Going against my History Professor

[cmacq]

Please, don't bother. This is very common, most are LIFERs at best. Lazy Inconsiderate Fu**ers Expecting Retirement. They can't really help you, just hurt you.

But, simply the Roman defeat a Cannae was not a mortal wound, yet the Seleucid loss at Magnesia was indeed over time very fatal. I can't actually see how one could compare Cannae with Magnesia? Other than the fact Hannibal was close at hand? Maybe he just needed a few more words to finish the book? Its also very possible his comments about Magnesia were ripped off of a former student paper?

[Kham]

I wouldn't do it.

Being a history professor who has written a book about the stuff, he is aware of differing theories about army strengths and casulty numbers in such a battle. And has given some thoughts about which ones to take. There also might be different "schools of thought" about how to make proper estimates, which kind of sources to trust (more) and so on. These choices determine the estimates.

Being renowned in your country he must have been around for some time. This also means that he has chosen a side in these debates. And has had quite a lot discussions about it. Probably enough to be annoyed by them now.

A student who challenges him should be aware about why he has choosen these estimates and why he thinks he can proof them (and the underlying "school" choices) wrong. If you are very well prepared and he is in a good mood, you might earn some reputation with him.

But the danger of appearing as an insolent sod who is daring to bother him AGAIN with this age-old question, without even knowing what he is talking about ,is quite high.

It might even be worse if he is not that renowned. From my experience (though from a differnt discipline), the mediocre to bad profs are VERY easily offended if they are criticized. Especially from a student.

[Danest]

I think you need to know why he believes in these particular troop number estimates, and, why the other side (you) believes in their estimates. It's probably better to confront premises and evidence, than to just confront a conclusion (not saying this is what you're doing, just rambling). But it won't matter if he's not interested in having his work contested by a student anyway (it's why I love philosophy... my professors _required_ that you try to put down their work, and loved it if you did a good job of it). And yeah, this professor is probably well aware of the argument and estimates you're bringing to him, and the evidence supporting them... so you probably won't be saying anything he hasn't already considered and disregarded, for whatever reason.

[anubis88]

Yeah i know... I can't just play a smartass... It wouldn't be good. But perhaps an interesting conversation might emerge from this. He may even have some resources who he would willing to share... We could become friends

On the other hand he may just dismiss me as a nuisance

God how I hate myself... Why do i always find something to challange my history teachers?

Any ideas how to talk about this in the most polite and secure manner?

[bovi]

"I noticed you mentioned a force of only 30000 Romans plus allies in the battle of Magnesia. I've heard greater numbers elsewhere and understand there naturally is some uncertainty about them. Could you point me to the sources that you used, and why you have trusted these before others?"

That's more or less the way I would go about starting a discussion without making him feel attacked. You might get a "I don't have time for this", and then you should probably drop the issue for your own sake. If he chooses to respond with information, let him present his views and show interest. He'll probably be more inclined to have a constructive discussion when you mention the other sources then, rather than if you come up with an equivalent to "Hey I saw some other research saying you're wrong", which your post here basically says.

You should be particularly careful about labeling your own numbers as facts. The soldiers didn't line up to be counted by the historian before the battle, and the historian would also likely pad the numbers. Be prepared to defend why you think these other numbers are more precise, again something you don't do here except by saying you know it, another inflammable word.

[Frostwulf]

Magnesia-Ad-Sipylum(190,December)
War against Antiochus
John Drogo Montagu-"Battles of the Greek & Roman Worlds"

