seem to sort of forget Alexander's undeniable skills and the easy majority of the Macedonian tactical system in circulation only reached where his actual core field army was. The garrison commanders and satraps he left to run assorted parts of his growing empire would have had to make do with their personal abilities, perhaps a smallish cadre of Hellenic troops, and local forces - in many cases former Achaemenid garrisons and feudal forces no doubt, and mercenaries.

[Centurio Nixalsverdrus]

@The Persian Cataphract:

I didn't want to offend the King of Kings, really. His exact title is just not very important to me.

I'd love to hear the Persian side. So he was not escaping the battle?

[mrtwisties]

I have to say, that's a pretty refreshing outlook on the history of Alexander's invasion of the Persian Empire. Most history books tend to present it as a non-stop parade of flawless successes from the genius Alexander who toppled without any real problems a massive empire. Those stories also tend to portray Darius as a rather weak and ineffectual emperor who was also a coward who didn't dare fight Alexander personally at any of the battles where he was present.

An interpretatio Graeca (not sure if that's how you spell it) of history, anyone?

Given that most of our sources are Greek and Roman secondary texts, you've got to expect at least some sort of bias towards Alexander, and be alert to the possibility of propaganda. It doesn't help that a lot of people (then and now) get involved because they're fanboys. I'm not trying to be massively revisionist here - Alexander was brilliant, and the Macedonians were pretty incredible soldiers. But as The Persian Cataphract remarked, you only get to be "The Great" if you do something that's, well, great. The Persians cannot have been as weak as the Greek and Roman sources portray them to be.

For example, there's a lot of material out there about how Darius was effete and spent most of his time despairing at Alexander's inexorable advance. That just doesn't match up with the facts to me. This is a guy who managed to seize a disputed throne, reassert control over his various provinces and reconquer Egypt - all in just a couple of years. That's pretty good kingmanship, so far as I can tell.

It's not as if the Greek sources present a consistent account of the guy, either. On the one hand, they rabbit on about how he's effete and despairing. On the other, they have him saying noble words and passing on greetings to Alexander after he gets stabbed. Ever been stabbed? If you're the effete guy they describe him as, you'd probably spend your time squealing and carrying on, not making grand noble gestures.

So, I reckon there's a lot of bias and misreporting in the Greek and Roman histories. I'm not even saying it was necessarily deliberate on their part - it would just have taken a couple of negative stereotypes about Persians to kick in, and suddenly confirmation bias would have affected their writing without them knowing it.

Now, to address some of the consequences of that bias.

Whether there was a real counter-attack after Issus

The actions in the Aegean, and so on the Peloponnesos and the Hellespont were undertaken by the Persian fleet, which was 1) out of supply because of Alexander's strategy of occupying the ports along the Levante, 2) running out of men and ships because the Cyprian / Phoenician contigents sided with Alexander after he had made the local rulers of the area petty kings, 3) without an able leader because Memnon had died. They managed to capture an Aegean city nevertheless.

What was left was the city of Halikarnassos, under Makedonian siege, and uprisings / vain attempts of remaining Persian forces in the more central parts of Asia Minor which have never been under any firm control of the Persians. These attempt can hardly be called ridiculous, but they weren't a big threat either, and were eventually beaten back.

I don't think that all that many Persians died at Issus. It wasn't like Rome Total War, where they wind up with 0 men remaining after a rout. We know, for example, that 8,000 of the Greek mercenaries who fought for Darius at Issus wound up with King Agis of Sparta and helped launch a counter-attack that threw the Macedonians out of Corinth. Pace TWFanatic, that counter-attack was a real threat to the Macedonians, and if it had not been defeated Alexander would surely have had to return home.

Similarly, I think that the forces operating in Lydia probably weren't "vain attempts of remaining Persian forces". I reckon they probably had some pretty significant forces, composed in part of the sizeable army that the Persians retained after Issus. We don't really have much information about the battles they fought against Antigonos, unfortunately. My guess is that if they were fighting battles it's because they had a good reason for doing so - either because they believed they could win, or because they believed it would tie up significant Macedonian resources. The war just wasn't at the stage where people would do things "in vain".

