issus vs gaugamela

[anubis88]

Hi! I question for all fellow historians... I've been randomly looking through my history books , that don't cover alexander very deeply, and i've seen that some of them only mention the battle of issus, while forgeting gaugamela completly. One describes thouroghly the battle of issus and just mentions gaugamela like a minor battle. I've also seen this in my school books, where they describe the battle of issus as the most crucial battle in the war between Alexander and Persia.

I always thought that the battle of Gaugamela was much more important and decisive than issus... Or am i missing something? the strenght of the army seems preety much the same... Did Darius had a more elite army fighting at issus? Or is there something else? like drunk profesors writing the books? Or is this just the way my countrymen think?

if anyone knows why this is so, please share your information.

[tapanojum]

"The Battle of Issus was a decisive Macedonian victory and it marked the beginning of the end of Persian power. It was the first time the Persian army had been defeated with the King (Darius III at the time) present."

An entry in Wikipedia. Could be a good point, but then again...its Wikipedia.

[TWFanatic]

Textbooks are extremely brief, and from my experience they like to be particularly brief when covering the more interesting parts of history.

[mrtwisties]

Strategically, they're both overrated.

At Issus, Darius led an army that had taken him mere months to assemble. Although they lost, the Persians retreated with the bulk of their better forces (cavalry, immortals, greek mercenaries) intact.

After Issus, while Alexander besieged Tyre and Gaza, the Persians (and their allies) counter-attacked on multiple fronts in the Peloponnese, Lydia, the Hellespont and the Aegean. Hardly the actions of an empire on the ropes.
(By sheer bad luck, all of these counter-attacks were defeated).

At Gaugamela, the Persians had a better prepared army. They again lost, perhaps more emphatically this time, but they again retreated with a fair number of their better forces intact.

After Gaugamela, Darius' resources were certainly more strained than they had been before. But the Persians were still able to fight a decent defensive war, buying time as Darius assembled a new force at Ecbatana. I think it took something like 30 days for Alexander to force his way through the Persian Gates, for example. Obviously, it wasn't exactly ideal having a conqueror traipsing through the heartland of the Persian Empire - but there's every indication that Darius was starting to assemble a decent-sized force at Ecbatana when he was betrayed by Bessus.

It was Bessus' betrayal that really put an end to Persian opposition. Remember, the Persian Empire had been roiled by in-fighting and secession before Darius took over as Great King just a few months before Alexander became King of Macedon. It was actually pretty impressive of Darius to hold the empire together the way he did, and it seems he was able to draw on a fair bit of charisma and energy to do so.

When he was betrayed and imprisoned, the intriguing factions were presented with a choice - either ally themselves with Bessus the usurper, or with Alexander the successful chap who had a track record of treating Persian nobles decently. It was at that point that the empire unravelled.

But if Darius had not been betrayed, the Persian Empire could have fought on. Perhaps they would still have lost. The Macedonian war machine was pretty impressive, and their generals were both talented and experienced.

But it wouldn't necessarily have turned out that way. Many times in history, Iranian empires have "pulled a Russia" on western land armies. Earlier in the campaign, before Granicus, Memnon had advocated doing just that. If Darius had remained in charge and retained the loyalty of the populace, Alexander's supply lines would have been far less secure. How far east could he realistically have marched? Who knows how things could have turned out?

So I don't think Issus and Gaugamela were as significant as most textbooks seem to think they are. Great battles, certainly, but they didn't bring about the downfall of the Persian Empire.

[J.Alco]

I have to say, that's a pretty refreshing outlook on the history of Alexander's invasion of the Persian Empire. Most history books tend to present it as a non-stop parade of flawless successes from the genius Alexander who toppled without any real problems a massive empire. Those stories also tend to portray Darius as a rather weak and ineffectual emperor who was also a coward who didn't dare fight Alexander personally at any of the battles where he was present.

An interpretatio Graeca (not sure if that's how you spell it) of history, anyone?

[TWFanatic]

Strategically, they're both overrated.