"Having robbed Antiochus of any control at sea, the Romans were bent on completing the destruction with a victory on land. Although the king had a large force of 60,000 foot and 12,000 horse he was apprehensive. He withdrew across the river Phrygius [Kum Cay] and established a strongly fortified encampment near Magnesia-ad-Sipylum[Manisa]. The consular army, with a total strength of about 30,000 advanced across the river and encamped about 2 to 3 miles away from the enemy. After several days of inaction in which the king refused to accept any challenge, the consul moved his camp nearer to the enemy and lined up for battle with his left wing against the river. The king accepted the challenge for fear of shame. The action started on the Roman right wing which was opposed by a mixed mass of light cavalry, preceded by scythed chariots and camels. Eumenes II, on the Roman right, took the initiative by sending his slingers and archers against the chariots, creating panic in the horses and disrupting the enemy wing. a charge by his cavalry followed and extended the disorder, which spread to include the whole of the flank. The Roman legions seized the opportunity to make a direct frontal attack on the enemy phalanx, which was in the centre of their line with elephants posted between the sections. In the meantime, Antiochus, who was in command of a large body of elite cavalry on the right wing, had noted that the enemy had thought it unnecessary to post any cavalry on their left, which was covered by the river. He executed the manoeuvre on which he had staked his chances by charging the infantry and outflanking them along the riverside and then driving them back to their camp. In this extended pursuit he threw away any chance of victory by failing to support his phalanx in its hour of need. It was driven back behind the rampart. Attalus who was with his brother Eumenes on the Roman right, saw the situation on the opposite flank along the river. Being at that time unengaged, he charged across the field to the assistance of the camp guard and forced Antiochus back. The king, seeing that his whole army was giving way, fled. His reputed losses were 50,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry against a loss on the Roman side of 350 men. After this total disaster Antiochus sent envoys to sue for peace."
Livy 37: 37(6)-44(2); Appian, Syrian Wars, 30-36

-pg. 131-132

[Intranetusa]

My history teacher is just like that - except he goes by the popular conception that the Gauls/Germans/etc were all naked uncivilized barbarians...which is far worse


He literally stated that barbarians were all smelly, diseased ridden savages who never bathed (even though they had soap - whereas Romans aristocrats used olive oil >.>)

[Sarkiss]

Magnesia-Ad-Sipylum(190,December)
War against Antiochus
John Drogo Montagu-"Battles of the Greek & Roman Worlds"
-pg. 131-132

Livy you say? him, Appian, Plutarch... Roman propagandists.
i am not going to argue about what happened at Magnesia, but from a little research i have done on Roman - Armenian war it is amazing how different the numbers given by above mentioned big mouth "historians" and other sources can turn out to be.
a good example is battle of Tigranokert. both Plutatch and Appian give Armenian side a number of over quarter of a million:
Appian - 250000 foot and 50000 horse.
Plutarch - 55000 horse, 20000 slingers and archers, 150000 heavy infantry, etc, etc.
whilst there is one refference that has always been overlooked:
Phlegon of Tralles:
"At that time [ie. the 177th Olympiad, 72-69 BC] Lucullus was besieging Amisus, but having left Murena with two legions to carry on the siege, he himself set out with three others against the territory of the Cabiri, where he went into winter quarters. He also ordered Hadrian to make war against Mithradates, who was defeated... In the fourth year of this Olympiad Tigranes and Mithradates, having collected an army of 40,000 foot and 30,000 horse, who were drawn up in the Roman order of battle, engaged Lucullus and were defeated; Tigranes lost 5000 killed, (on contrary to over 100000 dead Armenians with only 5 Roman dead and 100 wounded according to Plutarch!) a large number of prisoners, besides a promiscuous rabble".

[anubis88]

"I noticed you mentioned a force of only 30000 Romans plus allies in the battle of Magnesia. I've heard greater numbers elsewhere and understand there naturally is some uncertainty about them. Could you point me to the sources that you used, and why you have trusted these before others?"

Thanx Bovi, this might be just what i needed... I'll try my luck on wednsday

I've noticed during the weekend that in my country professors believe practicaly everything the romans wrote about themselves!!

I'll just have to change their minds

[Sarkiss]

Thanx Bovi, this might be just what i needed... I'll try my luck on wednsday

I've noticed during the weekend that in my country professors believe practicaly everything the romans wrote about themselves!!

I'll just have to change their minds

good luck.
let us know how it went.
and sorry for hijacking your ttread.

[Treverer]

... I'll try my luck on wednsday ...

A tip:

first talk to one of his ASSISTANTS!

From my experience, the Professor's assistants (at least one of them) are more or less deeply involved into the process of book writing. At least my Professors used to do this (Political Science, Sociology & [East European] History).

I've found out that talking to one of them provided in most cases the same (sometimes even more) information than the later talk to the Professors. And both of us being students made the discussion more relaxed and less/not at all formal. In 99%, there was no further need for a talk to Professor ...

Yours,
Treverer

P.S. I've studied in Germany.