You, sir, contribute quite a bit to luck. Forgive me for speaking plainly but you blatantly disregarded the greatness of Alexander and the superiority of his system of warfare to all others that he encountered. I suppose it would be more correct to say his father Phillip II's system of warfare, but that's beside the point (just had to appease the detail nitpickers). You simply cannot deny that the Macedonians were superior militarily to the Persians and the entire near east, and that Alexander and Phillip were (and still are) two of the greatest military leaders and reformers ever.

You can speak as plainly as you like. The point that the Macedonians had a great military machine and good generals has been made countless times. In fact, I think I made that point myself in my post. *checks* Yep, I did, down towards the bottom. But when a number of attacks are made on Macedonia, one from Sparta and a few from Lydia, combined with a series of naval assaults - well, I think it's reasonable to expect at least one of these operations to come off successfully. After all, even if the Macedonians had done some pretty good work improving their military, it's not as if the Persians conquered their empire by being bad at warfare - and IIRC the Spartans had some sort of a reputation for being halfway decent on the battlefield.

So, yeah, I think Darius had some bad luck in 332 BCE. I reckon he had a real chance at ending Alexander's invasion right then and there, by invading Macedonia.

Whether there was a real chance of victory after Gaugamela

Probably my most contentious point was that Darius still had a real chance at winning after Gaugamela. You could make a case for dishonour and defeat undermining his rule, leading to Bessus toppling him. But then again, he did hold onto his crown for almost a year after the big defeat, and he was successfully assembling a new army (at least, according to Curtius Rufus). That doesn't sound like a king whose authority has completely unraveled.

If you look at Bessus' earlier actions (eg retreating at Gaugamela when he had no good reason to), he looks pretty treacherous right from the get go. I doubt he needed an excuse...

Bugger, I'm out of time. Off to work. I'm looking forward to reading O'Etaipos' post. I readily admit that I communicate within 20th century frameworks, because I think it helps people understand. But I'll be interested to see if it has affected my underlying reasoning at all.

[Elthore]

Almost all the greeks fighting for the persians were killed(or put out of action, one way or another). It is mentioned that once Alexander surrounded the traitor greeks, he was merciless. That doesnt sound like many got away to fight with Darius. Besides, that would be very difficult while encircled by enemy cavarly.

Also, regarding macedonian superiority, probably the only thing better about Alex's army was the extended pikes. Similar to the large amount of conquering/colonization the early greeks were able to do after the invention of the phalanx.



PS: I am writing an essay regarding Alex's idea of harmonia, arguing that he was merely using this as a way of controlling his empire(which was becoming very Persian). Any points from ya clever Alex-haters would be appriciated.

[Watchman]

Almost all the greeks fighting for the persians were killed(or put out of action, one way or another). It is mentioned that once Alexander surrounded the traitor greeks, he was merciless. That doesnt sound like many got away to fight with Darius. Besides, that would be very difficult while encircled by enemy cavarly.

Er... that's Granicus you're thinking about. And even there enough of the encircled mercenaries survived to be shipped back to Greece in chains or something along those lines.

At Issus the mercenary hoplites are reported to have left the field in good order - if they marched in some sort of "hollow square" (a well enough known cavalry-defense formation), as would seem likely, it would not be difficult to see why pursuing Macedonian horse would rather look elsewhere for targets. And the Thessalians were sort of busy returning the favor to the heavy Persian horse that had almost rolled them flat to boot...

[Elthore]

oops, thanks for that correction

Granicus:
"The Persian centre collapsed, the wings turned to flight, and the Greek mercenaries were left to face the Macedonians. Surrounded, they asked for terms, but Alexander refused and cut them down except for two thousand who were taken prisoner." "...he treated the Greeks as traitors..."

Fleeing after Issus:
"The Persian king, joined by 4000 survivors, half of them Greek mercenaries, crossed the Euphrates at Thapsacus (perhaps near Susa) and made his escape to Babylon."

from:
Alexander the Great by J.R. Hamilton


Sounds to me that hardly any Greeks got away after Granicus, though they're clearly present at Issus. I'm looking through the compositions of the army to figure out where they came from. Just though I'd post this correction before anything else.