At Issus, Darius led an army that had taken him mere months to assemble. Although they lost, the Persians retreated with the bulk of their better forces (cavalry, immortals, greek mercenaries) intact.

After Issus, while Alexander besieged Tyre and Gaza, the Persians (and their allies) counter-attacked on multiple fronts in the Peloponnese, Lydia, the Hellespont and the Aegean. Hardly the actions of an empire on the ropes.
(By sheer bad luck, all of these counter-attacks were defeated).

You, sir, contribute quite a bit to luck. Forgive me for speaking plainly but you blatantly disregarded the greatness of Alexander and the superiority of his system of warfare to all others that he encountered. I suppose it would be more correct to say his father Phillip II's system of warfare, but that's beside the point (just had to appease the detail nitpickers). You simply cannot deny that the Macedonians were superior militarily to the Persians and the entire near east, and that Alexander and Phillip were (and still are) two of the greatest military leaders and reformers ever.

[mrtwisties]

I have to say, that's a pretty refreshing outlook on the history of Alexander's invasion of the Persian Empire. Most history books tend to present it as a non-stop parade of flawless successes from the genius Alexander who toppled without any real problems a massive empire. Those stories also tend to portray Darius as a rather weak and ineffectual emperor who was also a coward who didn't dare fight Alexander personally at any of the battles where he was present.

An interpretatio Graeca (not sure if that's how you spell it) of history, anyone?

Given that most of our sources are Greek and Roman secondary texts, you've got to expect at least some sort of bias towards Alexander, and be alert to the possibility of propaganda. It doesn't help that a lot of people (then and now) get involved because they're fanboys. I'm not trying to be massively revisionist here - Alexander was brilliant, and the Macedonians were pretty incredible soldiers. But as The Persian Cataphract remarked, you only get to be "The Great" if you do something that's, well, great. The Persians cannot have been as weak as the Greek and Roman sources portray them to be.

For example, there's a lot of material out there about how Darius was effete and spent most of his time despairing at Alexander's inexorable advance. That just doesn't match up with the facts to me. This is a guy who managed to seize a disputed throne, reassert control over his various provinces and reconquer Egypt - all in just a couple of years. That's pretty good kingmanship, so far as I can tell.

It's not as if the Greek sources present a consistent account of the guy, either. On the one hand, they rabbit on about how he's effete and despairing. On the other, they have him saying noble words and passing on greetings to Alexander after he gets stabbed. Ever been stabbed? If you're the effete guy they describe him as, you'd probably spend your time squealing and carrying on, not making grand noble gestures.

So, I reckon there's a lot of bias and misreporting in the Greek and Roman histories. I'm not even saying it was necessarily deliberate on their part - it would just have taken a couple of negative stereotypes about Persians to kick in, and suddenly confirmation bias would have affected their writing without them knowing it.

Now, to address some of the consequences of that bias.

Whether there was a real counter-attack after Issus

The actions in the Aegean, and so on the Peloponnesos and the Hellespont were undertaken by the Persian fleet, which was 1) out of supply because of Alexander's strategy of occupying the ports along the Levante, 2) running out of men and ships because the Cyprian / Phoenician contigents sided with Alexander after he had made the local rulers of the area petty kings, 3) without an able leader because Memnon had died. They managed to capture an Aegean city nevertheless.

What was left was the city of Halikarnassos, under Makedonian siege, and uprisings / vain attempts of remaining Persian forces in the more central parts of Asia Minor which have never been under any firm control of the Persians. These attempt can hardly be called ridiculous, but they weren't a big threat either, and were eventually beaten back.

I don't think that all that many Persians died at Issus. It wasn't like Rome Total War, where they wind up with 0 men remaining after a rout. We know, for example, that 8,000 of the Greek mercenaries who fought for Darius at Issus wound up with King Agis of Sparta and helped launch a counter-attack that threw the Macedonians out of Corinth. Pace TWFanatic, that counter-attack was a real threat to the Macedonians, and if it had not been defeated Alexander would surely have had to return home.