[delablake]

It might even be worse if he is not that renowned. From my experience (though from a different discipline), the mediocre to bad profs are VERY easily offended if they are criticized. Especially from a student.[/QUOTE]


I can subscribe to that...there's nothing worse than a vain yet bad scientist who gets confronted with his blundering idiocy or anyone's different opinion...in my case, that $%/&( - hole cost me a year at university: He kept finding new "errors" in my term paper, and refused to accept it, but he gave top grades to a female colleague (whose paper I had written) because he liked her knockers
After the 5th rejection I told his secretary I'd go to the Dean, and magically the same old paper was OK...he didn't ever bother to examine it a last time, instead returned it to me totally crumpled with this note attached to it: Have you ever read a book?
Should I meet him again, say in a dark and lonely alley, I'd really kick his teeth in....

[Sakkura]

I can't actually see how one could compare Cannae with Magnesia?

Maybe not compare, but you certainly can contrast them.

Cannae was a far greater tactical achievement, yet strategically, it achieved nothing. Magnesia was, on the other hand, perhaps not such a huge tactical achievement, but it broke the back of an otherwise revitalized empire.

[lobf]

Maybe not compare, but you certainly can contrast them.

Cannae was a far greater tactical achievement, yet strategically, it achieved nothing. Magnesia was, on the other hand, perhaps not such a huge tactical achievement, but it broke the back of an otherwise revitalized empire.

Cannae could have meant something, though, right? Had Hannibal followed through and moved on Rome then Cannae would be looked at as an important historical battle, am I wrong?

[Sarkiss]

Cannae could have meant something, though, right? Had Hannibal followed through and moved on Rome then Cannae would be looked at as an important historical battle, am I wrong?

it is an important historical battle. it is so important it is still studied in military academies. the most brilliant example of encirclement ever.
and everyone seem to forget that it is Cannae (one of the reasons) that allowed Hannibal to ravage Italy for 17 years and let to defection of entire Southern Italy (except citadel of Tarentum, iirc, that is).
marching straight for Rome? five days of non stop riding from Cannae? thats what Maharbal suggested. but there is a good example of doing just that with insufficient forces and failing: Phyrrus.
it could all be very different if not for Hanno and his peace party who would send reinforcements and aid anywhere but to Hannibal

[Watchman]

Eh, Hannibal was hardly someone to sit on his butt letting opportunities sail by. The fact is, as brilliant a victory as Cannae was it wasn't total - a decent chunk of the Roman army including most of the cavalry got away, and had started reorganising in a matter of days - and it had put a severe dent in Big H's manpower pool, chiefly in the infantry arm; the Iberians and Gauls who'd had the somewhat questionable honour of holding up the massive Roman column in the center had suffered their share of casualties. Neither had the destruction of the trapped Roman foot been exactly a cakewalk.

Quite simply, Hannibal's army was in no condition to do much anything impressive before some R&R, nevermind now with a mobile Roman force at loose in the vicinity. The latter may not have been even remotely strong enough to be any threat to Hannibal's force in a straight fight, but it takes a lot less to be a major problem and limiter in strategic terms.

Didn't the medieval Europeans believe that taking bathes would wash away your soul - so they would never take baths? :/ ??

Not really. I don't quite recall the exact reasoning involved, but it was more that bathing simply wasn't considered important; most people did it in some form at least every now and then, just very rarely. Only some reigious ascetics, such as some monestic sects, actually wholly declined to bathe - resulting in a strong whiff of what was termed odour sancte...

That sounds somewhat like you're mixing the matter with early superstitions about photography you know...

[Sarkiss]

Eh, Hannibal was hardly someone to sit on his butt letting opportunities sail by. The fact is, as brilliant a victory as Cannae was it wasn't total - a decent chunk of the Roman army including most of the cavalry got away, and had started reorganising in a matter of days - and it had put a severe dent in Big H's manpower pool, chiefly in the infantry arm; the Iberians and Gauls who'd had the somewhat questionable honour of holding up the massive Roman column in the center had suffered their share of casualties. Neither had the destruction of the trapped Roman foot been exactly a cakewalk.

quite correct, but i still consider its important to underline that Cannae is the bloodiest battles in Ancient and Medievil history. there is no parallels up until modern times.
the description you provided, however revives in memory battle of lake Trasimene rather than Cannae.

[Watchman]

Nobody said victories, no matter how impressive, weren't also rather exhausting even to the winner. It's a lot of hard work to demolish an army with hand weapons after all.