EDIT: After Issus: "2000 escaped with Darius, and two groups of 8000 and 4000 escaped independently" Estimated 20000 Greek mercs at Issus, 14000 fled.

EDIT2: " ...it was not until the early summer of 333 [after Granicus, before Issus] that Darius assembled an army from the central satrapies at Babylon" The exact number is not known, but 75000 "would not be wildly wrong". Heh, I still dont know where he got more Greeks from Babylon??!! The books I have focus on Alex and not Darius, so I dont have this information.

On another note, I believe that the sarissa played a bigger role than most people think. At Granicus, the first to flee were the Persians in the centre who were facing the phalanx. This mirrors the rapid expansions of the Greeks after the innovation of the original phalanx, their neighbours simply did not have the means(knowledge) to resist them. Likewise, the Persians facing the Macedonian phalanx would have found it near impossible to break them from the front, making it tactically more difficult to win the engagement. This of course did not make the Macedonians invincible, but would have gave them a good advantange in a pitched battle.

Hope I didnt confuse things too much, I am merely addressing/correcting the two points I mentioned in my first post.

[O'ETAIPOS]

Strategically, they're both overrated.

At Issus, Darius led an army that had taken him mere months to assemble. Although they lost, the Persians retreated with the bulk of their better forces (cavalry, immortals, greek mercenaries) intact.

This army consisted of the best troops King of Kings was able to assemble: A lot of cavalry, major part of greek mercenaries, foot and horse guard and Kardakes (while not succesful they were definately best part of foot levy).
After the battle Kardakes were gone, greek merc were gone and other forces took great casulties. Yes, greeks were gone - they retreated (as Elthore pointed out already) ON THEYRE OWN not with Darius. As fast as they could they seized some ships and sailed to Cyprus.

After Issus, while Alexander besieged Tyre and Gaza, the Persians (and their allies) counter-attacked on multiple fronts in the Peloponnese, Lydia, the Hellespont and the Aegean. Hardly the actions of an empire on the ropes.
(By sheer bad luck, all of these counter-attacks were defeated).

If the "counter attack" was so well planned and dangerous Alex would not spend 7 months against city that had importance only as port. He would not march to Egypt, rest his troops there and perform like tourist, visiting famous sites. And Darius would not send offer of ceasefire (even if it was done only to win more time for preparations)
Those attacks were either continuation of earlier policy (fleet) or actions performed without large forces and coordination (asia Minor). Spartans were easily defeated, and macedonian forces there were just too strong for Greeks to tackle. Even "Great Coalition" of greeks during Lamian war were able merly keep Antipater in check, even when Thessalians swiched sides.

Not to mention that after Issos smaller leaders, like kings of Phoenicia simply sided with victor and so persian fleet disappeared. When it happened we can't know, but probably as soon as info reached them. We do not have info about resistace in Phoenicia (Tyre simply didn't want to accept Mak garnisson and wanted to be "neutral" and opened for both forces - sth Alex could not allow)

At Gaugamela, the Persians had a better prepared army. They again lost, perhaps more emphatically this time, but they again retreated with a fair number of their better forces intact.

most of those who retreated deserted and returned home.

After Gaugamela, Darius' resources were certainly more strained than they had been before. But the Persians were still able to fight a decent defensive war, buying time as Darius assembled a new force at Ecbatana. I think it took something like 30 days for Alexander to force his way through the Persian Gates, for example. Obviously, it wasn't exactly ideal having a conqueror traipsing through the heartland of the Persian Empire - but there's every indication that Darius was starting to assemble a decent-sized force at Ecbatana when he was betrayed by Bessus.