Similarly, I think that the forces operating in Lydia probably weren't "vain attempts of remaining Persian forces". I reckon they probably had some pretty significant forces, composed in part of the sizeable army that the Persians retained after Issus. We don't really have much information about the battles they fought against Antigonos, unfortunately. My guess is that if they were fighting battles it's because they had a good reason for doing so - either because they believed they could win, or because they believed it would tie up significant Macedonian resources. The war just wasn't at the stage where people would do things "in vain".

You, sir, contribute quite a bit to luck. Forgive me for speaking plainly but you blatantly disregarded the greatness of Alexander and the superiority of his system of warfare to all others that he encountered. I suppose it would be more correct to say his father Phillip II's system of warfare, but that's beside the point (just had to appease the detail nitpickers). You simply cannot deny that the Macedonians were superior militarily to the Persians and the entire near east, and that Alexander and Phillip were (and still are) two of the greatest military leaders and reformers ever.

You can speak as plainly as you like. The point that the Macedonians had a great military machine and good generals has been made countless times. In fact, I think I made that point myself in my post. *checks* Yep, I did, down towards the bottom. But when a number of attacks are made on Macedonia, one from Sparta and a few from Lydia, combined with a series of naval assaults - well, I think it's reasonable to expect at least one of these operations to come off successfully. After all, even if the Macedonians had done some pretty good work improving their military, it's not as if the Persians conquered their empire by being bad at warfare - and IIRC the Spartans had some sort of a reputation for being halfway decent on the battlefield.

So, yeah, I think Darius had some bad luck in 332 BCE. I reckon he had a real chance at ending Alexander's invasion right then and there, by invading Macedonia.

Whether there was a real chance of victory after Gaugamela

Probably my most contentious point was that Darius still had a real chance at winning after Gaugamela. You could make a case for dishonour and defeat undermining his rule, leading to Bessus toppling him. But then again, he did hold onto his crown for almost a year after the big defeat, and he was successfully assembling a new army (at least, according to Curtius Rufus). That doesn't sound like a king whose authority has completely unraveled.

If you look at Bessus' earlier actions (eg retreating at Gaugamela when he had no good reason to), he looks pretty treacherous right from the get go. I doubt he needed an excuse...

Bugger, I'm out of time. Off to work. I'm looking forward to reading O'Etaipos' post. I readily admit that I communicate within 20th century frameworks, because I think it helps people understand. But I'll be interested to see if it has affected my underlying reasoning at all.

[O'ETAIPOS]

Strategically, they're both overrated.

At Issus, Darius led an army that had taken him mere months to assemble. Although they lost, the Persians retreated with the bulk of their better forces (cavalry, immortals, greek mercenaries) intact.

After Issus, while Alexander besieged Tyre and Gaza, the Persians (and their allies) counter-attacked on multiple fronts in the Peloponnese, Lydia, the Hellespont and the Aegean. Hardly the actions of an empire on the ropes.
(By sheer bad luck, all of these counter-attacks were defeated).

At Gaugamela, the Persians had a better prepared army. They again lost, perhaps more emphatically this time, but they again retreated with a fair number of their better forces intact.

After Gaugamela, Darius' resources were certainly more strained than they had been before. But the Persians were still able to fight a decent defensive war, buying time as Darius assembled a new force at Ecbatana. I think it took something like 30 days for Alexander to force his way through the Persian Gates, for example. Obviously, it wasn't exactly ideal having a conqueror traipsing through the heartland of the Persian Empire - but there's every indication that Darius was starting to assemble a decent-sized force at Ecbatana when he was betrayed by Bessus.

It was Bessus' betrayal that really put an end to Persian opposition. Remember, the Persian Empire had been roiled by in-fighting and secession before Darius took over as Great King just a few months before Alexander became King of Macedon. It was actually pretty impressive of Darius to hold the empire together the way he did, and it seems he was able to draw on a fair bit of charisma and energy to do so.

When he was betrayed and imprisoned, the intriguing factions were presented with a choice - either ally themselves with Bessus the usurper, or with Alexander the successful chap who had a track record of treating Persian nobles decently. It was at that point that the empire unravelled.