[delablake]

quite correct, but i still consider its important to underline that Cannae is the bloodiest battles in Ancient and Medievil history. there is no parallels up until modern times.
the description you provided, however revives in memory battle of lake Trasimene rather than Cannae.

sorry..but what about Gaugamela?

[CirdanDharix]

and everyone seem to forget that it is Cannae (one of the reasons) that allowed Hannibal to ravage Italy for 17 years and let to defection of entire Southern Italy (except citadel of Tarentum, iirc, that is).
marching straight for Rome? five days of non stop riding from Cannae? thats what Maharbal suggested. but there is a good example of doing just that with insufficient forces and failing: Phyrrus.
it could all be very different if not for Hanno and his peace party who would send reinforcements and aid anywhere but to Hannibal

Actually, much of Southern Italy remained loyal to Rome, or else in the expectative. It took Hannibal a year or two to get the Lucanians to switch sides after Cannae, and even longer until he got a foothold in Taras for completely unrelated reasons (Romans execute hostages for trying to run away; out of spite, hostages' families contrive a cunning plan to let Hannibal in). This was due to Roman garrisons, hostages, and simple inertia. Hannibal had kicked some Roman arse but he hadn't threatened the Urbs itself yet, and everyone in Italy knew how much manpower was available just in the Latium. Taking Rome by storm would have possible, but success in such an operation was by no means a foregone conclusion.

As to Hannibal lacking reinforcements, it can't really be blamed on Hanno. It appears that when Mago Barca came back with a bag full of Roman gold rings, Hanno was left completely isolated in the senate. That Mago and his army, originally intended to reifnorce Hannibal, ended up in Spain is the fault of their brother Hasdrubal (or of the elder Publius Cornelius Scipio and his brother Cnaeus, depending on how you look at things). The other two fronts that were opened in 215--Sicily and Sardinia--where logical, since recapturing the lost islands was one of Carthage's major war aims (although dispersing her forces was probably a strategical mistake). Hannibal was also, to some extent, a victim of his own success--since he was doing fine in Italy, why send him troops that were very much needed elsewhere?

[Sarkiss]

Actually, much of Southern Italy remained loyal to Rome, or else in the expectative. It took Hannibal a year or two to get the Lucanians to switch sides after Cannae, and even longer until he got a foothold in Taras for completely unrelated reasons (Romans execute hostages for trying to run away; out of spite, hostages' families contrive a cunning plan to let Hannibal in). This was due to Roman garrisons, hostages, and simple inertia. Hannibal had kicked some Roman arse but he hadn't threatened the Urbs itself yet, and everyone in Italy knew how much manpower was available just in the Latium. Taking Rome by storm would have possible, but success in such an operation was by no means a foregone conclusion.

As to Hannibal lacking reinforcements, it can't really be blamed on Hanno. It appears that when Mago Barca came back with a bag full of Roman gold rings, Hanno was left completely isolated in the senate. That Mago and his army, originally intended to reifnorce Hannibal, ended up in Spain is the fault of their brother Hasdrubal (or of the elder Publius Cornelius Scipio and his brother Cnaeus, depending on how you look at things). The other two fronts that were opened in 215--Sicily and Sardinia--where logical, since recapturing the lost islands was one of Carthage's major war aims (although dispersing her forces was probably a strategical mistake). Hannibal was also, to some extent, a victim of his own success--since he was doing fine in Italy, why send him troops that were very much needed elsewhere?

what i meant that it would not be possible to maintain a stable presence in Italy if things at Cannae went wrong. even Hannibal's Cisalpine Gaulic allies would probably turn back on him. he sought, a victory a decisive one and Cannae proved to be just that. it sealed his alies faith in his abilities and potential and taught his enemies a lesson.

yes, Hanno's party got outvoted, but even then he did create the base for what was yet to come, wasting menpower and resources just not to help Hannibal become all too powerful and successful.
why send troops to Italy if Hannibal is already successful? why would he ask for troops if he is in such a good situation then? Hannibal is well aware of Romans treathening Iberia and islands he does still ask for reinforcement and gets rejected. the reason he asks is: he cant take on Rome wtith what he got left, but the second and most important reason is that it seems that everyone else fails to understand a simple truth - the key to victory in this war lies in Italy, at Romes gates! it is not so important to hold other territories but to strangle them right there and then, in their heartland! do it there and need for reinforcing Spain will be no more.

[delablake]

[ he sought, a victory a decisive one and Cannae proved to be just that. i

are you really sure?
The decisive battle was won by Rome on the plains of Zama...