The problem is that Darius's authoriy dropped rappidly after Gaugamela. The fact that heavily fortified Persian gates manned by most of the forces Darius had at the moment held for some time is not that significant, as it was more like a siege. After this force had been crushed there was no significant defence and Alex merly chased Darius. Yes he tried to assembe force, but may I ask: How many sane people would join leader who already lost 2 times, fled from battle and now trying to find even more idiots to die for him?
It's not like XX c when countries had organised armies that commit some forces to battle and if lost retreat to reorganise and fight on.
Situation here is simmilar to situation after Kynoskefale: Philip V still had big forces, many heavily garnisoned cities in Thessaly and some human potential in Macedonia to draw upon. But he knew he cant win (if he commited better part of his forces and list how can he win with the worse part?)

It was Bessus' betrayal that really put an end to Persian opposition. Remember, the Persian Empire had been roiled by in-fighting and secession before Darius took over as Great King just a few months before Alexander became King of Macedon. It was actually pretty impressive of Darius to hold the empire together the way he did, and it seems he was able to draw on a fair bit of charisma and energy to do so.

Darus was very good politician, he was also good commander. That is without doubt. But after loosing 2 grand armies and 2 flights he was no longer King of Kings - he was a looser. That's why Bessus took him prisoner - he thought he would be better King.

But if Darius had not been betrayed, the Persian Empire could have fought on. Perhaps they would still have lost. The Macedonian war machine was pretty impressive, and their generals were both talented and experienced.

Persian empire was lost at the field of Gaugamella. Later it was no longer "empire". Darus lost richest provinces, majority of treasures, honour and authority. That' is the main reason why he was betrayed.

But it wouldn't necessarily have turned out that way. Many times in history, Iranian empires have "pulled a Russia" on western land armies. Earlier in the campaign, before Granicus, Memnon had advocated doing just that. If Darius had remained in charge and retained the loyalty of the populace, Alexander's supply lines would have been far less secure. How far east could he realistically have marched? Who knows how things could have turned out?

It had to turn that way. Later empires used terrain to theyre advantage, but it was always strategy planned BEFORE war. They avoided major engagements luring opponent deep into theyre territory to finally anihilate him.
But it's not possible for somebody who already was decisively beaten 2 times and lost most of the money to the enemy.
Most of local rulers most probably considered Alex new King of Kings by then. Guy won the crown just like Darius did few years before. This may be confirmed by very low resistance to Alex later on, at least until he "broke the rules" and started to settle colonies of greeks. This is not so strange as we may think now, when we consider country as unity. For majority of persian subjects persian emperor was foreginer who they need to obey. On every succesion some teritories tried to gain independence. For them it was not that important if King of Kings was persian or greek, if the rules (taxes, policy toward local comunities etc) were the same they may accept whoever proves "the Mightiest".

[mrtwisties]

A good post, O'Etaipos, and I agree with much of what you say. But there are two reasons why we occupy different positions on the significance of Issus and Gaugamela.

1. We disagree on the factual inferences that we believe ought to be drawn from the sources.

This is partially because I'm highly sceptical of those sources, and believe they ought to be treated like a biography of Simon Bolivar authored by Hugo Chavez. Interesting yes, full of facts, probably, but unquestionably biased.

For example, I'm not sure why you feel so confident in stating that Darius was completely discredited after Gaugamela, and that he had lost control of the empire. The Chaldaean tablets pass this judgment on Gaugamela:

The king, his troops deserted him and to their cities they went. They fled to the east.

I suggest that these tablets, in saying that the troops deserted the king, could well be referring to Bessus and his premature retreat (which, after all, lost the battle for the Persians - is it so unreasonable that they perceived this fact for themselves?). If the Persians laid the blame for Gaugamela with the unreliable Bessus, then Darius' reputation might have been intact at that time. In fact, Bessus might have committed his treachery out of self preservation. This is not the standard interpretation, but nor is it a far-fetched one.

The idea that Darius was discredited and powerless is promoted by Arrian, who describes a poor lost soul hanging out at Ecbatana with nary a soldier to defend him. But Arrian, for all his merits, wrote centuries after the event and was not without his biases. By contrast, the astronomical records of the Chaldaeans were contemporary and intended to be scrupulously accurate.