But if Darius had not been betrayed, the Persian Empire could have fought on. Perhaps they would still have lost. The Macedonian war machine was pretty impressive, and their generals were both talented and experienced.

But it wouldn't necessarily have turned out that way. Many times in history, Iranian empires have "pulled a Russia" on western land armies. Earlier in the campaign, before Granicus, Memnon had advocated doing just that. If Darius had remained in charge and retained the loyalty of the populace, Alexander's supply lines would have been far less secure. How far east could he realistically have marched? Who knows how things could have turned out?

So I don't think Issus and Gaugamela were as significant as most textbooks seem to think they are. Great battles, certainly, but they didn't bring about the downfall of the Persian Empire.

I will comment on many of this informations tommorow. Quite a few are not true or present facts from perspective of our XX c AD image of war.

[Centurio Nixalsverdrus]

At Issus, Darius led an army that had taken him mere months to assemble. Although they lost, the Persians retreated with the bulk of their better forces (cavalry, immortals, greek mercenaries) intact.

Afaik they lost all their remaining greek troops, correct me if I'm wrong.

After Issus, while Alexander besieged Tyre and Gaza, the Persians (and their allies) counter-attacked on multiple fronts in the Peloponnese, Lydia, the Hellespont and the Aegean. Hardly the actions of an empire on the ropes.
(By sheer bad luck, all of these counter-attacks were defeated).

The actions in the Aegean, and so on the Peloponnesos and the Hellespont were undertaken by the Persian fleet, which was 1) out of supply because of Alexander's strategy of occupying the ports along the Levante, 2) running out of men and ships because the Cyprian / Phoenician contigents sided with Alexander after he had made the local rulers of the area petty kings, 3) without an able leader because Memnon had died. They managed to capture an Aegean city nevertheless.

What was left was the city of Halikarnassos, under Makedonian siege, and uprisings / vain attempts of remaining Persian forces in the more central parts of Asia Minor which have never been under any firm control of the Persians. These attempt can hardly be called ridiculous, but they weren't a big threat either, and were eventually beaten back.

At Gaugamela, the Persians had a better prepared army. They again lost, perhaps more emphatically this time, but they again retreated with a fair number of their better forces intact.

Not only were they perfectly prepared, but even had they prepared the battlefield prior, evening it out for getting the maximum use out of their chariots. But even the best plan never survives the first enemy encounter, and this eventually led to their defeat: they haven't been able to react properly on Alexander's tactical maneuvers. The chariots, for example, resulted mere useless because they were treated by the Makedones much like Carthaginian elephants by Scipio Africanus. Communication lines in the Persian army were not fast enough. Persian troops were (almost) generally inferior to the Makedonians', consisting of general imperial levy, not used to fight on the battlefield as the Makedones were.

After Gaugamela, Darius' resources were certainly more strained than they had been before. But the Persians were still able to fight a decent defensive war, buying time as Darius assembled a new force at Ecbatana. I think it took something like 30 days for Alexander to force his way through the Persian Gates, for example. Obviously, it wasn't exactly ideal having a conqueror traipsing through the heartland of the Persian Empire - but there's every indication that Darius was starting to assemble a decent-sized force at Ecbatana when he was betrayed by Bessus.

Had they listened to Memnon, they would've done exactly this - letting Alexander wander around until he would have to retreat. It didn't correspond to the honour codex of the Achaemenids to do so though, and so Dareius decided to confront the agressor. He lost and fled two times the battlefield (prematurely perhaps). What's a king worth who's on the flight through his empire? I would say that he knew it was over in the moment he fled from Gaugamela.

But if Darius had not been betrayed, the Persian Empire could have fought on. Perhaps they would still have lost. The Macedonian war machine was pretty impressive, and their generals were both talented and experienced.

It wasn't easy to take the rest of the empire after Gaugamela, and I would go as far as to say that it was the most difficult part of the conquest.

So I don't think Issus and Gaugamela were as significant as most textbooks seem to think they are. Great battles, certainly, but they didn't bring about the downfall of the Persian Empire.