[Watchman]

why send troops to Italy if Hannibal is already successful? why would he ask for troops if he is in such a good situation then?

Since when did commanders not find extra troops useful ?

Hannibal is well aware of Romans treathening Iberia and islands he does still ask for reinforcement and gets rejected. the reason he asks is: he cant take on Rome wtith what he got left, but the second and most important reason is that it seems that everyone else fails to understand a simple truth - the key to victory in this war lies in Italy, at Romes gates! it is not so important to hold other territories but to strangle them right there and then, in their heartland! do it there and need for reinforcing Spain will be no more.

That sounds suspiciously like the benefit of hindsight talking. Nevermind presuming rather a lot, of both Hannibal's line of thinking, his and the Carthaginian view of the war aims in general, and of his assessement of the strategic situation in Italy. And given that the Romans had fresh armies shadowing his movements quite soon after Cannae, it is difficult indeed to see how he could have succesfully marched on the city itself, reinforcements or no - right in the still nearly untouched Latin heartlands, where the Carthaginian force would quite literally be in the middle of enemy territory much of which could if need be in an emergency called to arms against the invader.
A commander of his caliber could certainly discern that much, and decline to commit suicide in such fashion.

The Romans had learned their lessons from the bloodbaths Hannibal handed them. They refused to give him straight set-piece battles anymore, and isntead used their armies to shadow his movements and block and contain him strategically; reinforcements from Africa would not have changed this (indeed, they would only have made it that much more important to avoid a straight fight unless absolutely necessary), nor done that much to improve the odds of a succesful thrust against the Roman heartlands.
If they would have bettered his chances of dismantling the Roman "world-order" in Italy is another question. Personally I sometimes suspect the folks back in Carthage concluded he wasn't going to, and instead left him to tie down as much Roman resources and attention as possible while the war went on in other theaters. They may also have been hoping that the resulting drain of Roman manpower out of Italy might have allowed Hannibal to start unraveling the Roman political arrengements, for that matter.

[CirdanDharix]

what i meant that it would not be possible to maintain a stable presence in Italy if things at Cannae went wrong. even Hannibal's Cisalpine Gaulic allies would probably turn back on him. he sought, a victory a decisive one and Cannae proved to be just that. it sealed his alies faith in his abilities and potential and taught his enemies a lesson.

yes, Hanno's party got outvoted, but even then he did create the base for what was yet to come, wasting menpower and resources just not to help Hannibal become all too powerful and successful.
why send troops to Italy if Hannibal is already successful? why would he ask for troops if he is in such a good situation then? Hannibal is well aware of Romans treathening Iberia and islands he does still ask for reinforcement and gets rejected. the reason he asks is: he cant take on Rome wtith what he got left, but the second and most important reason is that it seems that everyone else fails to understand a simple truth - the key to victory in this war lies in Italy, at Romes gates! it is not so important to hold other territories but to strangle them right there and then, in their heartland! do it there and need for reinforcing Spain will be no more.

You seem to forget that Hannibal's request for reinforcements was not denied. By the end of 216, the Carthaginian senate had decided that 1) a powerful corps of about 15,000 men and several dozen elephants would be raised, and under Mago Barca, sent to Italy the following year and 2) Hasdrubal would gather his Iberian forces, destroy the Roman army in Iberia (since the Romans lacked any long-time allies or bases, the loss of their field army would have driven them out of Iberia) and then march on Italy. The weakness of this plan was that it underestimated the strength of the Scipio brothers' army in Iberia; near Dertosa on the Ebro, Hasdrubal was heavily defeated by the numerically superior Romans (but then, weren't the Romans always numerically superior?). As a result, not only was he forced to defend the Carthaginian holdings in Iberia, but Mago's army was used to reinforce him, instead of Hannibal (and this was a sound decision: losing Iberia meant losing the war, as we can verify with hindsight).

[cmacq]

Maybe not compare, but you certainly can contrast them.

Cannae was a far greater tactical achievement, yet strategically, it achieved nothing. Magnesia was, on the other hand, perhaps not such a huge tactical achievement, but it broke the back of an otherwise revitalized empire.

Right, that was the point of my post above; ‘But, simply the Roman defeat at Cannae was not a mortal wound, yet the Seleucid loss at Magnesia was indeed, over time, very fatal.’