Other Hellenic sources conflict with Arrian's account. Plutarch tells us that a number of Persians defected to Alexander after the betrayal, apparently out of a sense of disgust. This doesn't sound like something that would happen if Darius was as isolated as Arrian suggests he was.

Further, Curtius Rufus states that Darius had assembled an army of 30,000 infantry at Ecbatana (including, for the record, a number of Greek mercenaries), as well as a few thousand cavalry. Not a bad effort for just a few months of work. No doubt there were some Persian subjects who were playing a waiting game to see who would prevail, but (according to Curtius Rufus, anyway) it looks as if there were still plenty of men who were willing to defend the empire. If Darius had not been betrayed, he could conceivably have finished raising another grand army for a third great confrontation with Alexander.

I think you might have also just gotten some things wrong. For example, I don't know why you say that the Spartan offensive was easily beaten. It appears to have lasted from 333/332 BCE to 331/330BCE (at least until after Alexander sent those Athenians home), Agis III enjoyed considerable successes in both Crete and the Peloponnese, and Diodorus of Sicily describes the final battle with Antipater thus:

When it came to a general engagement, Agis was struck down fighting, but the Spartans fought furiously and maintained their position for a long time. When their Greek allies were forced out of position they themselves fell back on Sparta. More than 5,300 of the Spartans and their allies were killed in battle, and 3,500 of Antipater's troops.

That battle was on the same scale as Chaeronea and (according to the description) more fiercely contested. The very fact that the sources generally don't talk about it much should tell us something about how they've all chosen to portray the war with Persia.

2. We disagree in our conjectural attempts to fill in the blanks.

There were counter-attacks after Issus. We have very little information about them at all, although what information we do have suggests that they weren't small-scale affairs (see eg Agis III).

I suggest that the very fact they were initiated at all suggests that they had a decent chance of success. Darius wasn't exactly a wild risk taker. Memnon was sent to fight a defensive war against Alexander in Asia Minor, not an offensive one. At both Issus and Gaugamela, Darius assembled large forces and moved them about carefully. Why, then, would he throw away the lives of his men in frivolous counter-attacks?

You suggest that Alexander sitting in a siege camp for 7 months indicates that the attacks were not serious. That's not an unreasonable conjecture. But then, what else was he going to do? Retreat to Lydia? To the Peloponnese? That would have been tantamount to an admission of failure in the Persian campaign, and then how loyal would his Greek allies have been? Perhaps more importantly, where's the glory in that?

Alexander had soldiers and commanders scattered throughout his nascent empire. I suggest that he took a (calculated) risk that they'd be able to ward off the Persians (and their Hellenic allies). The fact that he took these risks doesn't mean they weren't serious. Alexander's entire life was full of him taking serious risks, from taming Bucephalus to the assault on the Malli. One wonders if the man had a bit of a problem, actually.

Is it then so far fetched to suppose that, after Issus, he took another great gamble and trusted sub-commanders around the empire to resist the Persian counter-attack?

That's more than enough for one post.

Note: I don't want to get trapped into the position where I'm arguing that the Persians weren't in serious trouble. They were - right from the get go, in fact. I'm arguing for the more limited and reasonable position that Issus and Gaugamela were important events, but that they did not spell the end of the Persian Empire.

[mrtwisties]

He would not march to Egypt, rest his troops there and perform like tourist, visiting famous sites.

Oh, and if you think that visiting the Siwa oasis was just Alexander skylarking with his mates, then... well... we disagree. I'm tired, we can argue about that another time.

[TWFanatic]

I am honored that you would respond to my statement in such depth, Persian Cataphract, though I feel it was not necessary, since it was a short statement meant solely for mrtwisties.

On what grounds was the Macedonian system superior to that of the Persians, and how does this relate to your assertion of correctly appreciating Alexander's reputation as a general? Are you by chance saying that Alexander's basis, which would constitute the backbone of his strategies and his tactics, superior to that of the Persians, facilitiating his victories?