I think you are right on the most part, although I'm not so optimistic towards the Persian resistance (and resilience), and especially you neglect a bit the military ability of Alexander the Great and his generals imho.

[Watchman]

By what I've read on it (in the Osprey "Essential Histories" book on Alex's campaigns mind you) Alex only finally got rid of the last of the Persians' Greek mercs after Gaugamela and Bessus' coup, when he managed to corner them in Hyrkania and force their surrender. The Central Asian satrapies apparently largely sided with Bessus (who did have a passably legitimate claim to kingship after all) who kept giving Alex trouble for a while with a hit-and-run rearguard campaign, and after he was finally run down and disposed of some Baktrian nobleman took up the reins and kept up the same for a few years (IIRC what I read about it he was eventually betrayed and killed by his Saka allies, who'd had enough of the whole thing and presented his head to Alex to open negotiations). Besides which Alex and his diverse deputies no doubt had to deal with any number of minor uprisings, troublesome stragglers, ever-troublesome mountain tribes and all the other crap that had plagued the Achaemenids and would keep the Seleukids somewhat busy.

You, sir, contribute quite a bit to luck. Forgive me for speaking plainly but you blatantly disregarded the greatness of Alexander and the superiority of his system of warfare to all others that he encountered. I suppose it would be more correct to say his father Phillip II's system of warfare, but that's beside the point (just had to appease the detail nitpickers). You simply cannot deny that the Macedonians were superior militarily to the Persians and the entire near east, and that Alexander and Phillip were (and still are) two of the greatest military leaders and reformers ever.

And you, sir, seem to sort of forget Alexander's undeniable skills and the easy majority of the Macedonian tactical system in circulation only reached where his actual core field army was. The garrison commanders and satraps he left to run assorted parts of his growing empire would have had to make do with their personal abilities, perhaps a smallish cadre of Hellenic troops, and local forces - in many cases former Achaemenid garrisons and feudal forces no doubt, and mercenaries.

[O'ETAIPOS]

Strategically, they're both overrated.

At Issus, Darius led an army that had taken him mere months to assemble. Although they lost, the Persians retreated with the bulk of their better forces (cavalry, immortals, greek mercenaries) intact.

This army consisted of the best troops King of Kings was able to assemble: A lot of cavalry, major part of greek mercenaries, foot and horse guard and Kardakes (while not succesful they were definately best part of foot levy).
After the battle Kardakes were gone, greek merc were gone and other forces took great casulties. Yes, greeks were gone - they retreated (as Elthore pointed out already) ON THEYRE OWN not with Darius. As fast as they could they seized some ships and sailed to Cyprus.

After Issus, while Alexander besieged Tyre and Gaza, the Persians (and their allies) counter-attacked on multiple fronts in the Peloponnese, Lydia, the Hellespont and the Aegean. Hardly the actions of an empire on the ropes.
(By sheer bad luck, all of these counter-attacks were defeated).

If the "counter attack" was so well planned and dangerous Alex would not spend 7 months against city that had importance only as port. He would not march to Egypt, rest his troops there and perform like tourist, visiting famous sites. And Darius would not send offer of ceasefire (even if it was done only to win more time for preparations)
Those attacks were either continuation of earlier policy (fleet) or actions performed without large forces and coordination (asia Minor). Spartans were easily defeated, and macedonian forces there were just too strong for Greeks to tackle. Even "Great Coalition" of greeks during Lamian war were able merly keep Antipater in check, even when Thessalians swiched sides.

Not to mention that after Issos smaller leaders, like kings of Phoenicia simply sided with victor and so persian fleet disappeared. When it happened we can't know, but probably as soon as info reached them. We do not have info about resistace in Phoenicia (Tyre simply didn't want to accept Mak garnisson and wanted to be "neutral" and opened for both forces - sth Alex could not allow)

At Gaugamela, the Persians had a better prepared army. They again lost, perhaps more emphatically this time, but they again retreated with a fair number of their better forces intact.

most of those who retreated deserted and returned home.