On what grounds? Surely you are humoring us. Perhaps a little map from wiki will refresh your memory.
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikiped...edonEmpire.jpg

Alexander is called the Great, because he wasn't a mediocre general; To somehow ascribe his victories automatically by saying that he had better troops, is to defile what truly revolutionized warfare, effectively bringing it to the Hellenistic age.

What are you speaking of? I do not recollect saying he was mediocre. I quote the last line of my post:

Alexander and Phillip were (and still are) two of the greatest military leaders and reformers ever.

In addition, I never said he had better troops. I said his system of warfare was superior. So in an essence, we are agreeing, if I understand you correctly.

The Graeco-Macedonians did not have the vast spectra of troops available to that of the Persians; Indeed, they did not even organize themselves accordingly to a decimal system, unlike the Persians who had an almost over-complicated system of ordaining junior and senior officers. It is hard to discard many popularly established idea, but in reality it is absurd to think that once Alexander captured babylon, it was all over; Equally, it is absurd to dismiss the factors that truly contributed to the downfall of the Codomannus.

Once again, you put words in my mouth. I never said Alexander captured Babylon. And I never "dismissed the factors that truly contributed to the downfall of the Codomannus." Why don't you back up your claims with a quote? Why is that? Perhaps it is because they are false?

Using your line of logic, I may as well as ascribe the Parthian army superior to the Seleucid war-machine; Simply because they got defeated by an almost ridiculously simple organization with a main corpus of horse-archers and light horse, with a nucleus of super-heavy cavalry. To ascribe superiority by such a basis is not only risky, but also discouraged; Alexander did for instance meet very harsh resistance from Ariobarzanes, who probably expected to complete the pincer once Darius had arrived with his reinforcements from Ecbatana. Then by what basis do you asribe the Macedonian military machine superior? At Gaugamela, Darius expected to win. Not only did he bring more, and heavier cavalry to the battle, he also brought elephants, shock chariotry and organized his lines accordingly to facilitate flanking.

And you know what? None of that worked. Darius was crushed. The Macedonian war machine and its commander showed their superiority yet again. By what basis do I ascribe the Macedonian military machine superior? Results. Alexander conquered the Persian empire. Alexander won every single battle he ever fought. He was undefeated. And thus, Darius and the Persians had not a single major victory against Alexander.

The argument I put forth in my previous post was that it is ludicrous to contribute such a phenominal, awe-inspiringing, collosal and swift conquest to luck. Luck! I am not saying that luck wasn't part of it, indeed luck is an essence in almost everything, but to dismiss the genius of Alexander and the greatness of his army is incredulous. Let me ask you, do you contribute Alexander's Persian conquest to luck?

To address your first point: did the Parthians manage to utterly crush the Seleucid empire? And for that matter, did they achieve this feat over the space of a few years? If your answer is no, then your argument is moot.

You, sir, contribute quite a bit to luck. Forgive me for speaking plainly but you blatantly disregarded the greatness of Alexander and the superiority of his system of warfare to all others that he encountered. I suppose it would be more correct to say his father Phillip II's system of warfare, but that's beside the point (just had to appease the detail nitpickers). You simply cannot deny that the Macedonians were superior militarily to the Persians and the entire near east, and that Alexander and Phillip were (and still are) two of the greatest military leaders and reformers ever.

And you, sir, seem to sort of forget Alexander's undeniable skills

And you, sir, would do well to read my post before responding to it. I am surprised that you would post something such as this, considering the usual high quality of your arguments. You claim that I "seem to sort of forget Alexander's undeniable skills." I can understand your hesitation in posting, for I too would hesitate if posting something as false this nonsense. Perhaps I should remind you of the very post you quoted?

the greatness of Alexander

You simply cannot deny...that Alexander and Phillip were (and still are) two of the greatest military leaders and reformers ever.

In the context of such a short post, my twice mentioning the greatness of Alexander hardly bodes well for your argument of me forgetting it.

the easy majority of the Macedonian tactical system in circulation only reached where his actual core field army was

And what a field army that was...it single handily brought down the greatest empire on earth. Thanks for backing me up.

The garrison commanders and satraps he left to run assorted parts of his growing empire would have had to make do with their personal abilities, perhaps a smallish cadre of Hellenic troops, and local forces - in many cases former Achaemenid garrisons and feudal forces no doubt, and mercenaries

That's nice. And what does this have to do with my post?

Thanks for a good laugh.

You can speak as plainly as you like. The point that the Macedonians had a great military machine and good generals has been made countless times. In fact, I think I made that point myself in my post. *checks* Yep, I did, down towards the bottom. But when a number of attacks are made on Macedonia, one from Sparta and a few from Lydia, combined with a series of naval assaults - well, I think it's reasonable to expect at least one of these operations to come off successfully. After all, even if the Macedonians had done some pretty good work improving their military, it's not as if the Persians conquered their empire by being bad at warfare - and IIRC the Spartans had some sort of a reputation for being halfway decent on the battlefield.

I am glad you agree with me "that the Macedonians had a great military machine and good generals," though I think you are understating them a bit. And I agree that the Persians were more skilled at warfare than their neighbors. My disagreement stems from your apparent claim that Alexander conquered the Persian empire because he was "lucky," and that his military was not superior to that of the Darius. I mean, what does an army have to do to prove its superiority these days?

So, yeah, I think Darius had some bad luck in 332 BCE. I reckon he had a real chance at ending Alexander's invasion right then and there, by invading Macedonia.

Interesting historical hypothesis.


It was never my intention to become involved in a major debate. But since you three have honored me with a response, I felt it necessary to respond in kind.

[The Persian Cataphract]

On what grounds? Surely you are humoring us. Perhaps a little map from wiki will refresh your memory.
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...edonEmpire.jpg

My presence and purpose in this thread is hardly that of a comedian. That you quote a map, may verily well lead us into thinking that the Early Achaemenid organization was superior to that of their Medean predecessors, the Neo-Babylonians and that of the Mermnad Lydian Kingdom, three of the great powers of the tetrarchy that ruled the bulk of known civilized world. It would be a disservice to the achievements and the luminary mind possessed by Cyrus The Great, if we automatically pointed to a supposed superior archery, cavalry and compound units. Equally, the Early Islamic expansion went almost without defeat (With only the battle of Al-Jisr, in which the Sassanians had temporarily crippled the Islamic invasion, as an exception), yet it was nothing more than the combination of desert-accustomed tactics, unorthodox methods in consolidation of lands, and religious glea that brought them that far. Yes, I think I have the merit to question your parameters; The Achaemenid war-machine was not, unlike the horrid portrayal in Nordicist movies like "Alexander", primitive. Nor was it inferior. If that is what you posit or imply, then you possess inadequate knowledge on the rigid structure of the Achaemenid organization. Remember, no one here is questioning the excellent drilling and experience of the Macedonian troops, or their auxiliaries for that matter, but on the other hand, it's a common Classicist tactic to disregard Eastern heraldry. You, my good sir, are treading right into the area of subjectivities, and I recommend for the sake of objectivity, that you respect commonly established academical praxis.

In addition, I never said he had better troops. I said his system of warfare was superior. So in an essence, we are agreeing, if I understand you correctly.

No, no, no dear, stay with me; We obviously put different emphasis to appreciating the military genius of Alexander. The Macedonian type of warfare, á la anvil-and-hammer was not inherently superior; It was certainly flexible and carried many advantages, but it was hardly anvil-and-hammer that decided the battle of Gaugamela; No flank was rolled up, au contraire, it was the exploit of a gap in the Achaemenid army and capitalization on the weakness through Alexander's charging wedge that decided the battle; If you study Darius' organization closely, you'll see he actually learned from his enemy, intending to use Alexander's tactics against him, while diminishing Alexander's chances. One way was to overlap Alexander's main column, another way was to bring in heavy shock elements. The third way was to amass enough soldiers to outnumber his enemy. Darius deserves credit for an astute strategical perception on things; He introduced military reforms, and for being antagonized as an "effete" character in primary sources, which can easily be dismissed as propagandistic bullshit, mildly put, he was an effective military administrator, Alexander's most worthy adversary. To even emphasize the genius of how far he wished to extend his defences, his reassembled army at Ecbatana had the potential to close the exit for Alexander as he marched towards Persepolis.