After Gaugamela, Darius' resources were certainly more strained than they had been before. But the Persians were still able to fight a decent defensive war, buying time as Darius assembled a new force at Ecbatana. I think it took something like 30 days for Alexander to force his way through the Persian Gates, for example. Obviously, it wasn't exactly ideal having a conqueror traipsing through the heartland of the Persian Empire - but there's every indication that Darius was starting to assemble a decent-sized force at Ecbatana when he was betrayed by Bessus.

The problem is that Darius's authoriy dropped rappidly after Gaugamela. The fact that heavily fortified Persian gates manned by most of the forces Darius had at the moment held for some time is not that significant, as it was more like a siege. After this force had been crushed there was no significant defence and Alex merly chased Darius. Yes he tried to assembe force, but may I ask: How many sane people would join leader who already lost 2 times, fled from battle and now trying to find even more idiots to die for him?
It's not like XX c when countries had organised armies that commit some forces to battle and if lost retreat to reorganise and fight on.
Situation here is simmilar to situation after Kynoskefale: Philip V still had big forces, many heavily garnisoned cities in Thessaly and some human potential in Macedonia to draw upon. But he knew he cant win (if he commited better part of his forces and list how can he win with the worse part?)

It was Bessus' betrayal that really put an end to Persian opposition. Remember, the Persian Empire had been roiled by in-fighting and secession before Darius took over as Great King just a few months before Alexander became King of Macedon. It was actually pretty impressive of Darius to hold the empire together the way he did, and it seems he was able to draw on a fair bit of charisma and energy to do so.

Darus was very good politician, he was also good commander. That is without doubt. But after loosing 2 grand armies and 2 flights he was no longer King of Kings - he was a looser. That's why Bessus took him prisoner - he thought he would be better King.

But if Darius had not been betrayed, the Persian Empire could have fought on. Perhaps they would still have lost. The Macedonian war machine was pretty impressive, and their generals were both talented and experienced.

Persian empire was lost at the field of Gaugamella. Later it was no longer "empire". Darus lost richest provinces, majority of treasures, honour and authority. That' is the main reason why he was betrayed.

But it wouldn't necessarily have turned out that way. Many times in history, Iranian empires have "pulled a Russia" on western land armies. Earlier in the campaign, before Granicus, Memnon had advocated doing just that. If Darius had remained in charge and retained the loyalty of the populace, Alexander's supply lines would have been far less secure. How far east could he realistically have marched? Who knows how things could have turned out?

It had to turn that way. Later empires used terrain to theyre advantage, but it was always strategy planned BEFORE war. They avoided major engagements luring opponent deep into theyre territory to finally anihilate him.
But it's not possible for somebody who already was decisively beaten 2 times and lost most of the money to the enemy.
Most of local rulers most probably considered Alex new King of Kings by then. Guy won the crown just like Darius did few years before. This may be confirmed by very low resistance to Alex later on, at least until he "broke the rules" and started to settle colonies of greeks. This is not so strange as we may think now, when we consider country as unity. For majority of persian subjects persian emperor was foreginer who they need to obey. On every succesion some teritories tried to gain independence. For them it was not that important if King of Kings was persian or greek, if the rules (taxes, policy toward local comunities etc) were the same they may accept whoever proves "the Mightiest".

[mrtwisties]

A good post, O'Etaipos, and I agree with much of what you say. But there are two reasons why we occupy different positions on the significance of Issus and Gaugamela.

1. We disagree on the factual inferences that we believe ought to be drawn from the sources.

This is partially because I'm highly sceptical of those sources, and believe they ought to be treated like a biography of Simon Bolivar authored by Hugo Chavez. Interesting yes, full of facts, probably, but unquestionably biased.

For example, I'm not sure why you feel so confident in stating that Darius was completely discredited after Gaugamela, and that he had lost control of the empire. The Chaldaean tablets pass this judgment on Gaugamela:

The king, his troops deserted him and to their cities they went. They fled to the east.

I suggest that these tablets, in saying that the troops deserted the king, could well be referring to Bessus and his premature retreat (which, after all, lost the battle for the Persians - is it so unreasonable that they perceived this fact for themselves?). If the Persians laid the blame for Gaugamela with the unreliable Bessus, then Darius' reputation might have been intact at that time. In fact, Bessus might have committed his treachery out of self preservation. This is not the standard interpretation, but nor is it a far-fetched one.

The idea that Darius was discredited and powerless is promoted by Arrian, who describes a poor lost soul hanging out at Ecbatana with nary a soldier to defend him. But Arrian, for all his merits, wrote centuries after the event and was not without his biases. By contrast, the astronomical records of the Chaldaeans were contemporary and intended to be scrupulously accurate.

Other Hellenic sources conflict with Arrian's account. Plutarch tells us that a number of Persians defected to Alexander after the betrayal, apparently out of a sense of disgust. This doesn't sound like something that would happen if Darius was as isolated as Arrian suggests he was.

Further, Curtius Rufus states that Darius had assembled an army of 30,000 infantry at Ecbatana (including, for the record, a number of Greek mercenaries), as well as a few thousand cavalry. Not a bad effort for just a few months of work. No doubt there were some Persian subjects who were playing a waiting game to see who would prevail, but (according to Curtius Rufus, anyway) it looks as if there were still plenty of men who were willing to defend the empire. If Darius had not been betrayed, he could conceivably have finished raising another grand army for a third great confrontation with Alexander.

I think you might have also just gotten some things wrong. For example, I don't know why you say that the Spartan offensive was easily beaten. It appears to have lasted from 333/332 BCE to 331/330BCE (at least until after Alexander sent those Athenians home), Agis III enjoyed considerable successes in both Crete and the Peloponnese, and Diodorus of Sicily describes the final battle with Antipater thus:

When it came to a general engagement, Agis was struck down fighting, but the Spartans fought furiously and maintained their position for a long time. When their Greek allies were forced out of position they themselves fell back on Sparta. More than 5,300 of the Spartans and their allies were killed in battle, and 3,500 of Antipater's troops.

That battle was on the same scale as Chaeronea and (according to the description) more fiercely contested. The very fact that the sources generally don't talk about it much should tell us something about how they've all chosen to portray the war with Persia.

2. We disagree in our conjectural attempts to fill in the blanks.

There were counter-attacks after Issus. We have very little information about them at all, although what information we do have suggests that they weren't small-scale affairs (see eg Agis III).

I suggest that the very fact they were initiated at all suggests that they had a decent chance of success. Darius wasn't exactly a wild risk taker. Memnon was sent to fight a defensive war against Alexander in Asia Minor, not an offensive one. At both Issus and Gaugamela, Darius assembled large forces and moved them about carefully. Why, then, would he throw away the lives of his men in frivolous counter-attacks?

You suggest that Alexander sitting in a siege camp for 7 months indicates that the attacks were not serious. That's not an unreasonable conjecture. But then, what else was he going to do? Retreat to Lydia? To the Peloponnese? That would have been tantamount to an admission of failure in the Persian campaign, and then how loyal would his Greek allies have been? Perhaps more importantly, where's the glory in that?

Alexander had soldiers and commanders scattered throughout his nascent empire. I suggest that he took a (calculated) risk that they'd be able to ward off the Persians (and their Hellenic allies). The fact that he took these risks doesn't mean they weren't serious. Alexander's entire life was full of him taking serious risks, from taming Bucephalus to the assault on the Malli. One wonders if the man had a bit of a problem, actually.

Is it then so far fetched to suppose that, after Issus, he took another great gamble and trusted sub-commanders around the empire to resist the Persian counter-attack?

That's more than enough for one post.

Note: I don't want to get trapped into the position where I'm arguing that the Persians weren't in serious trouble. They were - right from the get go, in fact. I'm arguing for the more limited and reasonable position that Issus and Gaugamela were important events, but that they did not spell the end of the Persian Empire.

[konny]

Did Darius had a more elite army fighting at issus?

The "Greek Mercenaries" (Iphikratians?) were the backbone of Darius army and that corps was more or less destroyed at Issus. We don't know how large the Persian armies in that time really were, if you don't take the Greek reports of the Persian mass armies with several 100,000 men for granted.