You see what I'm getting at? I'm speaking of how to appreciate the military genius of Alexander; He wasn't pitted against an amateur, no matter how much fourteen year old LoTR-crazed nerds would like to think that Darius was probably a king of the orchs. That he brought with himself an incredibly versatile military system, is one thing, but that he was about to tackle a military system, not only complex but host of a vast spectra, lead by a warrior-emperor who was not only a "hero" from quelling the local Cadusian rebellion (During the time when he was no more than a distant relative to the lineage of the Ochos), but also averted a crisis by having Bagoas executed (Not to mention his rapid reforming of the Persian army, not least the heavy cavalry). If we wish to evaluate the success of Alexander's campaign, we can't shrug away important things that otherwise appear to be "mere details". By the gods of Jägermeister, Curtius Rufus mentions how Alexander was stalled for weeks when Ariobarzanes adamantly held the Persian Gates. This isn't stuff you normally read in the books, and furthermore if I chose to favour a certain Encyclopaedia Iranica article on the issue, you'll find the whole ordeal to resemble a "Persian Thermopylae". Wait, isn't that one battle usually pin-pointed to the incompetence of King of Kings Xerxes? See what I'm pointing at? Context means everything; At the battle of Gaugamela, he did not only put the very basis of his army to an arduous test but he outwitted his Persian colleague by doing something extraordinary and never before seen.

Why don't you back up your claims with a quote? Why is that? Perhaps it is because they are false?

Wish granted:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

You simply cannot deny that the Macedonians were superior militarily to the Persians and the entire near east

From: https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showp...4&postcount=16

This in itself contains possibly a myriad of implications; Most of these that I am sure were never in your intention. Which is why I again must stress the importance of not treading into subjectivites.

And you know what? None of that worked. Darius was crushed.

So was Antiochus VII Sidetes, and later his brother Demetrius II Nicator. The latter captured twice by Mithradates I The Philhellene. The former by his successor, Phraates II, son of Mithradates. This of course, has been repeated later in history, for example when Shapur I The Great captured Valerian. 'Valerianvs Capta'. Darius was crushed, but unlike your all-too-clear-cut implication, he was assassinated before he marched with his rallied army at Ecbatana, and his greatest defeat was the lack of loyalty exhibited by his own kinsmen. In particular Bessus, satrap of Bactria; Remember him? He's the guy who prematurely retreats from the battlefield with the goodie heavy cavalry at Gaugamela. Not that I entirely label Alexandros' victory as the epitome of luck, but you have to admit that upon hearing such news, it must certainly have given Alexander less to think about.

To address your first point: did the Parthians manage to utterly crush the Seleucid empire? And for that matter, did they achieve this feat over the space of a few years? If your answer is no, then your argument is moot.

For some reason you'd seemingly like to ascribe Arsacid military success as some kind of a gradual process. I assure you that it was not. There may have been a century or so of pestering presence, and beyond the much legendary conquest of Arsaces I, which more or less established a foot-hold for the Parthians, not much really happened, until the aggressive and swift expansion of Mithradates I Philhellenos; He took over most of the previously Seleucid possessions, excluding Asia Minor, which became the plaything of the Romans, all the while he utterly defeated the Eucratid Graeco-Bactrians who had risen in Mithradates' rear. Who have heard of this man who was still a boy when Parthia was humilated by Antiochus III Megas? This man expanded a mere satrapal area in Parthyene into becoming a super-power extending from Bactria all the way to Osrhôëne in the west. Granted, he didn't entirely extinguish the Seleucid threat, which contained itself mostly in Syria, but he managed to capture his colleague (Hehe... Two times). I'm not even going to compare between the two great conquerors, but clearly, the chance is high you've never heard of this guy, this descendant of Arsaces. Lest you keep a nice, shiny catalogue of ancient coinage or know your classics well.