It is a tradition to regard Issus as more decisive and Gaugamela more as an afternath. That would make sense, when we assume that at Issus the "Royal Persian Army" was destroyed and could not be replaced, while at Gaugamela the Persians did not field much more than local militia from Mesopotamia and only a handfull of Persian core troops from the Iranian highlands.

[TWFanatic]

I've always wondered where the Immortals were. You never here about them in Alexander's conquests. Had they been disbanded?

[konny]

Good question. I can't recall to have heard of them after Xerxes, too.

[The Persian Cataphract]

Issus is regarded as the phase where Alexandros no longer needed to gamble; It ensured the conquest of Asia Minor and Egypt, which went relatively unopposed. That the battle of Issus additionally featured the Achaemenid emperor personally leading his army to defeat, and how this inspired portrayals such as the famed Alexander mosaic, is of course another factor. Gaugamela however is not a less known battle, and foremostly emphasizes Alexander's boldness and a very fine tactic; The giant wedge smashing right into the front. Issus was not a battle where Darius III Codomannus could have stopped Alexander; At Gaugamela, he was fully capable of doing it, but with the wing of Bessus prematurely retreating, Alexander is not only successful in showcasing the excellent central flexibility in the Macedonian infantry (It bends, it bends, it beeeeeeeeeeeeends, but thanks to the small plates between the regiments, it never breaks... When Mazaeus puts Parmenion to test, the entire line gradually arches itself to screen against the cavalry). This is remarkable, because Darius knew exactly what was needed to defeat the Macedonians; He did not only bring more manpower, or more shock elements, but he overlapped Alexander by quite some distance, which certainly would have made the task of flanking much more difficult for Alexander and his Companion cavalry.

As for the Immortals, in Arrian's account, he calls them the "Apple-bearers", hinting at the silver, or golden counter-weight on their spears. We don't hear that much about them at Issus, because the account rather focuses on the Persian-style hoplite, the Cardaces, that rather flopped in the battle, though the Immortals would always be present around the area of the King of Kings. However by this time, Darius' army was quite reformed and included several other regal elements, such as the heavily armed and armoured bodyguard cavalry, the Hûvakâ, which was later armed with the xyston-style lance as a reform past the battle of Issus. Thus we have, like in the early Imperial days something of an elite foot and cavalry unit, only following different organization. What I'm not quite sure of is if the 10,000 strong corps still included the 2,000 elite dé elite Ârshtîbarâ.

[Menander of India]

Well, as far as I know the name 'Immortals' was never used by the Persians themselves. These must have been the only pure Persian infantry force as Persians switched to horses once they established their dominance in the Iranian plateau. As it was the personal foot bodyguard of the Great King it is possible to have had a fixed strength (10,000 why not?Not all of them participated in opperations...)

And yes, after the Persian Wars they seem to disappear from the scene until Alexander the Great came into play, and particularly in Gaugamela. There, they appear close to the king. The 'units' 'King's relatives' and 'Apple bearers' most probably refer to this elite bodyguard.





PS; I think the 'apple bearers' appeared at Issus too, not sure though...

[CirdanDharix]

Weren't Arstibara (a.k.a Armtaka, "apple-bearers") separate from the Anusiya (which the Greeks mis-translated to Athanatoi, "Immortals"), with one of the best-documentated differences being in the shape of the counter-weights on their spears--pomegranates for the Anusiya, apples for the Arstibara?

[Menander of India]

Oooooops! Persian Cataphract you posted while I was typing!

Neat

[The Persian Cataphract]

It is true that the name "Immortals" was never in use by the Achaemenids themselves; Ironically, the designation given to the corps of 10,000 was "Companions" or "Ânûshiyâ".

Errata: I previously mentioned a 2,000 strong elite dé elite unit of spear-bearers, however for historicity, I must correct this figure: The most attested figure appears to be a highly disciplined and decorated unit of 1,000 men, surrounded by 9,000 Companions. However the point on whether this household organization remained intact until the Macedonian invasions is still valid.